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Networks of Effectiveness? The Impact of Politicization on Bureaucratic Performance in Pakistan

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Abstract

Bureaucratic performance varies immensely even within low-capacity states. Politicians and bureaucrats create pockets or networks of effectiveness that allow some departments to perform more efficiently than others. How do these networks develop and how are politicized bureaucratic appointments used to influence performance? Drawing on qualitative fieldwork conducted in Punjab, Pakistan, this paper argues that politicians and bureaucrats ensure enhanced performance by making legal and extra-legal appointments of hand-picked bureaucrats to key posts. The choice of bureaucrat is made on the basis of carefully curated relationships of patronage established through work, training, and old school networks. As a result, temporary networks of effectiveness are created but rendered unsustainable by the very patronage relationships that create them, preventing them from evolving into more permanent pockets of effectiveness. More broadly, my argument contributes to debates on intra-state capacity and politicization, establishing a link between patterns of staffing and patterns of governance.

Résumé

La performance bureaucratique est très variable, même au sein des états à faible capacité. Les politiciens et les bureaucrates créent des poches ou des réseaux d’efficacité, qui permettent à certains départements d’être plus performants que d’autres. Comment se développent ces réseaux, et comment utilise-t-on les nominations bureaucratiques politisées afin d’influencer la performance du réseau ? Utilisant un travail de terrain qualitatif au Punjab, Pakistan, cet étude soutient que les politiciens et les bureaucrates s’assurent des performances accrues grâce aux nominations (légales et extra-légales) aux postes clés de bureaucrates choisis par les politiciens et bureaucrates mêmes. Le choix de bureaucrate est formulé sur la base de relations de patronage soigneusement cultivées, établies à travers le travail, la formation, et les anciens réseaux scolaires. Par conséquent, des réseaux temporaires effectives sont instaurés, cependant ces réseaux sont rendus instables par les mêmes relations de patronage qui les ont fondés, ainsi les empêchant d’évoluer vers des poches d’efficacité plus durables. Plus généralement, cet étude contribue aux débats à propos des capacités intraétatiques et de la politisation, en établissant un lien entre les modèles de dotations de personnel et les modèles de gouvernance.

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Fig. 1

Source Punjab School Education Department website—https://schools.punjab.gov.pk/oursecretaries

Fig. 2

Source Compiled by the author using newspaper articles, government websites, and interviews

Fig. 3

Source Compiled by the author using newspaper articles, government websites, and interviews

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Notes

  1. Roll (2014, p. 24) defines pockets of effectiveness as ‘public organisations that are relatively effective in providing public goods and services that the organisation is officially mandated to provide, despite operating in an environment in which effective public service delivery is not the norm’. I do not adopt Roll’s criteria for identification of pockets of effectiveness, instead connecting my work to what Hickey (2019, p. 42) refers to as ‘networks or channels of effectiveness’ and McDonnell (2017) as bureaucratic ‘interstices’.

  2. Drawing on the work of Khan (2010), political settlements are ‘the balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes, on which any state is based’ (John and Putzel 2009, p. 4).

  3. In the past, Pakistan has had a hybrid system with strong elements of presidentialism. However, between 2008 and 2018, there was a firm shift toward parliamentarism.

  4. In identifying networks between politicians and bureaucrats, I focus on bureaucrats from the Pakistan Administrative Service, an elite cadre of federal bureaucrats who occupy the senior most posts in the administrative structure and work closely with politicians throughout their careers.

  5. Interview, 14 April 2015.

  6. Former PAS officer, interview, 16 April 2015.

  7. Former PAS officer, interview, 16 April 2015.

  8. PAS officers, interviews, 19 and 29 September 2014.

  9. PAS officer, interview, 13 April 2015.

  10. World Bank (2016). Combined Project Information Documents/Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (Pid/Isds) Appraisal Stage, Pakistan: Third Punjab Education Sector Project (P154524).

  11. ‘The Good News from Pakistan’, authored by Sir Michael Barber in 2013 and with forewords by the then President of the World Bank Group and the UK Foreign Secretary, can be found here: https://rtepakistan.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/The_good_news_from_Pakistan_final.pdf

  12. Interview, 2 September 2014.

  13. PESP II Annual Review—February 2020, DFID.

  14. Interview, 16 April 2015.

  15. As federal bureaucrats serving in the provinces, their appointments within that province are approved by the Chief Secretary and the Chief Minister and notified by the provincial Services and General Administration Department.

  16. Deputy Secretary SED, interview, 27 November 2014.

  17. PAS officer, interview, 18 September 2014. See also Ali (2020b, p. 190).

  18. PAS officer, interview, 18 September 2014.

  19. Former Chief Secretary (retired), interview, 3 March 2015.

  20. Interview, 13 April 2015.

  21. See Ali (2020a) for an account of the variable application of regulations within the SED.

  22. Interview, 14 April 2015.

  23. Extra-legality is commonplace amongst elites in Pakistan and elsewhere—see Armytage (2020, p. 137).

  24. PAS officer, interview, 13 April 2015.

  25. PAS officer, interview, 13 April 2015.

  26. Under the Sixth Schedule of the Government of Punjab Rules of Business 2011.

  27. Interview, 19 September 2014.

  28. Bureaucrat who served under Fawad Hasan Fawad, interview, 17 February 2015. See also, Aman-Rana (2019).

  29. PAS office, interview, 13 April 2015.

  30. Until December 2011, he continued to hold posts that are typically for BPS 20 and above (Pakistan Today 2011).

  31. Interview, 29 September 2014.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers, the EJDR editorial team, participants at the Development Studies Association Annual Conference 2020, and Dr Matthew Nelson (SOAS University of London) for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

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  1. Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan

    Sameen A. Mohsin Ali

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Ali, S.A.M. Networks of Effectiveness? The Impact of Politicization on Bureaucratic Performance in Pakistan. Eur J Dev Res 34, 733–753 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-021-00388-y

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