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S.  Hrg.  103-457 

EVALUATION  OF  THE  U.S.  STRATEGIC  NUCLEAR 

TRIAD 


Y  4.  G  74/9:  S.  HRG.  103-457 

Evaluation  of  the  U.S.   Strategic  Ku. . 


HEARING 

BEFORE  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON 
GOVERNMENTAL  AFFAIRS 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

ONE  HUNDRED  THIRD  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 


JUNE  10,  1993 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Governmental  Affairs 


may  2  ^ 


U.S.   GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
69-539  cc  WASHINGTON  :  1994 

For  sale  by  the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  Congressional  Sales  Office,  Washington,  DC  20402 
ISBN   0-16-043971-X 


S.  Hrg.  103-457 

EVALUATION  OF  THE  U.S.  STRATEGIC  NUCLEAR 

TRIAD 


Y  4.  G  74/9:  S.  HRG.  103-457 

Evaluation  of  the  U.S.   Strategic  Nu. . 


HEARING 

BEFORE  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON 
GOVERNMENTAL  AFFAIRS 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

ONE  HUNDRED  THIRD  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 


JUNE  10,  1993 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Governmental  Affairs 


may  2$ 


*-2l, 


U.S.   GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
69-539  cc  WASHINGTON  :  1994 

For  sale  by  the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  Congressional  Sales  Office,  Washington,  DC  20402 
ISBN   0-16-043971-X 


COMMITTEE  ON  GOVERNMENTAL  AFFAIRS 

JOHN  GLENN,  Ohio,  Chairman 

SAM  NUNN,  Georgia  WILLIAM  V.  ROTH,  Jr.,  Delaware 

CARL  LEVIN,  Michigan  TED  STEVENS,  Alaska 

JIM  SASSER,  Tennessee  WILLIAM  S.  COHEN,  Maine 

DAVID  PRYOR,  Arkansas  THAD  COCHRAN,  Mississippi 

JOSEPH  I.  LIEBERMAN,  Connecticut  JOHN  McCAIN,  Arizona 
DANIEL  K.  AKAKA,  Hawaii 
BYRON  L.  DORGAN,  North  Dakota 

Leonard  Weiss,  Staff  Director 

David  Hafemeister,  Professional  Staff  Member 

Franklin  G.  Polk,  Minority  Staff  Director  and  Chief  Counsel 

Michal  Sue  Prosser,  Chief  Clerk 

(ID 


CONTENTS 


Opening  statements:  Pagf 

Senator  Glenn  * 

Senator  Cohen  

Prepared  statement: 

Senator  Dorgan  

WITNESSES 
Thursday,  June  10,  1993 

Eleanor  Chelimsky,  Assistant  Comptroller  General  for  Program  Evaluation 

and  Methodology,  U.S.  General  Accounting  Office ...■.■■■ 4 

William  J.  Perry,  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense,  U.S.  Department  of  Defense  ...  Id 

Alphabetical  List  of  Witnesses 

Chelimsky,  Eleanor: 

Testimony  4 

Prepared  statement  dy 

Perry,  William  J.:  n  _ 

Testimony £> 

Prepared  statement 4» 

APPENDLX 

Prepared  statements  of  witnesses  in  order  of  appearance  39 

Team  B:  The  Trillion  j>2 

Dollar  Experiment  °' 

Senator  Glenn  news  release  dated  June  28,  1993 od 

Letter,  with  enclosures,  dated  June  16,  1993,  to  Senator  Glenn  from  Eleanor 

Chelimsky,  Assistant  Comptroller  General,  GAO 64 

Letter,  dated  June  28,  1993  to  Secretary  Les  Aspin  from  Senator  Glenn  88 

Letter,  dated  June  28,  1993  to  Mr.  Vander  Schaaf  from  Senator  Glenn  91 

Letter  with  enclosure,  dated  August  6,  1993  to  Senator  Glenn  from  Eleanor 

Chelimsky,  Assistant  Comptroller  General,  GAO  94 

Written  questions  submitted  by  Senator  Dorgan  and  GAO  responses  102 

Written  questions  submitted  by  Senator  Cochran  and  GAO  responses 106 

Inserts  for  the  Record — responses  to  questions  from  Senators  Glenn  and 
Cochran: 

DOD  Analysis  on  the  Triad  llj* 

The  Clinton-Aspin  Nuclear  Force 11? 

Uncertain  Costs  jl° 

B-52  vs.  Trident>— Cost  Per  Surviving  Warhead  119 

ICBMs  vs.  SLBMs  J21 

Minuteman  III  Modernization 122 

B-52  Lifetime  124 

Triad  Cost-Effectiveness  for  the  Future  125 

DOD  Position  on  GAO  Evaluation  126 

Triad  Support 127 

Resumption  of  Underground  Testing 12o 


(III) 


EVALUATION  OF  THE  U.S.  STRATEGIC 
NUCLEAR  TRIAD 


THURSDAY,  JUNE  10,  1993 

U.S.  Senate, 
Committee  on  Governmental  Affairs, 

Washington,  DC. 

The  Committee  met,  pursuant  to  notice,  at  9:35  a.m.,  in  room 
SD-342,  Dirksen  Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  John  Glenn,  Chair- 
man of  the  Committee,  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Glenn,  Levin,  Lieberman,  Dorgan,  and  Cohen. 

OPENING  STATEMENT  OF  CHAIRMAN  GLENN 

Chairman  Glenn.  The  hearing  will  be  in  order. 

We  are  going  to  change  our  usual  format  of  the  Committee  this 
morning  because  we  have  some  time  constraints  on  the  second  wit- 
ness this  morning.  Bill  Perry,  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense,  will  ar- 
rive shortly.  He  has  other  commitments  this  morning,  but  he 
worked  his  schedule  so  he  could  be  with  us  for  1  hour,  from  10  to 
11.  So  we  will  go  ahead  and  have  the  Hon.  Eleanor  Chelimsky,  As- 
sistant Comptroller  General  for  Program  Evaluation  and  Methodol- 
ogy of  GAO,  give  her  testimony,  and  answer  questions  until  10 
o'clock,  and  then  we  will  go  ahead  with  Bill  Perry's  testimony.  Fol- 
lowing his  testimony,  we  shall  then  return  to  Ms.  Chelimsky  for 
more  questions. 

I  will  enter  my  opening  statement  in  the  record  and  just  open 
with  a  few  remarks. 

Throughout  the  Cold  War  period,  our  nuclear  deterrent  has  con- 
sisted of  a  triad  of  land-based,  sea-based,  and  air-based  ability  to 
deliver  nuclear  weapons. 

There  has  been  a  lot  of  comment  about  the  triad  through  the 
years,  including  some  of  my  own,  because  I  have  felt  that  perhaps 
in  some  aspects  we  did  not  need  all  of  the  traid.  I  thought  that  if 
we  got  into  a  nuclear  war  and  we  had  ICBM's  and  SLBM's  and 
cruise  missiles  all  delivering  nuclear  weapons,  that  to  ask  our  peo- 
ple to  get  in  an  airplane  and  go  in  and  add  one  or  two  more  bombs 
to  what  was  already  going  off  was  too  much. 

I  have  supported  the  bombers  because  I  felt  that  in  war  we 
would  need  a  conventional  war  capability  and  I  have  not  supported 
the  bombers  on  their  nuclear  delivery  capability.  We  got  the  nu- 
clear capability  as  a  freebie.  That  was  my  view  on  this  for  a  long 
time. 

The  GAO,  in  response  to  a  House  Foreign  Affairs  request,  started 
a  study  on  the  triad  two  years  ago.  It  has  been  a  very  major  study, 
I  think  one  of  the  biggest  ones  GAO  has  ever  done.  Mr.  Bowsher 

(1) 


told  us  that  document  after  document  after  document  are  still  clas- 
sified secret,  which  we  will  obviously  not  release  today.  The  GAO 
has  gone  into  all  sorts  of  detail  on  the  triad.  They  have  done  a  very 
thorough  study  of  it,  and  that  is  why  we  are  here  today.  We  will 
examine  the  process  by  which  those  decisions  were  made  during 
the  days  of  the  Cold  War,  so  we  can  learn  something  from  it. 

This  is  not  supposed  to  be  just  a  critical  hearing  to  point  fingers 
at  anybody.  It  is  supposed  to  let  us  learn  how  we  made  those  deci- 
sions, so  that  as  we  are  making  decisions  on  other  weapons  sys- 
tems now,  which  we  will  be  doing,  we  can  do  it  on  a  more  rational 
basis  in  order  to  avoid  some  of  the  mistakes  that  we  made  during 
that  period  of  time. 

Mr.  Perry  will  be  along  at  10  and  be  prepared  to  answer  some 
questions. 

Prepared  Statement  of  Senator  Glenn 

Throughout  the  Cold  War  era,  America's  security  against  nuclear  attack  was 
maintained  by  a  defense  posture  based  on  the  threat  of  massive  nuclear  retaliation 
against  any  such  attack.  For  some  40  years,  this  capability  was  maintained  using 
long-range  bombers,  intercontinental  ballistic  missiles  (ICBMs)  and  submarine- 
launched  ballistic  missiles  (SLBMs).  These  three  elements  comprised  the  subject  of 
today's  hearing — namely  the  evaluation  of  the  U.S.  strategic  triad. 

In  1990,  Chairman  Dante  Fascell  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  re- 
quested the  General  Accounting  Office  to  evaluate  the  strengths.and  weaknesses  of 
the  triad  and  determine  which  triad  upgrades  appear  to  be  most  cost-effective.  On 
September  28,  1992,  the  GAO  released  its  unclassified  results,  which  raise  a  num- 
ber of  serious  questions  not  yet  addressed  by  Congress,  which  will  be  the  basis  for 
today's  hearing.  In  addition,  GAO  released  eight  classified  reports  on  the  many  de- 
tails of  the  study.  It  is  the  Governmental  Affairs  Committee's  role  to  examine  the 
"efficiency  and  effectiveness"  of  the  U.S.  government,  and  it  is  in  that  spirit  that 
we  meet  here  today. 

We  can  all  thank  our  lucky  stars  that  the  Cold  War  ended  with  a  peaceful  wimper 
and  not  a  catastrophic  bang.  Some  believe  that  the  Cold  War  ended  on  November 
19,  1990  with  the  signing  of  the  CFE  Treaty  in  Paris  when  the  Soviets  gave  up  a 
3  to  1  advantage  in  conventional  forces.  This  reduction  in  conventional  weapons  led 
the  way  to  reductions  in  strategic  nuclear  weapons  in  the  START  treaties.  On  that 
day  in  November  1990,  President  Mitterrand  of  France  wisely  reminded  us  that 
there  were  "neither  victors  nor  vanquished."  Both  sides  sacrificed  a  great  deal  in 
this  contest,  but  at  least  direct  confrontation  was  avoided. 

Nonetheless,  because  of  continued  uncertainties,  we  and  the  Russians  will  con- 
tinue to  have  nuclear  strategic  weapons  for  some  time  to  come.  Because  of  this  like- 
lihood, Congress  must  examine  our  past  experience  with  the  triad  to  find  lessons 
that  can  guide  us  to  a  better  future.  We  can  estimate  the  Cold  War  arms  build-up 
cost  at  some  $2  trillion,  and  the  cost  of  the  triad,  including  DOE  clean-up,  at  more 
than  one-half  trillion.  Peace  and  freedom  are  worth  a  very  high  price,  but  it  is  also 
true  that  we  could  have  saved  billions  if  we  had  been  able  to  predict  the  future  with 
certainty  and  better  data. 

A  key  conclusion  of  the  GAO  report  is  that  "there  exist  systematic  disparities  be- 
tween estimates  or  claims  that  have  been  made  about  the  triad  systems  and  what 
the  data  actually  show.  We  found  this  to  be  the  case  whether  the  issue  was  the  like- 
ly cost  and  performance  of  upgrades,  the  actual  performance  of  current  systems,  or 
the  likely  offensive  or  defensive  threats  to  these  systems  from  the  former  Soviet 
Union."  This  is  a  serious  assertion — in  short,  all  the  errors  on  actual  and  predicted 
performance  and  on  predicted  threats  pointed  to  the  same  conclusion,  that  of  foster- 
ing additional  procurements  for  the  strategic  forces. 

In  addition,  GAO  states  that  their  study  on  the  triad  will  be  useful  to  Congress 
for  making  decisions  on  future  strategic  forces  "because  it  is  the  first  study  in  at 
least  three  decades  that  sets  up  a  comprehensive  framework  for  comparing  numer- 
ous dissimilar  strategic  systems  on  multiple  measures  and  that  uses  test  and  per- 
formance data  to  compare  the  systems  in  question."  If  this  claim  is  true,  then  one 
can  only  wonder  how  so  much  could  be  spent  without  such  a  study  ever  having  been 
performed. 


Today's  hearing  will  dwell  mostly  on  process,  to  try  and  answer  the  question  "how 
can  we  spend  our  declining  financial  resources  more  wisely?"  However,  I  would  ex- 
pect that  our  witnesses  will  also  be  asked  questions  on  specific  triad  systems. 

It  is  my  distinct  honor  to  welcome  our  two  witnesses  who  will  address  the  issues 
raised  in  the  GAO  report  on  the  triad.  Our  first  witness  will  be  the  Honorable  Elea- 
nor Chelimsky,  Assistant  Comptroller  General  for  Program  Evaluation  and  Meth- 
odology, United  States  General  Accounting  Office.  Our  second  witness  on  a  separate 
panel  will  be  the  Honorable  William  J.  Perry,  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense,  Depart- 
ment of  Defense. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Senator  Cohen. 

OPENING  STATEMENT  OF  SENATOR  COHEN 

Senator  COHEN.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  first  of  all  for  rec- 
ognizing me  today.  I  know  you  have  great  difficulty  looking  to  your 
right  these  days.  [Laughter.] 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  am  being  needled  for  sitting  here  yesterday, 
reading  my  statement  and  not  recognizing  Senator  Cohen  who  had 
walked  in.  I  turned  and  asked  another  Senator  to  speak  in  im- 
proper order.  I  have  been  chastised  for  this  all  day  yesterday. 

Senator  Cohen.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  don't  have  an  opening  statement,  but  the  debate  that  we  have 
had  over  the  years  is  whether  or  not  we  should  first  devise  a  strat- 
egy and  then  appropriate  the  dollars  to  match  the  strategy,  rather 
than  looking  at  budgetary  constraints  and  then  shaping  our  strat- 
egy to  match  the  budget  numbers. 

That  is  a  debate,  I  suspect,  that  will  even  continue  here  today. 
We  know,  for  example,  that  Gen.  Powell  had  a  base  force  concept. 
That  concept,  it  seems  to  me,  under  the  proposal  coming  from  the 
administration,  has  been  pretty  much  discarded.  Instead  of  having 
a  two  regional  war  type  of  strategy,  it  seems  that  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  has  come  up  with  a  so-called  win-hold-win  strategy,  and 
it  may  be  portrayed  as  an  effort  to  close  the  gap  between  our  capa- 
bilities and  our  strategy,  but  I  would  suggest  that  it  might  have 
an  adverse  impact  upon  our  strategic  interest  in  the  future. 

I  won't  take  the  time  until  Secretary  Perry  arrives  to  explore  this 
with  him,  but  I  will  do  so  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  suggest  that  this  win-hold- win  strategy  really  is 
simply  a  rationalization,  in  the  final  analysis  of  the  budgetary  con- 
straints that  we  now  find  ourselves  faced  with.  We  see,  for  exam- 
ple, that  Secretary  Aspin  has  already  proposed  real  cuts  in  defense 
budget  authority  of  17  percent  between  fiscal  1993  and  fiscal  1997, 
compared  to  former  President  Bush's  planned  cut  of  8  percent  oyer 
that  same  period.  So  I  think  these  cuts,  along  with  the  uncertain- 
ties in  the  Secretary's  and  in  the  President's  plan  really  mean  we 
cannot  afford  Gen.  Powell's  base  force  concept.  But  I  will  talk  about 
that  more  when  Secretary  Perry  comes. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Ms.  Chelimsky,  welcome  to  our  hearing  this  morning.  Please  pro- 
ceed with  your  testimony. 


TESTIMONY  OF  ELEANOR  CHELIMSKY,*  ASSISTANT  COMP- 
TROLLER GENERAL  FOR  PROGRAM  EVALUATION  AND 
METHODOLOGY,  U.S.  GENERAL  ACCOUNTING  OFFICE 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Thank  you  so  much,  Mr.  Chairman.  Good  morn- 
ing. Good  morning,  Senator  Cohen.  Your  argument  reminded  me  of 
that  phrase  of  Muriel  Sparks  about  Job,  that  he  had  suffered  the 
problem  of  argument,  but  he  also  argued  the  problem  of  suffering. 

It  is  a  great  pleasure  to  be  here  today — excuse  my  voice,  I  have 
one  of  these  terrible  colds  that  never  goes  away — to  talk  about 
GAO's  evaluation  of  the  strategic  triad.  I  really  want  to  thank  you, 
Mr.  Chairman,  for  holding  this  hearing  on  the  study.  We  appre- 
ciate it. 

Let  me  begin  by  introducing  Kwai  Chan,  who  directed  this  work, 
as  well  as  Winslow  Wheeler,  who  is  in  back  of  me  and  who  is  our 
Assistant  Director  for  Defense  Studies;  and  Jonathan  Tumin,  our 
Project  Manager. 

Abraham  Lincoln  said  that  statements  should  be  short  and 
sweet,  like  the  old  woman's  dance,  and  I  really  subscribe  to  that, 
except  with  this  voice,  I  think  it  will  be  short  and  hoarse,  but  I  will 
try  to  be  as  short  as  I  possibly  can,  given  the  eight  studies  that 
we  have  produced  addressing  policy  questions  like  how  vulnerable 
are  our  submarines  and  our  silo-based  ICBM's?  How  effective  are 
our  ballistic  missiles  that  are  land  launched,  compared  to  ballistic 
missiles  that  are  sea-launched?  How  good  are  the  air  legs'  proposed 
upgrades  relative  to  the  systems  they  are  going  to  replace?  So  I 
will  try  to  be  short  and  sweet. 

Let  me  make  just  three  points  about  the  scope,  the  methodology 
and  the  origins  of  our  evaluation,  before  getting  into  the  findings. 
First,  what  does  the  study  include?  Well,  the  nuclear  weapon  sys- 
tems and  proposed  upgrades  we  included  in  the  evaluation  were  for 
the  air  leg:  The  B-52G  and  H,  B-1B  and  B-2B  bombers,  as  well 
as  the  ALCM,  ACM,  SRAM  A  and  SRAM  II  missiles. 

For  the  land  leg,  we  looked  at  Minuteman  II  and  Minuteman  III 
ICBM's,  the  Peacekeeper  Rail  Garrison  and  the  small  ICBM.  For 
the  sea  leg,  we  examined  the  C-4  and  D-5  SLBM's  on  Lafayette 
and  Ohio-class  nuclear-powered  ballistic  missile  subs.  We  assessed 
all  systems  under  a  full  range  of  threat  scenarios,  moving  from 
total  surprise  attack  to  strategic  warning. 

Second,  what  was  our  methodology?  Well,  our  basic  approach 
was  to  develop  a  framework  for  comparison.  Because  we  found  no 
earlier  comparative  studies  on  which  to  build,  we  had  to  develop 
our  own  set  of  measurements.  This  involved  using  the  same  30- 
year  life-cycle  cost  methodology  to  compare  upgrade  costs,  and  the 
same  measures  of  effectiveness  to  compare  weapon  system  perform- 
ance. Our  method  was  to  examine  the  Defense  Department's  con- 
clusions about  the  performance  of  the  various  triad  weapons  sys- 
tems, the  costs  of  the  upgrades  being  proposed  and  the  size  and  na- 
ture of  the  Soviet  threat.  We  then  looked  for  the  qualitative  and 
quantitative  evidence  that  was  needed  to  support  and  validate  the 
DOD  conclusions. 

We  collected  our  quantitative  data  through  an  exhaustive  review 
of  the  technical  literature,  including  all  the  relevant  DOD  tests  and 


1  The  prepared  statement  of  Ms.  Chelimsky  appears  on  page  39. 


evaluations  that  we  could  get.  The  data  we  drew  on  came  from  a 
wide  variety  and  large  quantity  of  classified  data  sources,  about 
250  major  technical  reports  in  all.  These  included  52  for  the  land 
leg  alone,  71  for  the  air  leg,  33  for  the  sea  leg  and  43  for  the  Soviet 
threat. 

We  collected  our  qualitative  data  through  interviews.  These  also 
were  extensive.  We  visited  field  sites,  military  commands  and 
bases,  as  well  as  program  offices.  In  addition  to  the  special  14- 
member  very  prestigious  advisory  board  that  we  constituted  for 
this  study,  we  consulted  military  and  civilian  experts  in  a  range  of 
agencies,  universities  and  think  tanks.  Our  interviews  took  us  to 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the  CIA,  the  DIA,  DARPA,  the  Center  for 
Naval  Analyses,  the  Institute  for  Defense  Analysis,  the  MITRE 
Corporation,  the  Rand  Corporation,  ANSER,  Johns  Hopkins  Ap- 
plied Physics  Lab,  the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency, 
CBO,  CRS,  OTA,  many  specialized  DOD  bureaus— for  instance,  the 
Defense  Mapping  and  Nuclear  Agencies — as  well  as  the  relevant 
service  and  OSD  offices,  plus  experts  at  Brookings,  MIT  and  a  host 
of  other  universities. 

Senator  Cohen.  Anybody  in  Congress? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  A  few  people  in  Congress,  yes.  We  never  men- 
tion them. 

In  all,  we  did  more  than  200  major  interviews.  This  was  not  a 
simple  study,  either  conceptually,  in  its  process,  or  logistically.  We 
studied  performance  in  weapons  systems,  across  weapons  systems 
and  across  legs,  and  we  looked  carefully  at  synergy  along  four  di- 
mensions, in  what  way  would  they  complement  enemy  defensive 
and  offensive  strategy  planning,  how  would  it  dilute  enemy  re- 
sources, providing  technical  hedges  against  potential  enemy  break- 
throughs and  providing  flexibility  response  options  to  the  U.S. 
President.  So  we  did  not  look  at  just  cost  and  performance  alone. 

My  third  point  is  on  the  study's  origins.  As  you  have  mentioned, 
Mr.  Chairman,  it  was  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  that 
asked  us  to  address  the  major  strategic  modernization  programs  of 
the  Carter,  Reagan  and  Bush  administrations.  In  particular,  what 
they  wanted  was  a  databased  evaluation  to  establish  the  strengths 
and  weaknesses  of  these  programs  and  the  determination  of  which 
among  them  appeared  to  be  the  most  cost-effective. 

These  eight  reports,  then,  constitute  what  I  would  call  a  baseline 
evaluation  of  the  cost-effectiveness  of  this  $350  billion  moderniza- 
tion program.  More  evaluations  need  to  be  done. 

Now  let  me  turn  to  our  findings,  first  of  all  those  regarding 
weapon  systems.  Trying  again  to  keep  this  short  and  sweet,  I  will 
report  only  seven  of  these,  but  there  are  many,  many  more. 

Comparing  across  the  triad  legs,  we  found  that,  on  balance,  the 
sea  leg  emerges  as  the  most  cost-effective  of  the  legs.  What  is  the 
basis  for  this  finding?  Well,  let  me  mention  just  three  points. 

First,  both  the  speed  and  the  reliability  of  day-to-day  communica- 
tions to  submerged  deployed  SSBN's  are  far  better  than  widely  be- 
lieved, and  about  equal  in  speed  and  reliability  of  communications 
to  ICBM  silos.  Contrary  to  what  we  expected,  SSBN's  are  in  essen- 
tially constant  communication  with  national  command  authorities 
and,  depending  on  the  scenario,  SLBM's  from  nuclear  submarines 
would  be  almost  as  prompt  as  ICBM's  in  hitting  enemy  targets. 


Second,  we  found  that  the  accuracy  of  the  D-5  is  about  equal  to 
that  of  the  Peacekeeper.  Its  reliability  also  is  about  equal.  Its  war- 
head had  a  higher  yield  than  the  Peacekeeper's,  and  we  estimate 
that  the  D-5  has  a  hard  target  kill  capability  about  equal  to  the 
Peacekeeper.  Further,  unlike  easily  located  silos,  the  submerged 
SSBN's  are  essentially  invulnerable.  They  are  even  less  detectable 
than  generally  understood,  and  there  appear  to  be  no  current  or 
long-term  technologies  that  would  change  this. 

Third,  cost  comparisons  also  turned  out  to  be  favorable.  Meas- 
ured against  the  B-2,  for  example,  in  terms  of  life-cycle  costs  for 
arriving  warhead,  we  found  that  the  B-2  would  cost  two  and  a  half 
to  five  times  more  than  the  D-5  under  any  attack  scenario,  depend- 
ing on  the  number  of  warheads  on  the  D-5. 

In  addition,  these  estimates  favor  the  B-2,  because  they  assume 
the  bomber  will  be  as  effective  as  DOD  plans  it  to  be,  and  that 
costs  will  not  grow.  Whereas,  for  the  D-5  Ohio  system,  we  already 
have  considerably  more  reliable  and  complete  data  on  cost  and 
operational  performance. 

When  we  compared  the  de-MIRVed  Minuteman  III  (now  being 
proposed  by  the  Air  Force)  to  the  D-5  Ohio,  using  life-cycle  cost- 
to-go  per  arriving  warhead,  we  had  found  that  the  cost  for  the  two 
systems  was  approximately  the  same,  but  that  was  based  on  an  Air 
Force  error.  Now,  corrected  life-cycle  cost  figures  for  the  Minute- 
man  III  increase  it  from  $16  to  $23  billion,  which  makes  the  D- 
5  Ohio  system  the  less  costly  of  the  two. 

Senator  Cohen.  Do  you  have  to  call  it  the  Ohio  system? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  I'm  sorry? 

Senator  Cohen.  Do  you  have  to  call  it  the  D-5  Ohio  system? 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  think  it  is  a  nice-sounding  name,  myself. 
[Laughter.] 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  In  short,  it  is  these  favorable  outcomes  that 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  can't  imagine  naming  a  submarine  the 
Maine  system,  can  you?  [Laughter.] 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  I  was  going  to  leave  that  one  entirely  alone,  but 
I  see  I  am  not  going  to  be  allowed  to  do  that. 

In  short,  it  is  these  favorable  outcomes,  all  of  them,  with  respect 
to  communications,  cost,  accuracy,  reliability,  warhead  yield,  hard- 
target-kill  capability  and,  most  importantly,  invulnerability,  that 
led  to  our  finding  on  the  sea  leg's  cost-effectiveness.  I  wanted  to 
make  that  abundantly  clear.  It  is  not  just  an  issue  of  cost.  There 
are  many,  many  issues  that  we  looked  at. 

A  second  finding  deals  with  the  uncertainties  in  the  B-2  pro- 
gram, in  particular,  the  aircraft's  stealth  characteristics.  We  found, 
as  did  the  Air  Force,  a  number  of  performance  weaknesses  that 
seemed  the  more  problematic  because  only  about  one-quarter  of  the 
bomber's  flight-testing  hours  have  been  flown.  Since  important  and 
expensive  problems  can  show  up  either  late  in  the  testing  process 
or  after  deployment,  as  we  have  all  seen,  this  means  the  jury  is 
still  out  on  B-2  performance.  As  for  the  B-2's  cost,  we  found  that 
each  B-2  for  a  20-aircraft  fleet  will  cost  over  $2  billion  in  develop- 
ment and  procurement,  and  there  will  also  be  added  operating 
costs  when  the  program  is  complete.  Yet,  the  five  additional  B-2's 
requested  by  DOD  will  increase  total  air  leg  strategic  warheads  by 
only  2.3  percent  above  current  numbers. 


A  third  finding  concerns  the  B-1B.  Although  this  aircraft  is  less 
technologically  ambitious  than  the  B-2,  its  own  problems  with 
stealth  capability  have  not  been  resolved.  Further,  we  found  DOD's 
presentation  of  these  problems  to  be  misleading,  especially  with  re- 
gard to  conclusions  about  the  B-lB's  radar  cross-section.  Finally, 
a  long  history  of  recognized  test  and  operational  shortcomings  in 
the  aircraft,  especially  its  electronic  countermeasures,  flight  con- 
trols, range  and  reliability,  raise  questions  about  both  feasibility 
and  cost. 

Our  fourth  finding  was  as  unexpected  to  us  as  reliability  and 
speed  of  communications  to  SSBN's,  namely,  the  continued  viabil- 
ity of  the  B-52,  whose  obsolescence  has  been  so  widely  reported 
and  so  often  cited  as  a  rationale  for  procuring  both  the  B-1B  and 
the  B-2.  Instead,  the  data  show  that  both  the  B-52G's  and  H's  will 
remain  usable  aircraft  for  years  to  come.  There  are  three  reasons 
for  this. 

First,  Air  Force  flight-hour  data  show  that,  as  of  1990,  the  air- 
frames and  other  key  structural  components  of  both  models  had 
reached  only  about  half  their  life  expectancies.  Indeed,  an  Air  Force 
analysis  on  the  effects  of  aging  in  the  B-52  addressed  multiple  age- 
related  factors  and  found  that  both  the  B-52G's  and  the  B-52H's 
would  remain  structurally  sound  until  the  year  2030,  if  they  were 
flown  at  the  current  average  number  of  flight-hours  per  year. 

The  second  reason  is  that  the  Air  Force  has  continued  to  modify 
the  B-52  to  assure  its  continuing  effectiveness,  has  indeed  done  an 
admirable  job  with  regard  to  that,  with  new  ECM,  new  passive  sen- 
sors, new  communications  equipment,  new  navigation  gear  and 
new  weapons,  both  conventional  and  nuclear.  So  this  is  a  system 
that  has  been  kept  up. 

Finally,  comparisons  of  data  on  multiple  measures  of  effective- 
ness show  that  the  B-52  compares  favorably  to  the  newer  B-1B  on 
a  number  of  important  performance  dimensions.  Both  models  of  the 
B-52  have  continuing  capability,  the  B-52G  as  a  cruise  missile  car- 
rier, the  B-52H  as  a  strategic  penetrating  bomber. 

A  further  rationale  for  procuring  the  B-2,  other  than  the  B-52's 
alleged  obsolescence,  was  a  projected  increase  in  the  Soviet  air  de- 
fense threat.  Our  fifth  finding  is  that  this  increase  never  took 
place.  The  data  show,  and  interviews  confirm,  that  Soviet  air  de- 
fenses were  considerably  lower  than  the  number  forecast  earlier, 
and  that  their  effectiveness  had  also  been  greatly  overstated. 

Today,  conditions  in  the  former  Soviet  Union  are  such  that  cur- 
rent air  defenses  are  much  more  likely  to  degrade  than  improve. 
In  other  words,  the  air  defense  threat  that  the  B-2  purported  to 
address  was  never  in  fact  deployed,  and  this  can  be  seen  before 
Gorbachev  came  to  power,  quite  a  bit  before. 

Our  sixth  finding  involves  the  predicted  benefits  of  the  ACM  ver- 
sus the  ALCM.  Here  we  found  that  the  range  requirement  for  the 
ACM  provided  only  a  small  improvement  over  what  the  older 
ALCM  already  could  do,  and  that  the  accuracy  improvement  of- 
fered also  doesn't  appear  to  have  much  real  operational  signifi- 
cance. Further,  because  of  important  limitations  in  the  flight  tests 
conducted  for  both  cruise  missile  systems,  their  performance  under 
operational  conditions  remains  uncertain. 


8 

Our  seventh  finding,  the  last  one  I  am  going  to  report  here  on 
weapon  systems,  deals  with  our  silo-based  ICBM's  and  the  expecta- 
tion of  their  increased  vulnerability.  We  found  this  questionable  on 
at  least  two  counts.  First,  the  expectation  was  premised  on  worst 
case  calculations,  that  is,  assuming  only  the  highest  estimates  for 
Soviet  missile  accuracy,  yield  and  reliability,  while  at  the  same 
time  discounting  substantial  performance  uncertainties  that  could 
only  have  been  resolved  in  a  nuclear  war. 

Second,  it  ignored  the  deterrence  function  of  the  triad's  other 
legs.  This  is  the  issue  of  synergy,  which  we  talk  about  so  often  as 
something  that  we  absolutely  must  have,  except  when  the  time 
comes  to  rationalize  weapons  systems.  Then  often  look  at  them 
without  considering  the  potential  of  the  other  legs  to  deal  with 
some  of  the  problems  a  given  leg  may  have.  What  was  the  purpose 
of  having  the  triad,  if  not  to  dissuade  the  Soviets  from  an  all-out 
attack  on  one  leg,  through  fear  of  retaliation  by  the  others?  In  this 
case,  of  course,  I  mean  retaliation  by  submerged  submarines  or  on- 
alert  bombers  and  their  thousands  of  warheads. 

Now  let  me  turn  to  our  findings  on  evaluation.  A  general  conclu- 
sion from  our  study  is  that  there  exist  systematic  disparities  be- 
tween what  the  data  showed  and  DOD's  claims  and  estimates  for 
(1)  the  Soviet  threat,  (2)  the  performance  of  mature  systems,  and 
(3)  the  expected  performance  and  costs  of  proposed  upgrades.  I  say 
systematic  disparities,  because  they  seem  to  follow  a  particular  pat- 
tern, tending  to  overstate  threats  to  our  weapon  systems,  to  under- 
state the  performance  of  mature  systems,  to  overstate  the  expected 
performance  of  upgrades,  and  to  understate  the  expected  costs  of 
those  upgrades. 

Specifically,  we  found  that  the  vulnerability  of  our  B-52's,  subs, 
and  silo-based  ICBM's  to  a  Soviet  threat  had  been  overstated;  that 
performance  claimed  for  the  B-2's  is  yet  unproven;  that  B-1B  ACM 
and  Peacekeeper  capabilities  were  often  inflated;  that  costs  for 
strategic  systems  generally  were  incomplete  (operating  and  support 
costs  having  typically  gone  unreported),  and  that  the  performance 
of  B-52's  and  SSBN's  were  consistently  understated. 

The  two  charts  that  you  see  over  there  summarize  the  different 
kinds  of  problems  we  found.  The  one  on  the  right  deals  with  knowl- 
edge limitations  based  on  insufficient  or  inadequate  testing,  and 
with  reporting  problems  in  which  conclusions  don't  necessarily  flow 
from  the  data  in  hand.  The  chart  on  the  left  gives  specific  examples 
of  these  reporting  problems  in  which  we  were  surprised  to  find  that 
the  data  did  not  support  six  widely-held  beliefs  or  conclusions  on 
triad  characteristics. 

In  sum,  and  with  a  few  happy  exceptions,  we  were  disappointed 
by  the  number  of  problems  we  found  in  the  quality  and  the  objec- 
tivity of  testing,  forecasting  and  reporting.  More  importantly,  how- 
ever, we  were  troubled  by  weaknesses  in  performance  measure- 
ment and  program  accountability  arising  from  the  lack  of  compara- 
tive evaluation. 

Our  recommendations  to  the  Congress  are  six  in  number.  First, 
we  see  no  requirement  for  five  more  B-2's.  Second,  we  believe  the 
B-1B  needs  a  lot  more  operational  testing  to  verify  that  its  long- 
standing performance  problems  have  been  resolved. 


Third,  given  the  estimated  $23  billion  cost  of  upgrading  and 
maintaining  the  de-MIRVed  Minuteman  III  force  through  the  year 
2020,  given  also  today's  low-threat  environment,  we  question  the 
advisability  of  funding  major  life-service  upgrades  for  this  force. 

Fourth,  we  urge  that  D-5  testing  be  continued  at  adequate  lev- 
els, to  insure  confidence  in  the  missile's  performance,  continuing 
confidence. 

Fifth,  we  agree  with  DOD's  decision  on  the  ACM,  but  believe 
more  testing  is  needed  for  both  the  ACM  and  the  ALCM. 

Last,  we  would  encourage  the  Congress,  and  especially  this  Com- 
mittee, with  its  concern  for  objective,  accurate  and  accountable  per- 
formance measurement,  to  request  two  kinds  of  comparative  eval- 
uations from  DOD.  First,  those  that  examine  whether  proposed  up- 
grades will  really  add  capability  to  existing  systems,  and,  if  so,  at 
what  cost.  And,  second,  those  that  compare  the  performance  and 
costs  of  like  weapon  systems  across  the  triad  legs.  Performing  these 
types  of  studies  carefully  and  objectively  should  greatly  improve 
current  uncertainties  with  regard  to  weapon  system  performance 
and  cost. 

That  concludes  my  remarks,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  I  would  be 
pleased  to  answer  any  questions. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you  very  much,  Ms.  Chelimsky. 

Secretary  Perry  is  here  and  we  will  get  to  him  in  just  a  moment. 
I  just  have  one  question  now.  What  were  the  limitations  that  were 
put  on  this  GAO  study? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes,  there  are  always  limitations  on  every 
study,  and  this  one  has  them,  too. 

Chairman  Glenn.  What  were  they,  so  we  will  know  what  the 
basis  was? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  I  feel  that  the  major  limitation — and  there  are 
others  I  am  sure  that  other  people  will  point  out — it  is  a  first  study 
and,  of  course,  it  has  probably  more  limitations  than  others,  but  I 
think  the  chief  limitation  is  the  dependence  on  DOD  data  and  the 
problems  we  found  with  the  DOD  data,  because  our  study  depends 
entirely  on  the  data  that  were  given  us. 

We  had  problems  with  missing  data,  data  that  were  so  sketchy 
that  we  could  not  really  validate  conclusions  that  had  been  made. 
In  those  cases,  we  always  gave  DOD  the  benefit  of  the  doubt.  We 
mentioned  that  there  was  an  uncertainty,  but  we  used  the  data 
that  DOD  gave  us,  even  if  it  was  not  validated. 

The  second  problem  we  had  with  the  data  was  exclusion,  often 
through  classification.  In  one  case  we  were  denied  data  that  we 
really  thought  that  we  should  have,  and  Mr.  Bowsher  sent  to  Sec- 
retary Cheney  a  demand  letter  for  it.  This  was  on  the  Peacekeeper 
warhead  reliability  data.  That  was  never  ever  given  to  us,  which 
was  a  very  important  problem. 

I  think  we  were  also  given  misleading  data. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Misleading  data? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Misleading  data.  The  $16  billion  for  the  Minute- 
man  that  I  was  talking  about  earlier,  we  were  told  that  it  included 
costs  to  the  year  2020.  Instead  they  went  only  to  the  year  2010. 
And  only  after  we  had  published  our  reports  did  they  rectify  the 
error.  I  am  sure  this  was  an  error,  but  it  was  misleading:  we  had 
to  redo  the  calculations  because  of  that,  and  it  made  a  big  dif- 


10 

ference  in  our  comparisons  between  the  Minuteman  and  the  D-5 
Ohio. 

Finally,  the  most  annoying,  we  were  given  some  falsified  data, 
and  this  was  on  the  B-1B  radar  cross-section.  We  have  a  memo  in 
our  possession  that  shows  what  data  GAO  should  have  received 
and  what  were  the  real  data.  Of  course,  that  was  a  problem  for  us 
and  we  went  back,  of  course,  and  we  got  that  ironed  out  rather  rap- 
idly, but  it  did 

Chairman  Glenn.  The  memo  indicated  that  false  data  was  to  be 
given  to  you.  Was  that  it? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  It  said  what  data  should  be  given  to  the  GAO 
and  what  data  they  were  giving  to  somebody  else.  I  don't  know  how 
we  got  this  memo.  It  was  sent  to  us  by  accident,  clearly,  but  we 
have  the  memo,  so  we  knew  that  the  data  we  had  on  the  B-1B 
radar  cross-section  was  false. 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  want  to  ask  more  questions  on  this  later. 

Senator  Cohen,  do  you  have  any  questions  before  we  go  on? 

Senator  Cohen.  One  of  the  questions  I  was  going  to  ask  in  terms 
of  in  what  way  it  was  misleading,  and  I  think  you  have  already 
clarified.  It  was  not  misleading,  it  was 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  I  would  like  to  end  with  one  hopeful  point,  and 
that  is  that  with  Secretary  Aspin  and  Secretary  Perry  here  and 
their  review  of  the  bottom-up  data,  we  are  hoping  that  other  data 
are  going  to  be  produced.  In  fact,  I  have  no  doubt  about  it.  But  we 
didn't  find  a  very  good  database. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Ms.  Chelimsky  will  still  be  here  for  questions 
after  Mr.  Perry  has  to  leave. 

Senator  Cohen.  Could  I  just  ask  one  quick  question? 

Chairman  Glenn.  Certainly. 

Senator  Cohen.  If  you  were  not  given  all  of  the  information,  if 
some  of  the  more  highly  classified  information  was  denied  to  you, 
can  you  still  have  reliability  or  can  we  have  reliability  in  some  of 
your  conclusions?  For  example,  you  were  very  clear  on  the  surviv- 
ability of  the  Ohio,  which  may  or  may  not  be  survivable  in  other 
contexts.  But  at  least  with  respect  to  the  D-5  sub,  there  was  infor- 
mation within  the  intelligence  community — and  I  am  sure  Senator 
Glenn,  having  a  number  of 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes,  we  have  been  briefed  on  it  and  we  are  very 
aware.  In  that  case,  we  had  no  problem.  We  were  given  all  the  data 
that  we  needed.  We  only  had  one  basic  problem,  I  think,  that  was 
of  serious  concern  to  us,  and  that  was  the  Peacekeeper  warhead  re- 
liability data. 

Senator  COHEN.  But  you  had  everything,  as  far  as  non-aperture 
radar  and  other  types  of  systems? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Right.  There  were  many  things  that  we  could 
not  write  about,  because  they  were  too  highly  classified. 

Senator  Cohen.  But  you  had  access? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes,  we  had  access. 

Senator  Cohen.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Senator  Dorgan,  do  you  have  any  questions 
before  we  move  on? 

Senator  Dorgan.  I  do  have  questions,  but  if  she  will  remain,  I 
will  be  happy  to  give  her  the 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  I  will. 


11 

Chairman  Glenn.  If  you  will  stand  by,  we  would  appreciate  that. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  I  will. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Our  next  witness  will  be  Deputy  Secretary  of 
Defense  Bill  Perry.  .  . 

Senator  Dorgan.  Mr.  Chairman,  while  Mr.  Perry  is  coming  for- 
ward, I  would  like  to  ask  that  my  opening  statement  be  made  a 
part  of  the  permanent  record. 

Chairman  Glenn.  It  will  be  included  in  the  record  in  its  entirety. 

Prepared  Statement  of  Senator  Dorgan 

Mr.  Chairman:  I  commend  you  for  calling  a  hearing  to  re-evaluate  the  Nation's 
strategic  triad,  the  combination  of  land-  and  sea-based  missiles  and  long-range 
bombers  that  has  underpinned  our  Nation's  defense  for  decades. 

The  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  budget  pressures  together  make  necessary  a  reas- 
sessment of  our  entire  defense  structure.  None  of  us  would  trade  the  old  conflict  for 
the  new  opportunities  that  have  emerged.  Also,  we  can  all  breathe  a  sigh  of  relief 
that  the  demise  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  Warsaw  Pact  come  at  a  moment  when 
we  need  to  get  our  budget  deficit  under  control. 

While  the  risk  of  nuclear  confrontation  has  lessened,  we  still  face  unsettling  devel- 
opments in  the  former  Soviet  Union.  Civil  strife  is  rampant  in  many  quarters,  in- 
cluding tensions  in  some  nuclear-armed  republics.  Only  this  week,  Ukrainian  Prime 
Minister  Leonid  Kuchman  urged  that  the  Ukraine  became  an  independent  nuclear 
p0wer — at  least  temporarily.  While  our  government  is  working  to  make  the  Ukraine 
a  nuclear-free  nation,  we  still  don't  know  the  final  outcome  of  those  efforts. 

Which  means  this  hearing  is  very  relevant.  We  need  to  understand  what  weapons 
systems  we  still  need,  which  ones  are  most  cost-effective,  and  what  is  the  right  com- 
bination of  strategic  forces  to  protect  us  for  the  years  ahead. 

Some  have  suggested  that  we  place  ever-increasing  reliance  on  the  sea-leg  of  the 
triad.  I  believe  this  would  be  an  expensive  and  risky  proposal.  In  contrast,  I  believe 
that  we  should  keep  a  robust  triad,  consisting  of  SLBMs,  up  to  650  ICBMs,  and 
heavy  bombers  (including  B-52s). 

This  arrangement  provides  the  security  that  has  served  us  well  for  several  dec- 
ades. It  draws  upon  the  flexibility  of  recallable  bombers  and  retargetable  ICBMs. 
It  keeps  costs  down  by  leveraging  the  investments  already  made  in  existing  sys- 
tems, the  B-52  bombers  and  Minuteman  III  missiles.  It  upholds  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  in  his  most  recent  force  structure  to  preserve  stra- 
tegic flexibility  by  retaining  four  northern  tier  missile  bases. 

Permit  me  to  make  a  few  other  observations  about  these  systems  and  the  GAO 
report. 

ICBMs  J       . 

I  agree  with  GAO's  original  finding  that  ICBMs  have  been  presumed  to  be  more 
vulnerable  than  they  are.  GAO  noted  the  over-estimate  of  Soviet  missile  capability, 
the  likelihood  that  the  Soviets  would  be  deterred  from  a  first-strike  by  our  other 
missile  assets,  and  the  failure  of  planners  to  recognize  the  "robust  capabilities  of 
U.S.  early  warning  systems  to  detect  a  Soviet  ICBM  attack  .  .  .  ." 

I  am  troubled,  however,  that  GAO  questions  the  advisability  of  funding  a  major 
service  life  extension  for  the  Minuteman  III  missile.  GAO  claims  it  would  be  too 
costly,  unnecessary,  and  consumptive  of  test  missiles. 

I  will  raise  these  issues  at  greater  length  in  questions  later  on.  for  now,  I  want 
to  simply  say  that  we  can  achieve  a  stronger  deterrent,  with  less  risk,  lower  costs, 
and  a  cleaner  environment  by  balancing  our  missile  forces  between  ICBMs  and 
SLBMs. 

•  For  example,  GAO's  own  analysis  shows  that  it  costs  a  maximum  of  $23  billion 
to  get  500  alert  Minuteman  III  missiles  good  for  30  years.  By  contrast,  spending 
$58  billion  would  extend  the  life  of  432  Trident  missiles,  but  not  for  30  years. 
That's  because  the  Trident  submarines  have  to  be  retired  after  their  hull  life 
reaches  30  years.  The  first  submarine  would  thus  have  to  be  retired  in  2011 
and  one  more  each  year  after  that.  Then,  many  of  these  submarines  will  require 
a  missile  backfit  costing  $12  billion,  when  the  expected  service  life  of  the  sub- 
marine will  be  no  more  than  8  years. 

•  Similarly,  Senators  Sasser  and  Bumpers  have  recommended  that  we  stop  buy- 
ing D-5  Trident  II  missiles.  We  could  do  so  reducing  the  number  of  Trident  mis- 
siles per  submarine  and  using  the  same  flight  test  regime  for  Tridents  as  for 
the  MX  and  Minuteman  III  ICBMs.  The  savings:  $4.5  billion  over  5  years. 


12 

•  Moreover,  land-based  missiles  afford  greater  reliability  because  they  have  a 
much  higher  alert  rate.  The  rate  is  99  percent  for  ICBMs  compared  no  more 
than  66  percent  for  SLBMs — because  only  two-thirds  of  our  submarines  are  at 
sea  at  any  given  time.  Reliability  is  still  worth  counting  in  an  unstable  world. 
Their  proven  reliability  also  means  they  require  fewer  tests.  Minuteman  III 
missiles  now  meet  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  test  standards,  a  fact  ignored  by  the 
GAO  report. 

•  Single-warhead  ICBM  missiles  also  offer  less  attractive  targets  than  MIRVed 
SLBMs,  thereby  enhancing  deterrence  and  strategic  stability. 

•  ICBMs  also  measure  up  better  on  nuclear  safety  and  environmental  standards. 
They  scored  much  better  than  SLBMs  in  the  prestigious  Drell  Panel's  nuclear 
safety  report  and  produce  no  radioactive  waste  like  nuclear  submarines. 

BOMBERS 

First,  the  GAO  report  properly  put  to  rest  the  myth  of  obsolete  B-52s.  As  GAO 
noted  in  its  advance  testimony: 

We  found  that  the  B-52,  whose  obsolescence  has  been  widely  reported  and 
cited  as  a  rationale  for  developing  both  the  B-1B  and  B-2,  is  still  a  viable  air- 
craft that  performs  a  great  deal  better  than  is  generally  understood. 

GAO  went  on  to  say  that  bombers  add  a  "critically  important  stabilizing  character 
to  the  overall  nuclear  force"  because  they  make  up  the  only  recallable  leg  of  the 
triad. 

The  GAO  bolstered  its  contention  by  showing  that  (1)  the  airframes  and  other  key 
components  of  the  B-52  have  reached  only  half  their  life  expectancies,  (2)  life  exten- 
sion programs  will  assure  the  continuing  effectiveness  of  the  B-52,  (3)  B-52s  com- 
pare favorably  with  B-lBs  on  a  broad  range  of  measures,  (4)  its  successful  service 
in  the  Gulf  War,  (5)  a  lessened  threat  from  air  defenses  in  the  former  Soviet  Union, 
and  (6)  the  flexibility  to  use  B-52s  in  either  a  nuclear  or  conventional  role. 

That  is  why  I  think  it  makes  good  sense  to  continue  the  flying  mission  of  the  3- 
52  and  associated  tankers.  And  this  mission  can  be  accomplished  at  a  lower  cost 
by  basing  bombers  and  tankers  at  abases  with  existing  missions  as  ICBM  sites. 
Once  a  decision  is  made  to  retain  a  robust  ICBM  force,  it  is  much  economical  to 
locate  bombers  and  tankers  at  the  same  bases  than  to  keep  open  a  base  only  to  han- 
dle a  flying  mission. 

In  conclusion,  I  think  the  GAO  report  has  stimulated  some  useful  debate  on  the 
future  shape  of  our  strategic  triad.  I  nave  suggested  the  outlines  of  the  kind  of  force 
we  need  to  meet  defense  and  budget  criteria. 

I  would  like  to  include  for  the  record  a  White  Paper  which  I  prepared  with  my 
colleagues,  Senator  Kent  Conrad  and  Congressman  Earl  Pomeroy.  This  sets  forth 
our  view  that  we  could  retain  up  to  650  Minuteman  III  missiles,  as  well  as  heavy 
bombers,  and  still  save  billions  of  dollars,  by  having  the  right  mix  of  strategic  forces. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Mr.  Secretary,  we  know  of  your  busy  schedule. 
We  have  already  had  one  previous  meeting  this  morning  on  a  dif- 
ferent subject,  so  I  personally  know  of  your  schedule.  I  particularly 
appreciate  your  working  with  us  to  make  time  available  for  this 
hearing. 

As  I  pointed  out  in  my  brief  opening  remarks  a  moment  ago  be- 
fore you  arrived,  the  hearing  is  not  to  finger-point  and  try  and  pin 
anybody  down.  It  is  to  try  and  learn  the  process  on  how  the  deci- 
sions were  made  with  regard  to  the  triad. 

I  believe  you  have  been  given  a  copy  of  the  GAO  report  some 
time  ago,  and  have  had  a  chance  to  review  it.  We  would  appreciate 
your  comments  on  the  report.  We  want  to  learn  from  whatever  mis- 
takes there  may  have  been  in  the  past,  because  in  the  selection  of 
future  weapons  systems  we  want  to  make  them  as  efficiently  and 
on  as  sound  a  basis  as  possible. 

We  appreciate  your  willingness  to  come  over  this  morning  and 
comment  on  the  triad,  giving  us  the  benefit  of  your  long  past  expe- 
rience in  the  Pentagon.  We  welcome  you  this  morning. 


13 

TESTIMONY  OF  WILLIAM  J.  PERRY,*  DEPUTY  SECRETARY  OF 
DEFENSE,  U.S.  DEPARTMENT  OF  DEFENSE 

Mr.  Perry.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  would  like  to  make  a  few  highlights  or  comments  from  an  open- 
ing statement  and  then  submit  a  statement  for  the  record,  if  I  may. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Your  entire  statement  will  be  included  in  the 
record,  without  objection. 

Mr.  Perry.  I  wanted  to  start  off  my  observing  a  point  which  your 
previous  witness  made,  is  that  the  Department  of  Defense  is  at  the 
moment  in  the  final  stages  of  what  we  call  a  bottom-up  review, 
which  is  a  comprehensive  review  of  the  strategic  forces  and  the 
strategic  strategy  of  the  United  States  defense  forces. 

We  have  about  3  or  4  weeks  to  go  to  complete  that  review,  and 
we  will  fully  brief  the  Congress  when  that  is  done.  That  will  in- 
clude conclusions  about  the  nuclear  forces  or  the  strategic  forces  of 
the  United  States.  So  to  a  certain  extent,  my  discussions  about  nu- 
clear forces  are  a  little  premature  today,  because  we  have  not  yet 
finished  that  study. 

Nevertheless,  there  are  some  comments  I  can  make  about  that 
on  the  basis  of  background  work  we  have  done  and  the  basis  of  the 
status  of  the  study  to  date.  I  also  will  make  some  general  com- 
ments on  the  GAO's  triad  report. 

Let  me  start  off  by  observing  that  in  the  last  decade,  even  since 
the  GAO  report  was  started,  there  have  been  very  dramatic 
changes  in  what  I  would  call  the  global  environment,  global  na- 
tional security  environment.  To  oversimplify  a  very  complex  ques- 
tion, I  would  say  that  the  change  in  threat  has  two  different  com- 
ponents. 

The  first  is  that  the  conventional  threat  from  the  Warsaw  Pact 
and  of  the  Soviet  Union  has  disappeared.  Therefore,  one  of  the 
major  threats  around  which  our  defense  planning  was  done,  which 
is  preparing  for  a  blitzkrieg  assault  in  Europe,  that  threat  has  ba- 
sically gone  away  and  the  capability  behind  it  has  been  very  great- 
ly diminished. 

The  second  point  is  that,  while  the  nuclear  capability  in  Russia 
and  in  some  of  the  other  former  Soviet  republics,  while  that  nu- 
clear capability  still  exists,  we  do  not  believe  that  we  have  a  signifi- 
cant threat  of  a  massive  nuclear  attack  on  the  United  States  today. 
That  is  not  because  of  a  change  in  capability.  That  is  because  of 
a  change  in  the  political  situation. 

I  wanted  to  emphasize  that  difference,  because  the  nuclear  capa- 
bility still  remains.  In  the  case  of  the  conventional  forces,  it  would 
take  many,  many  years,  maybe  a  decade  or  so  for  any  nation  to  re- 
build the  kind  of  a  conventional  military  threat  with  which  we 
were  faced  in  the  mid-1980's,  after  a  political  change  had  occurred. 
In  the  case  of  the  nuclear  threat,  the  nuclear  threat  could  reemerge 
rather  quickly  after  a  political  change  had  been  made,  and  that 
perception  of  the  global  environment  dominates  our  thinking  on 
what  we  should  be  doing  relative  to  the  nuclear  strategic  threat. 

The  second  point  to  make  about  this  nuclear  threat  is  that  these 
tens  of  thousands  of  nuclear  weapons  that  were  in  the  former  So- 
viet Union  forces,  while  not  only  still  existing,  but  they  are  dis- 


1  The  prepared  statement  of  Mr.  Perry  appears  on  page  49. 


14 

bursed  in  four  different  nations,  Russia,  Kazakhstan,  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  and  that  increases  the  danger  as  we  see  it  of  one  of  these 
weapons  falling  into  the  hands  of  a  terrorist  or  an  unfriendly  gov- 
ernment. Therefore,  we  believe  that  the  threat  of  a  small  nuclear 
incident  resulting  from  the  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  has  ac- 
tually increased  in  the  last  number  of  years. 

Now,  let  me  talk  first,  though,  about  the  very  large  number  of 
nuclear  weapons  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  how  our  strategy  should 
deal  with  that  problem.  I  think,  first  and  foremost,  we  are  working 
to  encourage  and  sustain  the  growth  of  friendly  democratic  govern- 
ments throughout  the  former  Soviet  Union.  Just  as  I  have  said  that 
we  see  the  threat  dramatically  diminish,  because  of  the  change  in 
the  political  situation,  then  it  is  very  important  to  us  to  see  that 
friendly  democratic  government  sustains  itself  now  in  Russia 
today. 

Fundamentally,  that  is  an  issue  for  the  Russian  people  to  decide. 
We  are  doing  what  we  can  to  sustain  them,  including  military-to- 
military  contracts  with  the  Russians.  I  and  Secretary  Aspin  have 
both  met  with  the  Russian  Minister  of  Defense  and  the  Ukrainian 
Minister  of  Defense,  and  we  have  discussed  these  issues  and  devel- 
oped cooperative  programs  with  them. 

Also,  we  have  provided  assistance  to  the  Russian  Defense  Min- 
istry and  the  Ukrainian  Defense  Ministry  with  U.S.  military  offi- 
cials, to  assist  them  in  understanding  how  in  a  democratic  society 
the  civilian  control  works  in  a  ministry  of  defense. 

The  second  point  is  that  we  are  working  cooperatively  with  other 
treaty  parties  to  bring  about  the  implementation  of  the  START  I 
and  the  START  II  Treaties.  This  is  a  very  complicated  situation, 
because  Russia  has  tied  the  entry  into  force  of  START  I  to 
Ukraine's  ratification  of  START  I  and  accession  to  the  NTP,  and 
the  Ukrainian  Rada  has  not  yet  acted  on  either  one  of  those  issues. 
And  while  we  are  hopeful  that  Ukraine  will  ratify  START  and  ac- 
cede to  the  NPT,  that  outcome  is  not  yet  clear. 

At  the  same  time,  Russia  has  not  yet  ratified  START  II,  and  its 
action  in  that  regard  is  linked  both  to  the  successful  entry  into 
force  of  START  I  and  it  is  linked  in  some  sense  to  the  political  tur- 
moil that  is  now  under  way  in  Russia. 

In  the  meantime,  we  are  proceeding  to  some  elements  of  the 
START  I  Treaty  by  accelerating  the  retirement  and  the  elimination 
of  ballistic  missile  systems  and  bombers  which  would  be  covered  by 
START  I,  and  we  are  trying  to  encourage  both  the  Russians  and 
the  Ukraines  to  act  more  quickly  on  START  I  and  START  II  in  the 
entry  of  force,  and  to  follow  our  example  on  accelerating  the  re- 
moval of  these  weapons  from  the  inventory.  To  date,  we  have  re- 
moved over  3,000  warheads  from  missiles  whose  launchers  START 
I  would  eliminate. 

The  third  point  I  make  is,  while  we  are  sparing  no  effort  to  sup- 
port democracy  in  the  former  Soviet  Union,  we  are  aware  that 
there  are  no  guarantees  that  that  will  happen.  There  does  exist  a 
potential  for  abrupt  political  change.  Should  that  occur  and  an  un- 
friendly regime  come  to  power,  they  would  have  significant  strate- 
gic forces  at  their  disposal.  Accordingly — and  I  need  to  underline 
this  point — even  though  we  believe  that  we  have  a  friendly  relation 
with  Russia  and  we  do  not  believe  they  pose  a  nuclear  threat  to 


15 

us,  we  believe  we  need  we  continue  to  maintain  a  strategic  force 
which  provides  deterrent  resources. 

Now,  the  reduced  threat,  then,  to  emphasize,  is  not  a  result  of 
reduced  capability  of  nuclear  forces  in  Russia.  It  is  a  result  of  im- 
proved political  relations,  and  that  could  turn  around.  We  hope  it 
will  not  and  we  are  working  to  see  that  it  will  not.  But  if  it  turns 
around,  then  the  capability  is  in  place  and,  indeed,  the  industrial 
capabilities  are  still  in  place  on  which  they  could  build  even  larger 
nuclear  forces. 

So  not  only  do  we  need  to  maintain  a  deterrent  in  place,  but  we 
need  to  have  some  capability  to  reconstitute  our  nuclear  forces 
above  the  levels  which  you  are  now  driving  them  to  in  the  START 
I  and  the  START  II,  to  hedge  against  the  possibility  that  such  an 
unfriendly  regime  might  not  only  reassert  the  military  power,  but 
might  begin  a  buildup  of  nuclear  forces. 

Precisely  because  such  scenarios  are  so  unattractive,  we  are  put- 
ting significant  effort  to  strengthen  democratic  governments,  to  ac- 
celerate the  START  I  reactivations,  and  to  achieve  the  earliest  pos- 
sible ratification  of  START  I  and  START  II. 

Mentioning  briefly  the  emerging  threat  from  other  nations,  Sec- 
retary Aspin  testified  to  the  House  Armed  Services  Committee  re- 
cently that  more  than  20  other  nations  have  embarked  on  efforts 
to  develop  weapons  of  mass  destruction.  They  do  not  now,  as  we 
see  it,  pose  a  threat  to  the  United  States.  It  is  a  future  threat  that 
we  are  concerned  about  and,  as  a  consequence,  we  have  placed  as 
a  very  high  priority  political  actions  we  can  take  to  prevent  the  fur- 
ther proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons,  and  that  indeed  will  be  one 
of  the  department's  highest  priorities.  In  the  meantime,  we  do  need 
to  maintain  some  deterrent  threat  against  regional  powers  who,  in 
spite  of  our  best  efforts,  may  succeed  in  achieving  nuclear  weapons. 

Now,  with  that  background  on  the  very  dramatically  different 
threat,  and  I  think  if  how  differently  we  size  the  threat  today  from 
when  I  was  working  on  this  problem  in  the  Pentagon  in  the  late 
1970's,  the  problem  is  very  different,  particularly  in  the  nuclear 
area,  but  it  is  still  one  we  have  to  pay  serious  attention  to.  Today, 
as  in  the  late  1970's,  we  have  to  pay  serious  attention  to  how  we 
shape  our  nuclear  forces  to  meet  this  threat. 

We  still  believe  we  require  in  our  nuclear  forces  a  fully  credible 
deterrent  capability,  and  by  that  we  mean  now  just  as  we  meant 
in  the  1970's  and  the  1980's,  one  that  can  complicate  a  potential 
enemy's  calculation  so  that  he  would  never  consider  initiating  an 
attack. 

Now,  we  have  through  the  years  achieved  this  by  maintaining  a 
triad,  that  is  three  different  elements  to  our  nuclear  forces,  the 
ground-based,  air-based  and  the  sea-based.  The  purpose  of  those  is 
not  because,  as  some  people  have  stated,  that  they  give  us  different 
capabilities,  although  they  do,  the  real  purpose  behind  the  triad  is 
to  provide  the  redundancy  and  the  complementary  nature  that 
would  complicate  an  attacker's  operational  plans  so  that  he  would 
not  believe  that  he  could  succeed  in  an  attack. 

Nevertheless,  even  with  this  broad  objective,  the  changing  of  se- 
curity environment  has  allowed  us  to  eliminate  many  of  the  nu- 
clear systems  that  we  have  currently  had  in  our  systems.  Not  only 
have  we  reduced  the  3,000  warheads  which  I  described  to  you,  but 


16 

we  have  moved  from  alert  that  portion  of  our  bomber  force  which 
throughout  the  Cold  War  was  kept  on  a  state  of  strict  alert,  that 
is,  it  was  capable  of  being  launched  on  very  short  notice. 

The  Minuteman  II  force  was  removed  from  alert  status  in  Sep- 
tember 1991,  and  we  are  currently  in  the  position  of  removing  all 
of  the  missiles  from  their  launchers.  We  have  retired  all  nuclear 
armed  B-52G's,  and  are  in  the  process  of  retiring  all  Poseidon  sub- 
marines carrying  the  C-3  and  the  C-4  missile.  In  1991  and  1992, 
President  Bush  reduced  the  number  of  B-2  bombers  to  a  program 
objective  of  20,  and  terminated  the  advanced  cruise  missile  and  the 
short-range  attack  missile,  too.  These  actions  were  primarily  taken 
in  the  prior  administration,  but  they  are  actions  with  which  we 
agree. 

With  START  II,  we  are  looking  forward  toward  reducing  our  de- 
ployed strategic  forces  to  about  3,500  warheads.  We  believe  that  is 
a  sufficient  number  of  warheads  in  our  force,  but  we  do  believe 
they  must  be  survivable,  flexible  and  they  have  offsetting 
vulnerabilities  by  the  nature  of  the  mixture  of  deployment. 

All  of  these  factors  are  taken  into  consideration  in  the  bottom- 
up  review,  and  within  a  month  or  so  we  will  be  reporting  to  you 
what  we  are  recommending  for  the  exact  makeup  of  the  nuclear 
forces  reflecting  these  factors. 

Now,  let  me  comment  briefly  on  the  GAO  report.  It  is  a  very  for- 
midable, substantial  undertaking.  It  is  in  my  judgment  done  objec- 
tively, done  carefully,  and  it  will  be  used  as  a  very  important  input. 
It  is  being  used  as  a  very  important  input  to  our  own  planning  of 
strategic  forces.  We  will  not  be  so  much  accepting  the  conclusions 
from  it,  as  we  will  be  accepting  the  input  and  the  analysis  in  it. 

I  will  emphasize  some  of  the  differences  we  have  with  this  re- 
port, but  I  don't  want  to  give  you  the  wrong  perspective  by  empha- 
sizing differences.  On  balance,  we  think  it  is  an  excellent  report, 
objectively  done,  and  agree  with  most  of  the  conclusions  in  the  re- 
port. 

For  example,  if  I  look  at  the  findings  on  that  first  chart  on  the 
board  there,  I  agree  completely  with  the  last  4  of  those  6  findings. 
I  agree  more  or  less  with  the  first  finding,  and  disagree  with  the 
second,  so  5  out  of  6  isn't  bad,  in  terms  of  agreement.  So  as  I  em- 
phasized the  1  out  of  6  that  we  differ  with,  I  do  not  want  to  give 
you  the  impression  that  we  do  not  find  it  a  very  valuable  report, 
because  we  do. 

Now,  leaving  the  details  of  the  report  for  the  moment,  let  me  say 
that  my  most  substantial  problem  with  the  report  is  the  fundamen- 
tal basis  on  which  the  analysis  is  done,  which  is  the  cost-effective- 
ness analysis. 

In  particular,  I  address  the  method  of  scoring  systems  and  scor- 
ing strategic  decisions  by  computing  the  program  costs,  life-cycle 
program  cost  and  dividing  that  by  the  surviving  warheads  as  they 
reach  target.  This  method  has  a  certain  compelling  logic  to  it,  and 
it  must  be  an  element  in  any  analysis  of  the  problem,  but  I  do  not 
think  it  is  a  sufficient  basis  for  making  the  major  decisions  about 
our  strategic  forces. 

My  problem  with  it  is  two-fold.  First  of  all,  in  consideration  of 
the  decisions  we  have  ahead  of  us  now,  the  consideration  of  sunked 
cost  is  not  a  useful  input.  The  cost  that  has  already  been  expended 


17 

really  doesn't  enter  into  our  calculations  on  what  actions  and  deci- 
sions we  are  going  to  be  making  for  the  future.  The  issue  ahead 
of  us  now  is  what  future  costs  have  to  be  expended,  given  where 
we  are  today,  given  what  has  been  expended  today  and  what  has 
already  occurred. 

Now,  I  think  a  more  fundamental  issue,  though,  is  that  the  pur- 
pose of  our  strategic  forces  is  only  indirectly  to  deliver  survivable 
warheads  to  targets.  That  is  a  means  to  an  end.  The  end  of  the 
strategic  forces  is  deterrence,  and  the  credibility  of  that  deterrence 
is  the  primary  factor  on  which  we  have  to  gauge  the  viability  of 
this  force. 

That  is  not  a  criterion  which  lends  itself  to  cost-effective  analy- 
sis: it  does  not  lend  itself  indeed  strictly  to  objectiveness  analyses. 
Therefore,  while  the  cost  per  arriving  warhead  is  an  important  ele- 
ment that  goes  into  our  decisions  and  judgment  on  strategic  forces, 
it  is  not  and  it  cannot  be  the  final  judgment,  and,  in  particular,  it 
does  not  provide  the  basis  for  deciding  the  proper  mix  between  air- 
based  systems,  ground-based  systems  and  sea-based  systems. 

Now,  one  particular  example  of  that  point  has  to  do  with  looking 
at  the  situation  we  have  today  in  our  sea-based  forces.  We  are  mov- 
ing towards  a  treaty  which  will  call  for  1,750  warheads  in  our  sea- 
based  forces.  A  very  simple  calculation  will  tell  you  that  the  most 
cost-effective  way  of  reaching  that  1,750  forces  is  to  simply  stop  the 
program  where  we  are  today,  stop  the  submarines  in  the  shipyards. 

We  don't  need  to  complete  any  more  submarines,  and,  much  less, 
build  new  submarines,  stop  the  missile  program,  we  don't  need  to 
produce  any  more  missiles — we  already  have  missiles  with  more 
than  1,750  warheads — and  deploy  approximately  9  submarines  to 
sea,  with  the  existing  missiles.  That  would  be  the  least  costly  and, 
in  terms  of  warheads  delivered  to  target,  would  be  equally  effective 
as  the  other  alternative  forces  being  considered. 

That  says  nothing  about  the  possible  vulnerability  of  having  only 
two  submarines  deployed  in  each  ocean.  That  says  nothing  about 
the  value  of  maintaining  an  industrial  base  either  for  our  sub- 
marines or  for  our  missiles,  in  the  event  we  ever  have  to  reconsti- 
tute our  forces.  The  D-5  missile  today  is  the  only  large  long-range 
missile  that  the  United  States  is  building,  and  if  we  shut  off  the 
production  of  that  missile,  we  will  be  building  none.  A  year  from 
now,  we  could  probably  restart  the  line.  In  2  years,  3  years,  it  be- 
comes very  doubtful,  since  all  of  the  intellectual  capital  which  is 
formed  to  do  that  would  have  been  disbursed  by  then. 

Therefore,  in  our  decisions  on  these  forces,  the  point  I  am  mak- 
ing to  you  is  that  we  cannot  decide  them  simply  on  the  basis  of  the 
cost  per  delivered  warhead  to  target.  That  is  an  important  element 
in  the  decision,  but  it  cannot  be  the  final  decision. 

A  final  point  on  the  GAO  report,  and  it  is  a  technical  point  of 
technical  difference,  I  believe,  and  a  moderately  important  point. 
As  I  read  the  GAO  report,  it  seemed  to  take  the  view  that  the 
stealth  characteristics  embodied  in  the  B-2  and  the  advanced 
cruise  missile  were  not  justified  by  the  Soviet  air  defense  system. 
That  I  do  not  agree  with.  I  agree  with  the  point  that  the  Soviet  air 
defenses  and,  indeed,  in  general,  the  Soviet  defense  program  has 
not  grown  as  dramatically  in  the  late  1980's  and  early  1990's  as 
had  been  projected  in  the  early  1980's. 


18 

Nevertheless,  the  Soviet  air  defense  system  as  it  now  stands,  So- 
viet fighters  and  the  surface-to-air  missile,  do  pose  significant 
threats  to  non-stealthy  airplanes  and  missiles.  Indeed,  I  believe 
this  was  fully  demonstrated  in  Desert  Storm.  Iraq  had  deployed 
around  Baghdad  some  of  these  same  fighters  and  some  of  these 
same  surface-to-air  missiles  which  were  developed  and  deployed  in 
the  then  Soviet  Union,  although  they  were  a  generation  older  than 
the  ones  now  in  the  Russian  air  defense  system. 

Nevertheless,  when  we  were  planning  our  missions  in  Baghdad, 
we  sent  only  two  systems  in  the  teeth  of  that  air  defense  system. 
One  of  them  was  the  F-117  stealth  fighter  and  the  other  was  the 
cruise  missile — both  the  Tomahawk  and  the  conventional  version  of 
the  ALCM.  The  F-117  conducted  about  3,000  sorties  into  Baghdad, 
a  very  dense  air  defense  system,  and  lost  not  a  single  aircraft. 

On  the  other  hand,  even  though  the  other  aircraft  we  had  were 
not  required  to  penetrate  this  densely  populated  air  defense  sys- 
tem, we  still  lost  I  believe  the  number  is  14  aircraft  in  much  less 
stressing  missions  to  this  air  defense  system.  So  I  do  believe  that 
stealth  plays  a  very  important  role  in  the  current  level  of  the  air 
defense  systems,  not  only  in  Russia,  but  proliferated  around  the 
world  today. 

The  final  and  somewhat  related  comment  of  that  is  that  the  one 
component  of  our  strategic  forces,  namely  our  air  component,  has 
the  capability  of  being  used,  has  the  potential  of  being  used  either 
for  nuclear  forces  or  for  conventional  forces,  and  it  is  my  judgment 
that  we  should  be  swinging  most  of  those  air-based  systems  over 
to  the  conventional  forces.  That  includes  the  B-1B  and  the  B-2. 
Therefore,  many  of  the  questions  raised  in  the  GAO  report  about 
the  applicability  of  B-1B  and  B-2  may  turn  out  to  be  moot,  if  we 
instead  direct  most  of  those  bombers  to  the  conventional  forces. 

Both  the  early  analyses  done  in  the  Defense  Department  and  the 
analysis  done  by  the  GAO  were  colored  to  a  great  extent  by  the 
Cold  War  nuclear  situation.  That  is  long  gone.  We  are  looking  at 
a  very  different  world  today,  and  we  must  plan  the  restructuring 
of  our  strategic  forces  to  face  this  new  world,  and  in  this  new  world 
we  have,  as  we  see  it,  Russia  as  a  friend  and  not  an  enemy.  We 
see  the  potential  danger  of  a  political  reversal  in  Russia,  at  which 
time  we  are  still  confronted  with  thousands  of  nuclear  weapons, 
and  so  we  have  to  be  prepared  for  a  reversal  of  that  threat  and  a 
reconstitution  of  our  own  force  and,  finally,  we  are  confronted  with 
increasing  dangers  of  small  numbers  of  nuclear  missiles  proliferat- 
ing at  unfriendly  countries  around  the  world. 

All  of  those  factors  will  be  taken  into  account,  as  we  structure 
a  nuclear  force  for  this  new  world,  and  within  a  month  or  two  we 
will  have  this  new  program  put  together  and  we  will  be  happy  to 
discuss  it  and  brief  it  with  you  at  that  time. 

Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you  very  much. 

We  will  follow  our  early  bird  arrivals  rule  this  morning  with  6- 
minute  questioning  periods.  Several  members  are  here  this  morn- 
ing. 

One  of  the  things  that  disturbs  me  most  about  the  GAO  report 
is  where  GAO  stated,  "There  exist  systematic  disparities  between 
estimates  or  claims  on  the  likely  cost  performance  of  upgrades,  the 


19 

actual  performance  of  current  systems,  or  the  likely  offense  or  de- 
fense threats  to  these  systems  from  the  former  Soviet  Union." 

Now,  these  are  serious  charges.  If  we  are  as  far  off,  as  GAO  indi- 
cates, in  our  estimates  of  what  our  weapons  systems  will  do  or  can- 
not do,  then  we  are  not  doing  a  very  good  job.  I  know  a  lot  of  these 
things  did  not  happen  on  your  watch,  and  I  know  that  you  are  also 
now  involved,  as  you  said,  in  a  big  reevaluation  of  our  military,  a 
bottom-up  review.  It  worries  me  that  we  not  make  these  same  mis- 
takes twice  here,  while  we  are  refurbishing  or  reanalyzing  our  ca- 
pabilities to  make  decisions  on  future  weapons  systems.  We  have 
to  correct  some  of  the  errors  from  the  past. 

As  I  said  earlier,  I  have  backed  the  bombers,  but  not  for  their 
nuclear  delivery  capability.  I  thought  that  if  we  got  into  a  nuclear 
war  and  we  were  exchanging  nuclear  weapons  with  somebody,  with 
ICBM's,  SLBM's  and  ALCM's,  and  these  bombs  are  going  off,  then 
to  expect  somebody  to  jump  into  an  airplane  and  add  a  couple  more 
nuclear  explosions  was  not  very  realistic. 

This  emphasis  on  the  triad  has  always  appeared  to  me,  quite 
frankly,  to  be  more  of  an  emphasis  on  letting  each  service  have  a 
piece  of  the  nuclear  pie.  I  do  not  know  whether  we  are  going  to  con- 
tinue that  or  not,  but  I  would  appreciate  your  comment  on  it. 

Mr.  Perry.  First  of  all,  let  me  repeat  that  I  found  the  GAO  re- 
port valuable,  and  it  will  be  an  important  and  well-studied  input 
in  our  restructuring  the  force.  Also,  to  repeat,  relative  to 
misestimates  in  the  past,  on  that  chart  there  the  GAO  has  listed 
six  general  beliefs,  of  which  they  come  to  different  findings,  and  the 
last  four  of  those  beliefs  and  findings,  I  agree  with  the  GAO  find- 
ings, and  those  findings  will  influence  our  view  on  how  we  restruc- 
ture the  forces. 

For  example,  that  the  B-52  is  viable  for  many  years  to  come,  I 
believe  that  is  correct  and  that  will  be  a  factor  in  our  consideration 
of  how  the  force  will  be  used.  It  would  say,  for  example,  that  we 
continue  to  use  the  B-52,  if  we  choose  to  do  it,  if  we  see  we  need 
that  capability  as  an  ALCM  carrier,  because,  while  I  do  not  believe 
that  the  B-52  is  a  suitable  penetrator  of  the  air  defense  system  of 
Russia,  I  do  believe  it  is  very  capable  to  deliver  ALCM's,  which,  in 
turn,  are  capable  as  penetrators. 

Chairman  Glenn.  You  mentioned  Baghdad.  It  is  a  conventional 
capability  we  are  talking  about  there,  and  I  do  not  quarrel  with 
that.  We  have  to  have  a  conventional  capability  and  I  hope  we 
never  cross  that  nuclear  threshold.  What  the  GAO  report  basically 
studied,  though,  was  the  nuclear  triad. 

Mr.  Perry.  Indeed,  it  did.  My  comment  about  the  B-1B  and  the 
B-2  relative  to  the  GAO  report  is  that  it  is  not  that  I  disagreed 
with  the  findings  they  had  there.  I  did  not  find  them  very  relevant 
to  our  force  structure  planning  for  strategic  forces,  because  I  am 
looking  to  the  B-1B  and  the  B-2  primarily  as  an  application  to 
conventional  forces,  which  is  the  same  point  that  you  made. 

Chairman  Glenn.  GAO  states  that,  "No  DOD  evaluation  exam- 
ined U.S.  strategic  forces  in  this  comprehensive  way  for  at  least 
three  decades,  and  the  GAO  was  concerned  to  find  little  or  no  prior 
recent  effort  by  DOD  to  evaluate  comprehensively  the  relative  ef- 
fectiveness of  similar  weapons  systems."  Now,  I  presume  you  are 


20 

going  to  remedy  that  with  your  current  study,  your  bottom-up  re- 
view, is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Perry.  Yes  and  no,  Senator  Glenn.  The  bottom-up  review 
will  be  a  comprehensive  assessment  of  the  strategic  forces  and  the 
force  structure.  It  will  not  have  the  emphasis  on  cost-effectiveness 
analysis  which  was  done  in  the  GAO  report,  for  the  reasons  that 
I  have  described.  We  will  take  the  cost-effectiveness  analysis  done 
in  this  report  as  an  important  input  to  what  we  are  doing,  but  that 
will  not  be  the  emphasis  of  our  study. 

Chairman  Glenn.  In  your  bottom-up  review  that  you  are  now 
making,  is  this  being  done  with  a  completely  separate  team?  I  am 
a  little  concerned  about  who  is  doing  all  the  analysis.  We  have  De- 
fense Acquisition  Board,  the  DAB,  we  have  the  Science  Board,  we 
have  the  Joint  Chiefs.  Who  is  doing  this  study  and  are  we  using 
all  of  these  different  groups  that  have  a  part  of  this  analysis?  How 
are  you  going  about  the  current  review? 

Dr.  Perry.  Yes,  the  team  that  is  doing  this  is  comprised  of  three 
major  elements,  the  Joint  Chiefs  are  the  military  element  of  the 
chain,  in  policy,  the  Under  Secretary  for  Policy,  we  have  the  offi- 
cers concerned  with  nuclear  systems,  and,  of  course,  the  Under  Sec- 
retary for  Acquisition  has  a  team  working  on  this,  too. 

I  have  to  say  that  we  have  important  elements  of  that  team  still 
not  in  place  yet,  and  it  is  possible  that  we  will  have  some  parts  of 
the  bottom-up  review  done  before  we  get  the  contribution  of  the 
strategic  forces,  because  there  are  some  key  people  still  missing 
from  the  team,  not  yet  confirmed  and  not  yet  in  position.  So  that 
may  be  moving  a  little  slower  than  some  other  aspects  of  the  bot- 
tom-up review. 

Chairman  Glenn.  You  heard  Ms.  Chelimsky's  comments  about 
they  felt  they  were  deliberately  misled  by  the  Pentagon.  I  hope  we 
are  getting  the  best  data  and  that  we  are  not  being  too  over-protec- 
tive of  internal  documents  that  would  prevent  a  real  study  of  what 
has  happened. 

I  have  some  sympathy  for  their  problem,  because  through  the 
years  at  hearings,  I  would  ask  about  the  B-l,  because  I  was  sup- 
porting the  B-l  on  the  basis  of  conventional  weapons  delivery.  We 
have  gotten  the  nuclear  capabilities  of  the  B-l  as  a  freebie  to  back 
up  the  SLBM's  and  ICBM's.  I  backed  the  B-l  and  fought  on  the 
floor  to  keep  the  B-l.  I  fought  very  hard  on  the  floor,  and  every 
year  I  would  be  told,  yes,  we  are  coming  along  fine  with  the  con- 
ventional weapons  system. 

Now  that  the  B-l  is  operational,  we  are  just  now  getting  around 
to  adding  its  conventional  capabilities,  after  I  had  been  told  for 
about  5  or  6  years,  yes,  we  are  developing  and  we  are  doing  all  that 
work.  I  was  flat  lied  to.  So  I  have  some  sympathy  for  the  GAO  peo- 
ple, when  they  say  they  were  misled,  because  I  was  misled  on  the 
B-l. 

That  is  more  a  statement  than  a  question,  but  I  hope  that  you 
are  doing  an  honest  bottom-up  review  this  time,  that  everybody  is 
getting  in  the  act  and  getting  all  the  information  they  need  and 
that  they  are  not  being  misled.  My  time  is  up,  but  I  would  appre- 
ciate any  short  comment  you  could  make  on  Ms.  Chelimsky's  state- 
ment that  they  were  misled  by  people  when  they  were  trying  to  do 
this  study. 


21 

Dr.  Perry.  Let  me  comment  very  briefly.  First  of  all,  sir,  as  far 
as  the  bottom-up  review  is  concerned,  it  will  be  as  honest  an  effort 
as  we  know  how  to  make  it.  Secondly,  relative  to  the  GAO  being 
misled,  I  will  not  always  agree  with  every  conclusion  in  GAO  re- 
ports, but  I  will  support  to  the  death  their  right  to  have  access  to 
honest  data  on  which  they  can  do  their  study. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Senator  Cohen? 

Senator  Cohen.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  be  a  little  bit 
stronger  on  this  issue,  rather  than  sympathizing  with  the  GAO.  It 
is  not  a  question  of  you  having  been  misled.  You  were  deceived, 
like  the  others  on  the  Committee  were  deceived. 

Now,  we  have  read  recent  news  accounts  about  an  Air  Force  gen- 
eral having  heaped  some  criticism  or  contempt,  I  should  say,  upon 
the  President.  But  I  might  say  that  reflects  in  some  degree  an  atti- 
tude which  has  been  rather  prevalent  over  the  years  with  a  sense 
of  contempt  being  heaped  upon  civilian  leadership. 

When  Senator  Glenn  and  I  served  on  the  Intelligence  Committee, 
we  had  to  go  through  the  routine,  if  you  don't  ask  the  right  ques- 
tion, you  don't  get  the  right  answer.  If  you  do  ask  the  right  ques- 
tion, you  might  get  half  of  the  right  answer.  That  has  led  to  a  num- 
ber of  problems,  I  might  say,  Secretary  Perry,  whenever  you  have 
two  sets  of  books. 

In  the  event  that  the  GAO  is  right,  there  is  one  set  for  GAO  and 
one  set  for  DOD.  If  anyone  ever  comes  before  the  Congress  to 
present  data  which  they  knowingly  know  to  be  incorrect  or  false, 
they  ought  to  be  prosecuted.  You  ought  to  dismiss  them,  but  we 
ought  to  see  to  it  that  they  are  prosecuted.  That  is  fundamental  to 
maintaining  the  integrity  of  this  system.  So  if  we  ever  find  a  docu- 
ment such  as  in  the  hands  of  the  GAO,  I  think  we  ought  to  go  re- 
quest the  Attorney  General  to  seek  to  prosecute  those  individuals 
responsible  for  it.  So  I  would  go  a  bit  further  than  you  on  that 
issue,  Mr.  Chairman,  other  than  expressing  sympathy  for  GAO. 

GAO  said,  well,  that  is  going  to  be  cleared  up  now  with  the  new 
administration.  That  assumes  that  under  the  Bush  administration 
or  the  Reagan-Bush  administrations,  the  Department  of  Defense 
tolerated  or  encouraged  the  falsification  of  data  to  achieve  a  certain 
goal.  I  suppose  you  could  make  the  same  argument  under  the  Clin- 
ton administration,  there  might  be  just  as  much  validity,  the  argu- 
ment that  data  or  information  will  be  shaped  or  distorted  to  con- 
form to  the  cutting  of  budgets.  So  I  think  we  have  to  be  careful 
that  we  not  assume,  just  because  we  have  a  new  administration, 
we  are  necessarily  going  to  get  accurate  information. 

I  would  like  to  make  a  statement,  Secretary  Perry,  rather  than 
a  question.  You  can  respond  to  it,  if  you  would  like.  I  made  this 
in  my  opening  remarks  about  the  debate  over  whether  or  not  budg- 
et drives  strategy  or  strategy  should  in  fact  shape  the  budget. 

Recently,  there  were  news  accounts  that  the  DOD  is  considering 
a  sort  of  win-hold- win  strategy.  Some  academics,  at  least,  have 
characterized  that  as  win-lose-recover  strategy,  but  we  can  leave 
that  for  another  debate.  I  would  like  to  point  out  that  when  Sen- 
ator Nunn  requested  of  Walter  Slocum  what  strategy  was  going  to 
underlie  this  bottom-up  review,  he  made  the  following  statement, 
and  we  have  this  in  a  record  submitted  to  the  Senate: 


22 

"U.S.  forces  should  be  sized  and  structured  to  win  two  nearly  si- 
multaneous major  regional  contingencies,  for  example,  the  out- 
break of  war  in  Southwest  Asia,  followed  by  aggression  in  North- 
east Asia.  We  want  to  avoid  being  placed  in  the  position  where  the 
United  States,  in  effect,  makes  a  two-war  scenario  more  likely,  by 
opening  up  a  window  of  opportunity  for  potential  aggressors." 

Now,  that  was  dated  just  in  June  of  this  year,  I  believe.  Now  we 
read  that  you  are  actually  considering  something  quite  different 
than  a  two-regional  war  strategy,  now  a  win-hold-win  strategy.  I 
would  suggest  to  you  that  such  a  proposal  achieves  the  very  sce- 
nario that  Mr.  Slocum  suggests  we  not  open  up  a  window  to  en- 
courage and  aggression  by  declaring  that  we  are  going  to  have  a 
window  of  opportunity  for  potential  aggressors.  That  is  a  personal 
opinion  here. 

I  think  what  is  happening  is  that  the  Department  of  Defense  is 
looking  at  the  budgetary  constraints  and  then  devising  a  strategy 
to  conform  to  that.  The  major  problem  right  now,  and  everyone  will 
agree,  is  that  we  don't  have  the  capabilities  to  match  our  strategy. 
But  that  is  due  primarily  to  a  lack  of  lift,  also  perhaps  a  lack  of 
precision  munitions,  particularly  for  naval  aviation,  and  also  per- 
haps some  deficiencies  in  CQU.  Nonetheless,  I  think  what  we  are 
seeing  is  an  effort  under  way  to  completely  remove  the  Gen.  Powell 
base  force  concept  and  replace  it  with  this  win-hold-win  strategy. 

I  would  hope  that  the  administration  would  not  abandon  the  de- 
claratory policy  of  being  able  to  fight  two  major  regional  conflicts 
simultaneously.  If  we  have  to  beef  up  our  capabilities  to  match  the 
strategy,  let  us  do  it,  or  at  least  not  solidify  and  consolidate  the 
opinion  in  the  eyes  of  would-be  aggressors  that,  indeed,  we  are 
going  to  have  a  win-hold-win  strategy,  which  I  think  would  only 
encourage  a  potential  aggressor. 

We  now  have  a  problem  in  North  Korea,  which  is  becoming  more 
aggressive.  We  still  have  to  be  concerned  with  Iran  or  Iraq,  another 
region.  We  may  be  faced  with  the  possibility  of  a  two-regional  con- 
flict actuality.  So  I  would  hope  that  you  would  not  abandon  the  de- 
claratory policy  of  having  a  two-regional  war  conflict  capability, 
and  then  to  take  some  steps  to  enhance  our  capability  to  match  the 
strategy. 

I  also  think  that  the  Secretary  should  accept  some  of  the  rec- 
ommendations about  the  Reserves  that  Gen.  Powell  has  suggested. 
I  think  there  is  a  great  imbalance  coming  about  in  terms  of  focus- 
ing so  much  on  Reserves  and  cutting  down  the  active  forces,  and 
I  think  that  we  have  to  really  take  a  revaluation  of  the  proposed 
cuts  by  Secretary  Aspin  in  the  outyears.  This  may  not  seem  quite 
as  ludicrous  in  today's  climate  as  some  might  think.  The  House,  for 
example,  recently  passed  a  budget  supplemental  of  $1.2  billion  to 
pay  for  the  operations  in  Somalia,  rather  than  reprogramming. 

Finally,  I  hope  we  do  not  do  what  I  consider  to  be  stupid  things 
in  this  bottom-up  review,  such  as  merging  the  Navy's  AFX  with  the 
Air  Force  multi-role  fighter,  the  F-16.  If  we  are  going  to  seek  ways 
of  consolidating  forces  or  weapons  systems,  it  is  far  preferable,  in 
my  judgment,  to  start  consolidating  F-22  and  the  AFX,  and  not  the 
other  way  around. 

So  I  hope  you  will  take  some  of  these  recommendations  in  the 
spirit  I  offer  them,  and  that  is  as  aggressively  as  I  can. 


23 

Dr.  Perry.  Thank  you.  May  I  mention  two  comments  on  that. 

Senator  Cohen.  Now  you  may  comment  on  Senator  Lieberman's 
time.  [Laughter.] 

Dr.  Perry.  I  will  try  to  make  them  fast.  I  think  win-hold-win  is 
an  unfortunate  moniker  for  a  complex  strategy  or  scenario,  which 
is  one  of  the  three  scenarios  being  considered  in  the  Bottom-Up  Re- 
view. 

You  might  have  called  World  War  II  strategy  a  win-hold-win,  but 
that  was  a  very  vast  oversimplification  of  what,  in  fact,  we  actually 
did  in  that  war. 

But  more  importantly,  I  want  to  comment  on  the  process  of  what 
the  Bottom-Up  Review  is  about.  It  is  not  that  we  are  coming  to  this 
is  the  strategy.  The  key,  the  essence,  of  this  Bottom-Up  Review  is 
that  we  are  connecting  resource  decisions  with  strategies,  with  al- 
ternative strategies,  and  we  will  be  able  to  present  both  to  the 
President  and  the  Congress  what  sort  of  resources  are  needed  to 
execute  alternative  strategies,  or  alternatively,  if  you  set  the  re- 
sources, what  kind  of  strategy  you  will  be  able  to  execute  with  it. 

And  that  whole  process  will  be  laid  out  in  front  of  you,  and  the 
President  and  the  Congress  will  be  able  to  come  to  judgments 
about  how  the  two  connect  with  each  other.  The  essence  of  the  Bot- 
tom-Up Review  is  making  the  connection  between  strategy  on  the 
one  hand  and  necessary  resources  on  the  other,  and  we  will  do  it 
with  several  alternative  strategies. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Senator  Dorgan? 

Senator  Dorgan.  Mr.  Chairman,  thank  you  very  much. 

I  would  like  to  ask  your  evaluation  of  the  discussion  by  the  GAO 
of  the  costs  of  extending  the  Minuteman-IIIs.  They  were  comparing 
them  to  the  life-cycle  costs  of  the  D-5,  and  they  indicated  today 
that  the  cost  increase  they  used  for  the  extension  of  the  life  cycle 
of  Minuteman-III  has  increased,  I  believe,  from  $16  billion  to  $23 
billion.  Is  that  the  number  you  heard? 

Dr.  Perry.  I  can  check  that  number  for  you,  Senator  Dorgan.  I 
do  not  have  it  in  my  head. 

Senator  Dorgan.  Well,  we  do  not  need  the  exact  number.  But 
the  question  is:  As  I  heard  the  discussion  about  the  D-5  versus  the 
Minuteman-IIIs  in  silos,  when  you  put  a  Minuteman-III  in  a  silo 
with  a  single  warhead,  its  life  cycle  lasts  for  a  good  long  while,  but 
a  D-5  put  in  a  boat  someplace,  a  submarine,  lasts  as  long  as  you 
have  a  delivery  vehicle,  as  long  as  the  boat  lasts,  and  then  you 
have  got  to  extend  the  recommended  life  of  the  boat,  and  I'm  most 
curious  how  you  evaluate  the  relative  costs  of  the  sea-based  ballis- 
tic missiles,  the  D-5  and  the  Tridents,  versus  the  Minuteman  sin- 
gle-warhead costs? 

Dr.  Perry.  On  a  cost-per-warhead  basis,  the  Minuteman  with  a 
single  warhead  will  be  an  expensive  way  of  maintaining  a  system. 
Even  though  we  are  extending  a  system  that  has  already  existed, 
we  lose  a  lot  of  the  cost  advantages  of  ICBMs  when  we  go  away 
from  the  MIRVed  features  of  that  system. 

The  reason  we  are  going  away  from  the  MIRVed  features, 
though,  is  because  we  wanted  to  reduce  the  threat  from  Russia, 
from  the  Soviet  Union,  of  MIRVed  systems,  and  therefore  we  of- 
fered a  package  of  de-MIRVing  our  ICBMs  and  having  them  de- 
MIRV  theirs. 


24 

So  I  would  look  at  the  notion  of  bringing  Minuteman-III  down  to 
a  single-warhead  system  as  done  for  that  reason,  and  the  price  you 
pay  for  it  is  a  higher  cost  per  warhead.  It  makes  it  much  less  com- 
petitive than  a  Trident 

Senator  Dorgan.  I  understand  that. 

Mr.  Perry  [continuing].  On  that  basis,  because  the  Trident  is  a 
MIRVed  system. 

Senator  DORGAN.  But  would  that  be  including  the  cost  of  extend- 
ing the  life  cycle  of  the  submarines? 

I  guess  I  will  ask  the  GAO  witness  in  some  detail  about  this,  but 
I  am  kind  of  curious  about  the  cost  comparisons  that  were  used 
today.  It  seems  to  me — and  I  understand  why  we  are  going  to  a 
single  warhead — but  having  a  Minuteman  missile  put  in  a  silo  and 
lett  there  for  some  long  while  and  with  the  understanding  that  if 
you  have  single-warhead  missiles,  the  risk  of  targeting  a  missile 
out  there  with  one  warhead  of  yours  to  one  warhead  in  a  silo  does 
not  make  much  sense,  so  the  survivability  is  pretty  substantial. 

Dr.  Perry.  The  survivability  is  good  for  that  reason;  that  is  right. 

Senator  Dorgan.  And  it  seems  to  me  that  the  cost  estimates 
given  today  by  the  GAO,  comparing  the  Minutemans  in  place  over 
the  30-year  life,  for  example,  versus  the  D-5  in  a  Trident  whose 
life  cycle  we  are  going  to  have  to  extend,  caused  me  some  confu- 
sion. 

So  I  guess  maybe  I  will  ask  those  questions  of  the  GAO. 

Dr.  Perry.  I  would  suggest  you  refer  those  questions  to  the  GAO. 
My  main  point  is  that  I  do  not  think  the  primary  basis  for  deciding 
to  keep  the  Minuteman  force  is  a  cost-per- warhead  deliver  basis. 
Had  we  wanted  to  make  that  criterion,  we  probably  would  have 
kept  the  three  warheads  in  the  Minuteman  in  the  first  place.  It 
would  have  been  much  more  attractive  from  that  point  of  view. 

Senator  DORGAN.  I  understand  that.  But  the  Minuteman  system 
over  the  years  has  been  a  fairly  cost-effective  system. 

Dr.  Perry.  It  is  very  cost-effective;  that  is  right. 

Senator  Dorgan.  And  given  the  circumstances  of  what  we  fore- 
see in  the  future  with  single  warheads,  it  is  probably  cost-effective 
and  relatively  survivable. 

Dr.  Perry.  It  is  cost-effective  for  two  reasons.  First  of  all,  it  has 
minimal  maintenance  compared  with  either  the  airborne  systems 
or  the  submarine  systems.  And  secondly,  it  had  this  MIRVed  capa- 
bility which  contributed  greatly  to  the  cost  per  warhead  effective- 
ness. 

We  have  lost  one  of  those  two  features,  but  the  other  one  still 
remains.  It  is  still  a  relatively  low  maintenance,  relatively  low  up- 
keep system. 

Senator  DORGAN.  Then  in  some  of  the  other  discussion  I  heard — 
again,  I  will  ask  the  GAO  witness,  but  I  would  like  your  comments 
on  it— the  discussion  about  the  B-52s  and  the  B-ls  that  talk  about 
its  cost  as  a  delivery  system  for  nuclear  weapons,  both  are  also  us- 
able for  conventional  warfare.  In  fact,  the  B-l  has  now  been  des- 
ignated as  a  conventional  weapon. 

I  want  to  know  whether  that  was  considered  in  the  evaluation, 
that  dual  capability.  But  your  assessment  of  the  B-52  and  the  B- 
1? 


25 

Dr.  Perry.  I  consider  the  B-1B  and  the  B-2  as  primarily  contrib- 
utors to  our  conventional  forces,  and  I  think  that  is  the  way 

Senator  Dorgan.  How  about  the  B-52? 

Dr.  Perry.  And  the  B-52H,  which  can  carry  the  ALCMs,  to  the 
extent  we  maintain  ALCMs  in  our  force,  the  B-52H  will  have  a 
unique  role,  and  that  will  be  strategic  nuclear  forces.  We  still  have 
the  potential  of  using  B-52s  for  conventional  forces. 

I  think  with  the  dedication  of  the  B-1B  and  the  B-2,  we  will  not 
see  the  merit  to  using  the  B-52  for  conventional  forces  as  well. 

Senator  DORGAN.  But  historically,  we  have  called  upon  it  for  con- 
ventional purposes,  and  the  only  point  I  make  is,  when  you  make 
an  evaluation  of  the  relative  costs  of  the  triad,  if  you  have  a  deliv- 
ery system  here,  a  B-52  that  has  dual-mission  capabilities 

Dr.  Perry.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Dorgan  [continuing].  It  seems  to  me  that  that  has  to  be 
considered 

Dr.  Perry.  All  three  of  those  aircraft  have  dual  capability. 

Senator  Dorgan.  Right. 

Dr.  Perry.  Now  to  make  the  B-1B  and  the  B-2 — in  fact,  any  one 
of  them — fully  effective  in  the  conventional  capability,  they  need  to 
be  outfitted  with  armament  to  make  them  effective  in  that  job.  So 
that  is  a  bill  to  be  paid  yet  in  order  to  get  that  full  capability. 

As  the  B-52,  as  it  was  used  in  Desert  Storm,  was  dropping  grav- 
ity bombs,  and  it  was  relatively  not  ineffective  then  for  that  reason, 
and  in  the  Air  Force's  review  of  how  they  would  use  the  B-1B  or 
the  B-2  in  a  conventional  war,  they  are  imagining  they  would  be 
used  with  precision  delivered  weapons,  making  them  much  more 
effective. 

But  that  is  a  cost  to  get  them  outfitted  for  that  purpose.  That 
is  a  cost  not  yet  accommodated. 

Senator  Dorgan.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Senator  Levin?  I  know  Secretary  Perry  has  to 
leave  right  at  11:00. 

I  am  sorry.  Senator  Lieberman  was  next. 

Senator  Lieberman.  I  took  his  seat.  I  apologize  for  that.  If  I  had 
known  you  were  coming,  I  would  not  have  sat  here. 

Senator  Levin.  I  cannot  think  of  anyone  I  would  rather  occupy 
that  seat,  except  for  the  other  colleagues  who  are  here. 

Senator  Lieberman.  I  am  honored,  I  think.  [Laughter.] 

Secretary  Perry,  I  appreciate  your  characteristically  thoughtful 
presentation.  I  want  to  pursue  with  you  just  a  bit,  so  I  am  sure 
that  I  understand  what  some  of  your  constructive  criticisms  of  the 
GAO  findings  are. 

It  seems  to  me  that  what  you  are  saying  in  your  testimony  is 
that  insofar  as  the  GAO,  in  its  conclusion  that  the  sea  leg  of  the 
triad  was  the  most  effective,  based  that  conclusion  on  cost-effective- 
ness, it  was  missing  what  might  be  called  some  subjective  factors 
that  have  to  do  with  the  interrelationship  of  the  three  legs  of  the 
triad.  In  a  sense,  this  is  a  classic  case  where  the  whole  is  greater 
than  the  sum  of  the  parts  because  of  both  the  subjective  and  fac- 
tual impact  on  a  potential  opponent. 

But  in  its  estimate  of  survivability  of  the  three  legs,  did  the  GAO 
go  beyond  just  a  balance-sheet,  cost-effectiveness  analysis  and  get 
to  what  might  be  called  a  more  strategic  element  here,  saying,  if 


26 

I  can  take  it  further  than  probably  is  appropriate,  that  if  you  had 
to  choose  where  you,  would  reduce  levels  of  threat  in  this  new  post- 
Cold  War  environment,  that  it  makes  more  sense  to  reduce  them 
in  the  air  and  land  legs,  as  opposed  to  the  sea,  because  that  leg 
not  only  has  a  lower  cost  per  warhead,  but  also  has  greater  surviv- 
ability? .  . 

Dr.  Perry.  I  think  that  is  a  fair  statement  of  both  my  position 
and  their  position,  and  I  think  I  would  amplify  my  position  by  say- 
ing that  at  whatever  level  of  warheads  you  have,  even  as  you  bring 
them  down,  if  I  were  structuring  the  force,  I  would  structure  them 
to  have  several  components  in  the  force  for  the  reasons  of  the  di- 
versity of  the  basing,  which  makes  it  difficult  for  them  to  be  at- 
tacked. 

Now  taking  into  account  the  conclusions  of  the  GAO  report  on 
the  relative  cost-effectiveness  of  the  submarine  versus  the  other 
two  legs,  I  would  then  say  I  would  tend  to  emphasize  that. 

Senator  LlEBERMAN.  You  would  agree,  as  you  have  indicated 

here?  . 

Dr.  Perry.  Yes,  I  do.  I  would  emphasize  that.  And  indeed,  in  the 
force  structure  that  has  already  been  put  together  and  that  we  are 
converging  to,  the  Trident  turns  out  to  be  the  dominant  leg  of  the 
triad,  and  it  is  the  one  on  which  we  depend  the  most  for  the  rea- 
sons that  were  stated  in  the  GAO  report. 

It  is  very  high  survivability.  Even  if  you  argue  with  some  details 
of  the  cost-effectiveness  analysis,  most  of  the  costs  on  the  Trident 
are  sunk  costs  at  this  point. 

Senator  LlEBERMAN.  Right. 

Dr.  Perry.  And  as  I  said  before,  I  am  looking  to  the  costs  to  be 
expended  yet.  And  on  that  basis,  it  is  a  very  attractive  alternative. 

We  could  put  the  entire  strategic  force  together  with  just  Tri- 
dents, and  I  recommend  against  that,  not  because  the  other  sys- 
tems are  more  cost-effective,  but  because  I  think  the  combination 
of  the  three  gives  us  the  highest  degree  of  confidence  that  we  have 
a  system  that  could  not  be— that  no  one  could  believe  they  could 
attack. 

I  do  not  plan  to  get  into  detail  in  this  discussion,  but  to  the  ex- 
tent you  wanted  to,  I  could  describe  the  problems  of  an  attacker; 
on  attacking  submarines,  it  is  profound.  But  if  they  were  to  ever 
get  some  kind  of  an  ASW  breakthrough 

Senator  LlEBERMAN.  Right. 

Mr.  Perry  [continuing].  Which  I  do  not  forecast,  but  if  they  were, 
then  the  submarine  becomes  the  most  vulnerable  part  of  the  sys- 
tem. 

Senator  LlEBERMAN.  Yes. 

Dr.  Perry.  And  the  way  to  hedge  that— and  it  is  just  a  hedge- 
is  to  have  a  mixture  which  makes  it  very  difficult  to  attack. 

Senator  Lieberman.  That  is  helpful.  So  that  you  are  not,  in 
being  constructively  critical  of  the  GAO  problems,  arguing 

Dr.  Perry.  No. 

Senator  LlEBERMAN  [continuing].  You  are  not  arguing  for  the 
triad  to  go  on  exactly  as  it  exists  now? 

Dr.  Perry.  By  no  means. 

Senator  LlEBERMAN.  And  you  are  also  not  disagreeing  with  the 
conclusion  that  the  sea-based  leg  is  the  most  survivable. 


27 

Dr.  Perry.  I  believe  it  is  the  most  survivable,  and  I  believe  it  will 
be  for  the  foreseeable  future. 

Senator  LiEBERMAN.  But  what  you  are  cautioning  us  against — 
and  I  am  extrapolating  here,  so  please  correct  me  if  needed — is 
that  as  we  go  forward  in  post-Cold  War  era  and  adjust  the  triad, 
we  ought  not  to  adjust  it  so  much  that  we  lose  the  land  and  air- 
based  legs.  Is  that  fair  to  say? 

Dr.  Perry.  That  is  fair. 

Senator  LiEBERMAN.  Even  though  you  would  agree  that  perhaps 
we  should,  in  this  readjustment,  give  somewhat  more  emphasis  to 
the  sea-based  leg. 

Dr.  Perry.  I  would  be  prepared  to  give  quite  a  bit  more  emphasis 
to  the  sea-based,  but  I  would  not  eliminate  the  other  two. 

It  would  be  a  different  question  if  you  had  asked  me,  would  I, 
from  scratch,  start  to  build  the  other  two. 

Senator  LiEBERMAN.  Right. 

Dr.  Perry.  Given  that  we  already  have  them,  I  would  not  elimi- 
nate them.  I  would  maintain  them.  On  a  sunk  cost  basis,  it  is  still 
a  relatively  economical  thing  to  do,  and  we  maintain  the  benefits 
of  the  diversity. 

Now  unless  a  serious  major  threat  reemerges,  a  reconstitution  of 
the  nuclear  capability,  a  nuclear  threat  from  the  former  Soviet 
Union,  say,  unless  something  like  that  happened,  much  of  this  dis- 
cussion is  academic. 

Senator  LiEBERMAN.  Right. 

Dr.  Perry.  We  could  get  by  very  nicely  with  much  smaller  forces 
and  a  single  leg.  So  we  are  trying  to  hedge  against  the  possibility 
of  that  reemerging. 

Senator  LiEBERMAN.  Thank  you.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Senator  Levin,  we  have  to  vote. 

Senator  Levin.  Shall  I,  then,  just  adjourn  when  I  am  done? 

Chairman  Glenn.  No,  go  ahead.  Because  Secretary  Perry  has  to 
leave,  let  us  just  go  ahead,  and  I  think  we  have  time  for  your  ques- 
tions. 

Senator  Levin.  When  I  am  concluded  with  mine,  shall  I  just  re- 
cess until  you  return? 

Chairman  Glenn.  Yes,  we  can  do  that. 

Senator  Levin.  All  right. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Go  ahead. 

Senator  Levin.  Welcome,  Secretary  Perry. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Just  give  me  30  seconds.  I  am  very  concerned 
about  the  charge  of  overestimates,  overestimating  defenses,  and 
cost  estimates  so  far  off  that  they  are  not  even  usable.  I  hope  you 
are  getting  better  figures  out  of  the  Services  on  this  Bottom-Up  Re- 
view than  what  we  have  had  in  the  past  and  what  the  GAO  got. 

Dr.  Perry.  One  of  the  very  positive  things  coming  out  of  the  Bot- 
tom-Up Review  is  the  very  close  working  together  of  the  military 
with  the  new  civilian  team,  and  I  am  very  impressed  with  that. 

Senator  Levin  [presiding].  First  on  the  question  of  false  informa- 
tion provided  to  the  GAO,  like  our  chairman  and  Senator  Cohen 
and,  I  think,  every  member  of  the  Congress,  we  feel  very  strongly 
about  this  issue.  This  occurred  before  your  current  position  or  be- 
fore this  Administration,  so  it  is  an  awkward  issue  in  a  sense,  be- 


28 

cause  you  were  not  here  when  these  two  events  reported  to  us 

today  occurred.  ,  ■■«-*» 

One  has  to  do  with  the  false  data.  That  is  the  word  used,  false  , 
"purposely  false  data"  provided,  I  think,  on  the  radar  cross-section 
issue  of  the  B-1B. 

And  then  another  issue  which  was  raised  by  the  GAO  has  to  do 
with  the  fact  that  the  DOD  refused  to  provide  the  GAO  with  reli- 
ability data  for  the  MX  warhead. 

So  there  are  two  kinds  of  issues  here.  Can  you  take  a  look  at 
both  of  those  statements  on  the  part  of  the  GAO? 

Dr.  Perry.  Yes. 

Senator  Levin.  Will  you  look  at  those? 

Dr.  Perry.  Yes. 

Senator  Levin.  And  would  you  report  to  this  committee  whether 
or  not,  number  one,  to  the  best  of  your  ability,  they  are  accurate, 
and  number  two,  if  so,  whether  the  persons  responsible  for  those 
decisions  are  still  in  places  of  responsibility? 

I  am  not  asking  you  to  act  directly  at  this  point,  but  I  am  asking 
you  to  report  to  the  committee  on  the  factual  accuracy  of  those  two 
statements  of  the  GAO  and  if  they  are  accurate,  whether  or  not  the 
persons  involved,  are  still  in  places  of  responsibility.  Could  you  do 
that? 

Dr.  Perry.  Yes,  I  will  do  that. 

[Insert  for  the  Record] 

MX  Warhead  Reliability  Data 

The  facts  concerning  the  DOD's  redacting  of  certain  portions  of  the  report  entitled 
"Evaluation  of  Weapon  System  Capabilities,  Peacekeeper  in  Minuteman  Silos,    are 

a  a  follOWS* 

On  August  3,  1990,  the  Comptroller  General  formally  requested  that  Secretary  of 
Defense  Cheney  provide  access  to  the  complete  and  unedited  Top  Secret/Restricted 
Data  report  entitled  "Evaluation  of  Weapon  System  Capabilities,  Peacekeeper  in 
Minuteman  Silos,"  dated  18  September  1989.  The  Comptroller  General  letter  stated 
that  CINCSAC  and  the  Department  of  Energy  had  indicated  that  they  had  no  objec- 
tion to  release  of  the  document  to  the  GAO.  General  John  T.  Chain,  Jr.,  Commander 
in  Chief,  Strategic  Air  Command  reviewed  the  Comptroller  General's  letter  dated 
August  3,  1990,  and  objected  to  the  release  of  the  report  to  the  GAO  on  the  basis 
that  "Information  contained  in  this  report  is  extremely  sensitive,  limited  access, 
TOP  SECRET/Restricted  Data,  and  must  be  carefully  controlled.  Release  of  this  in- 
formation would  pose  a  grave  threat  to  national  security." 

On  August  31,  1990,  Terrence  O'Donnell,  General  Counsel  of  the  Department  ot 
Defense,  informed  the  Honorable  Charles  Bowsher,  Comptroller  General,  that  Gen- 
eral Chain  did  object  to  release  of  the  report  and  the  Department  of  Energy,  which 
could  find  no  evidence  of  having  made  any  representation  concerning  release  of  the 
report,  deferred  to  the  views  of  the  Department  of  Defense  on  this  question.  Mr. 
O'Donnell  further  reiterated  his  conversation  with  the  Comptroller  General,  in  De- 
cember 1989,  in  which  he  informed  Mr.  Bowsher  that  the  Secretary  of  Defense  had 
personally  briefed  key  Congressional  leaders  on  the  matter. 

Finally,  on  October  26,  1990,  the  Comptroller  General  reported  the  denial  to  Rich- 
ard G.  Darman,  Director  of  the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget.  On  November 
28  1990,  Mr.  Darman  made  the  certification  pursuant  to  31  U.S.C.  Section  716  (d) 
to  the  Comptroller  General  that,  "the  redacted  portions  of  the  document  referred  to 
in  your  report  dated  October  26,  1990,  which  was  received  by  the  White  House  on 
November  9,  1990,  could  be  withheld  under  5  U.S.C.  Section  552  (b)  (5),  and  that 
disclosure  reasonably  could  be  expected  to  impair  substantially  the  operations  of  the 
Government."  Mr.  Darman's  letter  further  described  the  redacted  information  as 
"deliberative  material  used  to  make  weapons  allocation  and  targeting  determina- 
tions by  DOD  authorities  charged  with  the  oversight  of  the  SIOP.  The  redacted  ma- 
terial consists  of  uniquely  sensitive  estimates  to  assist  in  the  management  of  the 
Nation's  nuclear  deterrent  aimed  at  holding  Soviet  targets  at  risk.  Reporting  to  Con- 
gress on  this  extremely  sensitive  information  appropriately  has  been  limited  to  a 


29 

briefing  by  the  Secretary  of  Defense  of  the  leadership  of  the  House  and  Senate 
Armed  Services  Committees." 

I  have  reviewed  the  facts  and  believe  the  position  taken  by  the  Department,  be- 
cause of  the  extreme  sensitivity  to  national  security,  was  correct. 

Senator  Levin.  On  the  B-2  certification  issue,  I  think  that  at 
your  confirmation  hearing  and  I  know  at  Secretary  Aspin's  con- 
firmation hearing,  I  asked  the  question  about  whether  or  not  the 
Department  intends  to  comply  with  the  law  on  the  issue  of  B-2  cer- 
tification. This  has  to  do  with  whether  or  not  there  will  be,  before 
the  certification  is  made  that  triggers  the  obligation  of  certain 
funds,  whether  or  not  there  will  be  actual  flight  tests  of  the  inte- 
grated offensive  and  defensive  avionic  systems. 

Have  you  had  a  chance  to  look  at  that  issue,  and  can  you  give 
us  your  assurance  that  before  the  certification  provided  for  by  law 
would  be  made,  that,  in  fact,  those  actual  flight  tests  of  the  inte- 
grated offensive  and  defensive  avionic  systems  will  take  place? 
'  Dr.  Perry.  I  will  personally  review  the  certification  before  it  is 
made,  and  I  will  certainly  check  those  points. 

[Insert  for  the  Record] 

B-2  Flight  Tests 

The  DOD  will  comply  with  section  131  of  the  National  Defense  Authorization  Act 
for  Fiscal  Year  1992  and  1993.  Section  131  requires  the  Secretary  of  Defense  to  cer- 
tify that  the  program  for  the  B-2  aircraft  has  demonstrated  sufficiently  critical  per- 
formance characteristics  from  flight  testing  to  provide  a  high  degree  of  confidence 
in  mission  accomplishment.  Among  these  performance  characteristics  are  offensive 
and  defensive  avionics."  The  statute  does  not  specify  a  requirement  of  flight  tests 
of  integrated  offensive  and  defense  avionics.  Whether  the  Secretary  can  make  the 
statutorily  prescribed  certification  must  be  based  on  the  Secretary's  judgment,  tak- 
ing account  of  the  flight  tests  conducted  and,  of  course,  the  issues  raised  by  the 
GAO.  It  should  be  noted  that  both  the  B-2  offensive  and  defensive  systems  have 
been  through  extensive  laboratory  and  ground  testing,  and  are  now  being  evaluated 
through  flight  testing.  Full  integration  testing  of  both  systems  is  scheduled  to  start 
late  in  1993,  after  a  required  software  package  is  added,  and  will  be  completed  in 
late  1994.  This  test  schedule  was  provided  to  Congress  in  the  System  Maturity  Ma- 
trix. To  date,  no  integration  problems  have  been  found  during  any  testing. 

Senator  Levin.  Do  you  agree  that  that  is  a  correct  statement?  Is 
your  understanding  of  the  law  the  same  as  mine?  Since  I  helped 
write  it,  I  do  not  want  to  assume  that  everybody  agrees  with  it. 

Dr.  Perry.  I  am  very  careful  when  a  lawyer  asks  me  whether  I 
agree  on  a  statement  of  law  that  he  has  written. 

Senator  Levin.  Well,  you  are  generally  pretty  careful  anyway. 
But  are  you  familiar  with  it?  If  you  are  not 

Dr.  Perry.  I  have  not  read  the  law,  Senator  Levin,  but  I  will,  be- 
lieve me. 

Senator  Levin.  All  right.  If  you  would 

Dr.  Perry.  Before  I  sign  the  certification,  I  will  read  the  law. 

Senator  Levin.  Well,  in  addition  to  that,  would  you  provide  for 
the  record  your  best  assessment  as  to  when  you  believe  the  Air 
Force  will  be  in  a  position  to  either  make  or  not  be  able  to  make 
that  certification?  What  is  the  new  timeline? 

The  GAO  says  that  this  is  a  significant  period  of  time  ahead  of 
us,  that  it  cannot  be  made  in  the  near  future,  as  I  remember  their 
written  testimony  or  what  they  have  told  us.  So  can  you  give  us 
a  timetable  as  to  when  you  believe  such  certification  could  be  made 
at  the  earliest? 


fiQ_s^Q  n  -  Q4 


30 


Dr.  Perry.  Yes. 
[Insert  for  the  Record] 


B-2  Certification 


The  DOD  B-2  certification  is  planned  for  August  1993.  The  Air  Force  has  pro- 
vided B-2  testing  data  and  analysis  to  OSD.  The  OSD  staff  is  reviewing  the  infor- 
mation and  will  provide  its  finding  and  recommendations  to  SECDEF  in  July. 

Senator  Levin.  Now  we  also  had  a  question  about  the  warranty 
provision  on  the  B-2,  and  that  was  a  provision  which  I  also  wrote 
and  which  I  believe  was  clearly  violated  by  the  Air  Force.  Are  you 
familiar  with  that  issue? 

Dr.  Perry.  Only  in  general  terms,  Senator  Levin. 

Senator  Levin.  Can  you  review  that  and  tell  us  for  the  record 
whether  or  not  you  believe  that  that  provision  has  been  complied 
with,  and  if  not,  whether  or  not  you  will  require  compliance? 

Dr.  Perry.  Yes.  I  have  heard  different  opinions  on  that,  and  I 
would  have  to  look  at  that  much  more  carefully. 

Senator  Levin.  If  you  would  provide  that  for  the  record  as  well. 
We  had  a  commitment  on  both  of  these,  by  the  way,  by  the  Sec- 
retary at  the  time  of  his  confirmation. 

Dr.  Perry.  Yes,  I  am  aware. 

Senator  Levin.  I  am  reminding  you  of  that. 

The  B-52Hs  are  a  bomber  that  you  have  made  reference  to,  and 
I  would  like  to  ask  you  about  B-52Gs.  Is  it  true  that  they  also  have 
some  useful  life  left  in  them? 

Dr.  Perry.  Yes,  it  is. 

Senator  Levin.  Is  the  plan  to  retire  them  while  they  still  have 
useful  life? 

Dr.  Perry.  That  will  be  a  specific  recommendation  out  of  the 
Bottom-Up  Review.  We  have  not  come  to  that  one  yet,  but  if  the 
decision  is  to  retire  them,  it  will  not  be  because  we  believe  they  do 
not  have  useful  airframe  life. 

Senator  Levin.  So  the  decision  has  not  yet  been  made  to  retire 
those  B-52Gs? 

Dr.  Perry.  Whatever  has  been— judgments  that  have  been  made 
to  date,  it  is  on  the  table  during  the  Bottom-Up  Review. 

Senator  Levin.  And  so  the  final  decision  on  that  is  still  up  in  the 
air? 

Dr.  Perry.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Levin.  To  coin  a  phrase. 

Dr.  Perry.  The  decision  will  not  be,  though,  on  the  life  of  the  air- 
plane; it  will  be  on  the  cost  of  maintaining  it  and  the  cost  of  outfit- 
ting it  to  do  whatever  mission  is  prescribed  for  it  and  the  value  of 
that  mission. 

Senator  Levin.  In  any  event,  whatever  their  useful  life,  whatever 
the  decision  finally  is  from  the  Bottom-Up  Review,  they  still  have 
useful  life? 

Dr.  Perry.  Many  years  of  useful  life  as  an  airframe. 

Senator  Levin.  The  Air  Force  was  planning  on  reducing  the 
number  of  ICBM  bases  from  four  to  three.  Is  that  still  the  plan, 
do  you  know? 

Dr.  Perry.  I  do  not  know. 

Senator  Levin.  All  right.  Would  you  let  us  know  that  for  the 
record? 


31 


Dr.  Perry.  Yes. 
[Insert  for  the  Record] 

Number  of  ICBM  Bases 

ICBMs  provide  a  combination  of  accuracy,  yield,  range,  reliability,  and  rapid 
retargeting  for  maximum  flexibility  for  the  lowest  operating  costs.  Under  current 
plans,  the  ICBM  force  will  be  reduced  to  500  Minuteman  III  missiles  deployed  at 
three  bases.  Programs  are  in  place  to  maintain  system  reliability  through  2010. 
These  include  replacing  some  electronic  components  of  Minuteman  guidance  sub- 
systems and  refurbishing  solid  rocket  motors.  Efforts  to  ensure  that  by  the  year 
2000  all  Minuteman  III  missiles  have  been  downloaded  to  a  single  warhead  per 
START  treaties  continue  on  schedule. 

Senator  Levin.  You  have  made  reference  to  the  fact  that  political 
leadership  could  change  in  Russia,  and  therefore  we  have  got  to  be 
prepared.  And  I  agree  with  you  on  that. 

Is  it  also,  therefore,  because  of  that  same  reason  imperative  that 
we  quickly  move  to  reduce  the  number  of  missiles  in  Russian 
hands,  and  the  more  quickly  the  better  because  of  that  same  rea- 
son, that  political  leadership  could  revert  to  a  prior  type  of  leader- 
ship? 

Dr.  Perry.  Yes,  that  is  a  top  priority,  and  to  the  extent  we  can 
influence  it  in  that  direction,  we  would  do  it,  including  making 
whatever  concessions  we  need  to  make  on  our  own  forces. 

Senator  Levin.  Have  you  been  asked  whether  or  not  we  will  have 
the  results  of  the  Bottom-Up  Review  in  time  for  our  authorization 
and  appropriation  process?  Was  that  asked  of  you  this  morning? 

Dr.  Perry.  We  expect  to  have  the  primary  results  of  the  Bottom- 
Up  Review  available  in  early  July. 

Senator  Levin.  If  you  could  not  only  provide  answers  to  those 
questions,  particularly  on  the  B-2,  for  the  record,  but  provide  those 
within  the  next  couple  weeks,  it  would  be  most  appreciated. 

Dr.  Perry.  Yes,  we  can  do  that. 

Senator  Levin.  Thank  you.  We  will  stand  in  recess  until  either 
Senator  Glenn  or  someone  else  comes  back.  Thank  you. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman  Glenn  [presiding].  The  hearing  will  be  in  order.  I  am 
sorry  for  the  truncated  nature  of  the  hearings,  but  we  cannot  avoid 
these  votes.  I  am  sorry  for  the  delay. 

Would  you  expand,  Ms.  Chelimsky,  on  your  comments  that  you 
felt  you  were  deliberately  misled?  That  concerns  me  very,  very 
much.  The  DOD  is  now  into  another  study  and  they  are  relying  on 
figures  from  the  Services.  If  they  are  misled  again  and  if  the  Serv- 
ices are  trying  to  posture  for  whatever  particular  budgetary  advan- 
tage there  might  be  on  certain  weapons  systems,  now  is  the  time 
to  know  about  things  like  that,  so  that  the  DOD  or  the  other  people 
making  these  decisions  are  not  misled  again,  including  people  here 
in  Congress. 

Expand  on  that  a  little,  if  you  would. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Exactly,  Senator.  Well,  there  really  isn't  much 
more  to  say,  except  that  we  did  feel  that  that  one  passed  all  normal 
bounds  in  the  sense  that  we  have  a  memo  that  says  these  are  the 
correct  data,  and  these  are  the  data,  quite  different  data,  that  will 
be  sent  to  GAO  and  that  have  been  sent  to  GAO. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Is  it  just  like  that,  the  data  are  different? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes.  Oh,  yes.  They  are  quite  different  data. 


32 

Chairman  Glenn.  And  it  says  that  these  are  for  internal  use?  In 
other  words,  they  cooked  the  books  and 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  In  that  particular  case,  it  is  the  only  conclusion 
that  I  can  come  to,  sir. 

Chairman  Glenn.  And  are  the  figures  substantially  different, 
that  if  you  use  one  set  of  figures,  you  come  to  one  conclusion 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes. 

Chairman  Glenn  [continuing].  And  another  set  of  figures,  you 
would  come  to  another? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  They  are  quite  different.  And  the  real  issue,  the 
way  the  thing  finally  worked  out,  was  that,  as  you  saw  in  the 
statement,  we  discussed  the  business  of  the  radar  cross-section, 
what  the  actual  numbers  were,  in  fact,  and  how  only  the  heads-up 
number  had  been  given,  so  that  there  are  several  issues  there. 

Chairman  GLENN.  Is  this  memo  classified? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes,  it  is. 

Chairman  Glenn.  We  will  want  to  look  at  that.  I  want  to  look 
at  it  separately,  because  we  may  want  to  follow  up  on  that. 

Was  this  one  person,  or  would  this  have  been  reviewed  by  sev- 
eral people? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  I  don't  remember  it,  but  I  will  give  you  the 
memo.  It  is  a  classified  memo,  of  course. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Yes,  I  want  to  see  it. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  But  what  we  did  about  it,  Senator,  which  was 
the  point  I  wanted  to  make  to  you,  was  that,  at  first  they  opposed 
our  finding  on  the  B-1B  RCS,  giving  us  these  wrong  numbers. 

You  know  how  the  GAO  works.  When  we  get  our  results,  we  al- 
ways send  them  over  to  the  Defense  Department,  and  they  com- 
ment. Here  they  commented  to  us  saying  that  our  RCS  finding  was 
not  right. 

And  then  we  told  them:  No,  we  know  that  this  is  the  case.  And 
now  we  have  a  different  comment  from  DOD  saying  that,  yes,  we 
agree  with  GAO's  RCS  finding. 

So  in  other  words,  that  did  not  represent  a  problem.  They  did  not 
continue  with  that.  Once  we  told  them  we  knew,  that  was  the  end 
of  the  problem. 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  will  not  get  into  all  of  the  details  of  it,  since 
it  is  classified?  Is  this  something  that  was  open  to  a  considerable 
interpretation  where  there  could  have  been  two  different  views  of 
it? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  I  do  not  think  so,  not  in  my  view.  An  RCS  meas- 
urement is  an  RCS  measurement. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Let  me  turn  my  hat  around  and  argue  on 
DOD's  side  on  this  now. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes. 

Chairman  Glenn.  They  have  to  take  into  account  a  worst-case 
scenario.  If  you  are  in  combat,  you  want  to  be  prepared  for  the 
worst  thing  that  might  happen. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes. 

Chairman  Glenn.  How  much  of  their  disagreement  with  you  is 
based  on  worst-case  scenarios,  as  opposed  to  what,  with  20-20 
hindsight,  obviously  you  would  make  some  different  decisions  on 
weapons  systems,  once  we  found  out  in  a  war  that  there  was  not 
the  type  weapons  system  or  defense  out  there?  Then  obviously 


33 

whatever  we  had  prepared  is  not  necessary,  and  that  is  20-20 
hindsight? 
How  much  of  it  is  DOD  really  taking  the  worst-case  scenario  and 

trying  to  build  to  that? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Well,  it  is  a  question  of  philosophy,  it  seems  to 
me.  I  would  agree  that  it  is  always  possible  for  somebody  to  be  ap- 
propriately conservative.  Somebody  can  legitimately  say:  Well, 
maybe  I  do  not  know  everything  about  the  enemy's  defense;  maybe 
it  is  there,  and  I  am  just  not  aware  of  it;  the  data  don't  show  every- 
thing. 

If  that  were  the  only  issue,  I  would  say,  well,  they  might  inflate 
the  threat  because  they  were  being  prudent.  But  in  this  particular 
case  when  you  look  at  the  fact  that  the  performance  of  the  upgrades 
was  also  so  inflated,  that  is  not  a  prudent  act.  That  is  not  some- 
thing that  you  do  because  you  are  worried.  That  is  because  you  are 
trying  to  get  somebody  to  believe  that  you  have  something  which 
you  do  not  yet  know  you  have. 

I  am  concerned,  as  you  are,  Senator,  about  the  Bottom-Up  Re- 
view. When  I  heard  Secretary  Perry  say  a  few  minutes  ago  that  he 
feels  that  they  are  not  going  to  be  doing  the  kind  of  cost-effective- 
ness study  that  he  thinks  is  not  all  you  need— and  I  would  agree 
with  him,  that  is  not  all  you  need— but  that  they  are  not  going  to 
be  doing  it  is  of  some  concern  to  me. 

I  do  not  see  why  they  are  not  producing  those  data  and  looking 
at  performance  in  the  way  that  you  would  expect. 

One  other  point  I  wanted  to  make  about  what  he  said  was  that 
he  had  the  idea  that  we  had  just  done — and  I  mentioned  this  to 
him  on  his  way  out — that  we  had  just  looked  at  the  cost  of  surviv- 
ing warheads  generally,  but  we  looked  at  cost-to-go,  the  life-cycle 
cost-to-go,  which  excludes  sunk  costs.  We  took  those  out,  because 
obviously  we  agree  with  him,  that  really  the  big  issue  here  is  what 
is  left  to  spend.  We  cannot  do  anything  about  the  sunk  costs;  they 
are  gone. 

Chairman  Glenn.  What  did  you  find  on  their  look  at^-well,  look- 
ing at  your  findings  overall,  the  reader  might  feel  that  you  have 
been  a  little  hard  on  the  Air  Force.  Do  you  find  anything  worth 
praising? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Oh,  yes. 

Chairman  Glenn.  What  did  you  find  that  was  good? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  I  am  so  glad  you  asked  me  that.  I  am  concerned 
that  somebody  might  think  that  that  was  the  case,  and  I  am  afraid 
they  think  that. 

We  found,  you  know,  an  admirable  job  on  the  B-52,  as  I  men- 
tioned in  my  remarks,  and  we  also  feel  that  the  air  leg  makes  a 
really  important  contribution,  a  stabilizing  contribution  to  the 
triad.  As  you  have  probably  seen  in  GAO's  statement,  we  feel 
strongly  about  that. 

But  I  think  above  all  what  you  are  seeing  here  is  a  change  in 
circumstances  that  has  happened  over  the  years.  In  other  words, 
if  you  looked  at  the  triad  10  years  ago,  15  years  ago,  you  would 
definitely  say  that  the  ICBMs  had  great  accuracy  and  responsive- 
ness. They  were  the  dominant  leg,  along  with  the  bombers  mega- 
tonnage  and  payload  capability. 


34 

What  has  happened  is  that  the  Navy  has  really  gotten  an  ability 
to  deal  technologically  with  what  was  a  difficulty  of  the  medium; 
in  other  words,  launching  missiles  under  sea,  and  they  are  doing 
it  now  with  similar  accuracy  and  responsiveness  to  what  the 
ICBMs  can  do  and  with  similar  yield. 

So  what  you  have  is  a  kind  of  improvement  on  the  part  of  the 
Navy.  It  is  not  the  Air  Force's  fault  that  they  have  done  that.  But 
the  Navy  additionally  has  the  survivability  that  the  subs  have  al- 
ways had.  So  now  that  adds  up  to  an  extraordinarily  capable  and 
invulnerable  force.  I  was  glad  to  hear  that  Secretary  Perry  agreed 
with  that. 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  am  concerned  about  the  process  here,  be- 
cause DOD  is  into  a  whole  new  process  at  this  time. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes,  sir. 

Chairman  Glenn.  From  your  study,  how  do  we  get  more  ac- 
countability? What  process  change  do  you  think  is  necessary  in 
DOD  to  get  more  accuracy,  more  accountability?  Part  of  this  is  just 
plain  honesty  in  reporting. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes,  which  is  very  hard  to  get.  There  are  bar- 
riers. There  are  a  number  of  barriers. 

Chairman  Glenn.  If  there  is  difficulty  in  getting  honesty  in  re- 
porting to  get  your  figures,  and  you  were  getting  your  figures  direct 
from  individual  Services,  then  DOD  is  getting  those  same 
figures 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Exactly. 

Chairman  Glenn  [continuing].  To  make  their  decisions  on.  How 
do  we  correct  that? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Well,  I  think  there  are  barriers  in  the  sense  that 
the  incentives  that  are  there  essentially  tend  to  maximize  Service 
goals  rather  than  performance  goals,  as  you  and  other  people  said 
here  this  morning. 

And  I  think  there  is  a  lack  of  a  truly  independent  review  office 
with  strongly  analytical  capability  that  has  the  power  to  make  a 
review  stick  and  real  guarantees  for  independence.  I  think  that  is 
a  really  important  thing. 

I  think  you  can  always  go  to  GAO  for  a  second  review  to  take 
a  look  what  DOD  has  come  up  with,  and  we  can  go  into  the  meth- 
odological quality  of  the  work  that  has  been  done. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Let  me  ask  about  the  barriers  that  you  ran 
into  over  there  and  the  problems  you  have  had.  This  Committee 
has  been  very  active  in  working  very  closely  with  GAO  to  expand 
the  IGs  and  to  establish  Chief  Financial  Officers,  who  are  supposed 
to  evaluate  how  each  of  these  Departments  operates.  Is  it  efficient; 
is  it  not?  Are  we  getting  the  right  bottomline  statement  at  the  end 
of  the  year  to  accomplish  our  objectives?  All  these  things  that  are 
done  in  any  major  business  in  the  country. 

Are  these  going  to  help  in  this  regard- 


Ms.  Chelimsky.  Well,  they  help  with  regard  to- 


Chairman  Glenn  [continuing].  Or  do  we  need  something  else? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Well,  I  think  we  need  technical  capability  of  the 
sort  that  we  are  talking  about  in  the  studies  that  we  did  this  morn- 
ing and  certainly  in  the  Bottom-Up  Review. 

When  we  did  our  chemical  warfare  work  with  the  IG's  office  re- 
viewing it,  they  told  us  that  they  did  not  have  the  technical  capa- 


35 

bility  to  review  that  sort  of  work;  in  other  words,  the  kind  of  work 
we  have  done  for  you  this  morning  is  different  from  the  normal  au- 
diting function.  This  is  not  to  say  that  that  is  not  important;  it  is 
very  important,  but  there  are  some  other  things  that  you  need  as 

well. 

What  concerns  me  the  most,  Senator,  is  that  there  is  a  sort  of 
attitude  that  a  hypothesis,  an  opinion,  an  educated  guess  is  as  good 
as  a  retrospective  study.  In  other  words,  why  not  do  both?  It  is  fine 
to  have  educated,  very  smart  people  tell  you  what  they  think  is 
going  to  happen.  But  why  not  look  at  the  data  that  are  there  and 
see  what  has,  in  fact,  happened?  Why  do  we  not  do  that? 

Chairman  Glenn.  Can  you  suggest  any  other  system?  Do  you 
suggest  any  other  system  here,  other  than  calling  on  GAO  or 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  No.  I  think  they  need  their  own  independent — 
I  do  not  think  that  an  external  office  can  do  everything.  It  is  just 
impossible.  We  are  just,  what,  4800  people?  I  mean,  we  cannot  do 
all  of  these  studies.  Normally  we  should  be  looking  over  the  De- 
fense Department  studies  and  evaluating  them— that  is  our  normal 
role. 

So  it  seems  to  me,  they  need  their  own  independent  review  office 
which  should  really  be  able  to  say  something  to  the  Service  people. 
My  comment  on  that  is  that  in  the  past  it  has  been  very  hard  for 
them  to  gain  the  kind  of  power  that  they  need,  to  be  able  to  say, 
no,  this  is  not  a  good  study;  these  are  not  the  right  data.  It  is  very 
hard  for  them  to  say  that. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Now  there  has  been  a  proposal,  of  course,  to 
upgrade  or  to  modernize  Minuteman-III.  Is  that  correct? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Your  view  is  that  that  probably  is  not  nec- 
essary and  we  can  save  some  $23  billion?  Is  that  correct? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Well,  our  feeling  is,  it  is  not  clearly  justified  in 
the  sense  that  it  is  not  clear  what  that  would  get  for  us. 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  presume  we  would  just  leave  the  existing 
Minuteman  III  missiles  in  place? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Well,  that  certainly  is  an  option  that  the  Con- 
gress could  think  about. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Without  going  through  all  the  expensive  mod- 
ernizing. 

There  has  been  some  recent  information  about  the  potential  Rus- 
sian ASW,  anti-submarine  warfare  capabilities.  Do  you  still  stand 
by  your  finding,  "Test  and  operational  data  show  that  submerged 
SSBNs  are  much  less  detectable  than  generally  understood,  both 
now  and  in  future  years"?  Do  you  agree  with  that? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  We  really  do,  Senator.  I  am  glad  you  brought 
that  up,  because  Senator  Cohen  mentioned  it  earlier  a  little  bit  in 
passing. 

We  did  get  a  briefing  on  it.  We  know  what  the  situation  is  there. 
We  cannot,  of  course,  discuss  it,  because  it  is  classified,  but  the  fact 
is,  we  have  made  no  change  in  our  assessment. 

What  I  would  like  to  explain  to  you  is  why.  The  basis  is  that 
even  assuming  a  technological  breakthrough  in  detection,  the  ques- 
tion is:  What  would  it  then  take  to  make  it  operationally  effective 
against  a  deployed  force  of  U.S.  SSBNs?  That  is  really  the  issue. 


36 

And  we  calculated  the  ocean  areas  that  these  sensors  must 
search;  if  the  sensors  are  space-based,  the  number  of  satellites  re- 
quired for  continuous  coverage;  the  computer  capabilities  required 
to  process  the  data  from  the  space-based  sensors;  the  timeliness 
and  the  ability  of  the  processors  to  detect,  identify  (separating,  of 
course,  real  from  false  targets)  locate,  and  track  one  or  more 
SSBNs;  the  need  to  limit  the  barrage  area;  the  requirements  for  a 
water-penetrating  warhead;  and  the  ability  of  the  SSBN  to  utilize 
the  ocean  to  counter  the  threats. 

And  we  conclude  with  Secretary  Perry  that  this  is  not  a  likely 
event. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Were  your  findings  on  the  accuracy  of  dif- 
ferent missiles  a  result  of  test  data  that  you  had? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes. 

Chairman  Glenn.  It  was.  It  was  not  just  predictions;  they  were 
test  data? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  They  were  test  data.  We  used  test  data  when- 
ever they  were  available. 

Chairman  Glenn.  In  what  ways  did  GAO  estimates  on  ICBM 
silo  vulnerability  differ  with  the  DOD  estimates? 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Would  you  like  to  deal  with  that,  Jonathan? 

Chairman  Glenn.  Were  there  major  differences  there? 

Dr.  Tumin.  The  differences  were — in  the  end,  they  actually  con- 
curred with  our  analysis  that  essentially  there  was  not  a  window 
of  vulnerability — that,  as  we  stated,  the  only  way  you  could  con- 
clude that  the  entire  ICBM  silo  force  is  extremely  vulnerable  is  by 
using  only  the  worst-case  estimates  for  the  power  of  Soviet  ICBMs; 
that  is,  only  by  putting  in  the  highest  assumed  or  estimated  system 
reliability,  the  highest  accuracy,  and  so  forth,  and  highest  yield 
could  you  then  come  to  the  conclusion  that  our  entire  ICBM  force 
was  vulnerable  to  a  massive  surprise  attack. 

In  addition,  however,  you  must  take  into  account  several  of  what 
we  considered  unwarranted  assumptions.  For  example,  assuming 
that  the  Soviets  would  launch  a  massive  surprise  attack  without 
taking  into  consideration  both  our  bomber  force  and  our  submarine 
force,  that  there  would  be  no  retaliation  from  those  forces.  So  a 
number  of  assumptions  had  to  be  used  to  reach  the  conclusion  of 
great  vulnerability. 

In  their  comment  on  this  analysis  in  response  to  our  final  report, 
DOD  concurred  with  our  analysis  that  ICBM  vulnerability  had 
been  overestimated. 

Chairman  Glenn.  We  are  on  another  vote,  and  so  we  are  going 
to  have  to  end  here  very  shortly. 

Do  you  have  any  additional  comments  from  all  that  you  have 
heard  this  morning?  I  want  to  give  the  rest  of  you  a  chance  to 
make  any  comments  here. 

[No  response.] 

Chairman  Glenn.  Nothing?  No  one  else?  Thank  you. 

We  are  going  to  follow  up  with  questions  for  the  record.  In  par- 
ticular I  want  to  follow  up  on  where  you  were  given  false  informa- 
tion. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes,  sir. 


37 

Chairman  Glenn.  Where  we  had  two  different  sets  of  books,  in 
effect.  I  think  that  is  very  important,  so  that  we  do  not  get  caught 
this  way  again. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Not  again.  .  . 

Chairman  Glenn.  They  are  making  some  very  basic  decisions 
with  their  Bottom-Up  Review  right  now,  so  I  think  we  need  to  do 
that  right  away.  We  will  have  staff  getting  together  with  you  right 
away. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  That  is  fine. 

Chairman  Glenn.  You  have  put  in  a  great  deal  of  time  on  this, 
and  it  is  an  excellent  study. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  GLENN.  Obviously  it  is  something  that  we  should  be 
doing  and  they  should  be  doing  over  there 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes. 

Chairman  Glenn  [continuing].  Going  into  this  before,  not  coming 
out  of  it  afterwards. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Yes. 

Chairman  Glenn.  That  is  the  point. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  think  it  is  an  excellent  job,  and  I  thank  you 
very  much.  The  hearing  will  stand  in  recess. 

Ms.  Chelimsky.  Thank  you  very  much. 

[Whereupon,  at  11:34  a.m.,  the  Committee  was  recessed,  to  re- 
convene subject  to  the  call  of  the  chair.] 


APPENDIX 


Prepared  Statement  of  Eleanor  Chelimsky 

Mr  Chairman,  I  am  pleased  to  be  here  today  to  present  some  of  the  results  of 
GAO's  evaluation  of  the  U.S.  strategic  triad.  My  statement  is  based  on  a  set  of  eight 
classified  reports,  issued  in  September  1992,  that  assessed  the  cost-effectiveness  of 
the  principal  weapon  system  upgrades  in  the  triad's  air,  land,  and  sea  legs.  First 
I  would  like  to  review  the  most  important  findings  and  conclusions  of  our  study,  and 
then  briefly  summarize  our  recommendations. 

BACKGROUND 

In  April  1990,  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  asked  GAO  to  assess  the 
major  strategic  modernization  programs  of  the  Carter,  Reagan,  and  Bush  adminis- 
trations. In  particular,  the  Committee  wanted  a  comprehensive  evaluation  of  the 
strengths  and  weaknesses  of  these  programs,  and  a  determination  of  which  pro- 
posed upgrades  appeared  to  be  the  most  cost-effective.  This  required  us  to  make 
analytic  comparisons  between  deployed  and  proposed  weapon  systems,  and  across 
strategic  programs  in  all  three  legs  of  the  triad,  taking  into  account  the  threat  they 
were  intended  to  address  and  the  arms  control  agreements  that  would  likely  con- 
strain or  curtail  them.  In  conducting  our  literature  search  for  prior  similar  studies, 
we  found  that  no  Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  evaluation  had  examined  U.S.  stra- 
tegic forces  in  this  comprehensive  way  for  at  least  3  decades. 

The  nuclear  weapon  systems  and  proposed  upgrades  included  in  our  evaluation 
were,  for  the  air  leg:  the  B-52G  and  B-52H,  B-1B  and  B-2  bombers;  the  ALCM, 
ACM,  SRAM  A,  and  SRAM  II  missiles;  for  the  land  leg:  Minuteman  II  and  Minute- 
man  III  ICBMs;  the  Peacekeeper,  Peacekeeper  Rail  Garrison,  and  the  small  ICBM; 
and  for  the  sea  leg:  the  C-4  and  D-5  SLBMs  on  Lafayette  and  Ohio-class  nuclear- 
powered  ballistic  missile  submarines  (SSBNs).  We  assessed  all  systems  under  a  full 
range  of  threat  scenarios,  moving  from  total  surprise  attack  to  strategic  warning. 

To  compare  system  costs  across  strategic  program  upgrades,  our  unit  of  analysis 
was  the  30-year  life-cycle  (that  is,  we  included  not  just  R&D  and  procurement,  but 
also  operations  and  support  costs  for  every  system).  To  compare  system  effectiveness, 
we  used  seven  different  measures:  (1)  survivability  against  both  offensive  and  defen- 
sive threats,  for  both  platforms  and  weapons  (for  example,  submarines  and  their 
ballistic  missiles;  bombers  and  their  missiles);  (2)  delivery  system  performance  (that 
is,  accuracy,  range,  and  payload);  (3)  warhead  yield  and  reliability  (that  is,  the  prob- 
ability that  the  warhead  will  detonate  as  intended);  (4)  weapon  system  reliability 
(that  is,  the  combined  reliability  of  all  the  component  processes  from  platform 
launch  to  warhead  detonation);  (5)  flexibility  across  a  number  of  dimensions,  includ- 
ing retargeting,  recall,  and  impact  on  arms  control;  (6)  communications  (for  exam- 
ple, connectivity  between  command  authority  and  platforms);  and  (7)  responsiveness 
(that  is,  alert  rate  and  time-to-target). 

Establishing  these  comparisons  required  a  good  deal  of  test,  performance,  and  cost 
data.  In  the  great  majority  of  cases,  we  benefited  from  the  able  assistance  of  the 
Defense  Department.  However,  in  one  very  important  instance,  we  were  denied  ac- 
cess to  data  critical  to  establishing  the  reliability  of  the  Peacekeeper  warhead. 

We  organized  our  comparisons  around  seven  policy  questions,  each  presented  in 
a  separate  volume  of  the  triad  series,  along  with  a  summary  report.  The  questions 
are  as  follows: 

(1)  How  vulnerable  are  U.S.  SSBNs? 

(2)  How  vulnerable  are  silo-based  ICBMs? 

(3)  What  is  the  relative  effectiveness  of  ICBMs  versus  SLBMs? 

(4)  What  improved  capabilities  do  the  air  leg's  proposed  upgrades  provide,  relative 
to  existing  systems? 

(5)  What  are  the  comparative  costs  of  the  proposed  upgrades? 

(39) 


40 

(6)  What  capabilities  exist  within  the  triad  for  addressing  a  threat  posed  by  stra- 
tegic relocatable  targets  (SRTs)? 

(7)  What  strategic  capabilities  exist  in  France  and  the  United  Kingdom? 

Our  evaluative  approach  was  thus  designed  to  analytically  compare  the  major 
strategic  weapon  system  delivery  platforms,  missiles,  and  warheads,  incorporating 
arms  control,  threat,  cost,  and  performance  considerations.  It  was  also  intended  to 
provide  a  comprehensive  framework  that  would  permit  ongoing  and  future  calcula- 
tions of  the  number  and  structure  of  strategic  forces  likely  to  be  the  most  cost-effec- 
tive under  differing  arms  control  and  threat  configurations.  We  believe  this  latter 
capability  is  important  in  view  of  continuing  arms  reduction  agreements,  evolving 
uncertainties  in  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS),  a  changing  set  of 
threats  to  our  security,  and  consequent  requirements  for  potentially  different  mixes 
of  weapon  systems.  In  addition,  the  high  cost  of  new  procurement  in  a  period  of  di- 
minishing resources,  and  the  recurring  need  to  decide  which  weapon  systems  are 
most  desirable  to  retain,  make  it  critical  for  policymakers  to  know  with  confidence 
which  weapon  systems  operate  as  intended,  which  actually  possess  the  performance 
characteristics  commonly  attributed  to  them,  and  how  they  compare  in  a  variety  of 
measures. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  this  short  statement  can  present  only  highlights  of 
GAO's  eight  reports.  Also,  because  much  of  the  data  and  many  details  of  the  issues 
we  examined  are  classified,  both  this  statement  and  my  responses  to  your  questions 
are  constrained  by  security  requirements.  (I  would,  however,  welcome  the  oppor- 
tunity to  respond  to  questions  on  classified  issues  in  executive  session.) 

Now  let  me  turn  to  our  findings. 

MAJOR  GAO  FINDINGS 

Findings  on  the  Air  Led 

First,  in  examining  the  flight-test  performance  of  the  B-2,  we  found  problems  in- 
volving the  all-important  stealth  characteristics  intended  to  reduce  the  bomber's  de- 
tectability.  These  problems  have  also  been  reported  by  the  Air  Force:  that  is,  the 
B-2  did  not  perform  in  1991  tests  as  required.  More  recently,  however,  the  Air 
Force  reports  that  testing  has  progressed  far  enough  to  satisfy  the  various  certifi- 
cation requirements  imposed  by  the  Congress  on  the  B-2,  in  light  of  the  1991  test 
Sroblems.  Nonetheless,  only  one  quarter  of  the  B-2's  flight  testing  hours  had  been 
own  as  of  May  1993,  and  past  experience  has  been  that  important  and  costly  prob- 
lems have  emerged,  not  only  at  late  stages  of  flight  testing,  but  also  after  deploy- 
ment. Further,  as  we  reported  to  the  Congress  in  December  1992,  the  certification 
to  be  made  would  be  issued  without  benefit  of  actual  B-2  flight  tests  of  integrated 
offensive  and  defensive  avionics.  Given  the  limited  number  and  nature  of  the  tests 
held  to  date,  it  is  difficult  to  have  a  high  degree  of  confidence  in  overall  B-2  per- 
formance at  the  present  time. 

Indeed,  the  history  of  the  less  technologically  ambitious  B-1B  reinforces  the  prin- 
ciple that  final  evaluation  of  weapon  system  performance  should  be  reserved  until 
all  operational  testing  is  completed.  For  the  B-1B,  we  found  that  although  DOD  has 
reported  success  in  reducing  its  radar  cross  section  (RCS),  the  measurement  cited 
by  DOD  is  questionable  from  the  viewpoints  of  both  representativeness  and  accu- 
racy. First,  even  though  the  B-lB's  RCS  has  been  measured  from  all  angles,  only 
the  head-on  RCS  measurement  was  reported.  That  is,  the  side  and  rear  measure- 
ments, both  of  which  are  very  much  larger,  have  not  been  publicly  presented.  Since 
radar  intercepts  can  occur  at  any  angle,  head-on  data  alone  cannot  be  a  representa- 
tive measure  of  detectability.  Second,  we  found  that  even  the  head-on  measurement 
reported  did  not  correspond  to  actual  test  results. 

In  other  performance  areas,  the  B-1B  has  had  a  long  history  of  test  and  oper- 
ational shortcomings.  It  has  been  grounded  numerous  times;  its  electronic  counter- 
measures  continue  to  be  a  major  problem;  its  flight  controls  have  needed  significant 
modifications;  and  we  found  its  reliability  and  range  to  be  areas  for  serious  concern 
that  require  further  testing.  These  persistent  deficiencies  may  not  be  easily  or 
quickly  resolvable,  and  substantial  additional  costs  may  be  involved. 

Because  of  this  B-1B  history,  the  cost  of  the  B-2  program  is  of  particular  concern, 
especially  given  the  paucity  of  data  on  operational  and  support  costs.  Currently,  the 

E  rejected  cost  to  acquire  the  20-aircraft  program  is  $44.4  billion.  Of  this  total,  $2.8 
illion  was  authorized  but  "fenced"  by  the  Congress  for  the  last  five  B-2s  requested 
by  the  Bush  Administration.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  five  aircraft  together 
would  be  able  to  deliver  only  about  2.3  percent  of  the  total  number  of  strategic  war- 
heads permitted  under  the  START  II  agreement,  and,  as  discussed  below,  the  B- 


41 

2's  lifecycle  cost  per  arriving  warhead  substantially  exceeds  that  for  weapon  systems 
in  either  of  the  other  legs.1 

On  the  other  hand,  we  found  that  the  B-52,  whose  obsolescence  has  been  widely 
reported  and  cited  as  a  rationale  for  developing  both  the  B-1B  and  B-2,  is  still  a 
viable  aircraft  that  performs  a  great  deal  better  than  is  generally  understood.  Air 
Force  flight  hour  data  show  that,  as  of  1990,  the  airframes  and  other  key  structural 
components  of  both  the  B-52G  and  the  B-52H  had  reached  only  about  half  then- 
life  expectancies.  In  addition,  the  Air  Force  has  been  performing  numerous  modifica- 
tion programs  over  the  life  of  the  B-52  to  assure  its  continuing  effectiveness;  these 
include  new  offensive  and  defensive  avionics,  new  communications  equipment,  new 
missile  launcher  racks  to  provide  cruise  missile  compatibility,  and  various  programs 
to  enhance  reliability  and  maintainability.  Further,  comparisons  of  data  on  multiple 
measures  of  effectiveness  show  that  the  B-52  compares  favorably  to  the  newer  B- 
1B  which  has  shown  deficiencies  on  a  number  of  important  performance  dimensions 
(for  example,  reliability  or  electronic  countermeasures).  Both  models  of  the  B-52 
have  continuing  capability— the  B-52G  as  a  cruise  missile  carrier  and  the  B-52H 
as  a  strategic  penetrating  bomber— and  both  should  remain  usable  aircraft  for  many 
years  to  come,  in  both  conventional  and  strategic  roles.  Indeed,  the  entire  B-1B 
force  was  grounded  for  the  duration  of  the  Gulf  War,  while  the  B-52s  were  major 
participants.  .  ,      D  „ 

Also,  in  further  examining  the  rationales  supporting  the  need  tor  the  07A  we 
found  that  the  Soviet  air  defense  threat,  like  the  B-52's  obsolescence  had  been 
overestimated.2  Evaluation  of  the  data  over  the  period  1972-1991  showed  this  clear- 
ly with  regard  to  both  the  number  and  the  effectiveness  of  Soviet  an  defenses 
against  existing  U.S.  bombers  and  their  weapons.  Today,  the  breakup  of  the  Soviet 
Union  the  rivalries  among  the  CIS  states,  and  economic  conditions  within  the  Com- 
monwealth suggest  that  current  air  defenses  are  more  likely  to  degrade  than  im- 
prove. In  short,  the  Soviet  air  defense  threat  that  the  B-2  had  been  created  to  ad- 
dress was  never  in  fact  deployed.  . 

With  regard  to  air  leg  armaments,  we  found  that  the  actual  range  ot  the  Air 
Launched  Cruise  Missile  (ALCM)  was  better  than  what  had  been  reported.  This 
means  that  the  improvement  in  range  to  be  brought  by  the  ALCM  upgrade,  that 
is,  the  Advanced  Cruise  Missile  (ACM),  was  only  slightly  greater  than  the  older 
ALCM's  demonstrated  capability.  We  also  found  that  the  improvement  in  accuracy 
offered  by  the  ACM  appears  to  have  little  real  operational  significance. 

Findings  on  the  Land  and  Sea  Legs 

We  found  that  the  Soviet  threat  to  the  weapon  systems  of  the  land  and  sea  legs 
had  also  been  overstated.  For  the  sea  leg,  this  was  reflected  in  unsubstantiated  alle- 
gations about  likely  future  breakthroughs  in  Soviet  submarine  detection  tech- 
nologies, along  with  underestimation  of  the  performance  and  capabilities  of  our  own 
nuclear-powered  ballistic  missile  submarines.  The  projected  threat  to  the  sea  leg 
was,  however,  used  frequently  as  a  justification  for  costly  modernizations  in  the 
other  legs  to  "hedge"  against  SSBN  vulnerability.  Our  specific  finding,  based  on 
operational  test  results,  was  that  submerged  SSBNs  are  even  less  detectable  than 
is  generally  understood,  and  that  there  appear  to  be  no  current  or  long-term  tech- 
nologies that  would  change  this.  Moreover,  even  if  such  technologies  did  exist,  test 
and  operational  data  show  that  the  survivability  of  the  SSBN  fleet  would  not  be  in 
question.  , 

In  the  case  of  the  land  leg,  we  found  that  the  claimed  "window  of  vulnerability 
caused  by  improved  Soviet  missile  capability  against  our  silo-based  ICBMs  was 
overstated  on  three  counts.  First,  it  did  not  recognize  the  existence  of  sea  and  air 
leg  deterrence— that  is,  the  likelihood  that  the  Soviets  would  hesitate  to  launch  an 
all-out  attack  on  the  ICBM  silos,  given  their  inability  to  target  submerged  U.S. 
SSBNs  or  on-alert  bombers  and  their  thousands  of  warheads  that  could  be  expected 
to  retaliate.  Second,  the  logic  behind  the  claim  assumed  only  the  highest  estimates 
for  such  key  Soviet  missile  performance  dimensions  as  accuracy,  yield,  and  reliabil- 
ity, while  at  the  same  time  discounting  very  substantial  uncertainties  about  per- 
formance that  could  not  have  been  resolved  short  of  nuclear  conflict.  Third,  it  ig- 

1  Our  analysis  of  the  B-2  focused  on  its  originally  intended  strategic-nuclear  mission;  however, 
since  the  breakup  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the  Air  Force  has  articulated  a  conventional  role  for  the 
aircraft.  This  newer  rationale  for  the  bomber  is  addressed  in  our  February  1993  report,  Strategic 
Bombers:  Adding  Conventional  Capabilities  Will  Be  Complex  Time-Consuming  and  Costly, 
(GAO/NSIAD-93-45).  In  this  report,  we  found  that,  given  the  very  incomplete  nature  of  the 
flight  test  program,  it  is  premature  to  confirm  the  actual  operational  capabilities  of  the  aircraft 
in  a  conventional  role. 

2  Indeed,  our  analysis  revealed  a  fairly  large  number  of  areas  in  which  the  available  data  did 
not  support  many  conventionally-held  beliefs.  (See  appendix  I  for  a  display  of  these  issues.) 


42 

nored  the  capabilities  of  U.S.  early  warning  systems  to  detect  a  Soviet  ICBM  attack 
and,  thereby,  allow  a  reasonably  rapid  response. 

With  respect  to  ICBM  performance,  we  found  much  more  uncertainty  on  a  num- 
ber of  dimensions  than  expected.  Within  the  triad,  the  land  leg's  ICBMs  have  long 
been  perceived  as  having  the  highest  reliability  of  any  weapon  system,  as  well  as 
the  greatest  accuracy.  But  we  found,  using  test  data,  that  accuracy  estimates  for 
the  Peacekeeper — the  lead  ICBM  system — were  based  on  a  very  limited  number  of 
test  shots,  some  using  operationally  unrepresentative  software  or  hardware.  As  of 
early  1992,  accuracy  estimates  were  based  on  data  from  fewer  than  25  launches,  of 
which  the  first  18  combined  developmental  and  operational  elements.  This  alone 
creates  considerable  uncertainty  in  accuracy  claims  derived  from  these  results.  Sec- 
ond, because  DOD  refused  to  release  critical  data  on  Peacekeeper  warhead  reliabil- 
ity, we  cannot  validate  DOD's  high  estimates  for  it.  Third,  to  lower  costs,  SAC  re- 
duced the  Peacekeeper's  test  rate  from  8  to  3  shots  per  year,  which  further  dimin- 
ishes confidence  in  any  future  estimates  of  the  system's  performance.  (Similarly,  the 
test  rate  of  the  Minuteman  HI  system  was  also  reduced — from  7  to  4  shots  per 

?ear — thereby  also  decreasing,  over  time,  the  credibility  of  performance  estimates.) 
n  sum,  uncertainty  in  the  estimates  for  the  Peacekeeper  is  created  by  a  combina- 
tion of  inadequate  evidence,  insufficient  test  rates,  and  gaps  in  the  data. 

In  contrast,  we  found  that  the  sea  leg's  performance  has  been  understated  (or 
poorly  understood)  on  a  number  of  critical  dimensions.  Test  and  operational  patrol 
data  show  that  the  speed  and  reliability  of  day-to-day  communications  to  sub- 
merged, deployed  SSBNs'  are  far  better  than  widely  believed,  and  about  the  equal 
in  speed  and  reliability  of  communications  to  ICBM  silos.  Yet  conventional  wisdom 
gives  much  higher  marks  to  ICBM  command  and  control  responsiveness  than  to 
that  of  submarines.  In  point  of  fact,  SSBNs  are  in  essentially  constant  communica- 
tion with  national  command  authorities  and,  depending  on  the  scenario,  SLBMs 
from  submarine  platforms  would  be  almost  as  prompt  as  ICBMs  in  hitting  enemy 
targets. 

Other  test  data  show  that  the  accuracy  and  reliability  of  the  Navy's  D-5  SLBM 
are  about  equal  to  DOD's  best  estimates  for  the  Peacekeeper.  Further,  its  warhead 
has  a  higher  yield  than  the  Peacekeeper's.  In  short,  we  estimate  that  the  D-5  has 
a  hard  target  kill  capability  about  equal  to  the  Peacekeeper's,  while  its  platforms 
remain  virtually  undetectable,  unlike  easily  located  silos. 

Findings  on  Triad  System  Costs 

We  compared  the  30-year  life-cycle  costs  of  the  major  triad  system  upgrades,  tak- 
ing into  account  the  whole  range  of  attack  scenarios,  and  using  DOD's  own  estimates 
for  the  performance  of  each  major  upgrade,  whether  or  not  the  current  test  data 
supported  these  (high/best)  estimates.  Measured  in  terms  of  life-cycle  costs  per  ar- 
riving warhead,  the  B-2  would  cost  between  2V2  and  5  times  more  than  the  D-5/ 
Ohio  system  under  any  attack  scenario,  depending  on  the  number  of  warheads  on 
the  D-5.  (These  estimates  are  conservative  in  that  they  assume  the  B-2  will  be  as 
effective  as  planned  by  DOD  and  that  costs  will  not  grow,  whereas  the  cost,  test, 
and  operational  performance  data  on  the  D-5/Ohio  system  are  considerably  more  re- 
liable and  complete.)  When  we  compared  the  upgraded/de-MIRVed  Minuteman  III 
system — now  being  proposed  by  the  Air  Force — to  the  life-cycle  cost-to-go  per  arriv- 
ing warhead  for  the  D-5/Ohio  system,  we  found  they  were  almost  identical,  but  with 
the  significant  performance  advantage  for  the  latter  of  being  based  on  submerged, 
essentially  invulnerable  submarines.3 

Findings  on  DOD's  Evaluations  of  Its  Strategic  Programs 

In  comparing  performance  and  cost  across  the  legs  and  weapon  systems  of  the 
triad,  we  were  concerned  to  find  little  or  no  prior  recent  effort  by  DOD  to  do  what 
we  were  doing — that  is,  evaluate  comprehensively  the  relative  effectiveness  of  simi- 
lar weapon  systems.  Yet  such  agency  evaluation  is  critical  if  limited  budget  dollars 
are  to  be  concentrated  on  programs  that  are  both  needed  and  effective. 

With  regard  to  proposed  upgrades,  we  found  many  instances  of  dubious  support 
for  claims  of  their  high  performance;  insufficient  and  often  unrealistic  testing;  un- 
derstated cost;  incomplete  or  unrepresentative  reporting;  lack  of  systematic  compari- 
son against  the  systems  they  were  to  replace;  and  unconvincing  rationales  for  their 
development  in  the  first  place.  Where  mature  programs  were  concerned,  on  the 


3  This  comparative  coat  estimate  is  biased  against  the  D-5/Ohios,  since  the  Air  Force  has  in- 
formed us  that  the  Minuteman  III  cost  estimate  on  which  it  is  based — and  which  they  had  pro- 
vided to  us — actually  understated  lifecycle  costs  by  nearly  40  percent,  for  maintaining  the  Min- 
uteman III  force  through  the  year  2020.  Further,  even  the  revised  Minuteman  III  cost  estimate 
may  be  overly  optimistic,  in  that  it  assumes  that  maintenance  costs  do  not  increase  over  the 
2010-2020  decade,  compared  to  the  previous  one. 


43 

other  hand,  we  often  found  that  their  performance  was  understated  and  that  inap- 
propriate claims  of  obsolescence  had  been  made. 

Specifically,  we  found  that  the  vulnerability  of  our  B-52s,  submarines,  and  silo- 
based  ICBMs  to  a  Soviet  threat  had  been  overstated;  that  performance  claimed  for 
the  B-2  is  as  yet  unproven;  that  B-1B,  ACM,  and  Peacekeeper  capabilities  were 
often  inflated;  that  costs  for  strategic  systems  generally  were  incomplete  (operating 
and  support  costs  having  typically  gone  unreported);  and  that  the  performances  of 
B-52s  and  SSBNs  were  consistently  understated. 

We  looked  for  assessments  systematically  comparing  proposed  upgrades  against 
the  weapon  systems  they  were  intended  to  replace  and  found  none  in  the  cases  of 
the  B-2,  the  B-1B,  and  ACM;  we  found  insufficient  test  samples  for  the  B-1B, 
ALCM,  ACM,  SRAM  A,  and  Peacekeeper;  and  we  found  many  examples  of  unrealis- 
tic testing  for  the  B-1B,  ALCM,  ACM,  and  Peacekeeper. 

Perhaps  the  most  important  point  here  is  that  comparative  evaluation  across  the 
three  legs  of  the  triad — and  between  individual  weapon  systems  and  their  proposed 
upgrades — has  been  signally  lacking.  This  is  unfortunate  because  it  deprives  policy- 
makers in  both  the  executive  branch  and  the  Congress  of  information  they  need  for 
making  decisions  involving  hundreds  of  billions  of  dollars.  (The  life-cycle  costs  for 
triad  modernization  stood  at  about  $350  billion  in  1990.)  Examples  of  generic  areas 
in  which  we  found  significant  knowledge  gaps  are  given  in  appendix  II. 

This  is  not  to  argue  that  narrower  evaluation  should  not  also  be  done,  and  done 
realistically  and  rigorously.  Indeed,  we  have  seen  some  examples  of  excellent  work 
of  this  type,  including  the  evaluations  of  SLBM  and  SSBN  performance  produced 
for  DOD  by  the  Johns  Hopkins  University  Applied  Physics  Laboratory.  But  examin- 
ing whether  a  weapon  system  meets  its  specifications  cannot  get  at  larger  evalua- 
tive questions  like  (1)  whether  the  mission  to  be  addressed  by  a  proposed  new  sys- 
tem is  already  adequately  handled  by  capabilities  existing  elsewhere  in  the  triad, 
or  (2)  whether  that  new  system  has  the  capability  to  improve  significantly  on  exist- 
ing performance,  and  at  what  relative  cost. 

MAJOR  GAO  CONCLUSIONS 

Based  on  the  comparative  findings  presented  above  and  the  analysis  conducted  for 
our  studies,  we  conclude  that,  on  balance,  the  evidence  shows  the  sea  leg  to  be  the 
strongest,  most  cost-effective  component  of  the  triad  under  a  range  of  scenarios. 

A  second  conclusion  concerns  the  role  of  the  air  leg  in  the  context  of  the  triad. 
Because  strategic  bombers  are  recallable  (as  missiles  are  not),  and  because  they  are 
virtually  incapable  of  effecting  a  surprise  attack,  they  add  a  critically  important  sta- 
bilizing character  to  the  overall  nuclear  force.  This  is  not  to  argue  the  case  for  any 
particular  bomber,  but  rather  to  draw  attention  to  the  contribution  of  the  air  leg 
as  such. 

Finally,  on  the  subject  of  evaluation,  we  are,  of  course,  concerned  by  the  multiple 
individual  flaws  and  failures  we  found  in  areas  like  threat  forecasting,  testing,  and 
reporting.  However,  we  are  even  more  concerned  by  the  dearth  of  comparative  stud- 
ies that  are  needed  to  show  whether  a  proposed  system  is  justified  in  terms  of  the 
threat  it  faces,  its  performance  capabilities  vis-a-vis  other  systems,  and  its  relative 
costs. 

GAO  RECOMMENDATIONS 

Based  on  these  findings  and  conclusions,  we  make-  the  following  six  recommenda- 
tions to  the  Congress. 

•  With  respect  to  whether  five  more  B-2s  should  be  procured,  we  find  no  strategic 
grounds  for  acquiring  them.  Regarding  the  more  recent  justification  that  the 
program  is  needed  to  fill  a  conventional  role,  we  find  that  adding  such  capabil- 
ity to  the  B-2  strategic  bomber  design  will  be  complex,  time  consuming,  and 
extremely  costly.  In  addition,  its  capability  to  perform  either  of  its  intended  con- 
ventional and  strategic  missions  remains  unproven,  and  other  alternatives 
exist. 

•  More  operational  testing  of  the  B-1B  is  needed  to  verify  that  scheduled  im- 
provements in  reliability  and  electronic  countermeasures  are  achieved,  and  to 
remove  remaining  uncertainties  concerning  range  performance. 

•  On  Minuteman  III,  we  question  the  advisability  of  funding  extensive  major  life- 
service  upgrades  for  this  force  because  the  cost-effectiveness  of  such  an  effort 
is  not  obvious.  There  are  three  reasons  for  this:  the  Air  Force's  estimated  $23 
billion  as  the  price  tag  for  upgrading  and  maintaining  it  through  the  year  2020; 
the  fact  of  a  reduced-threat  environment,  now  and  in  the  foreseeable  future;  and 


44 

the  likelihood  that  substantive  modifications  would  require  robust  flight  test 
programs  that  would  quickly  use  up  limited  test  assets. 

•  Given  the  importance  of  the  D-5  missile  to  the  sea  leg  of  the  triad,  and  given 
the  importance  of  flight  testing  to  achieve  an  understanding  of  missile  perform- 
ance, adequate  D-5  SLBM  flight  testing  should  continue.  The  D-5  test  rate 
should  not  be  cut  from  levels  required  to  confidently  assess  weapon  system  ca- 
pability, as  has  occurred  with  the  Peacekeeper  and  Minuteman  forces. 

•  On  the  ACM,  we  concurred  with  the  September  1991  decision  to  cap  production 
at  520  missiles,  rather  than  funding  an  additional  120,  given  that  ACM  pro- 
vides little  operationally  significant  improvement  over  the  older  ALCM.  We 
would  also  concur  with  a  decision  to  cap  the  program  at  an  even  lower  level. 
However,  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  the  cruise  missile  inventory,  we  see  a 
need  to  hold  more  realistic  flight  tests  of  ALCM's  survivability  and  of  both 
ALCM's  and  ACM's  performance  over  terrain  that  has  not  been  pretested. 

•  On  evaluation,  we  would  reiterate  the  Comptroller  General's  recent  suggestion 
that  the  Congress  consider  setting  aside  hearing  time  each  year  for  Federal 
agencies — in  this  case,  DOD — to  present  the  results  of  requested  evaluations, 
studies,  and  audits.  We  believe  that  more  frequent  congressional  hearings  on 
weapons  performance,  combined  with  regular  congressionally-mandated  evalua- 
tions, would  provide  more  of  an  incentive  to  DOD  both  to  emphasize  the  quality 
and  usefulness  of  its  analyses,  and  to  undertake  the  critically  needed  compara- 
tive evaluations. 

The  Defense  Department's  response  to  our  series  of  reports  is  to  "partially  concur" 
on  some  of  our  findings,  and  to  disagree  with  others.  Where  appropriate,  we  modi- 
fied our  language  based  on  DOD's  comments  or  on  new  data  they  supplied.  In  other 
areas,  however,  we  must  continue  to  disagree.  For  example,  one  DOD  concern  cen- 
ters around  our  reanalysis  of  their  estimates  of  the  Soviet  air  defense  threat:  they 
point  out  that  past  intelligence  projections  will  invariably  show  divergences  from 
more  current  ones. 

While  it  is  true  that  projection  errors  are  always  to  be  expected,  they  normally 
occur  in  both  directions,  either  overstatement  or  understatement.  What  we  found, 
however,  is  that  DOD's  threat  projections  were  rarely  if  ever  understated,  but  rath- 
er, in  the  vast  majority  of  cases,  greatly  overstated.  Because  the  error  was  always 
in  one  direction,  this  undermines  the  explanation  of  random  divergence;  in  particu- 
lar, the  effect  was  to  make  the  threat  loom  larger  than  the  data  could  support. 

We  would  agree  with  the  Defense  Department  that  the  international  atmosphere 
of  our  time  is  greatly  altered  and  that  the  strategic  threat  has  changed,  but  we 
would  also  note  that  because  nuclear  weapons  remain  in  force  in  many  places  in 
the  world,  our  new  defense  posture  must  take  these  realities — and  especially  the  re- 
alities of  performance  and  cost — into  account.  The  fact  that  the  threat  has  changed 
does  not  mean  that  sound  information  is  no  longer  needed  on  the  triad  and  its  com- 
ponent parts.  Indeed,  decisions  on  procurements,  appropriations,  and  budgetary 
realignments  will  continue  to  require  the  very  best  possible  evaluative  analysis. 

It  may  be  worth  noting  that  while  DOD  differed  with  us  on  some  findings,  the 
Bush  administration's  actions  in  fact  mirrored  some  of  our  major  recommendations 
in  early  drafts  of  our  triad  capping  report.  For  example,  we  questioned  the  need  for 
either  SICBM  or  Peacekeeper  rail  garrison;  both  were  cancelled  by  President  Bush. 
We  found  no  need  for  even  four  more  B-2s;  that  force  was  cut  from  75  to  20  by 
President  Bush.  We  also  questioned  the  need  for  the  ACM,  and  noted  that  insuffi- 
cient tests  of  the  Minuteman  lis  precluded  any  confidence  in  estimates  of  the  mis- 
sile's reliability;  President  Bush  cut  the  ACM  buy  from  1,000  to  520,  and  decommis- 
sioned the  entire  Minuteman  II  force. 

We  hope  the  findings  we  have  presented  here  on  weapon  system  and  cross-leg 
cost-effectiveness  will  assist  both  DOD  and  the  Congress  in  deliberating  and  deter- 
mining the  future  size  and  structure  of  a  nuclear  force  that  (1)  integrates  our  most 
effective  weapon  systems  into  a  leaner,  less  costly  whole,  and  (2)  meets  the  Nation's 
strategic  security  requirements  for  many  years  to  come. 

Mr.  Chairman,  that  concludes  my  remarks.  I  would  be  happy  to  answer  any  ques- 
tions you  or  the  Committee  may  have. 


45 


APPENDIX  I 


APPENDIX  I 


Table  1.1:   The  Air  Lea:   Beliefs  Versus  Findings1 
££LX££  FtNPtW? 

1.  On  Air  Base  Survivability 


Bombers  at  bases  have  been 
vulnerable  to  surprise 
Soviet  attack. 

2.  On  Penetration  Survivability 

Soviet  air  defenses  have  grown 
dramatically. 

Soviet  SAMs  and  interceptors 
are  very  effective. 


B-2  is  needed  to  preserve 
the  penetrating  bomber  role. 


ACM  is  needed  to  overcome  low 
ALCM  survivability. 

3.  On  Target  Coverage 

Detectability  and  slowness  make 
the  air-leg  "stabilizing." 

B-1B  and  B-2  have  sufficient 
range  for  their  strategic 
mission  requirements. 

Bombers  are  readily  recallable 
and  retargetable  under  any 
scenario,  including  nuclear 
war. 

B-2  is  needed  for  SRT  missions. 


4.  On  Obsolescence 

B-52  age  mandates  replacement. 


The  data  show  surprise  attack 
to  have  been  extremely 
unlikely. 


High  growth  did  not  occur. 

Combat  experience  and 
intelligence  assessments 
indicate  lesser  capabilities. 

Data  show  B-1B  and  B-52H  can 
continue  to  be  survivable 
penetrators. 

Tests  did  not  demonstrate 
low  ALCM  survivability. 


Available  data 
support  this  belief. 

Insufficient  evidence  to 
support  this  belief;  reliable 
test  data  are  lacking. 

Nuclear  effects  and  jamming 
are  likely  to  degrade  C3, 
thus  limiting  recallability 
and  retargeting. 

Analysis  shows  that 
no  special  capability 
exists  or  is  foreseen. 


Air  Force  data  show  B-52G  &  H 
viability  for  many  years  to  come. 


10nly  selected  material  on  beliefs  versus  findings  is  presented 
here;  classified  information  has  been  deleted. 


22 


46 


APPENDIX  I 


APPENDIX  I 


Table  1.2:   The  Land  Leg 

EEilEZ 

1.  On  ICBM  Base  Survivability 


Beliefs  Versus  Findings2 
FINDING 


Silo-based  ICBMs  have  been 
highly  vulnerable  to  massive, 
surprise  Soviet  attack. 


2.  On  Penetration  Survivability 

ICBMs  face  no  effective  ABM 
defenses. 


Claims  for  high  vulnerability 
were  based  on  worst-case 
estimates  of  Soviet  ICBM 
capabilities,  as  well  as  other 
questionable  assumptions. 


Available  data  support  this 
view. 


3.  On  Target  Coverage 

ICBM  C3  is  prompt,  reliable, 
and  has  great  redundancy. 

ICBMs  can  launch  promptly 
after  receipt  of  orders 
for  attack. 


Available  data  generally 
support  this  perception. 

Available  data  support  this 
conclusion,  but  are  based  on 
launches  from  test  silos  and 
simulated  electronic  launch 
tests. 

DOD's  refusal  to  provide 
critical  reliability  data 
and  insufficient  operational 
tests  reduce  the  level  of 
confidence  in  Peacekeeper's 
performance  estimates. 

Rail  garrison  Peacekeepers        Insufficient  data  to  support 
and  mobile  SICBMs  would  have     this  belief, 
the  same  accuracy  and  reliability 
as  ICBMs  in  silos. 


Peacekeeper  is  very  accurate 
and  very  reliable. 


20nly  selected  material  on  beliefs  versus  findings  is  presented 
here;  classified  information  has  been  deleted. 

23 


47 


APPENDIX  I 


APPENDIX  I 


Table  1.3:   The  Sea  Lea: Beliefs  Versus  Findings3 

BELIEF  FINDING 

1.  On  Survivability 


While  submerged  SSBNs  are 
currently  hard  to  detect, 
a  breakthrough  in  detection 
technology  that  will  threaten 
them  is  possible  in  the 
future . 


2.  On  Penetration  Survivability 

SLBMs  face  no  effective  ABM 
defenses. 

3.  On  Target  Coverage 

C3  to  SSBNs  is  much  slower  and 
much  less  reliable  than  to 
ICBM  silos. 


SLBMs  cannot  be  used  against 
time  urgent  targets  due  to  a 
combination  of  slow  C3 
and  launch  procedures. 


SLBMs  cannot  effectively  attack 
the  hardest  category  of  Soviet 
targets  due  to  insufficient 
accuracy . 

Range  and  deployment  area 
limitations  may  weaken 
sea  leg  accuracy  and 
survivability. 


No  current,  near-  or  far-term 
submarine  detection 
technologies,  potential 
applications,  or  Soviet 
capabilities  would  be 
effective  in  reliably  locating 
a  single  submerged,  deployed 
U.S.  SSBN,  much  less  the 
entire  fleet. 


Available  data  support  this 
assumption. 


Data  show  C3  to  SSBNs 
is  about  as  prompt  and  as 
reliable  as  to  ICBM  silos, 
under  a  range  of  conditions. 

Compared  to  ICBMs, 
no  operationally  meaningful 
difference  in  time  to  target 
was  found.   Arms  control 
agreements  will  severely 
reduce  the  number  of  "time- 
urgent"  Soviet  ICBM  targets. 

Test  data  show  that  D-5  SLBMs 
do  in  fact  have  this 
capability. 


SSBN  patrol  areas  and  D-5 
range  and  estimated  accuracy 
impose  no  such  limitations. 


3Only  selected  material  on  beliefs  versus  findings  is  presented 
here;  classified  information  has  been  deleted. 


24 


48 


APPENDIX  II 


APPENDIX  II 


Table  II. 1:  _  GAO's  Findings  on  Significant  Knowledge  Limitations 
Vis-a-Vis  Three  Dimensions  of  Strategic  Weapons  System 
Assessment 


Air 

Land 

Sea 

B-2 

B-1B 

B-52 

Peace- 
keeper 

MM  III 

D-5/ 
Ohio 

Threat* 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

Performance' 

X 

X 

X 

X 

Testing6 

X 

X 

X 

X 

"Threat  or  performance  has  been  incorrectly  reported  on  at  least 
one  significant  dimension. 

Operational  testing  has  experienced  a  significant  qualitative  or 
quantitative  problem  or  limitation. 


25 


49 

Prepared  Statement  of  William  J.  Perry 

Good  morning  Mr.  Chairman  and  Members  of  the  Committee.  Thank  you  for  the 
opportunity  to  present  my  views  in  conjunction  with  the  committee's  hearing  on  the 
"Evaluation  of  the  Viability  of  the  U.S.  Strategic  Nuclear  Triad."  As  you  know,  the 
Department  is  currently  reviewing  the  full  range  of  DOD  force  structure  options.  We 
expect  to.  complete  that  review  shortly.  Since  it  is  ongoing,  I  will  defer  comment 
on  the  specifics  of  our  work.  However,  I  do  want  to  take  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
the  structure  of  our  nuclear  forces  in  the  context  of  today's  global  environment  I 
would  also  like  to  make  some  general  comments  on  the  GAO's  Triad  report,  al- 
though the  Department  has  not  yet  formally  completed  its  comments  on  the  GAO 
final  report  and  findings. 

Global  Environment  for  Strategic  Nuclear  Forces 

Today's  changing  security  environment  confronts  us  with  significant  uncertainties 
and  challenges  in  our  force  planning  The  disappearance  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  and  the 
subsequent  breakup  of  the  Soviet  Union  dramatically  altered  the  global  security 
landscape  in  a  very  positive  way.  The  conventional  threat  to  our  NATO  allies  has 
largely  disappeared  and,  in  light  of  our  continually  improving  relationship  with  the 
Russian  government,  the  threat  of  a  massive  nuclear  attack  on  the  United  States 
is  at  an  all  time  low.  There  are  nevertheless,  issues  with  which  we  have  to  deal; 
the  nuclear  weapons  deployed  by  the  former  Soviet  Union  still  number  in  the  tens 
of  thousands,  and  many  of  these  are  deployed  in  Ukraine,  Kazakhstan  and  Belarus; 
the  threat  of  FSU  nuclear  weapons  falling  into  the  hands  of  terrorists  or  unfriendly 
governments  still  remains — a  problem  we  have  dubbed  "loose  nucs";  in  addition,  an 
increasing  number  of  countries  possess,  or  are  seeking  to  acquire,  technologies  asso- 
ciated with  weapons  of  mass  destruction.  I  would  like  to  describe  to  you  our  strategy 
for  dealing  with  these  threats  to  American  security. 

Nuclear  Weapons  in  the  Former  Soviet  Union 

The  nuclear  weapons  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  represent  the  most  proximate  of 
the  potential  nuclear  threats  we  face.  We  are  dealing  with  this  on  four  fronts. 

First,  and  foremost,  we  are  working  to  encourage  and  sustain  the  growth  of 
friendly  democratic  governments  throughout  the  former  Soviet  Union.  This  involves 
a  wide  range  of  government  to  government  contacts  and  programs  in  which  the  De- 
fense Department  has  a  large  and  important  role.  As  you  may  know,  Secretary 
Aspin  has  just  returned  from  meetings  with  Russian  Minister  of  Defense  Grachev 
and  Ukrainian  Minister  of  Defense  Morozov.  In  each  of  those  meetings  the  Sec- 
retary expressed  our  strong  desire  to  build  links  between  the  DOD  and  their  Min- 
istries of  Defense;  these  will  help  expose  Russian  and  Ukrainian  officers  and  offi- 
cials— including  the  younger  ones  who  will  be  tomorrow's  leaders — to  our  democratic 
way  of  life  and  will  help  demonstrate  to  them  how  the  military  and  defense  proc- 
esses function  in  a  free  society  under  civilian  control. 

Second,  we  are  working  cooperatively  with  the  other  Treaty  parties  to  bring  about 
the  implementation  of  the  START  I  and  START  II  treaties.  As  you  know,  Russia 
has  tied  the  entry  into  force  of  START  I  to  Ukaine's  ratification  of  START  I  and 
accession  to  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  treaty  as  a  non-nuclear  weapons  state; 
the  Ukrainian  Rada  continues  to  debate  these  treaties,  and  while  we  are  hopeful 
that  Ukraine  will  ratify  START  and  accede  to  the  NPT  as  a  non-nuclear  weapons 
state,  the  outcome  is  not  clear.  Russia  has  not  yet  ratified  START  II,  and  its  action 
in  that  regard  is  linked  both  to  successful  entry  into  force  of  START  I,  and  to  the 
resolution  of  the  political  turmoil  in  Moscow.  So  there  is  much  to  be  done  on  the 
diplomatic  front  before  these  landmark  treaties  are  fully  in  place.  However,  we  want 
to  see  the  earliest  start  of  the  process  of  deactivating  and  dismantling  the  substan- 
tial nuclear  arsenal  that  once  belonged  to  the  former  Soviet  Union.  We  have  set  an 
example  for  our  other  treaty  partners  by  accelerating  the  retirement  and  elimi- 
nation of  the  ballistic  missile  systems  and  bombers  which  START  I  requires  us  to 
destroy.  We  believe  our  partners  can  benefit  both  themselves  and  the  United  States 
by  following  our  lead.  To  this  end,  we  are  working  with  Moscow  and  Kiev  to  develop 
means  to  help  accelerate  the  removal  of  warheads  from  ballistic  missile  systems 
START  would  eliminate,  and  to  assist  subsequently  in  the  removal  of  the  missiles 
from  their  launchers  and  the  destruction  of  those  launchers.  It  is  worth  noting  that 
every  former  Soviet  nuclear  warhead  which  is  destroyed  is  one  less  nuclear  warhead 
which  terrorists  can  seize;  additionally,  we  are  working  with  Russia  to  ensure  that 
the  nuclear  material  from  the  dismantled  warheads  is  accurately  accounted  for  and 
securely  controlled — again  keeping  this  material  out  of  the  hands  of  terrorists.  In 
this  manner,  accelerated  deactivation  and  implementation  can  serve  two  security 
goals  at  once. 


50 

As  I  noted  a  moment  ago,  our  own  record  in  early  deactivation  of  strategic  forces 
is  a  good  one.  To  date  the  United  States  has  removed  over  three  thousand  warheads 
from  missiles  whose  launchers  START  I  would  eliminate— representing  80  percent 
of  the  total  number  of  such  warheads;  we  will  have  fully  completed  this  task  by  the 
end  of  calendar  year  1994.  In  doing  so,  we  are  reinforcing  in  the  minds  of  our 
START  partners  that  we  view  them  as  friends  and  that  they  have  nothing  to  fear 
from  us;  by  the  same  token,  we  seek  to  encourage  them  to  accept  our  offers  of  assist- 
ance and  similarly  accelerate  the  draw  down  of  their  strategic  systems. 

Third,  while  we  are  sparing  no  effort  to  support  democracy  in  the  FSU  and  to 
achieve  the  reduction  including  on  an  accelerated  basis — of  START  I  associated  sys- 
tems, we  are  also  aware  that  there  are  no  guarantees.  Despite  our  best  efforts,  there 
still  exists  the  potential  for  abrupt  political  change  in  the  former  Soviet  Union. 
Should  this  occur,  and  unfriendly  regimes  come  to  power,  they  would  have  signifi- 
cant strategic  forces  at  their  disposal.  Accordingly,  we  need  to  continue  to  maintain 
a  strategic  force  which  provides  the  deterrent  resources  we  would  need  in  such  a 
situation. 

Fourth,  and  finally,  if  such  unhappy  events  should  come  to  pass,  we  would  also 
need  to  have  the  capability  to  reconstitute  our  nuclear  forces  above  the  levels  which 
we  otherwise  would  plan  to  move  to  under  the  two  START  treaties,  in  order  to 
hedge  against  the  possibility  that  such  unfriendly  regimes  might  seek  to  reassert 
their  military  power  by  increasing  their  nuclear  forces.  Precisely  because  such  sce- 
narios are  unattractive,  we  are  putting  significant  stock  in  our  efforts  to  strengthen 
democratic  governments,  to  accelerate  START  I  deactivations  even  before  the  treaty 
formally  enters  into  force,  and  to  achieve  the  earliest  ratification  of  START  I  and 
START  II. 

The  Emerging  Nuclear  Threat 

As  Secretary  Aspin  recently  reported  to  the  House  Armed  Services  Committee, 
more  than  20  other  nations  have  embarked  on  efforts  to  develop  weapons  of  mass 
destruction.  Regional  powers  continue  to  develop  and  obtain  nuclear  weapon  tech- 
nology and  the  means  to  deliver  nuclear  weapons.  Although  these  regional  powers 
do  not  now  pose  a  direct  threat  to  the  U.S.,  the  danger  to  our  national  interests 
and  to  our  allies  is  growing.  The  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  is  a  major  concern 
to  us  as  we  conduct  our  Bottom-Up  Review.  It  is  also  behind  our  efforts  to  put  re- 
newed emphasis  into  an  across  the  board  effort  to  stem  the  flow  of  nuclear  weapons 
technology  and  nuclear  weapons-related  technology;  defining  and  implementing  this 
"counterproliferation  initiative"  will  be  one  of  the  department's  highest  priorities. 
Our  forces  must  be  also  able  to  deter  those  regional  powers  who  succeed  in  obtain- 
ing nuclear  weapons.  We  must  maintain  a  viable  nuclear  force  in  order  to  deter  re- 
gional powers  from  threatening  the  use  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction.  Despite  our 
efforts  to  prevent  proliferation,  we  must  assume  that  some  states  will  succeed  in 
their  effort  to  obtain  these  weapons  and  may  be  willing  to  use  them.  The  threat  to 
our  allies  and  potentially  to  our  own  deployed  forces  would  be  significant,  and  to 
prevent  coercion  on  the  part  of  a  regional  power  will  require  a  convincing  nuclear 
force.  While  this  threat  will  not  drive  the  configuration  of  U.S.  strategic  forces,  our 
strategic  systems  can  play  an  important  role  in  deterring  the  use  of  nuclear  weap- 
ons by  a  proliferant  state. 

Shaping  our  Strategic  Forces 

Shaping  our  nuclear  forces  involves  many  variables.  We  have  always,  however, 
abided  by  one  overriding  principle — we  require  a  fully  credible  force  with  a  range 
of  capabilities.  By  this  we  mean  truly  a  deterrent  force,  one  that  so  complicates  a 
potential  enemy's  calculations  that  he  would  never  consider  initiating  an  attack. 
Through  the  years  the  Triad  has  provided  that  credibility  through  a  redundant  and 
complementary  mix  of  weapons  systems.  Each  has  its  own  strengths  and  weak- 
nesses, combining  to  form  a  deterrent  which  has  eluded  exploitation. 

With  the  changing  security  environment,  we  have  been  able  to  eliminate  those  nu- 
clear systems  which  are  no  longer  required  and  to  remove  from  alert  that  portion 
of  our  bomber  force,  which  throughout  the  Cold  War  was  capable  of  being  launched 
on  very  short  notice.  The  Minuteman  II  force  was  removed  from  alert  status  in  Sep- 
tember 1991,  and  we  are  currently  removing  all  of  the  missiles  from  their  launchers. 
We  have  retired  all  nuclear-armed  B-52Gs,  and  are  in  the  process  of  retiring  all 
Poseidon  submarines  carrying  the  C-3  and  C-4  missiles.  President  Bush's  nuclear 
initiatives  of  September  1991  and  January  1992  resulted  in  reductions  or  termi- 
nations to  the  B-2  bomber  program,  the  Advanced  Cruise  Missile  and  the  Short 
Range  Attack  Missile  II.  These  changes  have  not  weakened  our  deterrent  posture, 
but  reflect  adaptations  in  our  requirements  to  the  changing  security  environment 
and  to  the  flexibility  of  our  Triad  posture.  With  START  II,  we  look  toward  reducing 


51 

our  deployed  strategic  forces  further  to  3500  warheads.  The  force  that  carries  those 
3500  deployed  warheads  must,  however,  be  survivable,  flexible,  have  off-setting 
vulnerabilities,  and  be  fully  capable  of  carrying  out  national  policy.  A  mix  of  Trident 
submarines,  single  warhead  Minuteman  III  missiles,  and  heavy  bombers  will  meet 
these  requirements.  We  are  currently  examining  what  the  exact  make-up  of  the 
force  will  be. 

GAO  Findings 

The  GAO  report  on  the  Triad  had  taken  over  3  years  to  complete  and  raises  many 
good  issues.  Reports  of  this  nature  represent  an  extensive  effort  and  are  valuable 
for  us  when  reviewing  our  previous  decisions.  Many  changes  have  occurred  in  our 
forces  since  the  work  on  of  the  report  began,  and  many  more  are  still  to  occur. 

In  analyzing  the  Triad,  the  GAO  has  understandably  reduced  this  very  complex 
subject  into  smaller,  more  manageable  portions,  and  focused  on  a  more  straight- 
forward cost  effectiveness  analysis.  However,  with  such  an  approach  many  of  the 
subtle  relationships  of  the  systems  of  the  Triad  are  lost  in  what  becomes  a  simple 
"black  and  white"  cost  analysis.  When  the  systems  are  compared  on  a  cost-per-arriv- 
ing  warhead  basis,  as  the  GAO  has  done,  the  interactions  and  interdependencies 
among  the  Triad  legs  become  lost  as  subjective  arguments  that  cannot  be  quantified. 
The  Triad's  strength  has  always  been  derived  from  the  ability  of  its  various  legs  to 
"fill  the  gap"  of  vulnerabilities  of  the  others.  It  is  not  a  question  of  which  system 
cost  the  least  or  is  the  least  vulnerable  to  a  particular  threat  that  is  important.  The 
important  issue  is  whether  the  sum  strength  of  the  Triad  has  in  fact  caused  such 
insurmountable  difficulties  for  the  foreign  adversary,  that  its  deterrent  effect  has 
been  successful.  I  believe  that  for  the  U.S.  strategic  Triad,  this  is  the  case. 

An  example  of  the  difficulty  of  completing  an  analysis  of  this  nature  over  this  long 
a  period  of  time  is  evident  in  the  comparison  of  intelligence  data.  We  take  exception 
to  the  GAO  criticism  that  current  U.S.  strategic  forces — as  well  as  those  being  de- 
ployed now — provide  excessive  capabilities,  on  the  basis  that  the  threat  projections 
made  in  the  early  1980s  did  not  materialize  as  predicted.  The  projections  of  the 
early  1980s  were  grounded  in  a  long  history  of  ongoing  Soviet  force  structure  mod- 
ernization; certainly  no  projection  of  any  type  could  have  envisioned  the  changes 
which  former  President  Gorbachev  began  during  his  presidency,  to  say  nothing  of 
those  which  have  occurred  since  August  1991. 

We  also  do  not  accept  the  GAO's  view  that  the  stealth  characteristics  embodied 
in  the  B— 2  and  the  Advanced  Cruise  Missile  were  not  justified  by  the  Soviet  air  de- 
fense system.  Modern  Soviet  fighter  and  surface  to  air  missiles  posed  significant 
threats  to  non  stealthy  systems.  In  addition,  such  systems  are  now  found  elsewhere 
around  the  world.  Our  decision  to  develop  low  observable  systems  such  as  the  B— 
2  and  the  Advanced  Cruise  Missile  reflected  two  sound  judgments:  (1)  that  we  need- 
ed to  replace  and  fully  modernize  a  critical  leg  of  the  Triad  that  was  then — and  is 
still — underpinned  by  the  increasingly  limited  capabilities  of  the  B-52;  and  (2)  that, 
by  developing  stealth  technologies,  we  were  making  an  investment  that  played  to 
a  long-term  comparative  advantage  for  the  U.S.  in  its  strategic  competition  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  The  GAO  report  also  omits  any  reference  to  the  additional,  force  mul- 
tiplying capabilities  of  the  bomber  force,  i.e.,  its  ability  to  fulfill  both  conventional 
and  nuclear  missions. 

Finally,  I  must  note  that  despite  all  the  work  which  went  into  it,  the  GAO  re- 

{>ort — with  its  focus  on  the  interpretation  of  the  world  as  we  knew  it  even  in  the 
ate  1980's — is  not  a  paricularly  good  guide  to  force  planning  in  the  1990's.  While 
some  of  the  lessons  GAO  drew  from  its  analysis  of  the  Cold  War  nuclear  situation 
are  still  valid,  many  others  do  not  accord  with  the  new  realities  we  face.  It  is  to 
these  new  realities  that  we  must  devote  our  attention  as  we  consider  the  future  of 
U.S.  strategic  forces. 

Mr.  Chairman,  this  concludes  my  prepared  remarks.  I  look  forward  to  answering 
whatever  questions  you  might  have  and  to  providing  more  detailed  information  to 
the  Congress  on  the  future  shape  of  U.S.  strategic  forces  when  that  information  be- 
comes available. 


52 


TEAM  B: 


THE  TRILLION 


Two  experts  report  on  how  a  group  of  Cold  War  true  believers 

were  invited  to  second-guess  the  CIA.  Did  the  "outside  experts" 

of  the  1970s  contribute  to  the  military  buildup  of  the  1980s? 


Bv  ANNE  HESSING  CAHN 


Election  years  have  much  in  common. 
They  produce  a  profusion  of  punditry, 
media  attention,  and  politically  expedi- 
ent action,  quickly  forgotten,  and  with 
little  lasting  impact.  But  not  always;  some- 
times events  are  set  into  motion  that  have 
long  lifetimes.  This  was  the  case  in  1976  when, 
as  in  1992,  an  incumbent  Republican  president 
faced  a  strong  challenge  from  the  right  wing  of 
his  own  party.  Then  (as  last  year)  sops  were 
offered  to  placate  the  far  right  and,  while  it  is 
too  early  to  know  which  of  the  1992  capers  will 
endure,  we  now  know  a  great  deal  about  one 
of  the  most  political  events  of  197G,  and  its  re- 
markably long-lasting  effects  on  U.S.  policy. 

Late  last  year,  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  (CIA)  released  the  1970  "Team  B"  re- 
ports. Team  B  was  an  experiment  in  competi- 
tive threat  assessments  approved  by  then-Di- 
rector of  Central  Intelligence  George  Bush. 
Teams  of  "outside  experts"  were  to  take  inde- 
pendent looks  at  the  highly  classified  data 
used  by  the  intelligence  community  to  assess 
Soviet  strategic  forces  in  the  yearly  National 
Intelligence  Estimates  (NIEs).  NIEs  are  au- 
thoritative and  are  widely  circulated  within 
the  government.  U.S.  national  security  policy 
on  various  issues  as  well  as  the  defense  budget 
are  based  on  their  general  conclusions.  Al- 
(coiitimied  mi  /Kigc  -j) 

Anne  Hessing  Calm,  a  visiting  scholar  at  the 
Cmterfor  Mental ioual  Studies  at  the  I  hiiver- 
sitii  of  Maryland  in  College  Pari;,  is  a  former 
official  at  the  U.S.  Arm*  Control  and  Disar- 
mament Agency  and  the  Defense  Department. 


22   The  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists 


53 


The  Team  B 
experiment  was 
concocted  by 
conservative 
cold  warriors 
determined  to 
bury  detente. 


though  NIEs  represent  the  collective  judg- 
ment of  the  entire  intelligence  community,  the 
lead  agency  is  the  CIA. 

There  were  three  "B"  teams.  One  studied 
Soviet  low-altitude  air  defense  capabilities, 
one  examined  Soviet  intercontinental  ballistic 
missile  (ICBM)  accuracy,  and  one  investigated 
Soviet  strategic  policy  and  objectives.  But  it  is 
the  third  team,  chaired  by  Harvard  professor 
Richard  Pipes,  that  ultimately  received  con- 
siderable publicity  and  is  commonly  referred 
to  as  Team  B. 

The  Team  B  experiment  was  concocted  by 
conservative  cold  warriors  determined  to  bury 
detente  and  the  SALT  process.  Panel  mem- 
bers were  all  hard-liners.  The  experiment  was 
leaked  to  the  press  in  an  unsuccessful  attempt 
at  an  "October  surprise."  But  most  important, 
the  Team  B  reports  became  the  intellectual 
foundation  of  "the  window  of  vulnerability" 
and  of  the  massive  arms  buildup  that  began 
toward  the  end  of  the  Carter  administration 
and  accelerated  under  President  Reagan. 

How  did  the  Team  B  notion  come  about?  In 
1974,  Albert  Wohlstetter,  u  professor  at  the 
University  of  Chicago,  accused  the  CIA  of  sys- 
tematically underestimating  Soviet  missile  de- 
ployment, and  conservatives  began  a  concert- 
ed attack  on  the  CIA's  annual  assessment  of 
the  Soviet  threat.  This  assessment— the 
NIE — was  an  obvious  target. 

In  the  mid-1970s,  the  CIA  was  vulnerable 
on  three  counts.  First,  it  was  still  reeling  from 
the  1975  congressional  hearings  about  covert 
assassination  attempts  on  foreign  leaders  and 
other  activities.  Second,  it  was  considered 
"payback  time"  by  hard-liners,  who  were  still 
smarting  from  the  CIA's  realistic  assessments 
during  the  Vietnam  war  years — assessments 
that  failed  to  see  light  at  the  end  of  the  tunnel. 
And  finally,  between  1973  and  1976.  there  were 
four  different  directors  of  central  intelligence, 
in  contrast  to  the  more  stately  progression  of 
four  directors  in  the  preceding  20  years. 

The  vehicle  chosen  from  within  the  adminis- 
tration to  challenge  the  CIA  was  the  Presi- 
dent's Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board 
(PFIAB).  Formed  as  the  Board  of  Consultants 
on  Foreign  Intelligence  Affairs  by  President 
Eisenhower  in  1956,  PFIAB  was  reconstitut- 
ed by  President  Kennedy  in  1961  after  the 
Bay  of  Pigs  fiasco.  Members  are  appointed  by 
the  president  but  hold  no  other  government 
positions  (except  possibly  on  other  advisory 
committees  or  panels).  By  1975.  PFIAB  was  a 
home  for  such  conservatives  as  William  Casey. 
John  Connally.  John  Foster.  Clare  Booth  Luce, 
and  Edward  Teller. 

The  PFIAB  first  raised  the  issue  of  compet- 
itive threat  assessments  in  1975.  but  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence  William  Colby  was  able 
to   ward   them   off,   partly   on   procedural 


grounds  (an  NIE  was  in  progress).  But  Colby, 
a  career  CIA  officer,  also  said,  "It  is  hard  for 
me  to  envisage  how  an  ad  hoc  'independent' 
group  of  government  and  non-government  an- 
alyst* could  prepare  a  more  thorough,  compre- 
hensive assessment  of  Soviet  strategic  capa- 
bilities— even  in  two  specific  areas — than  the 
intelligence  community  can  prepare."1 

At  a  September  1975  meeting  of  CIA,  Na- 
tional Security  Council,  and  PFIAB  staff,  the 
deputy  for  National  Intelligence  Officers, 
George  A.  Carver,  noted  that  since  John  Fos- 
ter and  Edward  Teller,  the  principal  PFIAB 
members  pushing  for  the  alternative  assess- 
ment, disagreed  with  some  of  the  judgments 
made  by  the  intelligence  community,  "the 
PFIAB  proposal  could  be  construed  as  recom- 
mending the  establishment  of  another  organi- 
zation which  might  reach  conclusions  more 
compatible  with  their  thinking." 

In  1976,  when  George  Bush  became  the  new 
director  of  central  intelligence,  the  PFIAB 
lost  no  time  in  renewing  its  request  for  com- 
petitive threat  assessments.  Although  his  top 
analysts  argued  against  such  an  undertaking. 
Bush  checked  with  the  White  House,  obtained 
an  O.K.,  and  by  May  26  signed  off  on  the  ex- 
periment with  the  notation,  "Let  her  fly!!  O.K 
G.B."-  Why  in  the  world  did  the  Ford  adminis- 
tration, gearing  up  for  an  election  campaign, 
put  prominent  outside  critics  of  the  CIA  on 
the  agency's  payroll,  give  them  free  access  to 
the  classified  material,  data,  and  files  they  re- 
quested, and  not  foresee  how  damaging  the  re- 
sulting study  could  be? 


B 


y  spring  1976,  President  Ford  was  in 
deep  political  trouble.  A  January  poll  showed 
that  his  performance  had  a  46  percent  disap- 
proval rating.  The  president  attributed  much 
of  the  dissatisfaction  to  the  increasing  criti- 
cism of  detente  by  a  conservative  coalition  in 
both  parties.  Moreover,  at  the  time  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Cuba  were  actively  supporting  the 
Popular  Movement  for  the  Liberation  of  An- 
gola, while  the  U.S.  Senate  had  barred  fur- 
ther covert  American  support  to  the  other 
contenders. 

Nevertheless,  early  in  January  1976  Presi- 
dent Ford  defended  the  policy  of  detente  he 
had  inherited  from  Richard  Nixon  and  said  in 
an  S'BC  News  interview:  "I  think  it  would  be 
very  unwise  for  a  President— me  or  anyone 
eis< — to  abandon  detente.  I  think  detente  is  in 
the  best  interest  of  this  country.  It  is  in  the 
best  interest  of  world  stability,  world  peace." 

But  then  came  the  February  24  New  Hannv 
sliire  primary,  and  President  Ford  nosed  out 
challenger  Ronald  Reagan  by  only  one  percent- 
age point.  Reagan  began  to  step  up  his  attacks 


24   The  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists 


54 


on  the  "Ford-Kissinger"  foreign  )K>licy,  claim- 
ing that  the  Ignited  States  had  lieen  permitted 
to  slide  into  second  place  and  that  the  Soviet 
Union  was  taking  advantage  of  detente  at  the 
expense  of  American  prestige  and  security. 

In  March,  three  important  events  took  place. 
During  an  interview,  President  Ford  abruptly 
banished  the  word  "detente"  from  his  political 
vocabulary,  much  to  the  surprise  of  the  White 
House  staff.  "We  are  going  to  forget  the  use  of 
the  word  detente,"  the  president  said.  "What 
happens  in  the  negotiations . . .  are  the  things 
that  are  of  consequence.'"  Then,  at  a  lunch  at 
Washington  D.C.'s  Metropolitan  Club,  Richard 
Allen,  Max  Kampelman,  Paul  Nitze,  Eugene 
Rostow,  and  Elmo  Zumwalt,  all  well-known 
hawks  opposed  to  detente,  agreed  to  form  the 
"Committee  on  the  Present  Danger"  (CPD)  to 
alert  the  public  to  the  "growing  Soviet 
threat."  The  first  draft  of  the  committee's  ini- 
tial statement  was  circulated  to  its  members 
within  a  month.  Finally,  on  March  23.  Ronald 
Reagan  won  the  North  Carolina  primary — 
only  the  third  time  in  U.S.  history  that  a  chal- 
lenger had  defeated  an  incumbent  president  in 
a  primary.  He  went  on  to  win  the  Nebraska 
and  Texas  primaries  as  well. 

By  now,  conservative  critics  in  full  swing 
kept  up  a  steady  cry  of  alarm.  Paul  Nitze.  a 
CPD  and  Team  B  member,  testified  before  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Defense  Production  that 
the  Soviet  Union  was  conducting  a  massive 
civil  defense  program  that  would  give  it  a  bar- 
gaining edge  in  the  then-deadlocked  arms 
talks.  Retired  Defense  Intelligence  Agency 
Director  Lt.  Gen.  Daniel  Graham,  also  a  Team 
B  member,  wrote  in  the  September  1976 
Reader's  Digest  "The  Soviets  have  not  built 
up  their  forces,  as  we  have,  merely  to  deter  a 
nuclear  war.  They  build  their  forces  to  fight  a 
nuclear  war  and  [they]  see  an  enormous  per- 
suasive power  accruing  to  a  nation  which  can 
face  the  prospect  of  nuclear  war  with  confi- 
dence in  its  survival." 

A  January  21 .  1976.  Library  of  Congress  re- 
port, "The  U.SVSoviet  Military  Balance,  a 
Frame  of  Reference  for  Congress,"  identified 
a  strong  shift  in  the  quantitative  military  bal- 
ance toward  the  Soviet  Union  over  the  past  10 
years.  And  the  CIA  itself  revised  its  estimate 
of  Soviet  military  spending  to  10-15  percent  of 
Sonet  gross  national  product  (GNP).  as  com- 
pared to  6-S  percent  in  previous  NIEs.  The 
revision  was  immediate  news. 

(This  jump  did  not  indicate  any  great  in- 
crease in  Soviet  military  spending  nor  did  il 
change  the  Pentagon's  estimates  of  actual  So- 
viet troops,  tanks,  and  missiles.  Indeed,  it  re- 
flected the  judgment  that  the  Soviet  military 
sector  was  less  efficient  than  previously  be- 
lieved and  therefore  the  military's  economic 
burden  on  the  Soviet  Union  was  greater  than 


earlier  estimates  indicated.  None  of  this 
meant  a  greater  threat  to  the  United  Slates. 
However,  such  distinctions,  usually  made  in 
the  next  to  last  paragraph  of  a  long  article, 
were  lost  on  the  public,  and  the  message 
seemed  to  be  that  the  Russians  were  spending 
more  on  defense  and  therefore  we  should  too.) 
In  the  summer  of  1976,  President  Ford  was 
rearranging  priorities  in  much  the  same  errat- 
ic way  as  George  Bush  did  16  years  later  in  an 
effort  to  stave  off  conservative  critics.  Even 
the  signing  of  the  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions 
Treaty  was  delayed  from  May  12  to  May  28 
because  of  panic  at  Ford's  loss  to  Ronald  Rea- 
gan in  the  Nebraska  primary. 


After  Carter 
was  elected, 
George  Bush 
made  sure 
that  Team  B 
became  front- 
page news. 


I 


n  July  1976.  Director  of  Central  Intelli- 
gence George  Bush  let  a  PF1AB  subcommit- 
tee suggest  members  of  the  three  B  teams;  in 
August  he  wrote  to  the  president  that  "morale 
at  the  CI  A«s  improving."' 

Each  K  team  met  in  September  and  October 
and  exchanged  drafts  with  their  CIA  counter- 
parts during  October.  The  first  press  leak  oc- 
curred two  days  after  the  first  meeting  of  the 
CIA  and  Team  B  members  who  were  examin- 
ing Soviet  strategic  policy  and  objectives. 
William  Beecher's  story  in  the  October  20 
Boston  Globe  contained  leaks  by  at  least  one 
Team  B  member  who  conveyed  to  the  journal- 
ist only  his  recommendations,  not  those  of  his 
fellow  panelists.  According  to  Leo  Cherne, 
then  chairman  of  PFIAB,  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence  Bush  was  aghast  at  the  leak  and 
stormed  into  the  Old  Executive  Building  ac- 
cusing members  of  PFIAB  of  being  the  leak- 
ers. Cherne  assured  Bush  that  this  was  not 
the  case,  and  that  "members  of  PFIAB  were 
sufficiently  smart  to  recognize  that  any  public- 
ity would  invalidate  what  had  been  a  serious 
effort.'"  The  story  was  not  picked  up  and 
seemed  to  fade  from  view. 

However,  after  the  Democrats  won  the  elec- 
tion and  President-elect  Jimmy  Carte)-  had  ig- 
nored Bush's  hint  that  up  to  now.  CIA  direc- 
tors had  not  changed  with  an  incoming  admin- 
istration. George  Bush,  the  foe  of  leaks, 
agreed  to  meet  with  David  Binder  of  the  S'eiv 
York  Times.  The  same  director  who  wrote  to 
President  Ford  in  August  1976.  "1  want  to  get 
the  CIA  off  the  front  pages  and  at  some  point 
out  of  the  papers  altogether."  now  made  sure 
that  Team  B  would  become  front-page  news/ 

On  Sunday.  December  26.  the  lead  Srir 
York  Times  story  was  about  Team  I>.  Bush  ap- 
peared  on  Mat  tin  I'rcxx,  and  three  separate 
congressional  committees  vowed  to  hold  hear- 
ings on  the  whole  exercise.  Although  officials 
within  the  new  Carter  administration  paid 
scant  attention  to  the  Team  B  reports,  the 


April  ]!«>:;  25 


55 


Simultaneously, 
the  newly 
formed 
Committee  on 
the  Present 
Danger         i 
hammered  the 
message  home. 


spadework  had  been  done.  In  particular,  the 
Pipes  panel's  major  conclusions  had  been  pub- 
licly and  repeatedly  aired. 

Meanwhile,  back  in  November,  nine  days 
after  the  presidential  election,  the  Committee 
on  the  Present  Danger  issued  its  founding 
statement,  "Common  Sense  and  the  Common 
Danger."  "The  principal  threat  to  our  nation, 
to  world  peace  and  to  the  cause  of  human  free- 
dom is  the  Soviet  drive  for  dominance  based 

upon  an  unparalleled  military  buildup The 

Soviet  Union  has  not  altered  its  long  held  goal 
of  a  world  dominated  from  a  single  center — 
Moscow."  If  this  sounded  similar  to  the  conclu- 
sions of  Richard  Pipes 's  Team  B  panel,  it  was 
hardly  surprising;  panel  members  Paul  Nitze, 
Richard  Pipes,  and  William  Van  Cleave  had 
leading  roles  in  the  committee. 

Even  before  the  Team  B  report  was  officially 
presented  to  PFIAB,  Pipes  was  eager  to  publi- 
cize its  findings.  He  opened  a  December  7 
meeting  by  discussing  the  possibility  of  declas- 
sifying the  report.  After  the  CIA  rejected  de- 
classification, Pipes  said  that  "he  would  urge 
PFIAB  to  make  the  Team  B  report  available  to 
as  large  an  audience  as  possible.  If  his  appeal 
to  PFIAB  were  rejected  ...  he  mentioned  . . . 
the  publication  of  articles  on  the  general  sub- 
ject of  the  report  without  reference  to  classi- 
fied information Pipes  also  raised  the  possi- 
bility of  using  the  Freedom  of  Information  Act 
to  get  the  report  into  the  public  domain."* 


I 


t  took  16  years  before  Pipes's  hopes  were 
fully  realized  and  the  documents  published.  In 
February  1989, 1  filed  a  Freedom  of  Informa- 
tion Act  request  to  obtain  Team  B  documents. 
After  repeated  letters,  phone  calls,  and  an  in- 
terview by  the  chairman  of  the  Intelligence 
Council  produced  only  two  items,  I  filed  a 
complaint  in  the  U.S.  District  Court  in  July 
1992.  By  the  first  meeting  before  the  judge 
in  September  1992,  counsel  for  the  CIA 
promised  that  I  would  receive  all  the  docu- 
ments before  the  end  of  October.  The  CIA  de- 
posited the  Team  B  report  at  the  National 
Archive,  and  delivered  to  me  most  of  the  docu- 
ments I  had  requested  before  the  end  of  Octo- 
ber 1992. 

Today,  the  Team  B  reports  recall  the  stri- 
dency and  militancy  of  the  conservatives  in 
the  1970s.  Team  B  accused  the  CIA  of  consis- 
tently underestimating  the  "intensity,  scope, 
and  implicit  threat"  )x>sed  by  the  Soviet  Union 
by  relying  on  technical  or  "hard"  data  rather 
than  "contemplat[ing]  Soviet  strategic  objec- 
tives in  terms  of  the  Soviet  conception  of 
'strategy'  as  well  as  in  light  of  Soviet  history, 
the  structure  of  Soviet  society,  and  the  pro- 
nouncements of  Soviet  leaders." 


And  when  Team  B  looked  at  "hard"  data, 
everywhere  it  saw  the  worst  case.  It  reported, 
for  instance,  that  the  Backfire  bomber  "proba- 
bly will  be  produced  in  substantial  numbers, 
with  perhaps  600  aircraft  off  the  line  by  early 
1984."  (In  fact,  the  Soviets  had  235  in  1984.) 
Team  B  also  regarded  Soviet  defenses  with 
alarm.  "Mobile  ABM  [anti-ballistic  missiles] 
system  components  combined  with  the  de- 
ployed SAM  [surface-to-air  missile]  system 
could  produce  a  significant  ABM  capability." 
But  that  never  occurred. 

Team  B  found  the  Soviet  Union  immune 
from  Murphy's  law.  They  examined  ABM  and 
directed  energy  research,  and  said,  "Under- 
standing that  there  are  differing  evaluations 
of  the  potentialities  of  laser  and  CPB  [charged 
particle  beam]  for  ABM,  it  is  still  clear  that 
the  Soviets  have  mounted  ABM  efforts  in  both 
areas  of  a  magnitude  that  it  is  difficult  to 
overestimate. "  (Emphasis  in  original.) 

But  overestimate  they  did.  A  facility  at  the 
Soviet  Union's  nuclear  test  range  in  Semi- 
palatinsk  was  touted  by  Gen.  George  Keegan, 
Chief  of  Air  Force  Intelligence  (and  a  Team  B 
briefer),  as  a  site  for  tests  of  Soviet  nuclear- 
powered  beam  weapons.  In  fact,  it  was  used  to 
test  nuclear-powered  rocket  engines.  Accord- 
ing to  a  Los  Alamos  physicist  who  recently 
toured  Russian  directed-energy  facilities,  "We 
had  overestimated  both  their  capability  and 
their  [technical]  understanding." 

Team  B's  failure  to  find  a  Soviet  non-acous- 
tic anti-submarine  system  was  evidence  that 
there  could  well  be  one.  "The  implication  could 
be  that  the  Soviets  have,  in  fact,  deployed 
some  operational  non-acoustic  systems  and 
will  deploy  more  in  the  next  few  years."  It 
wasn't  a  question  of  if  the  Russians  were  com- 
ing. They  were  here.  (And  probably  working 
at  the  CIA!) 

When  Team  B  looked  at  the  "soft"  data  con- 
cerning Soviet  strategic  concepts,  they  slanted 
the  evidence  to  support  their  conclusions.  In 
asserting  that  "Russian,  and  especially  Soviet 
political  and  military  theories  are  distinctly  of- 
fensive in  character,"  Team  B  claimed  "their 
ideal  is  the  'science  of  conquest'  (nauka 
pobezltdat)  formulated  by  the  eighteenth-cen- 
tury Russian  commander.  Field  Marshal  A.V. 
Suvorov  in  a  treatise  of  the  same  name,  which 
has  been  a  standard  text  of  Imperial  as  well  as 
Soviet  military  science."  Raymond  Garthoff,  a 
senior  fellow  at  the  Brookings  Institution,  has 
pointed  out  that  the  correct  translation  of 
nauka  jmbezlidat  is  "the  science  of  winning"  or 
the  "science  of  victory."  All  military  strate- 
gists strive  for  a  winning  strategy.  Our  own 
military  writings  are  devoted  to  winning  vic- 
tories, but  this  is  not  commonly  viewed  as  a 
policy  of  conquest. 

Team  B  hurled  another  brickbat:  the  CIA 


26  The  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists 


56 


consistently  underestimated  Soviet  military 
expenditures.  With  the  advantage  of  hind- 
sight, we  now  know  that   Soviet   military 
spending  increases  began  to  slow  down  pre- 
cisely as  Team  B  was  writing  about  "an  in- 
tense military  buildup  in  nuclear  as  well  as 
conventional  forces  of  all  sorte,  not  moderated 
either  by  the  West's  self-imposed  restraints  or 
by  SALT."  In  1983,  then-deputy  director  of 
the  CIA,  Robert  Gates,  testified;  The  rate  of 
growth  of  overall  defense  costs  is  lower  be- 
cause procurement  of  military  hardware — the 
largest  category  of  defense  spending — was  al- 
most flat  in  1976-1981 . . .  [and  that  trend]  ap- 
pears to  have  continued  also  in  1982  and  1983." 
While  Team  B  waxed  eloquent  about  "con- 
ceptual failures,"  it  was  unable  to  grasp  how 
the  future  might  differ  from  the  past.  In  197G 
mortality  rates  were  rising  for  the  entire  Sovi- 
et population,  and  life  expectancies,  numbers 
of  new  labor  entrants,  and  agricultural  output 
were  all  declining.  Yet  Team  B  wrote  confi- 
dently. "Within  what  is,  after  all,  a  large  and 
expanding  GNP . . .  Soviet  strategic  force*  have 
yet  to  reflect  any  constraining  effect  of  civil 
economy  competition,  and  are  unlikely  to  do 
so  in  the  foreseeable  future."  (Emphasis  in 
original.)  And  When  Ronald  Reagan  got  elect- 
ed, Team  B  became,  in  essence,  the  "A  Team." 
For  more  than  a  third  of  a  century,  percep- 
tions about  U.S.  national  security  were  col- 
ored by  the  view  that  the  Soviet  Union  was  on 
the  road  to  military  superiority  over  the  Unit- 
ed States.  Neither  Team  B  nor  the  multibillion 
dollar  intelligence  agencies  could  see  that  the 
Soviet  Union  was  dissolving  from  within. 

For  more  than  a  third  of  a  century,  asser- 
tions of  Soviet  superiority  created  calls  for  the 
United  States  to  "rearm."  In  the  1980s,  the 
call  was  heeded  so  thoroughly  that  the  United 
States  embarked  on  a  trillion-dollar  defense 
buildup.  As  a  result,  the  country  neglected  its 
schools,  cities,  roads  and  bridges,  and  health 
care  system.  From  the  world's  greatest  credi- 
tor nation,  the  United  States  became  the 
world's  greatest  debtor — in  order  to  pay  for 
arms  to  counter  the  threat  of  a  nation  that  was 
collapsing.  ■ 

1.  William  E.  Colby  to  President  Ford  (Nov.  21, 
1975),  author  collection.  Obtained  under  the  Freedom 
of  Information  Act  by  Anne  H.  Cahn. 

2.  George  A.  Carver.  Jr..  "Note  for  the  Director."  Ma\ 
26, 1970. 

3.  Raymond  Garthoff.  Dtteiite  and  Ciiufrtiiitalimi: 
American. Sorhi  Relutioa*  From  Xisw,  it,  Hintian 
(Washington.  D.C.:  Brookings  Institution.  liiV.'.  p.  :Ms 

4.  Ibid. 

5.  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  George  Hush  to 
President  Ford  (August .:.  IHTIil.  author  collection. 

fi.  Leo  Cherne.  interviews  with  author  May  2.I. 1!)!KI: 
August  2.  HUM. 

7.  Leo  Cherne.  May  2.:,  HUM. 

S.  Donald  Suda.  note  to  file  (December  7.  1!)7U).  au- 
thor collection. 


57 


DOLLAR 
EXPERIMENT 


ByJOHNPRADOS 


By  the  mid-1 970s,  millions  of  Americans  had  be- 
come disillusioned.  A  president  had  resigned  in 
disgrace.  Saigon  had  fallen.  And  the  Nixon-Kiss- 
inger  policy  of  detente  with  the  Soviets  was  widely 
suspect  The  time  was  ripe  for  a  major  initiative 
by  conservatives.  Among  the  key  players  on 
"Team  B"  and  the  Committee  on  the  Present  Dan- 
ger were  diplomat  Paul  Nitze  (upper  left),  Richard 
Pipes  (left),  and  scientist  Edward  Teller  (above). 


Remember  the  "window  of  vulnerabili- 
ty?" Russians,  ten  feet  tall,  using  in- 
credibly accurate  intercontinental  bal- 
listic missiles,  would  be  able  to  elimi- 
nate America's  nuclear  deterrent  with  only  a 
fraction  of  their  strength.  Then,  remaining  So- 
viet nuclear  forces  would  threaten  to  vaporize 
American  cities,  paralyzing  Washington.  Mos- 
cow could  then  have  its  way. 

These  hy]>othetical  Soviet  nuclear  capabili- 
ties were  expected  to  peak  in  the  early 
1980s— the  "window  of  vulnerability."  As  used 
in  Ronald  Reagan's  1980  presidential  cam- 
paign, that  phrase  conveyed  the  specter  of  a 
Soviet  diplomatic  offensive'  the  like  of  which 
had  never  been  seen.  To  close  the  window  as 
president.  Reagan  embarked  on  a  military 
spending  spree  that,  by  itself,  went  a  good  dis- 
tance toward  plunging  the  United  States  into 
the  economic  crisis  we  face  today.  The  pur- 
ported threat  never  materialized. 

Originally  the  threat  had  been  delineated  in 
an  intelligence  report  and  in  a  top-secret  ex- 
periment in  threat  analysis.  Those  who  never 
saw  the  secret  reports  or  the  leaks  had  the 
message  drummed  into  them  by  a  conserva- 
tive organization,  the  Committee  on  the  Pre- 
sent Danger,  which  actively  opposed  Carter 
administration  policies.  Many  of  the  commit- 
tee's  key  members  went  on  to  top  posts  in 
Ronald  Reagan's  Washington.  Tints,  in  certain 
fcoiitiimvd  on  jxif/r  J?) 

.Join/  I'railos,  a  historian  ol  national  xccHi'ittf 
based  in  Waslihifftuv.  D.C..  is  the  author  of 
Keepers  of  the  Keys:  The  National  Security 
Council  from  Truman  to  Bush  (l!HU). 


April  19WI  23 


58 


— —  "Piffy-ab" 

PRADOS  (runt.fnnv  p.  j.i)  members 

crucial  ways,  a  mid-1970s  intelligence  "experi-        tugyp  annOVed 
ment"  proved  central  to  the  American  experi-        WCI  c  au      * 
ence  of  the  1980s.  that  CIA 

It  is  now  possible  to  revisit  this  formative  . 

episode,  thanks  in  part  to  the  efforts  of  author        analyses  Were 
Anne  Cahn  (see  page  22),  who  pressed  for  the        jjqJ  ^  douf  aS 
declassification  of  the  documents.  On  Septem- 
ber 16, 1992,  the  CIA  declassified  its  1976  Na-        their  0WI1. 
tional  Intelligence  Estimate  11-3-/8-76  (1976- 
NIE),  titled  "Soviet  Forces  for  Intercontinen- 
tal Conflict  Through  the  Mid-1980s,"  and  the 
related  "Intelligence  Community  Experiment 
in  Competitive  Analysis:  Soviet  Strategic  Ob- 
jectives, An  Alternative  View." 

National  intelligence  estimates  (NIEs)  pre- 
sent the  considered  view  of  the  U.S.  intelli- 
gence community  on  vital  subjects  or  prob- 
lems. NIEs  are  official  publications  of  the  Di- 
rector of  Central  Intelligence  (DCI),  the  se- 
nior intelligence  officer  of  the  U.S.  govern- 
ment. Rut  the  intelligence  experiment  con- 
ducted in  1976  included  a  so-called  "competi- 
tive analysis,"  in  which  the  official  analysts' 
work  was  to  be  matched  against  that  of  a 
group  of  outside  consultants  called  "Team  B." 
The  result  proved  devastating. 


S 


_'pecific  motivation  for  the  experiment 
flowed  from  the  President's  Foreign  Intelli- 
gence Advisory  Board  (PFIAB),  a  White 
House  watchdog  unit  set  up  by  President 
Dwight  D.  Eisenhower  to  monitor  the  intelli- 
gence community.  The  board  (the  "Piffy-ab") 
traditionally  reported  to  the  president  twice  a 
year  on  general  intelligence  matters,  and  it 
also  did  postmortems  on  important  events, 
such  as  the  Cuban  Missile  Crisis,  the  Tel  of- 
fensive, or  aircraft  over-flight  incidents.  Since 
1969.  PF1 AB  had  supplied  presidents  with  an- 
nual surveys  of  Soviet  power  separate  from 
the  national  estimates.  Some  board  members 
were  annoyed  that  CIA  analyses  were  not  as 
dour  as  their  own.  In  1975.  and  again  the  fol- 
lowing year,  PFIAB  recommended  a  competi- 
tive analysis.  When  first  suggested.  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence  William  Colby  resisted 
the  proposed  experiment,  but  in  1976  the  DCI 
was  George  Bush,  who  readily  cooperated 
with  the  White  House  and  PFIAB  officials  in 
selecting  consultants  for  the  exercise  and  ex- 
changing letters  with  PFIAB  to  set  the 
ground  rule.-  for  the  exercise. 

A  politician  to  his  fingertips.  Bush  was  as 
political  as  DCI  as  he  would  he  as  president 
years  later,  although  he  had  told  a  confirma- 
tion hearing  that  he  would  avoid  politics.  With 
the  Team  B  exercise  already  in  motion,  he  de- 


April  l  *>!»::  27 


59 


Team  B  did  not 
actually  analyze 
data;  it  relied 
on  ideological 
judgments . . . 


clared  to  the  Joint  Economic  Committee,  "I 
think  we  have  done  . . .  whiit  is  essential  to  see 
that  estimates  are  protected  from  policy 
bias.'"  The  opposite  turned  out  to  be  the  case. 

Selected  as  team  leader  for  the  experiment 
was  Harvard  historian  Richard  Pipes,  a  con- 
servative who  had  just  edited  a  collection  of 
papers  on  Soviet  strategy  in  Europe.  (Until 
that  time  his  work  had  focused  primarily  on 
Russian  pre-  and  early  post-revolutionary  his- 
tory.) Other  members  were  also  conserva- 
tives!— Dr.  William  R.  Van  Cleave,  professor  at 
the  University  of  Southern  California;  retired 
Gen.  Daniel  0.  Graham,  a  former  head  of  the 
Defense  Intelligence  Agency;  retired  Col. 
Thomas  W.  Wolfe,  a  figure  in  air  force  intelli- 
gence; and  a  retired  air  force  chief,  John  Vogt. 
There  was  also  an  advisory  panel  that  includ- 
ed Amb.  Foy  Kohler,  Paul  Nitze,  Seymour 
Weiss,  air  force  Gen.  Jasper  Welch,  and  Paul 
Wolfowitz — all  outspoken  conservatives. 

One  man's  experiment  became  another's  op- 
portunity. The  competition  was  supposed  to  lie 
in  the  fact  that  two  teams  with  different  views 
would  use  the  same  set  of  data  to  produce  anal- 
yses. In  actuality,  Team  B  took  the  exercise  as 
a  mandate  to  deconstruct  CIA  analyses,  even 
criticizing  estimates  cast  decades  earlier. 

Team  B's  report  was  not  an  alternative  NIE 
at  all.  Instead,  it  started  with  the  judgments 
about  Soviet  strategic  objectives  underlying 
the  NIEs,  continued  with  critiques  of  NIE 
judgments  on  substantive  issues,  then  re- 
turned to  Soviet  objectives  for  more  criticism. 

When  Team  B  members  met  with  the  ana- 
lysts who  worked  on  the  official  NIE  to  hold  a 
debate  for  the  benefit  of  senior  officials,  the 
exchanges  proved  bloody.  Howard  Stoertz. 
the  agency's  national  intelligence  officer  for 
the  Soviet  Union,  who  led  the  CIA  group  for- 
mally responsible  for  the  NIE,  was  unable  to 
stem  the  intellectual  rout.  "It  was  an  absolute 
disaster  for  the  CIA."  one  official  recounted.1' 


w 


I  hat  was  it  about  Team  K's  arguments 
that  carried  such  force?  The  recently  declassi- 
fied Team  B  report  itself  reveals  nothing  stun- 
ning at  all.  The  criticisms  leveled  at  the  CIA 
analysts  were  a  collection  of  standard  cautions 
(with  illustrations  from  past  NIEs).  plus  gen- 
erous dollops  of  conservative  presumption.  It 
was  the  kind  of  thing  (minus  the  ideological 
bent)  that  was  often  served  up  to  analysis  in 
training.  But  this  time  it  was  used  in  a  back- 
alley  cat  fight  in  which  Team  B  members  of 
lowering  reputation  overawed  respectful 
agency  counterparts. 

For  example,  the  Team  1!  critique  held  that 
the  NIEs  were  flawed  because  they  concen- 
trated on  hard  data!  And  NIE  authors  were 


declared  guilty  of  "misinterpreting"  softer  in- 
formation such  as  Soviet  writings  on  military 
doctrine.1 

What  were  the  NIEs  missing?  Team  B  ar- 
gued that  the  estimates  ignored  "the  possibili- 
ty that  the  Russians  may  be  pursuing  not  a 
defensive  but  an  offensive  strategy."'  (Original 
in  italics.)  The  CIA  was  castigated  for  pre- 
senting its  assessments  without  evidence: 
that  Moscow  was  interested  in  capping  the 
arms  race;  that  the  Soviets  sought  parity; 
that  Russians  feared  encroachment  due  to 
past  invasions  and  wars;  and  that  Soviet  lead- 
ers might  wish  to  limit  military  spending  in 
order  to  shift  resources  to  the  civilian  sector. 
According  to  Team  B,  these  things  were  mere 
suppositions. 

As  Team  B's  report  put  it  (using  italic  type 
for  emphasis):  "The  NIEs  are  filled  with  un- 
supported and  questionable  judgments  about 
what  it  is  that  the  Soviet  government  wants 
and  intends.  It  is  this  practice,  rather  than  the 
lack  of  solid  information,  that  has  caused  in  the 
past  (and  in  considerable  measure  does  so  in 
the  present)  recurrent  underestimations  of 
the  intensity,  scope,  and  implicit  threat  of  the 
Soviet  strategic  buildup."' 

Of  course,  Team  B's  contention  that  Soviet 
thinking  was  inherently  offensive  was  equally 
unsupported  by  "solid  information."  Team  B 
simply  asserted  that  Russia  had  not  suffered 
"an  exceptional  number  of  invasions  and  inter- 
ventions" (obviously  a  question  of  interpreta- 
tion).' Team  B's  other  evidence  included  state- 
ments about  the  importance  of  forward  move- 
ment in  Soviet  political  theory,  and  "the  lack  of 
any  kind  of  genuine  legitimacy  on  the  part  of 
the  Soviet  government  [which]  compels  it  to 
create  its  own  pseudo-legitimacy.'"  This  rea- 
soning was  not  grounded  in  data.  Team  B 
members  merely  picked  out  their  favorite  quo- 
tations from  Marxist-Leninist  writings,  exact- 
ly as  did  authors  for  Pravda. 

An  especially  pernicious  Team  B  contribu- 
tion was  the  description  of  Soviet  thinking  as 
"Clausewitzian."  Using  the  term  tended  to 
brand  Soviel  policy  as  somehow  militaristic  by 
definition,  as  if  American  and  allied  generals 
did  not  read  and  use  the  ideas  of  the  noted 
Prussian  military  philosopher.  Even  ideas 
were  guilty  by  association,  and  the  CIA's  1976 
analysts  were  guilty  of  the  sins  of  drafters  of 
previous  national  estimates. 

The  substantive  disputes  raised  by  the  re- 
port for  the  most  part  concerned  long-stand- 
ing intelligence  issues  over  which  analysts  dif- 
fered. Team  I',  members  merely  took  views 
other  than  those  expressed  in  the  NIEs.  By 
including  these  disputes.  Team  B  ap)>eared  to 
lend  substance  to  the  group's  commentary,  but 
the  report  was  actually  a  more  hortatory 
analysis  of  objectives. 


28   The  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists 


60 


Some  disputes  were  dredged  up  from  the 
past— like  the  rate  of  Soviet  1CBM  deploy- 
ments, or  the  anti-missile  potential  of  Soviet 
anti-aircraft  missiles.'  In  other  areas,  like  the 
debate  over  the  capabilities  of  the  Soviet 
Backfire  bomber,  the  NIEs  were  held  to  be  in- 
accurate, although  no  one  knew  the  truth,  in- 
cluding Team  B.  (The  Team  B  report  took  the 
quaint  position  that  the  existence  of  the  Soviet 
Strategic  Rocket  Forces  as  a  separate  military 
service  was  an  "administrative  device"  unre- 
lated to  the  importance  Moscow  placed  on  con- 
trolling nuclear  weapons.) 


I 


This  was  a  classic  dilemma.  Was  the  Soviet 
glass  half  empty  or  half  full?  It  was  Khrush- 
chev himself  who  had  coined  the  phrase 
"metal  eaters,"  and  Westerners  could  find  evi- 
dence of  the  strain  on  the  civilian  economy 
every  day  on  the  streets  of  Moscow,  where 
Russians'  desperate  desire  for  consumer 
goods  could  only  be  termed  obvious.  Never- 
theless, Team  B  helped  to  redefine  the  terms 
of  the  debate  in  such  a  way  that  through  the 
remaining  1970s  and  the  1980s  the  Soviet 


...  and  it  was 
critical  of  the 
CIA  for  relying 
on  data. 


t  is  not  possible  to  review  in  detail  all  the  is- 
sues raised  by  Team  B  in  a  brief  article.  But 
one  deserves  mention,  because  it  has  been 
central  to  the  entire  outcome  of  the  Cold 
War— the  estimates  of  Soviet  military  spend- 
ing. Soviet  spending  was  one  of  Team  B  mem- 
ber Daniel  Graham's  hobby-horses  and.  not 
surprisingly,  the  issue  was  taken  up  in  the 
team's  substantive  critique. 

At  the  time,  it  was  fashionable  to  criticize 
the  CIA's  building-block  model  of  the  Soviet 
economy  as  understating  the  level  of  military 
spending.  And  need  for  improvement  had  be- 
come evident  when  U.S.  intelligence  gained 
access  to  a  copy  of  a  Soviet  budget  document 
that  showed  the  Russians'  own  secret  projec- 
tion of  their  military  spending  levels— which 
were  roughly  twice  what  the  CIA  had  esti- 
mated. Official  assessments  of  Soviet  military 
spending  were  revised  to  11-13  percent  of 
gross  national  product  (GNP)  rather  than  the 
6-8  percent  the  CIA  had  earlier  estimated. 

So  far.  so  good.  But  the  problem  was.  how 
great  a  burden  did  such  spending  place  on  the 
Soviet  economy?  Given  their  ideological  bent. 
Team  B  argued  that  the  Soviets  had  no  con- 
flicts over  resource  allocation,  except  perhaps 
between  military  services.  The  Soviet  Union 
would  spend  whatever  was  necessary  to  attain 
strategic  superiority  and  a  war-winning  capa- 
bility against  the  United  States. 

As  Team  B  put  it:  "There  have  been  in  tlie 
past  some  disputes  between  heavy  industry 
and  medium  and  light  industry  sectors  of  the 
Soviet  economy.  The  heavy  industry  spokes- 
men (from  time  to  time  referred  to  as  'metal 
eaters')  include  the  producers  of  military 
equipment,  but  this  [these  disputes]  is  not 
convincing  evidence  of  a  civilian  economy  chal- 
lenge to  military  resource  allocation  priority." 
Team  B  attacked  several  NIEs  for  suggesting 
that  economic  considerations  might  restrain 
Soviet  military  growth.  Nikita  Khrushchev's 
effort  to  reform  the  Soviet  military  and 
limit  spending  was  not  classed  as  convincing 
evidence. 


The  real  danger 


As  the  Committee  on  the  Present  Danger  began  to  press  the 
idea  that  the  United  States  was  falling  behind  the  Soviet  Union 
in  producing  weapons  of  mass  destruction  and  heading  toward 
vulnerability  to  nuclear  blackmail,  Bernard  T.  Feld,  then  edi- 
tor-in-chief of  the  Bulletin,  expressed  his  exasperation.  (Feld, 
remembered  fondly  at  the  magazine  as  Bernie,  remained  a 
member  of  the  Bulletin's  Board  of  Directors  until  his  death  in 
February  1993.) 

"The  country,"  he  wrote  in  the  February  1978  Bulletin,  "is 
being  blanketed  by  one  of  the  most  insidious  campaigns  in  re- 
cent history;  an  attempt  to  turn  back  the  clock  to  the  worst 
days  of  the  Cold  War." 

Bernie  argued  that  despite  its  saber-rattling,  the  Committee 
on  the  Present  Danger  could  not  hope  to  convince  the  public 
that  the  Soviet  Union  was  already  stronger  than  the  United 
States.  "It  is  demonstrably  clear  (to  all  but  far-out  hawks  and 
ignoramuses)  that ...  the  American  nuclear  arsenal  is  today 
larger,  more  versatile,  more  lethal,  and  less  vulnerable  to  a  pre- 
emptive first  strike  than  that  of  the  Russians." 

But  the  committee's  argument— that  defense  spending 
should  be  increased  to  counter  the  aggressive  intentions  the 
Soviets  would  show  in  the  mid-1980s— was  a  more  difficult 
problem.  The  claim  may  have  been  fortune-telung,  not  analysis, 
but  the  committee  could  always  bolster  its  case  with  "readily 
available  quotes  from  blustering  Russian  generals  and  other 
hard-liners." 

And  Bernie  came  closer  than  most  to  realizing  the  trillion  dol- 
lar implications  of  the  committee's  campaign:  "What  is  at  stake 
is  not  simply  a  few  billion  dollars  here  or  there  for  'a  moderate 
program  of  political  action  and  military  improvement.'  What  is 
at  stake  is  a  complete  reversal  of  policy,  an  attempt  to  base 
American  (and,  indeed,  world)  security  on  the  open-ended  pur- 
suit of  more  and  more  lethal  arms,  the  rejection  of  the  principle 
that  we  are  all  better  off  in  a  world  of  limited  and  controlled 
arms  rather  than  in  an  uncontrolled  arms  race. 

"The  present  danger  is  not  that  we  are  failing  prudently  to 
waste  a  few  billion  dollars  and  to  keep  up  with  Ivanovich  in  a 
meaningless  but  benign  nuclear  arms  competition.  The  danger 
is  that  we  are  being  convinced  by  our  hawks  to  launch  into  a 
new  and  qualitative  spiral  in  the  nuclear  aims  accumulation,  to 
reject  the  on-going  mild,  even  somewhat  inadequate,  attempts 
to  find  a  roughly  equitable  ceiling  at  which  to  call  a  hall 

"The  present  danger  is  not  to  realize  that  the  Committee  in 
the  Present  Danger." 


April  IMS  29 


61 


Retired  Gen.  Daniel  0.  Graham,  whose  "High  Frontier'  proposal  foreshadowed 
SDI,  and  John  Foster,  Jr.,  head  of  Lawrence  Livermore  National  Laboratory, 
("the  most  enthusiastic  designer  of  nuclear  weapons"  in  America,  according  to 
Britain's  Lord  Zuckerman),  were  Team  6  members.  Gov.  Ronald  Reagan  of 
California,  who  challenged  President  Gerald  Ford  in  the  1 976  Republican 
primaries,  was  an  early  Committee  on  the  Present  Danger  enthusiast. 

glass  would  only  be  seen  as  half  full.  Soviet 
military  power,  according  to  the  series  of  Pen- 
tagon publications  by  that  title,  was  truly 
colossal,  justifying  a  $1.5  trillion  dollar  in- 
crease in  U.S.  military  spending  during  the 
Reagan  administration. 


B 


'ut  the  Soviet  colossus  had  feet  of  clay.  In 
the  mid-1980s,  the  intelligence  community  qui- 
etly halved  their  estimates  of  the  accuracy  of 
the  most  dangerous  type  of  Soviet  ICBMs, 
and  with  that,  the  window  of  vulnerability  in- 
stantly disappeared.  In  the  late  1980s,  military 
authorities  described  Soviet  military  spending 
as  consuming  15-17  percent  of  GNP  without 
achieving  military  superiority.  It  became 
harder  to  believe  in  the  efficient,  inexorable 
drive  for  Soviet  strategic  dominance.  Also  in 
the  1990s,  Mikhail  Gorbachev  spoke  of  the  ne- 
cessity of  reform  in  the  Soviet  economy, 
agreed  to  a  series  of  amis  control  proposals, 
then  unilaterally  declared  military  with- 
drawals from  Afghanistan  and  Eastern  Eu- 
rope— unprecedented  Soviet  actions.  Gor- 
bachev's reforms  were  too  little  to  ease  Soviet 
economic  difficulties,  however,  and  the  gov- 
ernment co'lapsed. 

In  short,  the  burden  of  Soviet  military 
spending,  which  was  much  greater  than  U.S. 
intelligence  projected  (and  completely  dis- 
counted by  Team  B)  caused  such  dislocation  in 
the  Russian  economy  that  it  brought  about  the 
disintegration  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

We  now  know  that  the  military  burden  was 
in  play  by  the  1970s,  probably  already  by  the 
late  1960s,  and  that  the  Soviet  economy  was  al- 
ready contracting  in  the  Brezhnev  era.  It  was 
not  necessary  for  the  United  States  to  spend 


itself  into  penury'  to 
bring  about  these  re- 
sults. The  worst  aspect 
of  the  Team  B  episode 
was  that  it  was  used  to 
justify  parallel  U.S.  ex- 
penditures by  exagger- 
ating the  Soviet  threat. 
Ironically,  the  justifi- 
cation for  increased  de- 
fense spending  lay  not 
in  the  Team  B  report 
itself,  but  in  how  the 
Team  B  process  influ- 
enced the  NIEs.  The 
experiment  emboldened 
those  in  the  intelligence  community  who  dis- 
agreed with  the  national  estimates.  The 
1976  NIE  is  especially  enlightening  in  this 
respect. 

In  the  intelligence  business,  to  dissent  from 
an  NIE  is  to  "take  a  footnote,"  although  by 
1976  "footnotes"  were  actually  interpolations 
presented  in  italics  in  the  main  text.  A  high 
proportion  of  the  1976  NIE  is  composed  of 
footnotes,  many  of  them  from  air  force  intelli- 
gence chief  George  J.  Keegan,  but  also  from 
the  intelligence  chiefs  of  the  army  and  navy 
and  from  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency, 
then  under  Lieut.  Gen.  Samuel  V.  Wilson. 

Keegan  claimed  in  the  1976  NIE  that  the 
record  of  footnotes  in  that  document  and  in 
previous  NIEs  represented  the  true  history  of 
Soviet  military  power,  with  the  majority  opin- 
ion in  the  NIEs  falling  "far  short  of  grasping 
the  essential  realities  of  Soviet  conflict  pur- 
pose and  evolving  capability."lli  This  dissent 
came  despite  the  fact  that,  in  a  process  of  self- 
censorship,  the  final  "consensus"  view  in  the 
NIE  was:  "In  our  view,  the  Soviets  are  striv- 
ing to  achieve  war-fighting  and  war-survival 
capabilities  which  would  leave  the  USSR  in  a 
better  position  than  the  US  if  war  occurred. 
The  Soviets  also  aim  for  intercontinental 
forces  which  have  visible  and  therefore  politi- 
cally useful  advantages  over  the  US.  They 
hope  that  their  capabilities  for  intercontinen- 
tal conflict  will  give  them  more  latitude  than 
they  have  had  in  the  past  for  the  vigorous  pur- 
suit of  foreign  policy  objectives,  and  that  these 
capabilities  will  discourage  the  US  and  others 
from  using  force  or  the  threat  of  force  to  influ- 
ence Soviet  actions."" 

This  NIE  vision — while  not  ominous  enough 
to  satisfy  George  Keegan — was  nevertheless 
so  somber  that  it  moved  the  director  of  the 
State  Department's  Bureau  of  Intelligence 
and  Research  to  insert  a  footnote  asserting 
that  the  threat  of  Soviet  behavior  had  been 
exaggerated. 

In  fact,  the  effort  to  keep  the  air  force  and 
other  dissenters  on  board  skewed  the  1976 


30   The  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists 


62 


NIE  no  much  that  the  CIA  took  footnotes  to 
dissent  from  its  own  NIE — on  the  Backfire 
bomber,  on  the  range  of  the  Soviet  SS-20  mo- 
bile missile,  on  the  purpose  of  several  large 
radars,  and  on  aspects  of  Soviet  air  defenses. 
There  may  be  other  places  where  the  CIA  dis- 
sented in  portions  of  the  NIE  narrative  that 
remain  classified. 


A.  he  net  effect  of  the  1976  NIE  was  to  move 
the  intelligence  community  far  down  the  road 
to  regarding  Moscow  as  a  near-term  threat.  If 
that  was  not  enough,  key  members  of  Team  B, 
many  of  whom  became  members  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  the  Present  Danger,  went  public 
with  their  version  of  the  threat.  Within 
months,  Richard  Pipes  produced  an  article  ti- 
tled "Why  the  Soviet  Union  Thinks  It  Could 
Fight  and  Win  a  Nuclear  War."11  Meanwhile, 
Paul  Nitze's  articles  and  press  briefings  were 
a  major  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  Carter  admin- 
istration, which  was  striving  to  achieve  arms 
control  agreements  with  the  Soviets.  Pipes 
later  joined  the  Reagan  administration's  Na- 
tional Security  Council  staff  as  its  first  direc- 
tor for  Soviet  Affairs.  Nitze  and  many  others 
from  the  Committee  on  the  Present  Danger 
served  in  the  Reagan  administration,  too. 

George  Bush,  if  one  credits  his  pubb'c  and 
private  expressions,  took  the  position  that 
there  was  nothing  special  about  the  Team  B 
experiment  or  its  outcome,  except  the  leaks 
that  resulted.  In  his  autobiography,  Bush 
writes  that  the  most  important  intelligence  es- 
timate he  produced  as  DCI  concerned  Leb- 
anon. He  does  not  mention  Team  B  at  all.  On  a 
television  news  show  (Face  tiie  Nation.  Jan- 
uary 2, 1977),  Bush  refused  to  be  drawn  out  on 
the  substance  of  the  dispute,  but  he  said  that 
the  Team  B  experiment  had  been  useful,  and 
that  he  might  recommend  more.  Privately,  in  a 
secret  memorandum  to  recipients  of  the  na- 
tional estimate,  Bush  wrote  that  its  judgments 

1.  U.S.  Congress.  Joint  Economic  Committee,  Hear- 
ings: Allocation  of liatoiircc*  in  the  Sonet  Union  anil 
China,  94th  Cong..  2nd  sess.  (Washington:  Government 
Printing  Office,  1976),  p.  61. 

2.  David  Callahan,  Dangerous  Capabilities:  Paul 
NiUe  and  Oie  Cold  War  (New  York:  HarperCollins, 
1990)  p.  380. 

3.  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA).  Intelligence 
Community  Experiment  in  Competitive  Analysis:  So- 
viet Strategic  Objectives.  An  Alternate  War:  Report  of 
Team  "B,~  December  1976  (declassified  September  10. 
1992).  p.  1.  Obtained  under  the  Freedom  of  Information 
Act  by  Anne  H.  Calm 

4.  CIA.  Intelligence  Community  Experiment.  |>.  12. 

5.  Ibid.,  p.  10. 

6.  Ibid.,  p.  14. 

7.  Ibid. 

8.  See  John  Prados.  The  Soviet  Estimate:  VS.  Intel- 
ligence Analysis  and  Soviet  Strategic  Forces  (Prince- 
ton: Princeton  University  Press,  1986).  This  work  cov- 


were  arrived  at  after  the  |>arties  "had  the  lioti- 
efit  of  alternative  views"  but  that  "there  is  no 
truth  to  .  .  .  allegations"  that  the  NIE  had 
been  influenced  by  pressure  from  Team  B.' 
Readers  may  judge  for  themselves. 

In  1978,  the  staff  of  the  Senate  Intelligence 
Committee  reviewed  the  Team  B  episode.14  It, 
too,  tried  to  minimize  the  damage,  construing 
the  leaks  as  the  problem,  not  the  substance  or 
methodology  of  the  experiment. 

Michael  Howard,  a  British  historian,  took  a 
more  forthright  position,  perhaps  because  he 
was  not  in  government.  His  comments  on  the 
Team  B  episode  have  survived  the  tests  of 
time  and  declassification.  Speaking  to  the  New 
York  Arms  Control  Seminar  on  March  31, 
1977,  Howard  said  that  interpreting  Soviet  in- 
tentions was  like  reading  a  Rorschach  ink 
blot — the  act  says  more  about  the  analyst  than 
it  does  about  Soviet  intentions. 

Decision-making.  Howard  maintained,  had 
to  be  at  least  as  confused  in  Moscow  as  in 
Washington.  Moreover,  as  Howartl  recalled, 
the  same  kinds  of  scare  tactics  were  used  U> 
promote  notions  of  a  "Bomber  Gap"  and  a 
"Missile  Gap"  in  the  1950s.  The  Soviet  military 
buildup  could  be  explained  in  less  convoluted 
ways  than  an  attempt  to  wrest  superiority  and 
expand  by  force.  The  precepts  of  Marxist  doc- 
trine, he  said,  preached  more  peaceful  expan- 
sion. He  drew  an  analogy  between  Russia  and 
Wilhelmine  Germany — countries  that  were 
psychologically  insecure,  feared  encirclement, 
and  were  conscious  of  backwardness.  The  de- 
scription fits  Brezhnev's  Soviet  Union  in  1977. 

But  Team  B  had  its  way,  and  the  Commit- 
tee on  the  Present  Danger  could  hardly  have 
been  more  pleased  at  the  fashion  in  which 
American  politics  evolved  over  the  following 
decade.  It  is  unfortunate  that  today,  with  the 
Cold  War  over,  Americans  are  still  paying  the 
price  for  the  extravagance  of  the  security  de- 
bate of  the  1970s.  It  is  doubly  unfortunate 
that  our  children,  and  even  their  children,  will 
still  be  paying.  ■ 

ers  these  and  other  intelligence  disputes  in  consider- 
able detail. 

9.  CIA.  Intelligence  Cnmmuuitu  Experiment,  p.  10. 

10.  Central  intelligence  Agency.  Soviet  Fortes  for 
Intercontinental  Conflict  Through  Uie  Mid  lDHOs.  No- 
tional  Intelligence  Estimate  11-3/8-7G,  December  21, 
1970  (declassified  September  16, 1992),  p.  6. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.  3 

12.  Richard  Pipes,  "Why  the  Soviet  Union  Thinks  It 
Could  Fight  and  Win  a  Nuclear  War."  Commentary 
(July  l977).pp.21-»4. 

IK.  Office  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence. 
Mi-limrtiiidiiiit  fur  licciptrnts  til  .Xittiutittt  Intelligence 
Estimate  lJ-J/X-Ttl.  (late  not  available  (declassified 
Septemlier  10. 1992),  p.  1. 

14.  Semite  Select  Committee  on  Intelligence.  Report: 
Tin  Siitiitual  intelligence  Estimate*  A-B  Team 
EpijttMli  Concerning  Soviet  Strategic  Ca/iabilttti  and 
Objectim.  95th  Cong.,  2nd  sess.  (Washington:  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office.  1978). 


The  CIA's 
own  estimate 
became  so  dark 
that  the  CIA 
began  to  insert 
footnotes 
taking  issue 
with  its  own 
report 


April  UNCI  31 


63 


Senator 

John  Glenn 

News  Release 


Tor  Immediate  Release:  Contact:  Bryan  McCleary (202) 224-9799 

June  28,  1993  Len  Weiss (202) 224-4751 


GLENN:   "AIR  FORCE  LIED  TO  CONGRESS" 

Senator  Calls  on  Pentagon  to  Punish  Those  Responsible 

Senator  John  Glenn  (D-Ohio)  is  demanding  the  Pentagon  launch 
an  investigation  to  determine  how  and  why  false  data  was  given  to 
Glenn  and  congressional  auditors  regarding  the  ability  of  the  B- 
1B  bomber  to  evade  radar. 

"I  was  lied  to  and  I  resent  it,"  said  Glenn,  a  supporter  of 
the  B-1B  on  the  Armed  Services  Committee.   "I  want  to  see  those 
responsible  punished  for  their  actions." 

The  call  for  an  investigation  comes  in  light  of  new  evidence 
provided  to  Glenn  by  the  General  Accounting  Office  (GAO) .   Glenn 
received  the  information  in  response  to  questions  he  raised  in  a 
hearing  before  his  Governmental  Affairs  Committee  June  10. 

A  de-classified  1989  Pentagon  memo  given  to  Glenn  reveals 
that  Department  of  Defense  officials  deliberately  provided 
congressional  investigators  with  false  B-l  radar  detection  data 
and  withheld  the  correct  information.   This  same  faulty 
information  was  again  used  in  a  letter  to  Glenn  last  year  touting 
the  benefits  of  the  B-1B.   It  was  also  given  out  to  Congressional 
investigators  in  1991. 

At  issue  is  the  B-lB's  "radar  cross  section"  which  is  the 
profile  that  will  appear  of  the  plane  at  various  angles  when  it 
appears  on  enemy  radar.  The  smaller  the  cross  section,  the 
better  the  chance  that  the  plane  will  not  be  picked  up  by  enemy 
radar.   The  size  of  the  cross  section  was  altered  in  the 
documents  given  to  Congress  to  make  the  plane's  ability  to  evade 
radar  appear  greater  than  it  really  was. 

Glenn  said  the  "credibility  problem  created  by  this 
misinformation  creates  questions  about  other  Air  Force  data  -- 
including  that  for  programs  like  the  B-2." 

Last  year,  the  Air  Force  designated  the  B-1B  as  the  backbone 
in  the  Air  Force's  conventional  bomber  force  --  an  action  which 
Glenn  agrees  with.   "Despite  the  controversy  over  radar  cross 
section,  the  B-1B  is  still  a  major  improvement  over  the  B-52,  and 
can  be  employed  at  a  fraction  of  the  cost  of  the  B^,2,"  said 
Glenn.   "I'm  angry,  though,  that  the  Pentagon  has  put  me  in  this 
difficult  position,"  he  added. 

Glenn  said  he  will  raise  this  matter  in  a  hearing  Tuesday  on 
Air  Force  bomber  issues  before  a  Senate  Armed  Services 
subcommittee.   Scheduled  to  testify  is  Air  Force  General  John  Loh 
who  is  responsible  for  the  operational  employment  of  virtually 
all  Air  Force  combat  aircraft.   General  Loh  wrote  a  1992  letter 
to  Glenn  citing  the  faulty  data.    (HEARING  TUESDAY  AT  9:30  a.m. 
222  RUSSELL  BUILDING) 


See  attached  Glenn  letter. 


64 


GAO 


United  State* 

General  Accounting  Office 

Washington,  D.C.  20648 


Program  Evaluation  and 
Methodology  Division 


June  16,    1993 

The  Honorable  John  Glenn 
Chairman,  Committee  on 
Governmental  Affairs 
United  States  Senate 

Dear  Mr.  Chairman: 

This  letter  follows  up  on  the  Senate  Governmental  Affairs 
Committee's  hearing  last  Thursday  (June  10)  on  GAO's 
Evaluation  of  the  U.S.  Strategic  Modernization  Program. 
As  you  will  recall,  in  answer  to  your  question  about  any 
limitations  of  our  study,  I  mentioned  four  kinds  of  data 
problems  that  troubled  me  with  regard  to  both  the  quality  of 
data  being  produced  by  the  Department  of  Defense,  and  GAO's 
access  to  data.   The  four  problems  were  (a)  data  that  were 
themselves  incomplete  or  of  poor  quality;  (b)  data  from  which 
we  were  excluded  via  classification;  (c)  data  that  were 
misleading;  and  (d)  data  that  were  falsely  reported  to  us. 

To  comply  with  your  request  at  that  hearing,  I  am  providing 
herewith  documents  and  information  on  two  issues:   the  data 
from  which  we  were  excluded  concerning  the  reliability  of  the 
Peacekeeper  missile  warhead,  and  the  data  which  we  found  to 
be  false  concerning  the  radar  cross  section  (RCS)  of  the  B-1B 
bomber. 

Denial  of  Data  on  Peacekeeper 
Warhead  Reliability 

GAO  first  requested  up-to-date  data  on  Peacekeeper  warhead 
reliability  in  June  1989,  which  had  been  reported 
periodically  in  reports  known  as  "CINCEVALS."  We  had  always 
had  access  to  these  CINCEVAL  reports  in  the  past  and  were  not 
given  a  clear  understanding  of  why  we  couldn't  see  this  one. 
Its  classification  level  was  one  to  which  we  normally  have 
access. 

We  repeated  our  request  to  various  DOD  offices,  moving  upward 
in  the  chain  of  command,  over  a  period  of  a  year.   At  each 
level,  we  were  refused  the  portions  of  the  report  on  the 
estimate  of  Peacekeeper  warhead  reliability.   As  you  can 
see  in  enclosure  I,  General  Chain,  then  commander  of  the 
Strategic  Air  Command,  objected  to  release  of  the  data  on   the 


65 


grounds  that  it  would  "pose  a  grave  threat  to  national 
security."  Although  GAO  did  then  receive  a  copy  of  the 
September  1989  Peacekeeper  CINCEVAL  (the  report  at  issue) , 
the  section  on  warhead  reliability  was  blacked  PUt. 

On  August  3,  1990,  GAO  sent  its  first  data  demand  letter  to 
the  Secretary  of  Defense  for  the  data  in  question  (see 
enclosure  II).   This  was  denied  by  DOD  in  a  letter  signed  by 
its  General  Counsel,  on  August  31,  1990  (enclosure  III).   GAO 
responded  with  a  second  demand  letter  on  October  26  to 
Secretary  of  Defense  Cheney  and  to  OMB  Director  Daman 
(enclosure  IV) .   This  request  was  again  subsequently  denied 
in  a  letter  signed  by  Director  Darman  (enclosure  V) .   After 
this  last  refusal,  we  ceased  our  efforts  to  enable  GAO 
evaluators  to  review  these  data  and  we  have  noted  in  our 
report  our  inability  to  corroborate  the  high  estimates  of 
both  Peacekeeper's  warhead  reliability,  and  hence  the 
missile's  overall  weapon  system  reliability. 

B-1B  Radar  Cross  Section  fRCS) 

Enclosure  VI,  the  memorandum  I  referred  to  in  my  testimony 
last  Thursday,  is  one  of  two  sources  for  our  realization  that 
false  data  were  being  provided  to  us  and  accurate  data 
withheld.   This  memorandum  was  found  by  GAO  evaluators  in  a 
package  of  written  DOD  comments  that  responded  to  a  1989 
draft  GAO  report.   I  draw  your  attention  first,  to  the  data 
given  in  paragraph  l.b.(l)  on  the  B-lB's  RCS  versus  the  data 
given  directly  below  under  l.b. (1)  "CONCERN."  which  are 
accurate,  but  not  to  be  released  to  us;  and  second,  to  the 
data  given  under  l.b. (2)  versus  the  accurate  data  given 
directly  below  under  l.b. (2),  "CONCERN."   The  language  given 
under  the  two  CONCERN  headings  specified  the  accurate  RCS 
measurement  of  an  actual  B-1B  and  provided  an  interpretation 
of  these  accurate  data. 

The  data  in  the  two  passages  marked  CONCERN — that  is,  the 
information  "not  intended  for  release  to  the  GAO" — were 
nonetheless  identified  and  confirmed  through  independent 
inquiry  and  analysis  by  GAO  evaluators,  and  were  incorporated 
in  a  draft  of  our  report,  U.S.  Strategic  Triad: — Modernizing 
Strategic  Bombers  and  Their  Missiles.   This  draft  report  was 
then  transmitted  to  the  Department  of  Defense  for  its 
official  comments  on  June  11,  1991,  and  was  the  subject  of 
several  meetings  of  DOD  and  GAO  representatives.   These 
meetings  were  held  to  provide  DOD  an  opportunity  to  supply 
official  oral  comments  in  response  to  the  draft  and 
documentation  to  support  those  comments.   One  of  those 
meetings  occurred  on  July  24,  1991  (the  attendees  to  that 
meeting  are  shown  in  enclosure  VII).   At  that  meeting,  the 
project  manager  for  our  draft  report  was  given  draft  written 
DOD  comments,  which  included  the  document  at  enclosure  VIII. 


66 


This  1991  document  is  the  second  source  I  mentioned  earlier: 
it  shows  that  2  years  later,  incorrect  b-ib  Res  data  were 
•till  being  offered  to  GAO.   In  addition,  over  the  course  of 
DOD's  official  oral  comments  we  were  criticized  for  the 
accurate  data  we  used  in  our  report  and  told  to  revise  our 
draft  to  conform  to  the  inaccurate  data  shown  in  enclosure 
VIII. 

During  these  discussions,  no  new  data  or  documentation  were 
provided  to  us  that  could  have  refuted  our  RCS  calculations 
and  finding.   Moreover,  a  DOD  representative  at  the  official 
oral  comments  session,  stated  that  he  believed  both  our  data 
and  our  interpretation  of  them  to  be  accurate.   Still 
further,  in  final  written  comments  to  our  draft  report,  the 
Department  of  Defense  recognized  the  accuracy  of  our  finding, 
based  on  the  RCS  measurements  we  reported,  and  stated  in  its 
comments,  "the  DOD  agrees  with  the  GAO"  concerning  our 
comparison  of  the  B-52  and  the  B-IB  on  the  issue  of  radar 
cross  section. 

Thank  you  again  for  your  careful  review  of  our  study  and  for 
the  important  hearing  which  resulted  from  it.   If  you  should 
have  further  questions  or  comments  about  the  information  we 
have  provided,  please  call  me  at  512-2900  or  Kwai-Cheung 
Chan,  Director  for  Program  Evaluation  in  Physical  Systems 
Areas  at  512-3092. 

Sincerely  yours, 


Eleanor  Chelimsky 

Assistant  Comptroller  General 


Enclosures 


67 


II 


ENCLOSURE    I 


r.rti 
.1 :  ! 


v. 


ENCLOSURE    I 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  AIR  FORCE 

MIAOOU*RTCRS  STRATEGIC    AIR   CCMMAnO 
OFfUTT  AIR   FORCE  BASE.  NEBRASKA  681  13 


Memo  for  Record 

Subject:  GAD  Request  for  Top  Secret  Docuroe-rt 

1.  I  have  reviewed  the  Corcptroller  General's  letter  to  Secretary  Cheney 
(B-240665,  3  Aug  90) .  After  careful  consideration  of  the  document  in 
question,  "Evaluation  of  Weapon  System  Capabilities  -  PEACEKEEPER  in  hONUTEMAN 
Silos  (U) ,"  18  Sep  89,  I  object  to  the  release  of  this  document  to  the  GAO. 

2.  Information  contained  in  this  report  is  extremely  sensitive,  limited 
access,  TOP  SBCRET/Restricted  Data,  and  must  be  carefully  controlled.  Release 
of  this  information  would  pose  a  grave  threat  to  national  security. 


JOHN  T.  CHAIN,  JR. 
General,  USAF 
Connander  in  Chief 


68 


ENCLOSURE  11 


ENCLOSURE  1} 


Comptroller  General 
of  the  United  State* 

Waahlaftoa.  D.C  WMa 


vAwLtV. 


f/L*jrsd 


B-240665 


August  3,  1990 


The  Honorable  Richard  B.  Cheney 
The  Secretary  of  Defense 

Dear  Mr.  Secretary: 

Pursuant  to  31  U.S.C.  716(b),  I  am  writing  to  request 
immediate  access  to  the  most  recent  complete  and  unedited 
(TS/RD)  Peacekeeper  CINCEVAL.   The  title  of  this  report  is 
"Evaluation  of  Weapon  System  Capabilities,  Peacekeeper  in 
Minuteraan  Silos,"  dated  18  September  1989  (ICBM  Evaluation 
Branch,  549  WSES,  SAC).   In  order  to  conduct  our  evaluation 
of  strategic  nuclear  weapons  (973266),  we  need  to  have 
access  to  the  latest  CINCEVAL  of  the  Peacekeeper  missile. 
I 

As  you  know,  we  were  previously  provided  with  an  extensively 
[edited  version  of  this  report.   But  because  all  information 
'regarding  the  actual  current  reliability  of  the  weapon 
system  was  deleted,  it  does  not  meet  our  needs.   Without 
this  information,  we  cannot  provide  the  Congress  with  ar. 
'informed  analysis  of  the  true  reliability  of  the  weapon 
'system. 


We  have  previously  been  given 
'unedited  versions  of  all  other 
nuclear  weapons  which  we  have 
this  project,  including  the  pr 
document  we  now  seek  is  not  a 
document.   GAO  staff  who  will 
hold  the  appropriate  security 
course  safeguard  it  in  accorda 
requirements.  "  CINCSAC  and  the 
bof.b  -  jdicated  that  they  have 
this  document  to  GAO. 


access  to  the  complete 
CINCEVALS  for  strategic 
requested  in  connection  ■  •_  -r, 
ior  Peacekeeper  CINCEVAL.  Th- 
planning  nor  a  war-fighting 
have  access  to  the  document 
clearances  and  we  will  of 
nee  with  established 

Department  of  Energy  have 
no  objection  to  the  release  o; 


This  review  is  being  conducted  pursuant  to  GAO's  author:. t« 
under  31  U.S.C.  712  and  31  U.S.C.  717.   We  have  a  right  :f 
'access  to  the  information  requested  under  31  U.S.C.  716:  '  . 
Pursuant  to  31  D.S.C.  716,  your  response  to  this  letter  is 
due  within  20  days.   If  full  access  to  the  requested 
information  is  not  granted,  you  are  required  to  furnish  a 
description  of  any  information  withheld,  and  the  reasons  for 
withholding  it. 

Sincerely  yours, 


^  t 


—     i   ' 
Charles  A.  Bowsher 

Comptroller  General 

of  the  United  States 


69 


ENCLOSURE    III  w.fcUfci     ..  .  .1 


■SECRET 

ENCLOSURE  III 


GENERAL  COUNSEL  OF  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON.  D  C     20301-KOO 


31  August  1990 

Honorable  Charles  A.  Bowsher 
Comptroller  General 
441  G  Street,  N.W. 
Washington,  DC    20548 

Dear  Mr.  Bowsher: 

(U)       This  Is  In  response  to  your  letter  dated  August  3,  1990,  which  was 
received  by  the  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  on  August  13,  1990  (GAO  File  B- 
240665). 


(U)       First,  It  appears  that  your  letter  was  based  on  a  serious 
misunderstanding  concerning  the  positions  of  the  Commander  In  Chief  of  the 
Strategic  Air  Command  and  the  Department  of  Energy.    Your  letter  represents  that 
"CINCSAC  and  the  Department  of  Energy  have  both  Indicated  that  they  have  no 
objection  to  the  release  of  this  document  ["Evaluation  of  Weapon  System 
Capabilities,  Peacekeeper  In  Mlnuteman  Silos,"  dated  9/18/89]  to  GAO."    This  Is  not 
correct.    CINCSAC  objects  to  the  release  of  this  document  to  GAO  (Tab  A),  and  the 
Department  of  Energy  can  find  no  evidence  that  anyone  In  the  Department  made  any 
such  representation  to  GAO.    In  fact,  the  Department  of  Energy  defers  to  the  views 
of  the  Department  of  Defense  on  the  question  of  the  release  of  the  report  to  GAO 
(Tab  B). 


i 
(U)       Third,  as  we  discussed  last  December,  the  Secretary  personally  briefed 
key  Congressional  leaders  on  this  matter. 

(U)       If  you  feel  that  It  would  be  helpful,  I  am  available  to  meet  with  you  and 
your  staff  to  discuss  this  Issue  further  and  to  reiterate  the  Important    national 
security  concerns  and  factual  Issues  underlying  the  Department's  position. 

Sincerely. 


Terrence  O'Donneli 


70 


ENCLOSURE  IV  ENCLOSURE  IV 


B-240665.2 
October  26,  1990 


The  Honorable  Dick  Cheney 
The  Secretary  of  Defense 

Dear  Mr.  Secretary: 

Pursuant  to  the  last  sentence  of  section  716(b)(1)  of  Title 
31,  United  States  Code,  I  am  submitting  this  report  on  your 
failure  to  provide  access  to  certain  records  to  the  General 
Accounting  Office  (GAO) . 

Section  716(b)  of  Title  31,  United  States  Code,  establishes 
mechanisms  for  the  resolution  of  GAO  access  to  records 
problems  involving  federal  agencies.   Subsection  716(b)(1) 
provides  that  when  access  to  any  records  of  a  federal  agency 
is  not  made  available  to  GAO  within  a  reasonable  time,  the 
Comptroller  General  may  make  a  written  request  for  such 
records  to  the  agency  head.   If  full  access  is  not  afforded 
within  20  days  from  receipt  of  that  request,  "the  Comptroller 
General  may  file  a  report  with  the  President,  the  Director  of 
the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget,  the  Attorney  General,  tht 
head  of  the  agency,  and  Congress." 

After  20  days  following  the  filing  of  this  report,  the 
Comptroller  General  may  apply  for  judicial  enforcement  of  the 
access  request,  subject  to  the  right  of  the  President  or  the 
Director  of  the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  to  preclude  an 
enforcement  action  for  certain  kinds  of  records. 

GAO  staff  had  asked  Department  of  Defense  officials  for  access 
to  the  most  recent  complete  and  unedited  (TS/RD)  Peacekeeper 
CINCEVAL,  entitled  "Evaluation  of  Weapon  System  Capabilities, 
Peacekeeper  in  Minuteman  Silos,"  dated  18  Sept.  1989  CC3M 
Evaluation  Branch,  549  WSES,  SAC) . 

Although  several  requests  were  made,  GAO  was  net  grar.ted 
access  to  the  information.   However,  in  conversations  over  a 
number  of  months  we  were  advised  by  ycur  General  Counsel  that 
the  report  would  be  made  available  upon  completion  of  certai.i 
sensitive  requirements.   The  delay  proved  to  be  unreasonably 
long  in  the  context  of  our  need  for  the  information  involved, 
and  1,  therefore,  on  August  3,  1990,  made  a  written  request 
for  the  documents  sursuant  to  31  U.S.C.  §  716(b)  (Enclosure 
I)  . 


71 


•I  • 


We  war*  not  afforded  full  access  to  the  requested  racords 
within  20  days  following  my  writtan  request.   On  August  31, 
1990,  tha  Ganaral  Counsal  of  the  Department  of  Defense  replied 
to  sty  request  in  a  classified  letter.   I  have  reviewed  the 
representations  in  that  letter.   I  remain  persuaded  that  GAO 
needs  tha  information  and  is  justified  in  invoking  its  legal 
authority  to  compel  disclosure. 

Since  GAO  has  a  legal  right  of  access  to  the  requested 
documents,  and  since  full  access  to  these  records  was  not 
afforded  within  20  days  following  our  August  3  request,  1  now 
submit  my  report  of  the  matter  to  you  and  tha  other  designated 
officials,  pursuant  to  31  U.S.C.  5  716(b)(1). 

Sincerely  yours 


Comptroller  General 
of  the  United  States 

Enclosure 


72 


'  ^ 


B-240665.2 
October  26,  1990 


The  Honorable  Richard  G.  Darman 
Director,  Office  of  Management 
and  Budget 

Oear  Mr.  Darman: 

Pursuant  to  the  last  sentence  of  section  716(b)(1)  of  Title 
31,  United  States  Code,  I  an  submitting  this  report  on  the 
failure  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  to  provide  access  to 
certain  records  to  the  General  Accounting  Office  (GAO) . 

Section  716(b)  of  Title  31,  United  States  Code,  establishes 
mechanisms  for  the  resolution  of  GAO  access  to  records 
problems  involving  federal  agencies.   Subsection  716(b)(1) 
provides  that  when  access  to  any  records  of  a  federal  agency 

is  not  made  available  to  GAO  within  a  reasonable  time,  the 
Comptroller  General  may  make  a  written  request  for  such 
records  to  the  agency  head.   If  full  access  is  not  afforded 
within  20  days  from  receipt  of  that  request,  "the  Comptroller 
General  may  file  a  report  with  the  President,  the  Director  of 
the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget,  the  Attorney  General,  the 
head  of  the  agency,  and  Congress." 

After  20  days  following  the  filing  of  this  report,  the 
Comptroller  General  may  apply  for  judicial  enforcement  of  the 
access  request,  subject  to  the  right  of  the  President  or  the 
Director  of  the  Office  of  Management  and  3udget  to  preclude  an 
enforcement  action  for  certain  kinds  of  records . 

GAO  staff  had  asked  Department  of  Defense  officials  for  access 

to  the  most  recent  complete  and  unedited  (TS/R2)  Peacekeeper 
CINCEVA1,  entitled  "Evaluation  of  Weapon  System  Capabilities, 
Peacekeeper  in  Minuteman  Silos,"  dated  IB  Sept.  19B9  CC3M 
Evaluation  Branch,  549  WSES,  SAC) . 

Although  several  requests  were  made,  GAO  was  r.ot  granted 
access  to  the  information.   However,  in  conversations  over  a 
number  of  months  we  were  advised  by  the  General  Counsel  of  the 
Department  of  Qefense  that  the  report  would  be  made  available 
upon  completion  of  certain  sensitive  requirements.   The  delay 
proved  to  be  unreasonably  long  in  the  context  of  our  need  for 
the  information  involved,  and  I,  therefore,  on  August  3,  1 59C ■ 
made  a  written  request  for  the  documents  pursuant  to  31  U.5.C. 
S  716(b)  (Enclosure  I) . 


73 


M«  ••re  not  afforded  full  access  to  the  requested  records 
within  20  days  following  my  written  request.   On  August  31, 
1990,  th«  General  Counsel  of  the  Department  of  Defense  replied 
to  my  request  in  a  classified  letter.   I  have  reviewed  the 
representations  in  that  letter.   I  remain  persuaded  that  GAO 
needs  the  information  and  is  Justified  in  invoicing  its  legal 
authority  to  compel  disclosure. 

Since  GAO  has  a  legal  right  of  access  to  the  requerted 
documents,  and  since  full  access  to  these  records  was  not 
afforded  within  20  days  following  our  August  3  requtat,  I  no-- 
submit  my  report  of  the  matter  to  you  and  the  other  designated 
officials,  pursuant  to  31  U.3.C.  S  716(b)(1). 

Sincerely  yours, 


Comptroller  General 
of  the  United  States 


Enclosure 


74 


ENCLOSURE    V  ENCLOSURE    V 

EXECUTIVE  OFFICE  OF  THE  PRESIDENT 

OFFICE  OF   MANAGEMENT  AND    BUDGET 
WASHINGTON.    C.C.    20503 

the  director  November  23,  1990 


Honorable  Charles  A.  Bowsher 
Comptroller  General  of  the  United  States 
U.S.  General  Accounting  Office 
Washington,  D.C.   20548 

Re:   B-240665.2 

Dear  Mr.  Bowsher: 

This  letter  constitutes  a  certification,  pursuant  to  31 
U.S.C.  Section  716(d),  that  the  redacted  portions  of  the 
document  referred  to  in  your  report  dated  October  26,  1990, 
which  was  received  by  the  White  House  on  November  9,  1990, 
could  be  withheld  under  5  U.S.C.  Section  552(b)(5),  and  th*t 
disclosure  reasonably  could  be  expected  to  impair 
substantially  the  operations  of  the  Government. 

The  document  referred  to  in  your  report  entitled 
"Evaluation  of  Weapon  System  Capabilities  —  Peacekeeper  in 
Minuteman  Silos,"  dated  September  18,  1989,  is  a  Restricted, 
Top  Secret,  uniquely  sensitive  Strategic  Air  Command  report. 
A  redacted  copy  of  the  report  was  provided  to  the  General 
Accounting  Office  (GAO) .   The  redacted  portions  of  the  report 
are  highly  classified  and  contain  estimates  on  the  W87 
nuclear  warhead. 

5  U.S.C.  Section  552(b)(5)  authorizes  the  withholding  of 
all  "inter-agency  or  intra-agency  memorandums  or  letters 
which  would  not  be  available  by  law  to  a  party  other  than  an 
agency  in  litigation  with  the  agency."  Thus,  Exemption  5 
exempts  from  mandatory  disclosure  all  documents  that  are 
"normally  privileged  in  the  civil  discovery  context."   NLRB 
v.  Sears.  Roebuck  &  Co. .  421  U.S.  132,  149  (1975).   See 
United  States  v.  Weber  Aircraft  Corp.,  465  U.S.  792,  798-804 
(1984)  (all  privileges  that  are  well  recognized  in  the  case 
law  are  incorporated  by  Exemption  5) . 

As  described  above,  the  redacted  portions  of  the 
Strategic  Air  Command  report  constitute  a  staff  evaluation 
for  the  Secretary  of  Defense  and  other  Defense  Department 
decisionmakers  of  the  capabilities  of  a  very  sensitive 
weapons  system  for  use  as  planning  factors  in  developing  and 
updating  the  Single  Integrated  Operations  Plan  (SIOP) .   The 
SIOP  is  among  the  most  sensitive  of  the  nation's  military 
secrets.   The  redacted  portions  thus  may  be  withheld  under 
Exemption  5  covering  predecisional,  deliberative  mercrranda 


75 


and  reports  for  agency  decisionmakers.   See  Sears.  Roebuck. 
421  U.S.  at  150-151.   See  also  United  States 
v.  Reynolds.  345  U.S.  1,  10  (1953)  (privilege  covering 
"military  matters,  which,  in  the  interest  of  national 
security,  should  not  be  divulged."). 

The  Secretary  of  Defense  has  determined  that  disclosure 
of  the  redacted  portions  of  this  document  to  the  GAO 
reasonably  could  be  expected  to  impair  substantially  the 
operations  of  the  Government.   The  redacted  information  is 
deliberative  material  used  to  make  weapons  allocation  and 
targeting  determinations  by  DOD  authorities  charged  with  tht. 
oversight  of  the  SIOP.   The  redacted  material  consists  of 
uniquely  sensitive  estimates  to  assist  in  the  management  of 
the  nation's  nuclear  deterrent  aimed  at  holding  Soviet 
targets  at  risk.   Reporting  to  Congress  on  this  extremely 
sensitive  information  appropriately  has  been  limited  to  a 
briefing  by  the  Secretary  of  Defense  of  the  leadership  of  ..  • 
House  and  Senate  Armed  Services  Committees. 

•  I  agree  with  the  Secretary's  determination  and  hereby 
make  the  certification  required  by  31  U.S.C.  Section  716(d) 
Since  all  certifications  under  this  section  must  be  provitft'. 
to  Congress,  as  well  as  the  Comptroller  General,  copies  o:_ 
this  letter  are  being  submitted  to  the  President  of  the 
Senate  and  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 


With  best  regards, 


Richard  G.  Darman 


76 


ENCLOSURE  VI 


•  ufcJtc: 


DEPARTMENT  CFTWE  AIR  ":RCi 

MEAOOUAR-TERS   STRATEGIC  AIR  COMMANO 
0«TUTT  AIR  FORCE  BASE.  NEBRASKA  •  •113-ftOOl 


ENCLOSURE   VI 


Is  2  8  J'JN  1cga 

GAO   Draft   Report,    on    "E-1B   Mission   Effectiveness"    (U) 


AC 

1.   (Uj   We  "nave  reviewed  the  GAO '  s  craft  report,  on  "3-iB  Mission 
Effectiveness"  and  coordinate  with  the  following  comments: 

a.   (  ) 


b.   (U)   The  following  two  comments  were  previously  stated  in 
INA's  18  Mar  89  letter  to  XOB  for  their  response  to  the  earlier 
draft.   They  are  included  here  for  the  record  and  reflect  the 
standing  DCS/lntelligence  position:  however,  they  are  not  intended 
for  release  to  the  GAO. 

(1)   (  ) 


(  )   CONCERN : 


(2)   (  ) 


(  )   CONCERN : 


.r.rr  Ms  -.  Lsrrv 


2.   (U)   If  you  have  further  questions,  you  may  contact  Maj 
Thomson,  IN'AD,  42476. 

/ 


//t 


-'AMES  P.  ROOT.  Ccione!,  USAr 
Assi  DCS-lnieilisancs 


ClASSiriEr    EY:      E-13   Security   C-u-ce 


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TAB 


NEWS 


B-lBandtheGAO,  JUNE  IS,  1593 


Allegations  that  the  Air  Force  deliberately  provided  false  informa- 
tion to  the  GAO  on  the  B-1B  is  not  true.  The  GAO  has  been  in 
possession  of  aD  B-1B  Radar  Cross  Section  data  since  July  1989.  in 
an  August  1989  meeting  between  the  Air  Farce,  DOD  and  the 
GAO  the  topic  of  Radar  Cross  Section  data  was  addressed.  The 
allegation  of  withholding  information  was  discussed  and  the  Air 
Force  officer  who  attended  the  meeting  left  believing  the  GAO 
knew  that  the  Air  Force  did  not  intend  to  deceive  the  GAO 
regarding  the  release  of  any  RCS  data. 


TALKING  POINTS 

-  There  was  a  June  24, 1989  letter,  classified  secret,  which  discussed 
RCS  and  did  state  the  figures  were  not  intended  for  release  to 
GAO.  The  letter  was  the  opinion  of  one  action  officer  and  did  not 
necessarily  reflect  the  views  of  the  Air  Force  or  DOD. 

-  A  July  19, 1989  letter  from  the  GAO,  to  JCS*  Strategic  Operations 

Division,  also  classified  secret,  contains  the  figures  cited  in  the  24 
June  letter.  The  July  19  letter  states  the  GAO  received  complete 
and  accurate  information  during  their  process  of  reviewing  DOD's 
comments  on  the  GAO's  draft  report  on  the  B-l. 

-  Finally,  in  an  August  10, 1989  unclassified  memo  from  SAF/AQ 
(Acquisition)  to  Air  Force  XOOT  (operations)  the  8  August  89 
meeting  between  the  Air  Force,  DOD  and  GAO  is  summarized. 
The  Air  Force  officer  who  attended  and  made  notes  at  the  meeting 
said  me  allegations  about  RCS  data  were  discussed  openly  and 
believed  that,  "More  imporfntly,  the  GAO  left  the  meeting 
knowing  mat  the  Air  Force  did  not  intend  to  deceive  the  GAO 
regarding  the  release  of  any  RCS  data." 


Source:       SAF/AQ 

AX>  Maj  Tom  LaRock 


80 


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UNCLASSIFIED 


APPENDIX  II  APPENDIX  II 


COMMENTS  FROM  THE  DIRECTOR  OF  DEFENSE 
RESEARCH  AND  ENGINEERTW, 


^»TJ*L 


DIRECTOR  OF  DCFCNSElMSSANCH  AND  CNOINCERINS 
WASHIN6TON.eC    10101-3010 


1  0  AUG   1989 


Mr.    rr«nk   C.    Conahan 
Assistant  Comptroller  General 
National   Security  and 

International  Affairs   Sivuion 
0.   S.  General  Accounting  Office 
Washington,    DC     20348 

Dear  Mr.  Conahan: 


»i»  is   the  Dcpartaene   of   Defense  (OoO)    response  to   the 

BOMBERS:    .ssues  Related   to  a-la  as  a  Penetrating   Sooner    "   d«-.rf 
JOM   I,    1988    (CAO  Cod.  393«33),    OSD  Case  1917.     «SoS.ttal5nf 

generally  concurs  with  the  draft  report?  oepartnent 

(-n„J?'.D°P*rlaent.fu?  «"><Sueted  a   thorough   review  of   the 
UA!?«  Je?t"fd,ntiei*S  c«"eiencit«  of  tzi  UO-ISXA  systea.     -h. 
ALO-ISU  is   intended  to  coapl.cu.nt   the   inherent  B-ls  fliSSt 
performance  characteristics   that  contribute  to  the  penetration 

been  perforaed   that  support   the  Dep.rt.enfs  plan  to  cor  *<' 
deficiencies  and  aaxisise   the  aircrew's  abilitv  to  detee- 

are  SSfd^M^TI  "fT  *"»«  ««ce.aes .    near-tern  DoD  efforts 
ace   toward  neetmg  baseline  defensive  system  reouireaents 

!f:!   :;^!  "•"""nee.    Suture  enhancements  miqht  be   rem  i  red   to 
aeet    teennology  edvaneeaer.ta  or   clanging   threats        Ae    the    -enort 

ffn3^"-   <""  SP**5"<=  enhanceme«rwill".5;nd^ JSTeSSS? 
roles   that  say   oe  assignee    to    the  e-1*.  suture 

on  July   is.    i-es.    the  GAO  asaed   tae  Of  Sice  of '  the  join. 
Chief,  of  Staff   and   the  Strategic  Air^oanind   to   -.«««  i-ib 

cross  sect. on  differed   froa  design   requlreaents.      The 


82 


tin-  -•  4  ■»«••«-•  _ri 


APPENDIX  II  APPENDIX  II 


referenced  "new  information"  is  actual  flight-test-derived  radar 
cross  section  values,  which  in  Tact  had  previously  been  provided 
to  the  CAO.  The  flight  test  data  did  indicate  a  somewhat  higher 
radar  cross  section  than  that  measured  in  model  tests  (which 
were  the  basis  for  the  contractor  meeting  specifications).   The 
flight  test  data  also  showed,  as  expected,  significant 
variations  with  aspect  angle  and  frequency.   However,  the 
modestly  higher  radar  cross  section  at  critical  sectors  and 
frequencies  does  not  significantly  affect  the  penetration 
effectiveness  of  tn«  B-IB.  -The  effectiveness  of  the  3-lB  as  a 
penetrating  bomber  derives  from  a  combination  of  its  low  radar 
cross  section,  high  penetration  speed,  and  low  altitude 
capability.   Because  of  its  low  altitude,  the  point  at  which 
ground-based  radars,  both  those  for  surface-to-air  missiles  and 
those  vectoring  interceptor  aircraft,  will  detect  the  S-1B  are  a 
result  of  line-of-sight  detection  from  breaking  the  horizon  at 
close  ranges  and  are  not  influenced  by  its  radar  cross  section. 
Consequently,  the  "new  information"  on  tbe  aircraft's  radar 
cross  section  should  not  alter  the  findings  of  the  current  CAO 
report. 

Specific  DoO  comments  on  the  draft  report  findings  are 
provided  in  trie  enclosure.   The  DoD  appreciates  the  opportunity 
to  comment  en  the  draft  report. 

Sincerclv 


Robert"c.  Otincari 

Enclosure 


34 


83 


finftd  gates  Senate 

WASHIN8T0N.  DC  208  10 


June  10/  1992 


Dear  Colleague: 


We  are  sending  this  letter  to  the  members  of  the  Senate 
Armed  Services  Committee  and  the  Defense  Appropriations 
Subcommittee  as  substantive  information  on  the  capabilities  of 
the  3-le  Lancer  bomber  as  assessed  by  General  John  M.  Loh,  USAF, 
Commander  Air  Combat  Command,  and  General  George  L.  Butler, 
Commander-in-Chief,  strategic  Command,  the  two  senior  commanders 
who  have  responsibility  for  employing  the  aircraft.   General  Loh 
and  General  Butler  were  responding  to  our  requests  for  their 
evaluations  of  the  B-l's  conventional  capabilities  and  of  its 
operational  utility  in  the  heavy  bomber  force. 

In  our  view  the 

ijflMikM£iM**fted  resistance  in  tbe  Congress  to  meaningful 
modifications  that  will  allow  best  employment  of  its  inherent 
capabilities.   General  Loh  and  General  Butler  agree,  and  in 
their  letters  they  strongly  urge  enhancement  of  the  B-l 
conventional  capability.  Among  other  needs  to  qualify  this 
superb  machine  for  best  employment  is  integration  of  1760 
wiring,  inclusion  of  a  Global  Positioning  Satellite  receiver, 
and  qualification  for  inertially-aided  munitions. 

Importantly,  during  the  week  of  June  15  the  Air  Force  will 
deliver  to  the  Congress  the  Bomber  Roadmap  in  which  General  Loh 
and  General  Butler  played  substantial  roles.   The  Roadmap  will 
address  the  integration  of  the  3-1,  B-2,  and  B-52  bombers  in  a 
comprehensive  assessment  of  U.S.  heavy  bomber  operational 
capabilities,  and  reportedly  will  reflect  General  Loh  and 
General  Butler's  strong  endorsement  of  3-1  conventional  mission 
needs. 

Our  letters  to  General  Loh  and  General  Butler  and  their 
replies  are  attached  for  information;  a  classified  (secret) 
supplement  to  General  Loh's  letter  comparing  the  weapons  and 
range  capabilities  of  the  B-l  and  the  B-52H  is  also  available  to 
you  and  your  staff  in  S-407. 

In  sunroary,  we  uxge  you  to  fully  support  funding  of  B-l 
upgrades  in  the  FY-93  Defense  Authorization  and  Appropriations 
bills  as  an  outstanding  investment  in  much  needed  additional 
qualifications  for  this  already  proven  aircraft. 

We  welcome  discussion  on  this  matter  either  with  us  or  our 
staffs. 


Best  regards. 


Sincerely, 


Alan  J. 
United 


Senator 


Richard  C.  Shelbj 
United  States  Senator 


84 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  AIR  FORCE 

HEADQUARTER!  AIR  COMBAT  COMMAND 
LANOUY  AIR  FORCE  BASE,  VIR3INIA 

JUK     5  t932 


OFFICE  OF  THE  COMMANDER 

Langley  AFB  VA  23665-5555 

Honorable  John  Glenn 
United  States  Senate 
Washington  DC  20510-0001 

Dear  Senator  Glenn 

Thank  you  lor  your  letter  of  22  May  1992.   The  B-l  questions  you 
raised  are  timely,  and  I  welcome  the  opportunity  to  clarify 
these  natters. 

As  the  Gulf  War  proved,  the  demise  of  the  Soviet  union  did  not 
eliminate  all  threats  to  American  interes-s.   On  the  contrary, 
the  world  iB  less  stable  now  than  during  the  Cold  War  and  with 
the  proliferation  of  sophisticated  weapons  around  the  world,  the 
threats  we  face  are  varied,  complex,  and  plentiful,  with  fewer 
forces  overseas  and  knowing  that  our  allies'  interests  may 
converge  with  our  own,  our  ability  to  respond  immediately  and 
forcefully  in  future  crises  is  imperative. 

This  demanding  set  of  criteria  explains  our  emphasis  on  the 
bomber's  conventional  capabilities.   Only  the  bomber  force  can 
provide  immediate,  massed  firepower  in  the  opening  phase  of  a 
conflict  anywhere  on  the  globe  from  home  or  from  a  theater 
location.   With  the  B-52  force  attacking  from  primarily  a 
standoff  position,  and  a  planned  force  of  only  20  B-2s,  it  is 
imperative  the  conventional  capability  of  the  B-l  be  enhanced. 
With  96  in  the  force  today,  it  will  be  the  workhorse  of  our 
conventional  heavy  bomber  force.  Although  the  B-l  was 
originally  optimized  for  nuclear  operations,  it  was  designed  for 
utilization  in  both  the  nuclear  and  conventional  role  and, 
therefore,  has  tremendous  inherent  capabilities  for  conventional 
operations  which  can  be  fully  exploited.   The  b-1'b  combination 
of  very  high  speed,  long  range,  high  payload  and  low  altitude 
terrain  following  avionics  makes  it  ideally  suited  for 
conventional  missions,  with  modifications.   These  modifications 
will  only  improve  the  B-l's  total  war-fighting  capability.   They 
will  not  diminish  the  ability  to  perform  its  nuclear  mission 
which  can  be  fully  retained. 

Today,  the  B-l's  conventional  capability  is  limited  to  carrying 
feneral  purpose  bombs;  however,  we  intend  to 

to  carr/gHBHHQ|M^i£icn  munitions.   By 
comparison,  an  F-lll—our  larges^^^^Wer  platform  for  these 
weapons— carries  only  OTMHHMl^VMPtMMlMP~~ 


85 


I'm  sending  a  classified  chart  separately  to  illustrate  better 
why  I  believe  it  is  prudent  to  modify  this  aircraft  to  reach  its 
full  capabilities.   The  chart  compares  the  B-52H  to  the  B-l, 
showing  the  weapons  and  range  capabilities  of  the  two  aircraft. 
In  some  cases,  you  will  notice  the  aircraft  are  very  similar; 
however,  there  are  dramatic  differences  in  the  two  aircraft's 
war-fighting  capabilities. 

First,  the  B-l  is  much  more  compatible  with  composite  force 
^operations.   Its  speed  and  radar  signature  are  similar  to  the 

other  aircraft  in  a  strike  force  package,  unlike  the  much  older 

■ggpMHMQSffKThe   B-l   can 

also  operate  "from  the  same  type  of  airfields  as  our  fighter 

aircraft,  using  narrower  taxiways  and  shorter  runways.   During 
speserr,  storm,  the  B-l  could  have  operated  from  more  than  30 

airfields  within  the  theater,  while  the  B-52  was  restricted  to 

less  than  10. 

Secondly,  the  B-l,  even  with  its  current  electronic  counter- 
measures  (ECM)  limitations,  is  a  more  capable  and  survivable 
platform  than  the  B-52.   If  we  are  able  to  proceed  with  the 
planned  B-l  ECM  program,  we  will  be  able  to  exploit  its  inherent 
advantages  of  high  speed  and  lower  radar  signature  better,  with 
the  ECM,  the  B-l  can  penetrate  defenses  and  strike  targets 
unescorted  using  direct  attack  munitions,  while  the  B-52  cannot. 
The  B-52  could  only  be  used  to  directly  overfly  targets  in  areas 
where  the  air  defenses  have  been  severely  degraded. 
Consequently,  we  will  use  the  B-52  primarily  in  a  standoff  role 
necessitating  the  use  of  significantly  more  expensive  missiles 
until  defenses  have  been  eliminated  when  it  can  add  mass  and 
reach  to  follow  on  sustained  operations. 


The 


we  want  to  make  to  the  B-l  ECM  suite  affects. 
Irst,  we  want  all  the  aircraft  to  have 

■Pwe  plan  to  improve  the  ^rews ' 
situational  awareness.  This  will  allow  them  to 
CHMg|H00HBHHBI^VHHHBV'v€:ntior>al  threats,  while 
simultaneously  detecting  modern  radars  both  Russian  and  non- 
Fussian.  Finally,  we  will  iif__ 
thereby,  increasing  employment  options  ana  survivability  against 
the  threats  we  expect  it  to  face. 

Third,  the  B-l  has  many  unique  capabilities  the  B-52  can  never 
match.   It  has  the  speed  advantage  cf_routinely  attacking 
targets  at  «MWSBBBHHHB(IBHWWHWWBli*BWBW|«P«»-e suiting 
in  much  longer  threat  exposure.  Also,  the  B-l  can  use  its 
automatic  terrain  following  system  to  ingress  to  its  targets  at 
2  00  feet.   These  features,  along  with  its  greater  bomb  load, 
better  accuracy,  and  high  resolution  radar,  give  the  B-l 
enormous  potential  to  provide  significant  power  projection  well 
into  the  next  century. 


86 


4 

I 


Finally,  it  is  important  to  note  the  average 

VMMMMMtfHMl  It  will  cost  us  less  to  maintain  a 
B-l  well  into  the  twenty-first  century  than  to  continue  to  shore 
up  a  aid-twentieth  century  design.  To  date,  restrictions  which 
have  denied  us  the  baseline  program  funds  to  provide  for  spare 
parts  and  establish  organic  repair  capability  have  kept  B-l 
aircraft  availability  rates  artificially  low.  These  low  rates 
&n<3Jth£_JpBMMriesing|tigggaA^ftptf^£iBeve  given  the  B-l  an 
leserved  negative  Characterization..  .The  B-l . .availability 
■*Tates  xor  its_first  6  years  of  operations  are  similar  to  other 
^sonpieoraTrcraft  at"this~  stage  of  maturity.  Therefore,  we  are 
convinced  adequate  B-l  provisioning  would  increase  aircraft 
availability  rates  comparable  to  the  B-52  and  our  current 
fighters. 

Delaying  funds  for  our  proposed  B-l  conventional  enhancements 
program,  will  leave  the  B-l  with  its  current  MK-82  soft,  area 
target  kill  capability.   As  you  are  aware,  this  program 
includes:   MIL-STD  1760  avionics  architecture,  ECM  upgrades, 
full  integration  of  the  GPS  system  into  the  offensive  avionics, 
qualification  of  the  Joint  Direct  Attack  Munitions,  improved 
radios,  and  an  upgraded  computer  system.  Additionally,  since 
the  proposed  ECM  improvements  are  not  currently  in'  production,  ' 
.any  funding-  delay  will*. iTSg  the  start- date,-  affecting  the  other 
/improvements  in  capability:   Delays  in  ECM  funding  also- leave  us" 
'  with  13  aircraft" with  ho^defensive  avionics  at  all,  and  we  will 
be  unable  to  decrease  the  roan-hours  required  to  trouble-shoot 
system  problems. 

Hopefully,  this  information,  will  answer  your  concerns.  With 
carefully  planned  modifications,  the  B-l  will  add  to  our  ability 
to  project  conventional  military  power  significantly  and  well 
into  the  future. 


/ 


Sincerely 


JOIK^M.  LOH 
General,  USAF 
Commander 


87 


DEFENSE  WEEK    Monday,  Octobtr  .'(5.  1992 


The  All  Force  over  the 
Uut  decade  has  incorrectly 
stated  the  stealthy,  head- 
on  profile  of  the  B-l 
bomber,  claiming  It  would 
appear  smaller  oa  enemy 
radar  screens  than  the 
data  Indicates,  according 
to  the  unclassified 
_  tiont  of  a  new  secret  stud; 

According  to 
cross  section 
data  and  pilofn 


B-l  Not  As  Stealthy 

As  Air  Force  Claims, 

Says  GAO  Review 


BY  TONY  CAPACCIO 


"We  use  the  front-view 
radar  cross  section,  which 
we  have  done  consisten- 
tly," Camana  said.  "If 
they  take  issue  with  that, 
it's  a  problem  with  their 
interpretation  of  the  data 
the  Air  Force  is  using  be- 
cause we  have  been  using 


head-on  radar 
Force  offi- 
congressional  testimony 
and  interviews  that  the  B-l,  with  its  fully-swept  back 
76-foot  wing  span,  has  a  profile  about  the  size  of  an  F- 1 6 
fighter,  with  its  32-foot  wing  span. 

While  never  justified  exclusively  on  the  basis  of  its 
stealthy  characteristics,  the  B-l  was  billed  as  a  marked  im- 
provement over  the  B-52  in  terms  of  radar  cross  section. 
But  the  cross  section  issue  strikes  at  the  heart  of  questions 
about  the  B-l 's  survivability  in  low-level  nuclear  bomb- 
ing runs  over  the  once-Soviet  Union. 

Until  the  Soviet  empire  crumbled,  the  jury  was  still  out 
on  whether  the  B-l  could  meet  its  low-level  operations 
requirements. 

"GAO  found  that  the  Air  Force  has  incorrectly  repor- 
ted the  radar  cross  section  of  the  B-l  B.  ..Although  the  Air 
Force  states  the  B-l's  head-on  radar  cross  section  is  no 
greater  than  (deleted  RCS  figure),  GAO  found  that  an  ac- 
tual head-on  measurement  was  [deleted  RCS  figure],  de- 
pending on  the  type  of  radar  performing  the  detection," 
GAO  wrote. 

Based  on  their  analysis  of  classified  stealth  data,  GAO 
investigators  concluded  the  B-l's  RCS  was  significantly 
larger  than  service  claims,  said  a  congressional  source 
familiar  with  the  study. 

The  unclassified  GAO  conclusions  are  contained  in  a 
classified  study  entitled,  "U.S.  Strategic  Triad:  Moder- 
nizing Strategic  Bombers  and  Their  Missiles,"  It  was 
provided  September  28  to  Rep.  Dante  Fascell  (7>Fla.), 
the  retiring  chairman  of  the  House  F  oreign  Affairs 
Committee,  as  part  of  an  eight-volume  study  on  the  nu- 
clear triad. 

Fascell  placed  as  unclassified  summary  of  the  entire 
study  into  the  Congressional  Record,  but  the  B-l  stealth 
discussion  has  not  been  made  public. 

News  of  the  B-l  RCS  controversy  is  the  latest  in  a 
string  of  unflattering  revelations  to  dog  the  B-l.  But  de- 
spite major  funding  cuts  suggested  by  the  Senate  Armed 
Services  Committee  and  its  appropriations  counterpart, 
congressional  defense  conferees  decided  to  approve 
$304. 1  million  of  the  Pentagon's  S35S .9  million  fiscal 
1993  procurement  and  rtsearcoAJeveiopment  request. 
And  Air  Force  officials  at  a  B-l '  'summit' '  meeting 
late  last  month  tentatively  approved  an  approximately 
SI  .9  biJlioa.  three-part  conventional  B- 1  upgrade  pro- 
gram that  fleshes  out  the  details  first  unveiled  in  June  in 
the  service's  "Bomber  Roadmap." 

"We  really  don't  need  to  get  into  numbers"  of  B-l 
RCS  measurement,  said  Ma).  Gen.  Patrick  Camana,  Air 
Force  director  of  strategic  acqmtjtipj 


Carotins,  had  direct  involvement  with  GAO  during 
compilation  of  the  bomber-  report- 


that  data  all  along. ..I  guess  we  would  have  a  basic  dis- 
agreement on  this  issue,"  Caruana  said. 

According  to  GAO,  even  if  the  B-I  's  head-on  RCS  was 
as  small  as  the  Air  Force  claimed,  its  apparently  larger 
side  and  rear  profiles  negate  any  advantage  against  So- 
viet-style radar  provided  by  the  more  compact  frontal 
view. 

The  purportedly  small  head-on  view  "can  be  a  mislead- 
ing description,  since  from  the  side  and  rear  GAO  found 
that  the  B-l's  RCS  is  [figure  deleted].  Clearly,  this  makes 
the  smaller  head-on  measurement  much  less  meaningful 
since  it  is  unlikely  that  air-to-air  and  air-to-ground  eng- 
agements will  only  occur  with  the  aircraft  flying  head-on 
to  Soviet  radars,"  the  report  said. 

Concerning  the  recently  completed  B-l  "summit," 
Caruana  said  the  Air  Force  plans  to  begin  lethality  en- 
hancements this  fiscal  year.  The  enhancements  call  for 
installation  of  Global  Positioning  System  equipment  for 
navigation  and  weapons  Improvement  and  Military  Stan- 
dard 1760  wiring  that  allows  for  the  carriage  of  conven- 
tional ordnance  such  as  the  Joint  Direct  Attack  Munition 
and  Tri-Service  Attack  Munition. 

According  to  Caruana,  the  summit  participants  agreed 
to  press  forward  with  improved  countermeasures  and 
"situational  awareness"  gear.  He  declined  to  explain 
whether  the  Air  Force  will  abandon  the  so-called  CORE 
electronic  countermeasures  (ECM)  system— a  system  that 
despite  years  of  development  has  yet  to  meet  all  of  its 
operational  and  maintenance  requirements. 

"You  will  see  that  we  stayed  very  close  to  the 
[bomber]  roadmap.  But  what  we  filled  in,  we  will  be 
more  specific  in  timing  the  phasing  of  lethality  and 
ECM  improvements,"  he  said. 

"W«  are  not  taking  a  'dean  sheet*  review  but  based  on 
combat  requirements  from  the  Air  Combat  Command 
look  at  what  system  will  give  the  best  situational  aware- 
ness,"  Caruana  said. 

"The  roadmap  addressed  the  first  five  days  of  a  cam- 
paign and  a  sustained  operation.  The  summit  refined  that 
even  more.  We  will  see  a  better  defined  statement  for  the 
lethality,  survivability  and  provisioning  than  you  did  In 
the  roadmap, "  be  said. 

Congressional  approval  of  virtually  all  the  Pentagon's 
funding  request  m  the  face  of  B-l  criticism  "suggests  that 
they  are  ready  to  look  at  this  airplane  as  they  look  at 
every  other  airplane,"  Caruana  said,  instead  of  as  the 
much-maligned  bomber  of  the  Reagan  years. 

Caruana  has  said  Congress  is  unwilling  to  let  the  B-l 
"out  of  the  penalty  box,"  but  with  this  year's  funding 
may  release  it. 

"1  think  the  airplane  is  moving  out  of  that  [penalty 
box]  cawgory,"  he  said.  "Given  the  $20  billion  [in  19E2 
dollars]  spent  on  the  program,  it's  to  everyone's  advan- 
tage for  us  to  press  down  this  very  calculated  path  with  a 
same  plan  to  continue  to  enhance  the  bomber's  capabi- 
lity " 


88 


mtmam  «.  m 


Bmtd  States  Senate 

COMMITTEE  ON 
GOVERNMENTAL  MMM 

WASHINGTON.  DC  20f  1O42S0 


June  28,  1993 

The  Honorable  Les  Aspin 
Secretary  of  Defense 
Washington,  D.C.   20301 

Dear  Mr.  Secretary: 

On  June  10,  1993,  I  chaired  a  hearing  of  the  Governmental 
Affairs  Committee  on  the  General  Accounting  Office  (GAO)  Evaluation 
of  the  O.S.  Strategic  Modernization  Program. 

At  that  hearing,  I  was  shocked  to  learn,  in  response  to  a 
question  I  asked  of  Assistant  Comptroller  General  Eleanor 
Chelimsky,  that  the  Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  had  provided 
falsified  data  to  the  GAO  concerning  the  radar  cross  section  (RCS) 
of  the  B-1B  bomber. 

This  deception  was  discovered  by  the  GAO  when  the  Strategic 
Air  Command  inadvertently  delivered  a  memo  blatantly  describing  the 
deception  (and  showing  the  correct  data)  as  part  of  a  package  of 
written  DOD  comments  responding  to  a  1989  draft,  of  a  GAO  report  on 
the  B-1B.  Subsequent  meetings  between  the  GAO  and  the  Air  Porce 
resulted  in  changes  to  the  report. 

In  1991,  GAO  was  deeply  into  its  study  of  triad  systems  and 
received  draft  written  comments  from  the  Air  Porce  stating  in 
substance  that  GAO's  measurement  data  and  interpretation  thereof 
on  the  B-1B  was  wrong.  At  a  meeting  with  Air  Porce  officials,  an 
argument  was  made  by  one  officer  (who  apparently  did  not  know  that 
GAO  had  the  now  two-year-old  incriminating  memo)  that  GAO  should 
be  using  other  (false)  data  than  that  used  in  their  report.  He  was 
corrected  by  another  Air  Force  officer  who  knew  that  GAO  had  both 
the  accurate  data  and  the  1989  memo.  If  GAO  had  not  had  the  memo, 
it  is  evident  that  the  Air  Porce  would  have  continued  to  make  false 
claims  about  the  RCS  of  the  B-1B  using  data  known  to  be  incor.ect. 
As  it  was,  the  Air  Force's  formal  final  written  comments  on  this 
part  of  the  triad  study  stated  in  substance  that  the  Air  Porce 
agreed  with  GAO's  findings  on  the  measurement  of  the  B-lB's  RCS  and 
on  the  comparison  of  the  B-52  and  the  B-1B  on  this  issue. 


89 


The  Honorable  Lea  Aspin 
June  28,  1993 
Page  Two 

More  recently,  incorrect  data  on  the  RCS  of  the  B-1B  was  used 
in  a  letter  to  me  from  General  John  Loh  on  June  8,  1992.  General 
Loh  stated  that  "the  much  older  B-52...has  a  radar  signature  100 
times  larger  [than  the  B-1B]".  That,  and  a  questionable 
interpretation  of  the  RCS  values  as  giving  the  B-1B  stealth -like 
qualities,  induced  me  to  sign,  with  three  other  Senators,  a  letter 
to  our  colleagues  in  support  of  the  B-1B  with  General  Loh's  letter 
as  an  attachment.  I  do  not  know  whether  General  Loh  was  in 
possession  of  the  correct  data  when  he  wrote  to  me,  but  the  result 
in  any  case  was  that  I  was  misinformed  by  the  Air  Foi_o  on  the 
capabilities  of  the  B-1B.  There  have  been  other  instances  where 
I  believe  the  Air  Force  misled  me  about  B-1B  capabilities  -- 
particularly  concerning  its  ability  to  deliver  conventional 
ordnance  during  Desert  Storm. 

My  outrage  at  being  personally  misled  is  dwarfed  by  my  outrage 
at  the  attempt  to  deceive  the  Congress  as  an  institution  and  the 
nation  at  large. 

Unfortunately,  this  is  not  the  only  example  the  GAO  provided 
at  the  June  10,  1993  hearing  of  difficulties  obtaining  correct  data 
to  evaluate  the  performance  of  triad  systems.  GAO  was  denied 
access  to  up-to-date  data  on  the  reliability  of  the  w-87  warhead 
on  the  Peacekeeper  missile  on  the  grounds  that  it  would  "pose  a 
grave  threat  to  national  security,"  despite  the  fact  that  earlier 
reports  containing  such  data  had  previously  been  routinely  provided 
to  GAO.  Formal  "demand"  letters  sent  by  the  Comptroller  General 
in  1990  to  then  Secretary  of  Defense  Cheney  and  then-OMB  Director 
Darman  were  answered  with  denials  of  access  to  the  data,  thereby 
preventing  GAO  from  corroborating  the  high  estimates  of 
peacekeeper's  warhead  reliability. 

Mr.  Secretary,  I  hope  you  are  as  troubled  by  this  as  I  am. 
For  attempts  to  deceive  Congress  with  false  data  could  also  happen 
to  the  highest  civilian  leadership  at  the  Pentagon.  And  if  you 
cannot  depend  on  the  accuracy  and  reliability  of  the  performance 
data  presented  to  you,  then  you  will  be  unable  to  formulate 
reliable  plans  and  policies  for  the  defense  of  the  nation.  Deputy 
Defense  Secretary  William  Perry,  who  testified  at  our  hearing,  has 
assured  us  that  DOD  will  take  steps  to  prevent  such  willful 
contempt  for  truth  from  occurring  again.  I  look  for*— rd  to  any 
remedies  you  may  suggest  for  accomplishing  this. 

I  am  enclosing  a  copy  of  Ms.  Chelimsky's  testimony,  her  post- 
hearing  letter  to  me  dated  June  16,  1993,  and  General  Loh's  letter 
of  June  8,  1992. 


90 


The  Honorable  Les  Aspin 
June  28,  1993 
Page  Three 

I  am  also  sending  a  copy  of  this  letter  to  the  Acting 
Inspector  General  of  DOD,  with  a  request  that  he  undertake  an 
investigation  of  the  circumstances  by  which  the  GAO  and  the 
Congress  were  supplied  false  data,  and  its  interpretation,  by  DOD, 
in  1991  and  afterward,  and  provide  recommendations  regarding 
appropriate  policy  and  personnel  actions  to  be  taken  by  DOD. 


Sincerely, 


(^S     John  Glenn 
Chairman 


cc:  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  William  Perry 

Acting  Inspector  General  Derek  vender  schaaf 


91 


'Hnitcd  £>t8tcs  £>tndtt 

I,  QMMI  IIHQd 

mwwim  www 
wm— mow,  oc  set lo-ssso 

June  28,  1993 


Mr.  Derek  J.  Vander  Schaaf 
Acting  Inspector  General,  DOD 
Room  1000 

400  Army-Navy  Drive 
Arlington,  VA  22202-2884 

Dear  Mr.  vender  Schaaf, 

On  June  10,  I  chaired  a  hearing  of  the  Governmental 
Affairs  Committee  on  the  General  Accounting  Office  (GAO) 
Evaluation  of  the  U.S.  Stragetic  Modernization  Program. 

At  that  hearing,  I  was  shocked  to  learn,  in  response  to 
a  question  I  asked  of  Assistant  Comptroller  General  Eleanor 
Chelimsky,  that  the  Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  had  provided 
falsified  data  to  the  GAO  concerning  the  radar  cross  section 
(RCS)  of  the  B-1B  bomber. 

This  deception  was  discovered  by  the  GAO  when  the 
Strategic  Air  Command  inadvertently  delivered  a  memo 
blatantly  describing  the  deception  (and  showing  the  correct 
data)  as  part  of  a  package  of  written  DOD  comments  responding 
to  a  1989  draft  of  a  GAO  report  on  the  B-1B.   Subsequent 
meetings  between  the  GAO  and  the  Air  Force  resulted  in 
changes  to  the  report. 

In  1991,  GAO  was  deeply  into  its  study  of  triad  systems 
and  received  draft  written  comments  from  the  Air  Force, 
stating  in  substance  that  GAO's  measurement  data  and 
interpretation  thereof  on  the  B-1B  was  wrong.  At  a  meeting 
with  Air  Force  officials,  an  argument  was  made  by  one  officer 
(who  apparently  did  not  know  that  GAG  had  the  now 
two-year-old  incriminating  memo)  that  GAO  should  be  using 
other  (false)  data  than  that  used  in  their  report.  He  was 
corrected  by  another  Air  Force  officer  who  knew  that  GAO  had 
the  accurate  data  and  the  1989  memo.   If  GAO  had  not  had  the 
memo,  it  is  evident  that  the  Air  Force  would  have  continued 
to  make  false  claims  about  the  RCS  of  the  B-1B  using  data 
known  to  be  incorrect.  As  it  was,  the  Air  Force's  formal 
final  written  comments  on  this  part  of  the  triad  study  stated 
in  substance  that  the  Air  Force  agreed  with  GAO's  findings  on 
the  measurement  of  the  B-lB's  RCS  and  on  the  comparison  of 
the  B-S2  and  the  B-1B  on  this  issue. 


92 


Mr.  Derek  Vender  Schaaf 
June  28,  1993 
Page  Two 

More  recently,  Incorrect  data  on  the  RCS  of  the  B-1B  was 
used  In  a  letter  to  me  from  General  John  Loh  on  June  8, 
1992.   General  Loh  stated  that  "the  much  older  B- 52... has  a 
radar  signature  100  times  larger  [than  the  B-1B]."   That,  and 
a  questionable  interpretation  of  the  RCS  values  as  giving  the 
B-1B  stealth-like  qualities,  induced  me  to  sign,  with  three 
other  Senators,  a  letter  to  our  colleagues  in  support  of  the 
B-1B  with  General  Loh's  letter  as  an  attachment.   I  do  not 
know  whether  General  Loh  was  in  possession  of  the  correct 
data  when  he  wrote  to  me,  but  the  result  in  any  case  was  that 
I  was  misinformed  by  the  Air  Force  on  the  capabilties  of  the 
B-1B.   There  have  been  other  instances  where  I  believe  the 
Air  Force  misled  me  about  B-1B  capabiliities  —  particularly 
concerning  its  ability  to  deliver  conventional  ordnance 
during  Desert  Storm. 

My  outrage  at  being  personally  mislead  is  dwarfed  by  my 
outrage  at  the  attempt  to  deceive  the  Congress  as  an 
institution  and  the  nation  at  large. 

Unfortunately,  this  is  not  the  only  example  the  GAO 
provided  at  the  June  10,  1993  hearing  of  difficulties 
obtaining  correct  data  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  triad 
systems.   GAO  was  denied  access  to  up-to-date  data  on  the 
reliability  of  the  W-87  warhead  on  the  Peacekeeper  missile  on 
the  grounds  that  it  would  "pose  a  grave  threat  to  national 
security,"  despite  the  fact  that  earlier  reports  containing 
such  data  had  previously  been  routinely  provided  to  GAO. 
Formal  "demand"  letters  sent  by  the  Comptroller  General  in 
1990  to  then- Secretary  of  Defense  Cheney  and  then-OMB 
Director  Darman  were  answered  with  denials  of  access  to  the 
data,  thereby  preventing  GAO  from  corroborating  the  high 
estimates  of  Peacekeeper's  warhead  reliability. 

I  am  troubled  that  the  Congress  cannot  depend  on  the 
accuracy  and  reliability  of  the  performance  data  presented  to 
it.   Deputy  Secretary  William  Perry,  who  testified  at  our 
hearing,  has  assured  us  that  DOD  will  take  steps  to  prevent 
such  willful  contempt  for  truth  from  happening  again.   In 
your  capacity  as  the  Acting  Inspector  General  of  DOD,  I  am 
formally  requesting  that  you  undertake  an  investigation  of 
the  circumstances  by  which  the  GAO  and  the  Congress  were 
supplied  false  data  by  DOD,  in  1991  and  afterward,  as  well  as 
its  interpretation.   In  addition,  I  would  like  you  to  examine 
why  GAO  was  denied  data  on  the  reliability  of  the  W-87.   At 
the  end  of  your  investigation,  I  further  request  that  you 
provide  recommendations  regarding  appropriate  policy  and 
personnel  actions  to  be  taken  by  DOD.   Thank  you  very  much 
for  your  cooperation  in  this  matter. 


93 


Mr.  Derek  Vander  Schaaf 
June  28,  1993 
Page  Three 

I  am  enclosing  a  copy  of  Ms.  Chelimsky's  testimony,  her 
post-hearing  letter  to  me  dated  June  16,  1993  and  its 
attachments,  General  Loh's  letter  of  June  8,  1992,  and  my 
letter  of  June  28,  1993  to  Secretary  Aspin. 

Sincerely, 


(^      John  Glenn 
Chairman 


CC:   Secretary  of  Defense  Les  Aspin 

Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  William  J.  Perry 


94 


GAO 


United  States 

General  Accounting  Office 

Washington,  D.C.  20548 

Program  Evaluation  and 
Methodology  Division 


August    6,    1993 

The  Honorable  John  Glenn 
Chairman,  Committee  on 
Governmental  Affairs 
United  States  Senate 

Dear  Mr.  Chairman: 

In  answer  to  your  letter,  I  enclose  GAO's  responses  to  the 
written  questions  you  submitted  on  behalf  of  yourself. 
Senator  Dorgan,  and  Senator  Cochran  as  follow-up  to  the 
hearing  you  chaired  on  June  10  concerning  our  "Evaluation  of 
the  U.S.  Strategic  Nuclear  Triad." 

I  want  to  take  this  opportunity  to  express  my  sincere 
appreciation  for  your  work  in  making  the  June  10  hearing 
possible  and  for  the  follow-up  work  you  and  your  staff  have 
performed  in  trying  to  draw  the  critical  lessons  from  our 
eight  reports. 

I  am  also  hopeful  because  of  the  constructive  response  the 
Department  of  Defense  has  adopted  with  regard  to  our  study. 
As  you  know,  Deputy  Secretary  Perry  testified  at  the  hearing 
that  our  findings  will  be  "a  very  important  input"  to  DOD's 
strategic  planning.   However,  I  will  avoid  getting  too 
enthusiastic  until  I  see  some  strong  studies  coming  out  of 
DOD  that  use  valid  and  reliable  data  to  back  up  assertions 
about  weapon  system  performance  and  cost. 

If  you  or  the  other  Members  of  the  Governmental  Affairs 
Committee  have  any  further  questions,  please  call  me  on 
202-512-2900. 

Sincerely  yours, 


Eleanor  Chelimsky 

Assistant  Comptroller  General 


Enclosure 


95 


ENCLOSURE  ENCLOSURE 

Written  Questions  Submitted  bv  Senator  Glenn 
and  GAP  Responses 

Question  it   Uncertain  Costs 

The  cost  of  modernizing  the  triad  has  uncertainties. 
Which  systems  have  the  greatest  (and  the  least)  cost 
uncertainties?  How  uncertain? 

GAP  Response 

Our  assessments  of  cost  uncertainty  do  not  always  agree  with 
those  of  the  Department  of  Defense  (DOD) .   A  major  difference 
between  DOD's  and  our  cost  assessments  is  that  we  assess  costs 
for  both  the  acquisition  and  deployment  phases  of  the  proposed 
strategic  modernization  programs,  while  DOD  typically  assesses 
only  the  acquisition  phase. 

In  making  the  assessments  for  GAO's  evaluation  of  the 
strategic  nuclear  triad,  we  analyzed  four  factors  to  estimate  the 
cost  uncertainty  of  a  proposed  weapon  system:   (1)  the  extent  to 
which  the  system  had  already  progressed  through  the  DOD 
acquisition  process  and  already  demonstrated  stability  in  DOD's 
own  acquisition  cost  estimates;  (2)  whether  it  had  completed  its 
test  and  evaluation,  either  with  overall  success  or  with  some 
problems,  but  with  known  costs  to  address  them;  (3)  whether  there 
was  a  history  of  operational  deployment  to  empirically 
demonstrate  operating  and  support  costs,  and  (4)  whether  the 
system  posed  significant  technological  risk. 

With  regard  to  the  cost  uncertainties  of  the  strategic 
programs  that  are  currently  deployed  or  being  acquired,  we  made 
the  following  assessments: 

B-lB:   The  program  has  encountered  numerous  performance 
problems  during  both  the  acquisition  and  deployment 
phases  and  substantial  cost  growth  has  occurred; 
nevertheless,  the  costs  to  redress  the  deficiencies, 
although  high,  have  been  identified  based  on  a 
substantial  record  of  testing  and  deployment. 
Accordingly,  we  assessed  cost  uncertainty  to  be  low;  it 
is  the  cost  growth  for  this  system  that  has  been  high. 
In  this  latter  regard,  another  GAO  report,  Strategic 

Bombers; Adding  Conventional  Capabilities  Will  Be 

Complex.  Time-Consumina.  and  Costly  (GAO/NSIAD-93-45) , 
finds  that  the  recent  assignment  of  the  B-lB  to  new 
conventional  roles  will  add  still  more  costs;  but  these 
also  appear  to  have  been  reliably  identified  by  DOD. 


96 


—  B-2:   During  its  acquisition  phase,  the  program  has 
experienced  both  performance  problems  and  a  high  level 
of  instability  in  DOD's  own  acquisition  cost  estimates. 
Moreover,  there  is  no  deployment  history  to  demonstrate 
the  accuracy  of  predicted  operating  and  support  costs, 
and  the  program  poses  a  significant  level  of 
technological  risk.   Accordingly,  we  assessed  cost 
uncertainty  to  be  high. 

—  Ohio-class  SSBNs  with  D-5  SLBMs:   Although  production  of 
the  last  of  the  18  SSBNs  has  not  been  completed,  the 
design  has  been  stable,  as  have  DOD  cost  estimates.   In 
addition,  the  system  has  been  deployed  for  several 
years,  thus  establishing  an  operations  and  support  track 
record.   We  assessed  cost  uncertainty  to  be  low. 

The  analysis  of  our  cost  report,  U.S.  strategic  Triad;  Costs 
and  Uncertainties  of  Proposed  Upgrades  (GAO/C-PEMD-92-6) ,  did  not 
include  an  assessment  of  the  cost  uncertainty  of  the  Minuteman 
III  (MM  III)  upgrade  and  lifeservice  extension  programs.   During 
the  period  in  which  we  were  performing  our  analysis,  MM  III  was 
not  a  proposed  modernization.   However,  based  on  the  assessment 
factors  outlined  above,  we  would  currently  assess  the  cost 
uncertainty  of  the  program  to  be  low. 

In  summary,  we  found  that  the  B-2  involves  the  greatest 
number  of  unknowns  for  any  of  the  weapon  systems  we  examined  and 
thus  presents  the  highest  level  of  cost  uncertainty. 

Question  2;   Minu»tmflft  ttt  Modernization.  Part  I 

—  Please  describe  how  GAO  obtained  the  figure  of  $23 
billion  for  Minuteman  III  modernization,  giving  a  break- 
out of  the  $23  billion  budget. 

GAO  Response 

Our  report,  U.S.  Strategic  Triad:   Final  Report  and 
Recommendations  (GAO/C-PEMD-92-8) ,  relied  on  data  provided  by  the 
Air  Force  showing  that  the  30-year  lifecycle  cost  for  the  MM  III 
lifecycle  extension  program  was  $16.5  billion.   We  subsequently 
found  those  data  to  be  incorrect:   the  Air  Force's  Minuteman  III 
Life  Extension  Report,  which  we  received  after  our  report's 
publication,  made  explicit  that  the  $16.5  billion  figure  was  for 
a  lifecycle  cost  out  to  the  year  2010,  not  to  the  year  2020.   To 
obtain  a  30-year  lifecycle  cost,  we  extrapolated  the  operations 
and  support  costs  of  the  MM  III  program  10  additional  years. 

Specifically,  we  used  the  Air  Force's  cost  estimate  for 
various  acquisition  programs  necessary  to  maintain  reliability 
and  to  extend  the  life  of  MM  III  to  2010  ($4.6  billion)  and  the 
Air  Force's  cost  estimate  for  annual  operations  and  support  to 


97 


the  same  year  ($11.9  billion  at  $.631  billion  per  year);  to  this 
we  added  10  additional  years  of  operations  and  support  costs  at 
the  same  rate  of  $.631  billion  per  year  ($6.3  billion).   A 
breakout  of  the  Air  Force's  cost  estimates  is  provided  on  page  18 
of  its  Minuteman  III  Life  Extension  Report,  which  we  enclose 
herewith  as  appendix  I. 

Question  2;   Minuteman  III  Modernization.  Part  II 

—  Why  does  GAO  recommend  examining  the  decision  to 
modernize  the  Minuteman  III?  What  are  the  advantages 
and  disadvantages  of  modernizing  the  MM  III  in  terms  of 
capabilities,  survivability  and  other  factors? 

GAO  Response 

We  stated  in  our  classified  report,  U.S.  Strategic  Triad: 
Final  Report  and  Recommendations,  and  in  our  unclassified 
testimony,  that  we  guestion  the  advisability  of  funding  major 
life-service  upgrades  for  the  MM  III  force  because  the  cost- 
effectiveness  of  such  an  effort  is  not  obvious.   There  are  three 
reasons  for  this:   (1)  its  estimated  cost  through  the  year  2020 
will  be  $23  billion,  based  on  Air  Force  figures;  (2)  the  fact 
that  a  reduced  nuclear  threat  environment  exists,  both  now  and  in 
the  foreseeable  future;  and  (3)  the  likelihood  that  substantive 
modifications  would  reguire  robust  flight  test  programs  that 
would  quickly  use  up  limited  test  assets. 

A  re-examination  of  the  MM  III  life  extension  program,  which 
we  recommend,  might  consider  the  various  advantages  and 
disadvantages  that  emerged  from  our  analysis.   Two  major 
advantages  are  that  (1)  the  de-MIRVing  of  MM  III  will  further 
reduce  "destabilizing"  elements  in  the  triad,  and  (2)  the 
lifeservice  extension  will  likely  maintain,  if  not  improve,  the 
relatively  high  reliability  of  the  MM  III  force.   Four  major 
disadvantages  are  that  (1)  MM  III  has  less  military  capability 
than  the  D-5  (Mark  5)  SLBM  in  terms  of  hard  target  attack 
capability;  (2)  being  based  in  immobile  silos,  the  MM  III  force 
presents  an  array  of  easily  located  targets  that  an  enemy  can 
choose  to  attack;  (3)  confidence  in  the  system's  reliability  and 
accuracy,  especially  out  to  the  year  2020,  will  necessarily 
deteriorate  without  new  test  assets  beyond  those  currently  being 
contemplated  for  MM  III  flight  testing;  and  (4)  the  MM  Ill's  $23 
billion  cost,  including  significantly  greater  per  warhead  costs 
than  those  of  other  systems  (see  table  1  below) ,  may  make  other 
alternatives  relatively  more  attractive. 

Question  3;   MM  III  vs.  Trident.  coat-to-Go.  Part  I 

—  What  are  the  costs-to-go  in  the  GAO  report  on  a  total 
cost  basis  for  the  de-MIRVed  Minuteman  III  and  the 
Trident? 


98 


GAP  Response 


Based  on  the  Air  Force's  Life  Extension  Report  numbers,  we 
found  the  total  costs-to-go  for  the  de-MIRVed  MM  III  force  to  be 
$23  billion  out  to  the  year  2020.   We  found  the  total  costs-to-go 
for  the  Ohio/D-5  force  to  be  $58  billion,  assuming  a  30-year 
lifecycle  for  each  SSBN.   However,  because  some  Ohio  class  SSBNs 
were  deployed  in  the  1980s  and  will  be  retired  before  2020,  we 
calculated  the  average  lifecycle  cost-to-go  for  the  entire  force 
of  18  Ohio  SSBNs  to  be  25.6  years  from  the  year  1992  forward.   To 
take  the  difference  in  lifecycle  assumptions  for  the  two  systems 
more  fully  into  account,  we  calculated  cost  per  warhead  per  year 
for  the  MM  III  and  Ohio/D-5  systems.   These  calculations  are 
shown  in  table  1. 


Table  1:   Costs-to-Go  per  Warhead  per  Year  for  Minuteman  III  and 
Ohio/D-5  (with  1  warhead  per  Minuteman  III  and  4  per 
D-51 


System 

Assumed 
Life- 
cycle 
From 
1992 

Life- 
cycle 
Cost- 
to-Go 

Number 

of 

Warheads 

Dollars 

per 

Warhead 

Dollars 
per  Year 
per 
Warhead 

MM  III 
Compared 
to 
Ohio/D-5 

MM  III 

18  years 
to  the 
year 
2010 

$16.5 
billion 

500 

$33 
million 

$1.83 
million 

40% 

higher 
than 
Ohio/D-5 

MM  III 

28  years 
to  the 
year 
2020 

$23 
billion 

500 

$46 
million 

$1.64 
million 

25% 

higher 
than 
Ohio/D-5 

Ohio/ 
D-5 

25.6 

years  on 
average 
for  each 
SSBN 

$58 
billion 

1728 

$33.6 
million 

$1.31 
million 

Note  that  these  estimates  do  not  take  into  account  various 
differences  between  the  MM  III  and  Ohio/D-5  systems,  such  as  the 
essential  invulnerability  of  the  SSBNs  at  sea  compared  to  the 
known  (attackable)  locations  of  ICBM  silos,  the  greater  accuracy 
of  the  D-5  SLBM,  or  different  likely  alert  rates  for  ICBMs  and 
SLBMs  under  a  variety  of  different  scenarios.   The  analyses  that 
incorporate  these  factors  are  classified. 


99 


Question  3:   MM  III  va.  Trident.  Cost-to-Qo,  Part  II 

—  Do  these  costs  take  into  account  (1)  the  retention  of 
C-4s  in  the  Pacific  fleet,  (2)  the  increase  of  MM  III 
costs  from  $16  billion  to  $23  billion,  (3)  the  lifetimes 
of  the  Trident  SSBNs,  and  (4)  the  decommissioning  costs 
of  nuclear  weapons  and  nuclear  reactors? 

GAP  Response 

The  calculations  given  in  table  1  above  make  the  following 
assumptions: 

(1)  The  lifecvcle  costs  estimated  for  all  18  Ohio  SSBNs  are 
based  on  an  assumption  that  each  would  carry  24  D-5 
missiles  with  8  warheads  each.   (Retention  of  C-4 
missiles,  even  including  lifeservice  extension  for 
them,  if  necessary,  would  likely  be  less  costly.) 
Estimates  in  table  1  for  dollars  per  warhead,  however, 
are  based  on  4  warheads  per  missile,  to  comply  with  the 
1750  SLBM  warhead  ceiling  of  the  START  II  treaty. 
Overall  costs  (or  savings)  to  download  the  SLBM  force 
from  8  to  4  warheads  per  missile  are  not  included. 

(2)  As  shown,  MM  III  lifeservice  extension  costs  to  the 
year  2010  ($16.5  billion)  and  to  the  year  2020  ($23 
billion)  are  taken  into  account. 

(3)  We  used  an  average  remaining  lifeservice  of  25.6  years 
from  the  year  1992  for  the  entire  Ohio  SSBN  force. 
This  calculation  assumes  a  lifeservice  of  30  years  from 
deployment  for  each  Ohio  SSBN. 

(4)  As  we  point  out  in  our  report,  U.S.  Strategic  Triad; 
Costs  and  Uncertainties  of  Proposed  Upgrades,  nuclear 
warhead  and/or  power  plant  disposal  costs  for  either  MM 
III  or  the  Ohio/D-5  force  and  the  scrap  costs  (and 
value)  of  non-nuclear  components  of  systems  were  not 
available  from  the  Department  of  Defense  and  are  not 
included. 

Question  3:   MM  III  v.  Trident.  Coat-to-Go.  Part  III 

—  Which  system  is  more  capable,  the  MM  III  or  the  Trident 
II  D-5  with  W-88  warheads?  Which  one  is  capable  of 
destroying  "hard-targets?" 

GAP  Response 

At  the  time  we  performed  our  analysis,  the  MM  III  was  not  a 
proposed  upgrade  for  the  land  leg  of  the  triad.   Thus  our 
comparison  for  the  D-5  SLBM  was  not  to  Minuteman  but  to  the  then 


100 


proposed  upgrade  Peacekeeper  ICBM.   We  performed  this  comparison 
using  the  following  measures  of  effectiveness:   (1)  speed  and 
reliability  of  communications  to  command  authority;  (2)  time  to 
target,  especially  for  time  urgent  targets;  (3)  pre-launch 
survivability  against  pre-emptive  attack;  and  (4)  lethality  to 
enemy  targets,  including  accuracy,  warhead  yield,  and 
reliability. 

On  the  measures  of  speed  and  reliability  of  communications 
and  on  time  to  target,  we  found  Peacekeeper  and  the  Ohio/D-5 
system  with  W-88  (Mark  5)  warheads  to  be  essentially  equal  in 
terms  of  actual  operational  effectiveness.   For  pre-launch 
survivability,  we  found  that  SLBMs  on  submerged  SSBNs  possess  a 
clear  advantage  over  ICBMs  in  easily  locatable  silos.   And  we 
found  the  D-5  Mark  5  SLBM  to  be  equivalent  to  the  Peacekeeper 
ICBM  on  the  measure  of  capability  to  destroy  hard  targets. 

In  contrast,  MM  III  is  considerably  less  accurate  than 
either  the  Peacekeeper  or  D-5/Mark  5,  and  hence  would  be  much 
less  lethal  against  hard  targets.   On  other  measures,  such  as 
communications  speed  and  system  reliability,  MM  III  is 
essentially  the  equal  of  the  two  other  systems,  while  sharing  the 
same  deficiency  as  Peacekeeper  with  regard  to  easy  locatability, 
given  its  basing  mode  in  fixed  silos. 

In  sum,  the  D-5  with  Mark  5  (W-88)  warheads  would  be 
considerably  more  capable  with  regard  to  hard  targets  than  the 
MM  III. 

Question  4t   ICBM-silo  vulnerability 

—  Has  your  analysis  on  silo  vulnerability  taken  into 
account  the  effects  of  (1)  fratricide  on  second  and 
subsequent  warheads  and  (2)  the  lack  of  an  ability  to 
practice  such  an  attack?  Generally,  how  would  these  two 
effects  change  your  estimates  of  silo  kill  probability? 

GAP  Response 

Our  report,  V.S,  Strategic  Triad; ICBM  Vulnerability 

(GAO/C-PEMD-92-2) ,  found  that  the  claimed  increase  in 
vulnerability  of  U.S.  ICBMs  in  their  silos  due  to  improved  Soviet 
missile  accuracy  had  been  greatly  overstated.   The  specific 
calculations  we  employed  in  this  study  followed  a  methodology 
provided  to  us  by  the  Department  of  Defense,  using  intelligence 
community  data  to  incorporate  the  performance  of  the  most  lethal 
Soviet  ICBMs. 

As  our  study  noted,  the  former  Soviet  Union  would  have  faced 
a  number  of  major  uncertainties  about  their  missiles'  performance 
in  planning  any  attack  on  the  U.S.   Many  of  these  uncertainties 
could  not  have  been  confidently  resolved  short  of  actual  nuclear 


101 


conflict.   Since  no  computer  model  can  adequately  simulate  all 
actual  attack  conditions — and  since  we  were  in  part  addressing 
the  claim  that  U.S.  ICBMs  were  highly  vulnerable  to  massive 
Soviet  attack — we  chose  to  examine  U.S.  ICBM  losses  assuming 
Soviet  systems  of  maximum  effectiveness.   This  meant  no.  Soviet 
losses  of  incoming  warheads  to  fratricide.   The  number  of 
incoming  Soviet  warheads  in  our  analysis  was  reduced  only  by  the 
system  reliability  factor  estimated  by  the  U.S.  intelligence 
community  for  particular  Soviet  missiles.   Soviet  warheads  were 
further  assumed  to  detonate  at  the  altitude  that  would  cause  the 
greatest  damage  to  U.S.  silos.   And  we  assumed  that  no  U.S.  ICBMs 
were  launched  on  warning  or  even  under  attack — both  of  which 
would  reduce  U.S.  losses. 

In  effect,  this  analysis  embodied  the  so-called  "worst-case" 
scenario  from  the  U.S.  point  of  view.   But  even  in  this  case,  we 
calculated  that  more  U.S.  ICBMs  would  survive  than  had  been 
claimed.   Further,  it  is  readily  apparent  that  if  fratricide  and 
test  unrealism  were  quantifiable  in  some  reliable  manner,  the 
impact  on  our  calculations  would  have  been  to  increase  the  number 
of  surviving  U.S.  silos. 

The  point  here  is  that  any  model  that  could  reliably  predict 
U.S.  ICBM  survivability — by  taking  into  account  uncertainties  for 
the  attacker  that  are  not  currently  measurable — would  demonstrate 
less  vulnerability  than  the  "worst  case"  scenario.   Further, 
accounting  for  fratricide  and  test  unrealism,  if  that  could  have 
been  done  in  some  reasonably  rigorous  way,  would  have  had  the 
effect  of  augmenting  the  number  of  U.S.  ICBM  silos  that  could 
ride  out  a  former  Soviet  ICBM  attack,  survive,  and  retaliate. 

Question  5; Air  Defense  Estimates 

—  Are  the  1976  CIA  Team  B  projections  for  Soviet  air 

defenses  consistent  with  those  used  by  the  DOD  in  the 
late  1970s  and  early  1980s? 

GAP  Response 

We  did  not  go  back  to  any  intelligence  sources,  such  as  the 
1976  Team  B  projections,  that  pre-dated  the  Defense  Department's 
justifications  to  Congress  for  acquiring  both  the  B-1B  and  the 
B-2.   One  of  the  major  baseline  sources  of  our  analysis  of  the 
size  of  Soviet  strategic  air  defenses  and  of  the  accuracy  of 
intelligence  community  projections  that  were  made  for  them  was 
the  October  1981  Joint  OSD/Air  Force  Bomber  Alternatives  Study. 
It  was  this  study  that  presented  the  DoD  justifications  to 
Congress  for  the  B-1B  and  the  B-2,  in  very  large  part  on  the 
basis  of  claimed  increases  in  the  number  and  effectiveness  of 
Soviet  strategic  air  defenses.   The  study's  estimates  were  based 
on  the  latest  threat  analysis  from  the  U.S.  intelligence 
community  available  at  the  time.   The  specific  sources  were 
official  intelligence  community  assessments,  such  as  the  Defense 
Intelligence  Projections  for  Planning  ("DIPPs")  which  are 
coordinated  throughout  the  various  agencies  of  the  intelligence 
community. 


102 


Written  Questions  Submitted  bv  Senator  Doraan 
and  GAP  Responses  . 

Question  1;   The  Air  Force's  proposed  Minuteman  Life  Extension 
Program  involves  an  acquisition  cost  of  $4.6B  for  modifications. 
Air  Force  cites  a  total  cost-to-go  of  $16B  based  on  the  $4.6B  of 
acquisition  programs  and  $11. 9B  of  operations  and  support  for  the 
1992-2010  timeframe.   You  have  chosen  the  timeframe  to  the  year 
2020  as  a  basis  for  comparison.   In  your  cost  conversion,  you 
appear  to  have  extrapolated  without  first  removing  the 
acquisition  cost.  Hill  you  please  make  the  necessary  correction? 

GAP  Response 

No  correction  is  required  because  we  did  not  include 
acquisition  costs  in  the  2010-2020  estimate,  having  already 
included  them  in  the  1992-2010  estimate.   The  calculation  I 
presented  in  my  testimony — $23  billion  for  the  30-year  lifecycle 
cost  for  MM  III — is  not  the  same  as  the  number  ($16.5  billion) 

given  in  our  report,  U.S.  Strategic  Triad; Final  Report  and 

Rec9mm?ndat ions  (GAP/C-PEMD-92-8) .   This  report  relied  on  data 
provided  by  the  Air  Force  showing  that  the  30-year  lifecycle  cost 
for  the  MM  III  program  was  $16.5  billion.   We  subsequently  found 
those  data  to  be  incorrect:   the  Air  Force's  Minuteman  III  Life 
Extension  Report,  which  we  received  subsequent  to  the  publication 
of  our  series  of  reports,  made  clear  that  the  $16.5  billion 
figure  was  only  for  a  lifecycle  out  to  the  year  2010,  not  to  the 
year  2020.   To  obtain  a  30-year  lifecycle  cost,  we  extrapolated 
the  operations  and  support  costs  of  the  MM  III  program  10 
additional  years. 

Specifically,  we  used  the  Air  Force's  cost  estimate  for 
various  acquisition  programs  necessary  to  maintain  reliability 
and  to  help  extend  the  life  of  MM  III  to  2010  ($4.6  billion).   We 
also  adopted  the  Air  Force's  cost  estimate  for  annual  operations 
and  support  to  the  same  year  ($11.9  billion  at  $.631  billion  per 
year) ;  these  costs  are  needed  in  addition  to  the  acquisition 
costs  cited  above  for  normal  operations  and  maintenance  and 
general  facility  support.  To  this  $11.9  billion  for  operations 
and  support,  we  added  10  additional  years  of  operations  and 
support  costs  at  the  same  rate  of  $.631  billion  per  year  ($6.3 
billion).   ($4.6  billion  +  $11.9  billion  +  $6.3  billion  -  $22.8 
billion;  statistical  rounding  gives  the  figure  of  $23  billion.) 

Question  2;   Your  estimate  of  the  life  cycle  cost-to-go  for  the 
Trident  system  is  $58B  based  on  a  timeframe  out  to  the  year  2020. 
How  did  you  compute  the  annual  operational  and  support  (O&S)  cost 
of  a  Trident  boat?  Did  you  include  cost  of  operating  shore  bases 
such  as  Bangor  and  Kings  Point?  To  be  more  specific,  did  you 
include,  for  each  base,  costs  of  maintaining  roads,  grounds  and 
buildings;  medical  facilities;  dining  facilities;  dormitories; 


103 


salaries  of  indirect  support  people;  recreational  activities? 
(In  calculating  ICBM  costs,  all  of  these  elements  are  included.) 
Including  all  these  elements,  what  is  the  annual  O&S  cost  of  a 
Trident  submarine  and  its  missiles? 

GAP  Response 

As  specified  in  our  report,  U.S.  Strategic  Triad; Costs  and 

Uncertainties  of  Proposed  Upgrades  (GAO/C-PEMD-92-6,  see  pages 
14-15,  and  32-33),  our  Ohio/D-5  lifecycle  cost  analysis  does 
include  both  the  direct  and  indirect  costs  of  operating  the 
Trident  system-related  facilities  at  Bangor  and  Kings  Point. 
Specifically,  our  analysis  of  the  costs  to  operate  and  support 
the  Ohio/D-5  system  includes  the  following  elements: 

(1)  Military  construction  costs  for  the  Trident  missiles 
and  submarines  ($1.2  billion); 

(2)  General  SSBN  operating  costs,  including  the  costs  to 
convert  C-4  capable  SSBNs  to  the  D-5  missile,  missile 
industrial  facility  maintenance,  general  support  costs 
(such  as  base  infrastructure  costs  like  housing, 
chapels,  and  theaters) ,  and  ongoing  investment  costs 
(totaling  $40.7  billion); 

(3)  Fleet  ballistic  missile  support  ($.7  billion);  and 

(4)  Headquarters  support  ($3.7  billion). 

The  total  of  these  operations  and  support  (O&S)  costs  is 
thus  $46.3  billion. 

As  our  report  states  on  page  14,  our  cost  estimates  do  not 
include  the  disposal  or  scrap  costs,  and  value,  of  materials  at 
the  end  of  the  system  lifecycle.   DOD  officials  informed  us  that 
such  cost  estimates  were  not  available,  and  for  that  reason  we 
could  not  include  them. 

Based  on  the  acquisition  and  operations  and  support  costs 
yet  to  be  expended  as  of  the  end  of  fiscal  year  1990,  we 
calculated  the  total  costs-to-go  for  the  Ohio  SSBN/D-5  SLBM 
system  to  be  $58  billion.   Of  course,  to  calculate  the  system's 
cost-to-go  on  a  more  current  basis — that  is,  as  of  the  end  of 
fiscal  year  1992,  which  is  the  date  of  the  Air  Force's  Life 
Extension  study  estimating  costs  to  the  year  2010 — would  require 
a  downward  adjustment  of  the  $58  billion  figure. 

Question  3;   A  certain  number  of  Trident  boats  will  age  out 
before  the  year  2020.   In  your  cost-to-go,  did  you  include  boat 
replacement  costs?  In  cases  where  submarine  nuclear  reactors 
will  require  re-coring,  did  you  include  the  relevant  costs? 

10 


104 


GAP  Response 

We  did  not  calculate  costs  for  any  follow-on  system  to 
replace  either  Ohio  class  SSBNs  or  D-S  missiles.   Our  lifecycle 
cost  analysis  assumed  a  30-year  lifecycle  for  each  Ohio  class 
SSBN.   Because  a  portion  of  the  fleet  vas  deployed  in  the  1980s 
and  is  scheduled  for  retirement  before  the  year  2020,  we  have 
calculated  the  average  lifecycle  to  go  for  the  entire  force  of  18 
Ohio  SSBNs  to  be  25.6  years  from  the  year  1992  forward,  and  we 
have  calculated  a  cost  per  warhead  per  year  for  the  Ohio/D-5 
system.   He  have  performed  a  similar  calculation  for  the  MM  III 
lifeservice  extension  program,  using  both  the  Air  Force's  $16 
billion  estimate  for  service  to  the  year  2010  and  our 
extrapolation  of  operation  and  support  costs  to  the  year  2020. 
The  results  of  these  calculations  are  shown  in  table  1.   (This 
table,  already  presented  earlier,  is  repeated  here  for  the 
reader's  convenience.) 

Table  1:   Costs-to-Go  per  Warhead  per  Year  for  Mjjmfcemaj]  III  and 
Ohio/D-5  fwith  1  warhead  per  Mlnuteman  III  and  4  per 
D-5) 


System 

Assumed 
Life- 
cycle 
From 
1992 

Life- 
cycle 

Cost- 
tO-GO 

Number 

of 

Warheads 

Dollars 

per 

Warhead 

Dollars 
per  Year 
per 
Warhead 

MM  HI 
Compared 
to 
Ohio/D-5 

MM  III 

18  years 
to  the 
year 

2010 

$16.5 
billion 

500 

$33 
million 

$1.83 
million 

40% 

higher 
than 
Ohio/D-5 

MM  III 

28  years 
to  the 
year 

2020 

$23 
billion 

500 

$46 
million 

$1.64 

million 

25% 

higher 

than 

Ohio/D-5 

Ohio/ 
D-5 

25.6 

years  on 
average 
for  each 
SSBN 

$58 
billion 

1728 

$33.6 

million 

$1.31 
million 

Note  that  these  estimates  do  not  take  into  account  various 
differences  between  the  MM  III  and  Ohio/D-5  systems,  such  as  the 
invulnerability  of  the  SSBNs  at  sea  compared  to  the  known 
(attackable)  locations  of  ICBM  silos,  the  greater  accuracy  of  the 


11 


105 


D-5  SLBM,  or  different  likely  alert  rates  for  ICBMs  and  SLBMs 
under  a  variety  of  different  scenarios. 

The  calculations  above  make  the  following  assumptions: 

(1)  The  lifecvcle  costs  estimated  for  all  18  Ohio  SSBNs  are 
based  on  an  assumption  that  each  would  carry  24  D-5 
missiles  with  8  warheads  each.   (Retention  of  C-4 
missiles,  even  including  lifeservice  extension  for 
them,  if  necessary,  would  likely  be  less  costly.) 
Estimates  for  dollars  per  warhead  in  table  1,  however, 
are  based  on  4  warheads  per  missile,  to  comply  with  the 
1750  SLBM  warhead  ceiling  of  the  START  II  treaty. 
Overall  costs  (or  savings)  to  download  the  SLBM  force 
from  8  to  4  warheads  per  missile  are  not  included. 

(2)  As  we  point  out  in  our  report,  U.S.  Strategic  Triad: 
Costs  and  Uncertainties  of  Proposed  Upgrades,  nuclear 
warhead  and/or  power  plant  disposal  costs  for  either  MM 
III  or  the  Ohio/D-5  force  and  the  scrap  costs  (and 
value)  of  non-nuclear  components  of  systems  were  not 
available  from  the  Department  of  Defense  and  are  not 
included. 

(3)  These  data  do  not  include  a  potential  additional  $1.9 
billion  being  considered  by  the  Air  Force  to  improve 
the  inertial  measurement  unit  of  the  MM  Ill's  guidance 
system  for  the  purpose  of  improving  accuracy. 

(4)  Costs  for  the  Ohio  class  SSBNs  do  include  all  of  the 
Navy's  estimates  for  operating  and  maintaining  the 
system,  such  as  any  nuclear  power  plant  re-corings 
scheduled  before  the  year  2020.   Only  the  costs  of 
disposing  of  the  used  core,  once  replaced,  were  not 
available  from  the  Navy  and  are  not  included. 

Question  4:   The  C-4  missiles  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  submarines 
will  begin  to  age  out  before  the  year  2020.   We  understand  that 
the  Navy  wants  to  backfit  with  D-5  missiles.   Have  you  included 
the  cost  of  backfitting,  including  the  costs  of  the  boat 
modifications  needed  to  accommodate  the  backfit? 

GAP  Response 

Our  lifecycle  cost  estimates  do  include  the  costs  of 
backfitting  the  C-4  Ohio  class  SSBNs  with  D-5  missiles,  involving 
the  costs  of  both  the  new  missiles  and  the  necessary 
modifications  to  the  submarines  themselves. 


12 


106 


Written  Questions  Submitted  by  Senator  Cochran 
and  GAP  Responses 

Panel  1;   Eleanor  Chelimsky.  Assistant  Comptroller  General  for 
Program  Evaluation  and  Methodology  GAP 

Ms.  Chelimsky,  I'd  like  to  thank  you  for  taking  the  time  to 
appear  before  this  committee  to  discuss  a  serious  topic  which  so 
directly  affects  our  nation's  security.   I'd  also  like  to  commend 
the  General  Accounting  Qffice  for  studying  the  cost  effectiveness 
of  the  various  legs  of  the  triad.   Certainly,  any  serious 
discussion  of  how  to  structure  and  arm  our  nation's  military  must 
examine  cost  effectiveness — GAQ's  yardstick  in  this  study — as  one 
of  the  many  components  considered. 

Question  1:   I  am,  however,  concerned  that  this  study  focuses  so 
heavily  on  the  question  of  which  upgrades  to  the  Triad  are  most 
cost  effective.   The  cost  of  a  program  is  something  my  colleagues 
and  I  take  very  seriously,  but  does  this  approach  not  limit  the 
flexibility  of  a  U.S.  response? 

GAG  Response 

Two  points  are  relevant  here:  first,  we  did  not  perform  one 
analysis  of  cost-effectiveness,  we  performed  several;  and  second, 
we  did  not  perform  only  cost-effectiveness  analysis. 

Concerning  the  first  point,  we  measured  cost  in  a  variety  of 
ways  because  we  believe  that  no  single  measure  provides  a 
definitive  picture  even  of  the  cost  issue  taken  alone. 
Accordingly,  we  assessed:   acquisition  costs  (the  measure  most 
frequently  cited  by  DCD) ;  total  lifecycle  costs  (combining 
acquisition  costs  [RDT&E  and  procurement]  with  all  available 
forms  of  operating  and  support  costs) ;  sunk  lifecycle  costs,  and 
lifecycle  costs  yet  to  be  expended  ("costs-to-go") .   Using  these 
different  cost  measures,  we  then  performed  various  cost 
effectiveness  calculations  on  a  cost  per  warhead  basis.   In  this 
regard,  we  calculated  costs  per  deployed  warhead  for  each 
proposed  modernization  system,  and  we  performed  cost  per  arriving 
warhead  calculations  employing  classified  DOD  assumptions 
concerning  alert  rates,  reliability,  and  survivability.   We 
performed  these  latter  cost  per  arriving  warhead  calculations  for 
two  different  scenarios:   surprise  Soviet  attack,  and  attack 
under  generated  alert,  that  is,  with  strategic  warning. 

In  addition  to  performing  these  cost  analyses,  we  assessed 
the  effectiveness  of  each  proposed  modernization  plan  and  of 
several  previously  deployed  systems  using  seven  different 


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measures  of  effectiveness.1  Thus,  from  a  methodological 
viewpoint,  our  analysis  of  cost  effectiveness  issues  was  quite 

comprehensive . 

Concerning  my  second  point  above,  GAO  never  imagined  that 
cost  effectiveness  could  be  the  sole  basis  for  comprehensively 
evaluating  the  strategic  triad — although  it  is  an  important 
basis — because  it  fails  to  capture  several  critical  concepts  and 
elements.   For  precisely  that  reason,  we  did  not  limit  either  our 
conceptualization  of  the  issues  or  our  specific  analyses  to  cost 
effectiveness.   We  examined  many  other  aspects  of  the  triad  and 
specifically  performed  the  following  additional  analyses,  all  of 
which  can  be  found  in  the  evaluation's  final  report  (GAO/C-PEMD- 
92-8) : 

The  impact  of  both  existing  strategic  systems  and 
proposed  modernizations  on  arms  control  considerations, 
and  the  impact  of  specific  provisions  of  the  START  I  and 
II  treaties  on  the  systems  and  their  upgrades  (pp.  200- 
201)  . 

The  interactions  of  various  systems  within  legs  of  the 
triad,  such  as  whether  the  air-leg's  combination  of 
penetrating  bombers  and  cruise  missile  carrying  aircraft 
enhanced  the  ability  of  either  system  to  achieve  mission 
objectives  (pp.  187  and  194)  . 

Interactions  among  the  three  legs  of  the  triad, 
including  whether  and  how  dissimilar  performance 
characteristics — both  strengths  and  weaknesses — of  the 
systems  in  the  different  legs  were  complementary  or 
merely  redundant.   For  example,  we  assessed  the 
feasibility  and  likely  effectiveness  of  attacks  on  each 
of  the  very  different  basing  modes  of  the  three  legs  of 
the  triad  (bomber  bases,  ICBH  silos,  and  SSBNs  at  sea) 
employing  different  attack  scenarios — either 


1The  seven  measures  of  effectiveness  we  employed  were  the 
following:   (1)  survivability  against  both  offensive  and 
defensive  threat  systems,  for  both  platforms  and  weapons  (for 
example,  submarines  and  their  ballistic  missiles;  bombers  and 
their  cruise  missiles) ;  (2)  delivery  system  performance  (that  is, 
accuracy,  range,  and  payload) ;  (3)  warhead  yield  and  reliability 
(that  is,  the  probability  that  the  warhead  will  detonate  as 
intended);  (4)  weapon  system  reliability  (that  is,  the  combined 
reliability  of  all  the  component  processes  from  platform  launch 
to  warhead  detonation) ;  (5)  flexibility  across  a  number  of 
dimensions,  including  retargeting  and  recall;  (6)  communications 
(for  example,  connectivity  between  command  authority  and 
platforms) ;  and  (7)  responsiveness  (that  is,  alert  rate  and  time- 
to-target)  . 

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simultaneous  launch  of  attack  systems  or  simultaneous 
detonations  of  the  warheads  employed  (pp.  190-191) . 

—  The  likely  cumulative  or  synergistic  impact  of  the  three 
legs  of  the  triad  on  Soviet  nuclear  force  planning  and 
strategy.   Specifically,  we  first  assessed  whether,  if 
deployed,  each  proposed  U.S.  strategic  system  would 
have:   (1)  provided  the  U.S.  with  a  technological  hedge 
against  the  capabilities  of  defensive  or  offensive 
Soviet  systems;  (2)  complicated  Soviet  planning,  (3) 
helped  dilute  Soviet  material  resources,  and/ or  (4)  had 
a  positive  or  negative  effect  on  the  U.S.  ability  to 
respond  flexibly  to  a  range  of  Soviet  attack  scenarios 
(p.  199).   Second,  we  examined  whether  existing  U.S. 
systems  and  proposed  upgrades,  taken  together,  enhance 
or  detract  from  U.S.  deterrence  of  Soviet  attack  and 
whether  the  performance  of  new  and  currently  deployed 
U.S.  systems  can  be  considered  adequate  to  support  an 
effective  deterrence  strategy.   For  example,  while  we 
found  that  adding  mobility  to  ICBM  systems  would, 
indeed,  increase  their  survivability,  we  found  that  a 
U.S.  silo  hardening  program  would  have  similarly 
increased  silo-based  ICBM  survivability.   However,  based 
on  other  analyses — in  this  case,  threat  analysis — we 
found  that  neither  program  was  necessary  to  preserve 
either  the  survivability  of  U.S.  retaliatory 
capability — including  that  of  ICBMs — or  deterrence  (pp. 
195-196) . 

It  is  important  to  recall  that  my  statement  at  the 
Committee's  June  10th  hearing  presented  only  highlights  of  our 
evaluation  and  that  our  nearly  thousand-page,  8-volume  study 
considered  many  other  aspects  of  the  triad  (as  discussed  above) 
that  could  not  be  covered  in  the  time  available. 

Question  2 :   Oo  you  believe  cost  effectiveness  to  be  the 
paramount  consideration  in  upgrading  the  legs  of  the  Triad? 

GAP  Response 

As  already  noted  in  my  answer  to  your  first  question,  we 
believe  that  cost-effectiveness  analysis  (such  as  cost-to-go  per 
arriving  warhead  under  strategic  warning) ,  based  on  valid  and 
reliable  data,  is  one  of  several  forms  of  analysis  that  is  needed 
to  perform  a  comprehensive  evaluation  of  a  complex  matrix  of 
systems  such  as  the  strategic  triad.   In  the  particular  case  of 
the  triad,  however,  such  analysis  takes  on  exceptional  importance 
because  it  is  more  than  30  years  since  this  kind  of  work  has  been 
performed.   On  balance,  I  would  suggest  that  a  thorough 
assessment — such  as  the  one  already  conducted  by  GAO,  or  the 
Defense  Department's  current  "bottom  up"  review — would  be 
incomplete  if  it  consisted  only  of  a  cost-effectiveness  analysis, 

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but  that  it  would  also  be  Incomplete — like  so  very  many  other 
assessments  of  the  past — if  it  did  not  include  analysis. 

Question  3:   In  the  past,  we  were  dealing  with  the  Soviet  Union 
within  the  framework  of  deterrence.   This  framework  posited  that 
deterrence  would  "work"  as  long  as  both  sides  were  risk  averse, 
rational  actors.   DCI  Jim  Woolsey,  in  his  confirmation  hearing  a 
few  months  back,  stated  "He  have  slain  a  large  dragon,  but  we  now 
live  in  a  jungle  filled  with  a  bewildering  variety  of  poisonous 
snakes,  and  in  many  ways  the  dragon  was  easier  to  keep  track  of." 
Is  the  GAO  so  sure  of  the  future  that  you  are  willing  to  state 
that  we  need  cost  effective  forces,  which  is  where  your  report 
leads  us,  instead  of  flexible  forces  with  a  spectrum  of 
capabilities? 

GAO  Response 

As  requested  by  the  Congress,  our  review  was  of  U.S. 
strategic  systems  in  the  context  of  the  U.S.  relationship  with 
the  former  Soviet  Union.   During  the  course  of  our  work,  we  found 
that  the  U.S.  possession  of  flexible  strategic  nuclear  forces, 
able  to  respond  to  a  range  of  scenarios  with  a  spectrum  of 
capabilities,  was  an  essential  element  of  an  ability  to  deter  and 
if  necessary  respond  to  attack,  even  from  the  unitary  "dragon" 
that  Director  Woolsey  referred  to  in  his  confirmation  hearing. 

Specifically,  we  evaluated  flexibility  in  two  different 
ways.   First,  we  analyzed  the  ability  of  each  individual 
strategic  system  to  operate  in  a  flexible  manner:   that  is,  we 
assessed  the  extent  to  which,  if  at  all,  systems  could  be 
recalled,  retargeted,  or  could  attack  a  variety  of  target  types 
under  differing  circumstances.   Second,  we  assessed  the  extent  to 
which  the  overall  triad  gave  the  President  a  variety  of  different 
retaliatory  options:   that  is,  whether  the  capabilities  in  the 
various  legs  of  the  triad  were  in  fact  complementary. 

In  effect,  our  reports  analyze  the  triad  systems  across  a 
number  of  dimensions  that  are  directly  relevant,  not  just  to  the 
Cold  War,  but  also  to  evaluating  the  usefulness  of  these  systems 
in  the  present  and  future.   It  is  readily  apparent  that  the 
recallability  of  bombers  gives  them  a  performance  flexibility 
that  is  considerably  greater  than  ballistic  missiles,  and  that 
this  could  be  useful  in  conventional  post-Cold  War  crises. 
At  the  same  time,  it  is  clear  that  the  focus  of  our  work — as 
requested — was  the  capability  of  U.S.  strategic  systems  vis-a-vis 
the  then-existing  principal  threat,  the  Soviet  Union.   Analysis 
of  the  applicability  of  U.S.  strategic  forces  to  dealing  with, 
say,  third-world  states  possessing  nuclear  stockpiles  of  a  dozen 
weapons  or  less,  and  exclusively  medium-range  missiles,  was 
outside  the  scope  of  our  study. 


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GAO's  evaluation  does  not  state  that  cost-effectiveness 
should  take  precedence  over  other  dimensions  or  measures  in 
deciding  what  strategic  systems  offer  the  most  advantages. 
Indeed,  our  reports  make  clear  that  there  are  multiple  important 
non-cost  dimensions  to  these  systems,  such  as  flexibility  or  arms 
control.   The  analysis  presented  in  the  eight  reports  show  the 
desirability  for  the  United  States  to  retain  strategic  forces 
that  are  flexible  and  that  possess  a  spectrum  of  capabilities  to 
cope  with  a  variety  of  potentially  unforeseen  threat  scenarios. 
However,  it  is  also  important  that  these  systems  be  cost- 
effective,  given  that  it  makes  little  sense  to  spend  money  on  new 
systems  to  obtain  capabilities  that  already  exist  in  our  military 
inventory,  or  that  are  designed  to  meet  non-existent  or  vastly 
overestimated  threats. 

The  short  answer  to  your  question,  then,  is  that  we  believe 
our  report  leads  not  to  the  conclusion  that  we  need  cost- 
effective  forces,  but  that  whatever  forces  we  need  should  be 
subjected  to  cost-effectiveness  (and  other)  analysis  on  a  fairly 
regular  basis. 

Question  4;   When  the  GAO  began  this  study  in  1990,  Peacekeeper 
Rail  Garrison  and  the  Small  ICBM  were  ongoing  programs,  and  we 
were  projecting  a  much  larger  B-2  buy  than  we  are  today.   Given 
the  demise  of  the  first  two  programs,  and  the  evisceration  of  the 
B-2  program,  how  valid  does  your  study  remain? 

GAO  Response 

It  is  correct  that  we  were  asked  to  address  certain  systems 
that  are  no  longer  being  developed  or  procured.   However,  our 
reports  also  address  eight  systems  that  are  currently  under 
development,  being  flight  tested,  or  currently  deployed — and  that 
will  remain  viable  for  many  years  to  come.2 

While  our  studies  produced  numerous  findings  and 
recommendations,  many  of  them  classified,  we  believe  three  of 
these  merit  serious  attention  in  the  post-Soviet  world.   These 
are: 

1.   On  balance,  the  evidence  shows  the  sea- leg  to  be  the 
strongest,  most  cost-effective  component  of  the  triad 
under  a  range  of  scenarios.   We  believe  this  conclusion 
has  special  importance  as  we  enter  a  post-Soviet  period 
of  uncertainty  and  major  domestic  budgetary  pressures. 
I  would  remind  you  that  Deputy  Secretary  Perry  agrees 
with  us  on  this  point:   he  commented  at  the  Committee's 
June  10th  hearing  that  in  his  view  also,  the  Trident 


ZThese  systems  include  the  B-S2H,  B-1B,  B-2,  ALCM,  ACM,  MM  III, 
Ohio  SSBN,  and  D-S  SLBM. 

17 


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system  is  the  "dominant  leg  of  the  triad"  and  that  "we 
could  get  by  very  nicely  with  much  smaller  forces  and 
[even]  a  single  leg." 

Because  strategic  bombers  are  flexible  and  stabilizing, 
they  add  a  critically  important  character  to  the  overall 
nuclear  force.   Again,  we  believe  this  finding  has 
significant  implications  for  our  post-Soviet  force 
structure . 

Finally,  the  multiple  flaws  and  failures  we  found  in 
areas  like  threat  forecasting,  testing,  and  reporting 
are,  if  anything,  more  important  for  the  future  than  the 
past.   As  you  know,  our  data  showed  that  Soviet 
threats — whether  to  our  land,  sea,  or  air  leg  weapon 
systems — were  consistently  inflated  beyond  what  was 
actually  the  case;  testing  of  the  U.S.  systems  was 
frequently  truncated  or  unrealistic  or  both;  and 
reporting  on  a  variety  of  subjects  was  frequently 
incomplete,  pessimistic  with  regard  to  mature  systems, 
and  optimistic  about  the  likely  cost  and  performance  of 
new  ones.   We  also  found  a  dearth  of  the  comparative 
evaluations  needed  to  show  whether  a  proposed  system  is 
justified  in  terms  of  three  things:   the  threat  it 
faces,  its  performance  capabilities  vis-a-vis  other 
systems,  and  its  relative  costs. 

These  flaw--,  and  omissions  are  not,  as  some  have  claimed, 
the  characteristics  of  an  acquisition  strategy  that  is 
exercising  prudence  by  preparing  for  a  "worst  case 
scenario."   Indeed,  it  can  never  be  prudent  to  have 
imprecise  or  distorted  information,  either  about  U.S.  or 
enemy  capabilities.   On  the  contrary,  we  would  argue 
that  such  a  situation  is  inherently  imprudent .  because 
it  allows  unhappy  surprises  in  time  of  war  and  costly 
consequences  for  the  U.S.  budget.   Overall,  the  failures 
of  information  we  found  were  serious,  pervasive,  and 
persistent  over  the  past  10-15  years;  one  measure  of  the 
validity  of  our  study  will  certainly  be  the  degree  to 
which  it  helps  us  avoid  these  failures  in  the  future. 


18 


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112 


APPENDIX  I 


APPENDIX  I 


Totals  Through  2010 

The  total  cost  of  sustaining  the  Minuteman  III  ICBM  force  through 
FY  2010  is  estimated  to  be  $16.5  billion.   An  additional  $1.9 
billion  is  being  considered  to  improve  the  inertial  measurement 
unit  of  the  Guidance  and  Control  Unit. 

These  costs  are  summarized  in  Table  2. 

Minuteman  III  Life  Extension  Costs  Through  FY  2010 
(FY  1992  Constant  Dollars  in  Millions) 


Stage  1 


Stage  2 


Stage  3 


PSRE 


Guidance 


Rivet  MILE 


Non-Missile  Equipment 


REACT 


—   -c- 


MEECN 


Others 


Operations  &  Support  ($631M  per  year) 


Military  Personnel 


Depot  Maintenance 


Sustaining  Investment 


Sustaining  Engineering 


other  Direct  Costs  (SAC) 


Indirect  Costs 


Total  FY92-2010 


FY  1992-2010 


$657 


$639 


$432 


$250 


$1,406 


$265 


$310 


$346 


$113 


$72 


($11,989) 


$3,819 


$931 


$380 


$912 


$3,781 


$2,166 


$16,479 


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Government  Affairs 


Question  1 


DOD  ANALYSIS  ON  THE  TRIAD 


Senator  Glenn:   GAO  states  that  they  found  that  no  DoD 
evaluation  had  examined  U.S.  strategic  forces  in  this 
comprehensive  way  for  at  least  three  decades,  and  that  GAO  was 
concerned  to  find  little  or  no  prior  recent  effort  by  DoD  to 
evaluate  comprehensively  the  relative  effectiveness  of  similar 
weapons  systems.   — Do  you  agree  with  the  GAO's  assessment?  What 
kinds  of  inter-leg  comparisons  did  DoD  carry  out  on  the  Triad? 

Dr.  Perry:   The  Department  strongly  disagrees  with  the  GAO 
assessment,  which  is  based  on  their  study  that  focuses  primarily 
on  cost  and  fails  to  properly  recognize  other  critical  measures 
of  effectiveness  appropriate  for  decisions  regarding  the 
acquisition  and  deployment  of  nuclear  forces. 


The 
part,  has 
mutually 
leg  hedge 
beginning 
or  did  ma 
quality, 
acquisiti 


Triad,  and  the  national  strategy  of  which  it  has  been  a 
been  successful  largely  because  the  different  legs  are 
reinforcing.   The  capabilities  and  attributes  of  each 

against  perceived  weaknesses  of  the  others.   From  the 
,  our  analysis  of  the  weapon  systems  options,  that  could 
ke  up  the  Triad  has  been  comprehensive  and  of  high 
and  was  utilized  for  important  decisions  regarding  the 
on  and  operations  planning. 


Analysis  has  been  conducted  throughout  the  Department  (plus 
elsewhere  in  the  Executive  Branch)  at  various  levies,  from 
different  perspectives  (e.g.,  concept  designs,  acquisition 
alternatives,  arms  control),  and  on  the  basis  of  up-to-date  test 
and  design  data.   The  Strategic  Command  (previously  the  JSTPS  and 
Strategic  Air  Command),  the  Services  (including  their 
headquarters  and  system  program  offices),  the  Joint  Staff,  and 
OSD  all  have  had  dedicated  offices  which  conduct  evaluations  on 
the  cost  and  combat  and  deterrent  effectiveness  of  our  strategic 
forces.   The  records  provide  for  countless  presentations  to  the 
Congress  over  the  years  detailing  costs,  effectiveness,  and 
performance  requirements  during  the  Department's  budget  requests 
regarding  such  undertakings  as  the  Strategic  Modernization 
Program,  Peackeeper  basing  modes,  cruise  missile  programs, 
submarine-launched  ballistic  missile  programs,  Small  ICBM,  the 
1986  Bomber  Study,  and  many  more. 

Today,  on  the  basis  of  updated  intelligence  estimates  and 
system  performance  assessments,  the  U.S.  Strategic  Command 
continually  analyzes  the  effectiveness  of  our  nuclear  forces  for 
changing  conditions  and  the  full  range  of  plausible  scenarios. 
Under  the  Unified  Command  Plan,  USSTRATCOM  is  tasked  with 
formulating  war  plans,  future  strategic  nuclear  force  structures, 
and  systems  analyses  of  the  capabilities  of  current  and  planned 
strategic  nuclear  forces.   Since  assuming  the  role  as  the  single 
voice  for  strategic  systems  on  June  1,  1992,  USSTRATCOM  has 
conducted  studies  about  our  current  capabilities. 


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Question  1 

DoD  ANALYSIS  ON  THE  TRIAD  (CONTINUED) 


The  Joint  Staff  has  a  directorate  dedicated  to  conducting 
analysis,  net  assessments,  and  evaluations  of  military  forces, 
plans,  programs,  and  strategies  for  the  Chairman  of  the  Joint 
Chiefs,  and  support  of  the  Secretary  and  the  President.   The 
Force  Design  Division  and  the  Nuclear  Forces  Analysis  Division 
within  this  directorate  are  dedicated  to  analyzing  U.S.  strategic 
forces.   Their  efforts  include  developing  force  structure 
alternatives,  conducting  tradeoff  analyses,  cost  and  budget 
analysis  independent  of  the  Services,  and  preparing  comparative 
analyses  and  net  assessments  of  weapon  systems. 

Within  the  staff  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  (Policy, 
Acquisition,  and  Program  Analysis  and  Evaluation)  ongoing 
oversight  and  analysis  of  various  aspects  of  our  strategic  forces 
evaluate  alternative  force  structures  as  well  as  individual 
system  performance.   These  offices  each  work  with  their 
counterparts  within  the  Joint  Staff,  the  Services,  and  the 
Unified  and  Specified  Commands  to  investigate  issues  of  interest 
based  on  changing  constraints. 

I  hope  this  discussion  gives  you  a  clearer  picture  of  the 
type  of  analysis  and  oversight  the  Department  conducts.   It  is  my 
judgment  that  the  Department  has  conducted  appropriate  analysis 
over  the  years  with  respect  to  our  strategic  forces. 

Senator  Glenn:  If  DoD  failed  to  carry  out  the  studies  which 
compared  land-,  sea-,  and  air-based  weapons,  to  what  do  you 
attribute  this  lack  of  analysis? 

Dr.  Perry:   The  United  States  Government  in  general,  and  the 
Department  of  Defense  in  particular,  has  not  failed  to  properly 
analyze  our  past,  current,  and  potential  forces.   Decisions 
regarding  our  strategic  forces  have  responded  to,  and  in  many 
cases  have  exploited,  changing  threats,  technology,  and  the 
results  of  arms  control  negotiations.   In  each  case,  extensive 
and  independent  analyses  and  assessments  were  conducted  by  the 
Department  and  Services. 

Senator  Glenn:  Which  part  of  the  Pentagon  should  do  such 
analysis?  The  Defense  Acquisition  Board?  The  Defense  Science 
Board?   The  Joint  Chiefs? 

Dr.  Perry:   USSTRATCOM  now  has  primary  responsibility  for 
strategic  nuclear  forces  to  support  the  national  objective  of 
strategic  deterrence,  is  the  primary  military  voice  for  strategic 
forces  issues,  and  shares  that  responsibility  with  the 
appropriate  components  within  the  Office  of  the  Secretary  of 
Defense,  the  Joint  Staff,  and  the  Services. 


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Question  2 


U.S.  Strategic  TRIAD: 


U.S.  Strategic  TRIAD: 


Senator  Glenn:   Areas  of  Disagreement:   GAO  stated  that 
«»*?£   i  s^emati-c   disparities  between  estimates  or  claims 
";f°"the  likely  cost  and  performance  of  upgrades,  the  actual 
performance  of  current  systems,  or  the  likely  offensive  or 
defensive  threats  to  these  systems  from  the  former  Soviet  Union. 
be^nn^rk^fnd^oD^0^  '  —«***-  °f  th*  disagreements 

n'SlJV*''      V't. f ollowin9  li3t  Provides  references  to  the 
extensive  documentation  on  GAO  positions  and  the  DoD  responses: 

Final  Report  and  Recommendations, 
Dated  September  25,  1992,  GAO/C- 
PMED-92-8  (OSD  Case  8936-X) 

DoD  Response  to  Draft: 
Appendix  V,  pp.  235-274 

Current  Status,  Modernization  Plans, 
and  Doctrine  of  British  and  French 
Nuclear  Forces,  Dated  September  25, 
1992,  GAO/C-PEMD-92-7  (OSD  Case 
8672X) 

DoD  Response  to  Draft: 
Appendix  II,  p.  42 

Costs  and  Uncertainties  of  Proposed 
Upgrades,  Dated  September  25,  1992, 
GAO/C-PEMD-92-6  (OSD  Case  8693-X) 

DoD  Response  to  Draft: 
Appendix  II,  pp.  67-78 

Strategic  Relocatable  Targets, 
Dated  September  25,  1992,  GAO/C- 
PEMD-92-5  (OSD  Case  8637-X) 


DoD  Response  to  Draft:  Appendix  II, 
pp.  48-58 


U.S.  Strategic  TRIAD: 


U.S.  Strategic  TRIAD: 


U.S.  Strategic  TRIAD: 


Modernizing  Strategic  Bombers  and 

Their  Missiles,  Dated  September  25, 

1992,  GAO/C-PEMD-92-4  OSD  Case 
8727-X) 

DoD  Response  to  Draft:  Appendix  V. 
pp.  142-164 


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Question  2  (Com) 

(Cont) 


U.S.  Strategic  TRIAD: 


U.  S.  Strategic  TRIAD: 


A  Comparison  of  ICBMs  and  SLBMs, 
Dated  September  25,  1992, 
GAO/C-FEMD-92-3  (OSD  Case  8802-X) 

DoD  Response  To  Draft:  Appendix  IV, 
pp.  156-186 

ICBM  Vulnerability,  Dated  September 
25,  1992,  GAO/C-PEMD-92-2  (OSD  Case 
8801-X) 


DoD  Response  to  Draft: 
II,  pp.  54-64 


Appendix 


U.S.  Strategic  TRIAD: 


ICBM  Vulnerability  of  Strategic 
Ballistic  Missile  Nuclear 
Submarines,  Dated  September  25, 
1992,  GAO/C-PEMD-92-1  (OSD  Case 
8446-X) 


DoD  Response  to  Draft: 
III,  pp.  67-82 


Appendix 


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Question  3 


THE  CLINTON-ASPIN  NUCLEAR  FORCE 


Senator  Glenn:   In  what  ways  will  the  nuclear  force 
structure  of  the  Clinton  Administration  differ  from  that  of  the 
Bush  Administration? 


Dr.  Perry:   The  Depar 
structure  review,  known  as 
conducting  further  review 
strategy,  doctrine,  force 
supporting  infrastructure) 
Defense  Planning  Guidance, 
comment  on  the  results  of 
review  is  complete  we  will 


tment  has  conducted  an  extensive  force 
the  Bottom  Up  Review,  and  is 

of  our  nuclear  posture  (policy, 

structure,  command  and  control,  and 
consistent  with  the  recently  issued 
It  would  be  premature  for  me  to 

that  study  now;  however,  when  the 
provide  the  results  to  the  Congress. 


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Question  4 

UNCERTAIN  COSTS 


Senator  Glenn:   The  cost  of  modernizing  the  Triad  has 
uncertainties.   Which  systems  have  the  greatest  (and  the  least) 
cost  uncertainties?   How  uncertain? 

Dr.  Perry:   It  is  not  possible  to  quantify  the  precise  degree 
of  cost  uncertainty  with  any  acquisition  program.   However,  a 
program  will  have  more  uncertainty  when  there  is  more  engineering 
design  and  development  to  accomplish. 

On  this  basis,  the  Trident  D-5  program  could  be  judged  to 
have  the  least  cost  uncertainty,  because  it  has  completed 
engineering  design  and  development,  and  is  in  a  mature  production 
phase  of  procurement. 

The  B-2  program  is  now  completing  engineering  design  and 
development.   It  is  approximately  thirty-five  percent  through 
flight  test,  and  is  completing  its  limited  production.   The 
Congress  has  now  capped  the  program  at  twenty  operational 
bombers,  and  the  cost  of  the  program  at  $44.4  billion.   While 
there  is  risk  in  the  program,  it  has  been  minimized  through 
extensive  laboratory,  simulator,  airborne  test  bed,  and  flight 
test  activity.   The  first  operational  aircraft  will  be  delivered 
on  December  17,  1993. 

The  Minuteman  Ill/Life  Extension  Program  will  replace  aging 
components  on  the  Minuteman  III  weapon  system.   Little 
engineering  and  design  work  is  expected;  thus  it  has  a  low  cost 
uncertainty. 


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Question  5 

B-2  VS  TRIDENT--COST  PER  SURVIVING  WARHEAD 


Senator  Glenn: 

nuclear  and  conventi 
following  approximat 
for  a  B-2  weapon.  U 
B-2  at  about  S2  bill 
amounts  to  $125  mill 
alert  rate  of  about 
of  the  B-2s  would  su 
arriving  B-2  warhead 
reasonable?  (Part  1) 


The  B-2  has  been  designed  to  have  both  a 
onal  mission.   Please  comment  on  the 
e  estimate  for  the  cost  per  arriving  warhead 
sing  estimates  for  the  life-cycle  cost  of  a 
ion  (for  20  B-2s)  with  16  warheads  each,  this 
ion  per  warhead.   If  the  B-2  has  the  B-52 
one-third,  this  implies  that  about  one-third 
rvive  an  attack,  raising  the  cost  of  an 

to  about  $375  million.   Is  this  approach 


The  Navy  has  stated  that  two-thirds  of  the  Tridents  are  at 
sea  and  survivable,  on  a  day-to-day  basis,  and  about  80  percent 
of  the  Tridents  would  be  survivable  under  a  generated  alert. 
Using  the  day-to-day  alert  figure  and  the  $110  billion  total  cost 
of  the  Trident  program,  we  get  about  $50  to  $100  million  for  each 
arriving  warhead,  depending  on  whether  8  or  4  weapons  are  placed 
on  each  SLBM.   Is  this  approach  reasonable?  (Part  2) 

From  the  above  results,  is  it  reasonable  to  conclude  that 
the  B-2  is  some  four  to  seven  times  more  expensive  for  each 
arriving  warhead?  (Part  3) 

Dr.  Perry:   Part  1.   The  approach  is  not  reasonable. 
Bombers  are  not  currently  on  alert.   Any  situation  that  would 
change  that  condition  would  more  than  likely  mean  a  full 
generation  of  the  B-2  force.   Assuming  a  one-third  alert  rate  is 
therefore  an  inappropriate  assumption.   If  the  B-2s  are  fully 
generated,  the  computation  for  the  cost  of  an  arriving  warhead 
would  be  $125  million  based  on  a  life  cycle  cost  of  about  $2 
billion  per  bomber. 

Part  2.   Again  the  assumptions  are  incorrect.   To  keep  a  B-2 
and  a  Trident  comparison  on  the  same  plane,  one  would  have  to 
assume  that  the  set  of  events  that  caused  the  generation  of  the 
B-2  fleet  also  changed  the  posture  of  the  Trident  fleet. 
Assuming  a  fully  generated  Trident  fleet  of  21,  and  assuming  a 
cost  of  $110  billion  and  four  warheads  per  missile  (2,016 
warheads),  the  cost  of  an  arriving  warhead  would  be  $54  million. 

Part  3.  From  the  above  analysis  it  would  appear  that  the 
B-2  is  two  to  three  times  more  expensive  per  arriving  warhead, 
not  four  to  seven  times  more  expensive. 

However,  such  analysis  is  immaterial  at  this  time.   The 
correct  time  to  use  such  a  cost-per-arriving  warhead  analysis  is 
when  one  is  making  decisions  on  what  force  structure  to  buy, 
evaluating  alternatives,  etc.   To  do  so  after  the  forces  have 
been  ordered,  delivered,  procurement  programs  truncated,  and/or 
canceled  is  not  meaningful. 

The  modernization  of  the  Strategic  Triad  started  in  the 
early  1980 's  and  addressed  the  three  legs  of  the  Triad  as  a 
package. 


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INSERT  NO. 

Question  5 

B-2  vs. Trident — Cost  per  Surviving  WH  (Cont) 


The  chart  below  shows  what  computations  of  the  cost  of 
'acquired  warheads"  may  have  been  at  that  time. 


Weapons 

per 

Total 

Estimated 

Cost/ 

Weapon 

Quantity 

vehic; 

e 

weapons 

cost   1981 

warhead 

B-1B 

90    PAA 

16 

1440 

$20. 5B 

$14. 2M 

B-2 

120    PAA 

16 

1920 

$36. 2B 

$18. 8M 

Peacekeeper 

100 

10 

1000 

$33. 0B 

$33. 0M 

Trident 

21 

192 

4032 

$110. 0B 

$27. 3M 

(24x8) 

From  this  rebuilt  analysis  of  the  cost-per-warhead  delivery, 
one  can  see  that  the  B-2  was  very  competitive  when  the  aircraft 
buy  was  132  aircraft. 

The  question  is  posed  in  "surviving  warhead"  terms,  and 
alludes  only  to  the  vehicle  being  on  or  off  alert  as  the 
determining  factor  of  the  survivability.   Survivability  of  the 
warhead  vehicle  is  only  one  element  of  a  very  complex  issue  that 
is  more  appropriately  expressed  in  terms  of  damage  expectancy  of 
a  set  of  targets. 


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Question  6 


ICBMs  vs  SLBMs 


Senator  Glenn:    Do  you  agree  that  in  all  essential 
5  ltnltVt   "pect3  the  Peacekeeper  and  the  Trident  D-5  with  the 
W-88  warheads  are  essentially  equivalent? 

*„*   JSH'*9??*!   Jce  Peacekeeper  missile  with  the  W-87  warhead 
and  the  Trident  D-5  missile  with  the  W-88  warhead  share  many  of 
the  same  warfighting  attributes.   The  yield,  accuracy,  and  range 
nard-targ^tmi:rs.eSSentiany  e*uivalent<  «"««  both  effective 

fh„   However,  a  comparison  of  missile  attributes  alone  ignores 
the  advantages  of  the  different  and  independent  basing  node,  of 
the  Tra;HnK  }and"bfsed  le°s  °f  the  Triad.   Each  of  the  legs  of 
for  J  hfM   ??  ""i^^^ities  to  America's  strategic  deterrent 
lea-  icSSi  ir   ^mfSXle  3ubmarines  represent  the  molt  survivable 
leg,  ICBMs  are  the  least  expensive  to  operate  and  are  highly 
responsive;  and  bombers  provide  recallable,  reusable  assets.   The 
elch  ?.»  /   effeCt  =reated  W  combining  the  unique  qualities  of 
Mot  «i?2  h   ^KeedSt^e  SUra  o£  their  ^dividual  contributions, 
anv  noiLd°e?  ^S  T"ad  comPii"te  the  war-planning  efforts  of 
""h°  nia   adversary,  it  hedges  against  the  unforseen  cata- 
strophic failure  of  a  single  leg  and  ensures  that  the  United 

deterrenf  n°TK°    ,\  feliant  on  anv  °ne  system  for  its  strategic 
Tr^H       The  qualities  provided  by  all  three  legs  of  the 
value' withVr-hafy  ?""  Feliability,  provide  adequate  deterrent 
STAR?  II  "    6    envisioned  for  compliance  with 


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Question  7 

MINUTEMAN  III  MODERNIZATION 


Senator  Glenn:  GAO  has  concluded  that  major  upgrades  of  the 
Minuteman  III  are  not  advisable  at  this  time.   Do  you  agree  with 
GAO's  extrapolation  of  the  DoD  estimate  of  $16  billion  by  2010  to 
$23  billion  by  2020?   If  the  Minuteman  III  is  not  upgraded, 
approximately  when  would  its  reliability  be  reduced  to 
seventy-five  percent?  Would  it  be  prudent  to  postpone  the 
modernization  of  Minuteman  III,  saving  some  $23  billion,  while  we 
watch  events  in  the  former  Soviet  Union?   Would  an  unmodernized 
Minuteman  III  be  one  of  the  first  systems  eliminated  as  part  of  a 
much  deeper  cuts  treaty  which  included  all  five  nuclear  weapons 
states? 

Dr.  Perry:   The  GAO  has  quoted  a  cost  of  $23  billion  to 
"modernize"  the  Minuteman  III.   The  accurate  description  of  the 
Minuteman  III  Life  Extension  Program  is  the  cost  to  operate  and 
maintain  the  Minuteman  III.   The  Department  has  documented  this 
cost  as  $4.6  billion  for  acquisition  and  $11.9  billion  for 
operations  and  support,  stated  in  FY  1992  dollars,  and  covering 
the  period  FY  1992  to  FY  2020.   The  acquisition  portion  of  the 
Life  Extension  Program  will  accomplish  all  the  required 
development  and  procurement  of  components  that  must  be  replaced 
due  to  age,  reliability,  or  sustainability  problems.   It  also 
includes  the  test  costs  of  a  sufficient  number  of  test  flights  to 
verify  that  the  performance  of  the  system  is  not  changed  by  the 
modifications. 

The  GAO's  extrapolation  of  the  Department's  estimate  of  the 
cost  to  operate  and  maintain  the  Minuteman  III  adds  $631  million 
per  year  for  the  period  2010  to  2020,  to  the  $16  billion  cost 
identified  in  the  Minuteman  III  Life  Extension  Program  Report  to 
Congress.   The  $631  million  amount  is  the  annual  cost  for 
operations  and  support,  and  is  a  validated  number  in  that 
context.  However,  because  no  validated  DoD  effort  has  been 
undertaken  to  quantify  any  additional  life  extension  requirements 
for  the  period  2010  to  2020,  we  are  unable  to  verify  the  accuracy 
of  the  GAO  estimate. 

No  validated  analytical  technique  can  predict  with  certainty 
when,  or  if,  the  Minuteman  III  reliabilitly  would  be  reduced  to 
seventy-five  percent  if  the  Life  Extension  Program  was  postponed. 
Postponement  of  the  Minuteman  III  Life  Extension  Program  can 
never  save  $23  billion.   As  explained  above,  this  number  is 
derived  from  the  period  1992  through  2020.   It  includes 
acquisition  costs  as  well  as  operations  and  support  costs.   Even 
if  all  ICBMs  were  eliminated  from  the  Triad  today,  savings  would 
not  add  up  to  $23  billion  after  costs  to  deposture  and  store  or 
eliminate  the  missiles  and  facilities  were  added  to  the  amunt 
already  spent  since  1992. 

The  most  important  consideration,  however,  is  not  cost. 
Retirement  of  the  entire  ICBM  force  would  be  inconsistent  with  US 
national  security  requirements  in  a  START  environment  and  would 
remove  a  significant  incentive  for  Russian  implementation  of 
START  I  and  II.   Continued  deployment  of  the  ICBM  force  provides 
a  visible  American   strategic  deterrent  force. 


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UNENO. 

INSERT  NO. 

Question  7  (Cont) 

MINUTEMAN  III  MODENRNIZATION  (CONT) 


Each  of  the  legs  of  the  Triad  brings  unique  qualities  to 
America's  strategic  deterrent  force:  ballistic  missile  submarines 
represent  the  most  survivable  leg;  ICBMs  are  the  least  expensive 
to  operate  and  are  highly  responsive;  and  bombers  provide 
recallable,  reusable  assets.   The  synergistic  effect  created  by 
combining  the  unique  qualities  of  each  leg  far  exceeds  the  sum  of 
their  individual  contributions.   Not  only  does  the  Triad 
complicate  the  war-planning  efforts  of  any  potential  adversary, 
it  hedges  against  the  unforeseen  catastrophic  failure  of  a  single 
leg  and  ensures  that  the  United  States  is  not  overly  reliant  on 
any  one  system  for  its  strategic  deterrent.   The  qualities 
provided  by  all  three  legs  of  the  Triad,  survivability  and 
reliability,   provide  adequate  deterrent  value  with  the  force 
levels  envisioned  for  compliance  with  START  II.   Even  under  the 
most  optimistic  projections,  the  START  II  treaty  will  not  be 
fully  implemented  for  almost  a  decade.   Unilateral  retiring  of 
the  ICBM  force  would  reduce  prematurely  U.S.  strategic  forces  to 
levels  well  below  the  planned  post-START  II  force  levels  and 
completely  remove  one  of  the  key  elements  of  the  strategic  Triad. 


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LINE  NO. 

INSERT  NO. 

Question  10 

B-52  LIFETIME 


Senator  Glenn:  "How  many  more  years  can  the  B-52HS  be 
expected  to  last?   How  many  miles  have  they  flown,  and  what  is 
their  expected  lifetime  mileage?" 

Dr.  Perry:   The  B-52H  was  designed  for  30,000  flying  hours. 
Currently,  there  is  an  average  of   approximately  13,000  hours  per 
airframe.   Their  service  life  (air  worthiness)  is  projected  to 
reach  beyond  the  year  2030  based  on  current  tactical  operations. 

Senator  Glenn:  "Do  you  agree  with  the  estimate  of  $35 
billion  to  maintain  95  B-52s  for  30  years?   For  comparison  sake, 
what  are  total  costs  to  go  for  the  B-1B  (95  aircraft)  and  the  B-2 
(20  aircraft)  for  the  next  30  years?" 

Dr.  Perry:    DoD  completed  a  20-year  estimate  for  the  B-52H 
to  comply  with  Section  132  of  Public  Law  102-190.   This  Bomber 
Comparison  Study  covered  the  years  FY94  through  FY13.   All 
estimates  are  expressed  in  terms  of  FY92  base  year  dollars.   Our 
20  year  estimate  for  the  95  B-52Hs  is  $17. 7B,  which  equates  to  an 
average  annual  cost  of  $885M.   The  Air  Force  update  to  that  1992 
study  estimated  a  cost  for  95  B-ls  of  $20. IB,  which  equals  an 
average  annual  cost  of  $1B. 

Regarding  the  B-2,  there  has  been  no  final  decision  on  the 
B-2  support  concept.   DoD  continues  investigating  the  optimum  mix 
of  organic  and  contractor  logistics  support.   Therefore,  the 
December  1992  Selected  Acquisition  Report  (SAR)  contains  the  best 
life  cycle  cost  estimate  at  this  time.   The  SAR  estimate  is  based 
on  a  nine-year  phase-in  and  a  25-year  steady  state  period  of 
operations.    The  life  cycle  cost  estimate  for  20  B-2s  in  FY92 
base  year  dollars  averages  $542. 0M  per  year.   Over  the  34  year 
period  this  equates  to  $13. 5B.   After  completing  the  B-2  logistic 
support  plan,  updated  DoD  B-2  life  cycle  cost  estimates  will  be 
available. 


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Question  15 


TRIAD  COST-EFFECTIVENESS  FOR  THE  FUTURE 


Senator  Glenn:  Is  it  the  position  of  the  Department  that  in 

folce!1"9  °Ur  "UClear  f°rCeS  We  aEe  seekin*  Purely  cost  effective 

e'orhare  we  constructing  a  threat-based  Triad  that  is  as 
cost-effective  as  possible,  given  JimWoolsey's  "...  jungle  filled 
with  a  bewildering  variety  of  poisonous  snakes....?"       rmea 

t-h^  ?L   £""*;  Mthou9h  c°st-effectiveness  is  one  criterion 
that  the  Department  uses  when  upgrading  strategic  nuclear  forces 
it  is  only  one  of  many  factors  considered.   ThI  DoD  intends 
through  programming  decisions  and  arms  control  support,  that  the 

Irobu^  H^"69^  nUCiear  f°rCeS  Pr°vide  the  United  States  with 
thll   *^h d  T'  Thee   und«lying  principle  continues  to  be 

charac?eri!ti«%iegS  °^  thC  Triad  bringS  Uni<^e'  complementary 
characteristics  to  our  force  posture.   ICBMs  have  accuracy, 

In  thHrVf   rellaSi1±tY'  and  provide  a  hed9«  ^"nst  a^roblem 
"  hae,SLBM  force-   The  SLBMs  possess  the  same  attributes,  whil^ 

ICBM  for^Pr°TKd%f^edge  againSt  a  P°te"tial  problem  with  the 
ICBM  force.   The  SLBMs  are  also  highly  survivable  when  they  are 
at  sea.   Heavy  bombers  can  deliver  their  weapons  with  high 
degrees  of  accuracy  and  flexibility,  including  the  feature  that 
stfhM3?  b%r^all?d  be£°re  reachin3  their  targets,  adding  to  the 
thf  H^fy  °f.thiS  X!9  °f  the  Triad-   In  sum'  ^e  Triad,  trough 
the  different  attributes  of  the  three  legs,  accomplishes 

fdve'rfary6   *  ^^  comPlicatin9  attack  planning  for  any  future 

withinhRussn  and  encou"9ed  fay  the  progress  of  democratic  reform 
lrSh.   i\k     f  neW  lndePen<*ent  states,  we  still  have  many 

STA^T  trtltie*   *rT ?*?f  *TP°2   reducti°"  negotiated  in  the   * 
START  treaties  are  realized.   Even  after  START  II  limitations  are 

Tresult  "tne'n  ?~   V?1   P°SSeSS  a  "Zable  -clear™ 'sen!?  £ 
a  result,  the  Department  sees  a  continuing  need  for  a  flexible 

Indad,°f  K^9^  nuclear  forces-   I"  addition,  the  capabilities 

deler  »nH  Ulty  °J   ^   Triad  Wil1  Permit  the  United  States  to 
deter  and  respond  to  threats  that  may  emerge  in  the  future   The 
Nuclear  Posture  Review,  to  be  conducted  by9the  DoD?  will  review 
all  aspects  of  our  nuclear  posture  in  the  post-Cold  War  world 


BOSTON  PUBLIC  LIBRARY 


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Question  16 

DOD  POSITION  ON  GAO  EVALUATION 


Senator  Cochran:   Given  that  the  GAO  report  was  started  in 
1990,  and  that  several  programs  considered  in  the  analysis  have 
since  been  dropped  or  dramatically  reduced,  what  is  the  DoD 
position  on  the  GAO  evaluation? 

Dr.  Perry:   The  DoD  position  on  each  finding  and 
recommendation  from  the  eight  GAO  reports  on  the  U.S.  Strategic 
Nuclear  Triad  is  part  of  the  eight  departmental  responses 
officially  provided  to  the  GAO  and  submitted  herewith  for  the 
record.   The  dramatic  impact  of  changing  world  events  and  the 
fact  that,  in  response  to  these  world  events,  several  strategic 
programs  were  canceled  (e.g.,  Small  ICBM,  SRAM-II)  or  reduced 
(e.g.,  B-2,  ACM)  have  been  repeatedly  addressed  in  the 
Department's  responses. 

A  DoD  position  that  particularly  merits  further  emphasis 
concerns  the  inherent  conventional  capability  of  strategic 
bombers  (i.e.,  B-52,  B-l,  B-2)  and  cruise  missiles  (i.e.,  ALCM, 
ACM) .   GAO  evaluations  of  the  various  Triad  weapon  systems  have 
not  adequately  addressed  the  current  and/or  planned  conventional 
capabilities  of  these  long-range  weapon  systems,  which  take  on  a 
greater  importance  as  the  U.S.  downsizes  force  structures, 
reduces  overseas  military  presence,  and  takes  on  initiatives  such 
as  counterproliferation.   The  Department  will  not  make 
modernization  or  acquisition  decisions  for  these  weapon  systems 
based  solely  on  their  contribution  to  the  Strategic  Nuclear 
Triad. 


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Question  18 

TRIAD  SUPPORT 


Senator  Cochran:   Cost  effectiveness  must  be  a  serious 
consideration  in  any  acquisition  decision,  though  not  to  the 
exclusion  of  other  considerations,  not  the  least  of  which  is  the 
question  of  how  to  provide  the  President  with  the  maximum  number 
of  options  should  there  be  a  need  for  the  use  of  our  strategic 
forces.   I'd  like  to  put  that  aside  for  a  moment,  though,  because 
I  believe  that  the  GAO  report  only  answers  in  part  what  I 
consider  to  be  a  second-order  question.   The  first-order  question 
has  to  do  with  the  viability  of  our  nuclear  weapons  production 
complex:   Given  that  we  no  longer  have  the  facilities  to  produce 
tritium,  I  am  not  aware  of  any  plan  to  produce  tritium  in  the 
future,  and  the  half-life  of  tritium  is  12  years,  are  we  not  — 
by  conscious  policy,  or  worse  —  proceeding  down  the  road  of 
unilateral  nuclear  disarmament,  making  this  discussion  of 
upgrades  to  the  Triad  almost  irrelevant? 

Dr.  Perry:   We  have  no  intention  of  abandoning  the  Triad  nor 
placing  the  efficacy  of  the  US  nuclear  deterrent  at  risk  by  not 
ensuring  that  we  have  a  reliable  source  of  tritium.   In 
conjunction  with  the  Department  of  Energy,  we  are  taking  steps 
to  ensure  that  the  nuclear  stockpile  has  an  adequate  supply  of 
tritium,  not  only  to  replenish  it  in  weapons  periodically,  but  to 
ensure  we  have  sufficient  quantities  to  support  plausible 
contingency  scenarios  that  may  place  presently  unanticipated 
demands  on  the  reserve  maintained  by  the  Department  of  Energy. 


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Question  19 

RESUMPTION  OF  UNDERGROUND  TESTING 


Senator  Cochran:   As  you  are  aware,  most  of  our  warheads 
were  built  in  the  1960s  and  '70s,  with  a  small  number  built  in 
the  1980s,  posing  a  reliability  problem.   Once  the  temporary  test 
moratorium  ends  in  the  near  future,  will  we  have  the  capability 
to  test?   What  is  the  Administration's  position  on  the  number  of 
tests  per  year?   Is  this  number  for  a  set  number  of  years,  or  ad 
infinitum? 

Dr.  Perry:   Recent  and  projected  retirements  of  older 
warheads  will  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  age  of  what  we 
term  the  enduring  stockpile  —  those  weapons  that  we  plan  to 
maintain  in  the  post-START  environment.   With  a  few  exceptions, 
these  weapons  were  produced  in  the  1980s.   Each  has  undergone  a 
number  of  developmental  and  one  or  more  post-production  or 
stockpile-confidence  tests.   Based  on  these  tests,  coupled  with 
an  active  quality  assurance  and  reliability  non-nuclear  testing 
program,  Secretary  O'Leary  has  certified  that  the  current  stock- 
pile is  safe,  reliable,  and  secure.   It  should  remain  so  for  a 
number  of  years  without  the  aid  and  insight  derived  from  further 
underground  nuclear  testing. 

In  July,  President  Clinton  announced  that  the  U.S.  would 
continue  its  moratorium  on  nuclear  testing  through  at  least 
September  1994,  so  long  as  no  other  nation  conducted  a  test.   On 
October  5,  despite  heavy  international  pressure  not  to  do  so, 
China  conducted  an  underground  nuclear  test.   In  response  to  this 
test,  the  White  House  announced  that  the  President  had  directed 
the  DOE  to  take  such  actions  as  are  needed  to  put  the  U.S.  in  a 
position  to  conduct  nuclear  tests  next  year,  provided  the 
Congressional  notification  and  review  conditions  are  met  in  the 
Spring  of  1994.   The  ultimate  decision  on  whether  the  U.S.  will 
resume  nuclear  testing  will  be  based  on  fundamental  U.S.  national 
security  interests,  taking  into  account  all  appropriate  factors 
and  considerations.   The  Administration  has  begun  consultations 
with  Congress  and  our  allies  on  these  issues.   The  Clinton 
Administration  remains  committed  to  the  goal  of  completing  a 
Comprehensive  Test  Ban  by  1996.   To  this  end,  multilateral 
negotiations  will  begin  in  the  Geneva-based  Conference  on 
Disarmament  in  January. 


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