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Adi Schwartz, Eytan Gilboa, False Readiness: Expanding the Concept of Readiness in Conflict Resolution Theory, International Studies Review, Volume 23, Issue 4, December 2021, Pages 1328–1348, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viab006
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Abstract
This study introduces a new theoretical concept, “false readiness” (FR), to fill a lacuna in theories of conflict resolution (CR). Existing theories focus mostly on successful cases and opening phases and suggest conditions and variables to determine whether a conflict is “ripe” or “ready” for resolution. The prevailing assumption is that if disputants decide to enter negotiations, they must have “crossed the Rubicon” and wish to reach agreement. This is not always the case in protracted conflicts where parties enter negotiations for reasons other than reaching peace. Existing CR theories do not adequately address this phenomenon. Negotiation theories do explore dishonest intentions but describe them as side effects, short lived and tactical. They also offer too many overlapping and confusing concepts that for the purposes of this study had to be clarified, categorized, and modified. The main goal of this work is not to create an entirely new theory, but rather to add a new theoretical layer to the readiness theory of CR that would be capable of investigating failures to resolve protracted conflicts. The layer is based on the integration of the readiness theory with concepts from negotiation theory that explore conditions where parties negotiate without intention to achieve agreement. FR addresses dubious intentions as strategic and long run that can span multiple stages in CR processes, not only the opening one.
Este estudio introduce un nuevo concepto teórico, la “Falsa disposición” (FD), para llenar un vacío de las teorías de resolución de conflictos (RC). Las teorías existentes se centran principalmente en casos exitosos y en fases iniciales, y recomiendan condiciones y variables para determinar si un conflicto está “maduro” o “listo” para la resolución. El supuesto predominante es que si los contendientes deciden iniciar negociaciones, deben haber “cruzado el Rubicón” y desean concretar un acuerdo. Esto no siempre es así en los conflictos prolongados, en los que las partes inician las negociaciones por motivos diferentes a lograr la paz. Las teorías existentes de resolución de conflictos no abordan este fenómeno de manera adecuada. Las teorías de la negociación no exploran las intenciones deshonestas, sino que las describen como efectos colaterales efímeros y tácticos. Además, ofrecen demasiados conceptos superpuestos y confusos que, a los fines de este estudio, tuvieron que aclararse, categorizarse y modificarse. El principal objetivo de este trabajo no es crear una teoría totalmente nueva, sino más bien agregar un nuevo nivel teórico a la teoría de la disposición para la resolución de conflictos que podría investigar fallas para resolver conflictos prolongados. El nivel se basa en la integración de la teoría de la disposición con conceptos provenientes de la teoría de la negociación que analizan las condiciones en las que las partes negocian sin intención de lograr un acuerdo. La FD aborda las intenciones dudosas como estratégicas y a largo plazo que pueden abarcar varias etapas en los procesos de RC, no solo la etapa inicial.
Cette étude introduit un nouveau concept théorique, la « Fausse volonté », pour combler une lacune des théories de résolution des conflits. Les théories existantes se concentrent principalement sur les cas réussis et sur les phases d'ouverture de résolution des conflits et suggèrent des conditions et variables pour déterminer si un conflit est suffisamment « mûr » ou « prêt » à être résolu. L'hypothèse dominante est que si les parties prenantes décident d'entrer en négociations, elles doivent avoir « franchi le Rubicon » et souhaiter parvenir à un accord. Cela n'est pas toujours le cas dans les conflits prolongés dans lesquels les parties entrent en négociations pour des raisons autres que l'atteinte de la paix. Les théories de résolution des conflits existantes n'abordent pas ce phénomène de manière adéquate. Les théories de la négociation explorent les intentions malhonnêtes mais les décrivent comme étant des effets secondaires tactiques de courte durée. Elles proposent également de nombreux concepts confus qui se chevauchent qui ont été clarifiés, classés et modifiés aux fins de cette étude. L'objectif principal de ce travail n'est pas de créer une théorie entièrement nouvelle, mais plutôt d'ajouter une nouvelle couche théorique à la théorie de la volonté de la résolution des conflits qui permettrait d’étudier les échecs de résolution des conflits prolongés. Cette couche repose sur l'intégration de la théorie de la volonté à des concepts issus de la théorie de la négociation qui permet d'explorer les conditions dans lesquelles des parties négocient sans intention de parvenir à un accord. La théorie de la Fausse volonté aborde les intentions douteuses comme étant stratégiques, à long terme et capables de s’étendre sur plusieurs phases de la résolution du conflit, et non uniquement sur la phase d'ouverture.
Introduction
The field of conflict resolution (CR) is constantly expanding in both scope and depth. Scholars are attempting to identify the conditions required to secure successful processes as well as reasons for failed cases (Kriesberg 2009; Zartman 2009; Faure and Cede 2012; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2016; Schiff 2020). Protracted conflicts are the most dangerous because occasionally they flare up and cause much damage in lives and infrastructure. They are also the most difficult to resolve because parties cling to zero-sum perceptions of contentious issues and believe that their conflicting objectives are irreconcilable (Coleman 2006; Bar-Tal 2013; Mitchell 2014; Zartman 2019).
Protracted conflicts are long-enduring conflicts that resist resolution. They occur between states (interstate conflicts), such as India versus Pakistan, North Korea against South Korea, and Palestine versus Israel; and within states (intrastate conflicts), such as Cyprus versus the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, the Sahrawi and the Polisario against Morocco in Western Sahara, or the Tamils against the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. Since 1816, protracted conflicts have led to about half of interstate wars (Azar 1990; Coleman 2006; Kriesberg 2010; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2018).
The prevailing assumption of existing CR theories is that conflict resolution is possible only if a conflict is “ripe” or “ready” for resolution. The critical step is a decision by both sides to open negotiations. In protracted conflicts, it frequently means “crossing the Rubicon.” Therefore, CR theories have focused mainly on the pre-negotiation phase where parties ponder advantages and shortcomings of entering negotiations and decide accordingly. CR theories have examined conditions and variables that influence this decision. In several protracted conflicts, however, parties have begun negotiations and seemed to have “crossed the Rubicon,” but after many years and numerous rounds still failed to conclude a peace agreement. This study attempts to discover what accounts for this predicament and how CR theories addressed it.
Negotiations to resolve international conflicts go through four stages: opening, advancing, reaching, and implementing agreements (Gilboa 2009a, 2009b). The focus on the first stage may miss developments in the other stages. It could also place the initial decision to begin negotiations in a different perspective in cases where at least one party uses negotiations for reasons other than resolution. Two theories, “ripeness” and “readiness,” have dominated the field. The first maintains that parties will begin negotiations only when the conflict is ripe for resolution and certain threats and opportunities are present. The second argues that parties will begin negotiations only when they are ready and continue to seek an agreement if they are capable of building a large domestic coalition for peace. The two theories are based mostly on successful CR cases. This study acknowledged the utility of these theories yet added a theoretical layer that could conceptualize and explain certain failed CR processes. The layer, “false readiness” (FR), combined, integrated, and sharpened components from “readiness theory” of CR and concepts from negotiation theory that explored conditions where parties negotiate without any intention to achieve agreement.
FR suggests that from the outset at least one party in certain protracted conflicts employs negotiations not to reach resolution, but rather as a strategy to continue the conflict from improved positions until its final strategic goals are achieved. CR and negotiation theories allow cases where parties begin negotiation for reasons other than resolution, but the focus is on side effects, short duration, and tactical gains. FR focuses on cases where parties deliberately and intentionally exploit negotiations as a long-term strategic tool. It aids in understanding additional stages of the negotiation process, aside from the opening one. It is multidisciplinary and incorporates theoretical knowledge from political science and international relations, and theories and models from other disciplines, including management, business, decision-making, and labor relations. It attempts to fill a lacuna in current CR theories by adding a layer to readiness theory that addresses, analyzes, and explains failures to resolve conflicts from the opening phase through subsequent stages. It provides a different interpretation of interim agreements, which in CR theories are generally viewed as steps toward peace, but in FR are conceptualized as deceptive measures designed to maximize strategic gains.
The article includes four sections. The first explains successful CR and describes the principles of the ripeness and readiness theories. The second explains failed negotiations and presents concepts from negotiation theories and models, including “side effects,” “hard avoidance bargaining,” “false negotiation,” “insincere negotiations,” “insincere bargaining,” and “spoilers.” The next section offers a critical analysis of both CR and negotiation theories. It demonstrates gaps in and between the two and exposes both strengths and weaknesses. The final section presents and discusses the principles and advantages of the FR theory.
CR Theories: Explaining Successful Negotiations
Zartman (2000) argued that two variables might explain successful CR: “substance” and “timing.” Substance means the willingness and ability of disputants to reconcile differences and reach an agreement acceptable to both. Timing means that parties can resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so. At that point, they grab on to proposals that may have been available for a long time and now appear feasible. The two variables represent two different scholarly approaches to CR: the “substance” school focuses almost exclusively on finding the right solution, regardless of the right moment, whereas the “timing” school claims that substantive proposals are fruitful only when the moment is ripe (Sandole et al. 2008; Bercovitch and Jackson 2009; Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, and Zartman 2009; Deutsch, Coleman, and Marcus 2011).
Ripeness
Zartman (1998) focused on timing and developed the ripeness theory. Disputants will move toward an agreed-upon negotiated solution when the alternative is blocked or more costly, or when the negotiated solution is perceived as more promising and relatively cheaper. Ripeness is a necessary but insufficient condition for opening negotiations, either bilaterally or through mediators (Zartman 1983, 1986, 1989, 1995, 2000; Kriesberg and Thorson 1991; Druckman and Green 1995; Kleiboer and ’t Hart 1995; Goodby 1996; Kleiboer 1997).
Zartman used ripeness as a metaphor for two necessary but insufficient conditions for starting negotiations: threats and opportunities.
Mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) represents a threat. Both sides feel that they are at a dead end (“It can't go on like this”), suffer considerable damage from the conflict, and cannot exacerbate the tension because it is not feasible or a good option. MHS is a push factor. Parties feel that if they do not change course, their situation will only get worse. The situation should be painful for both sides, but not necessarily equally. An impasse would be a more significant catalyst, if accompanied by a recent or impending catastrophe (Stein 1989). The basic reasoning behind MHS lies in cost–benefit rational calculation. When parties to a conflict find themselves on a pain-producing path, they are more likely to look for a better alternative.
Mutually perceived way out (WO) represents an opportunity. The sides believe that a negotiated solution is possible and can be just and satisfying for both. This is a pull factor. The solution does not have to appear at the beginning of the decision-making process, only the possibility of searching for it. Each side believes that the other wants to end the conflict and is willing and able to make the necessary concessions.
Zartman (1986) called a conflict moving toward resolution a “ripening conflict.” The movement is not linear and goes through “ripe moments”—windows of opportunity—that parties or mediators can identify and exploit to advance a solution. External actors can create ripe moments by persuading the parties to compare the painful present with a better future. Without such interference from the outside, ripe moments may be delayed.
Originally, ripeness was intended to analyze only decisions to open negotiations, not the follow-up steps. Recognizing this limitation, Zartman (2000, 2008) added a component, mutually enticing opportunity (MEO), to explain the conditions required to move forward from the first opening stage. MEO assists parties in discerning whether resolution can meet their interests better than the status quo (Zartman 2008, 236). MEO includes a common understanding of the conflict, a possible solution, a common sense of justice, and a set of trade terms.
MEO could extend the WO condition from the opening stage to the next one, but to do so it must assume a more central role. The MHS's push factor is more important in stage 1, while the MEO's pull factor is more critical for stage 2. MHS can begin the process but cannot by itself provide enough momentum to continue negotiations. Several studies have tested and validated ripeness in both international (Haass 1990) and domestic conflicts such as those in the Middle East (Touval 1982), Zimbabwe (Stedman 1991), the Philippines (Druckman and Green 1995), Uganda (Taisier and Matthews 1999), Eritrea (Ottaway 1995), South Africa (Sisk 1995), Cyprus (Hampson 1996), East Timor (Salla 1997), and Nagorno-Karabakh (Mooradian and Druckman 1999).
Readiness
Pruitt (1997, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2015a) added a theoretical layer, “readiness,” to Zartman's ripeness theory. Unlike Zartman, he suggested variables rather than conditions. Ripeness described the “ripe” moment as a black box and evaluated it in a binary mode: either it exists or it does not. Readiness opened the black box and described its contents in more detail. Using variables instead of conditions enables researchers to track and compare changes in negotiations over time, within and between cases (Schiff 2014, 2020; Pruitt 2015b). Pruitt created a spectrum whereby an actor can be “more ready” or “less ready.” Readiness also “allows construction of a compensatory model in which more of one variable can compensate for less of another” (Pruitt 2015a, 126). Unlike ripeness, which investigates reciprocal exchanges between the sides, readiness focuses separately on the psychological condition of each side.
According to Pruitt, parties would begin negotiations only if they reach a certain level of readiness. The higher the level, the greater the chances for starting negotiations. Two psychological variables determine the willingness of a party to negotiate: “motivation” to end the conflict and “optimism” about the outcome. Pruitt described readiness as an elaboration on Zartman's ripeness theory and replaced MHS with “motivation” and WO with “optimism.” He noted that his aim was “not to go off in a new direction but to make further progress in the original direction” (Pruitt 2005a, 31).
Motivation to end a conflict may stem from an internal sense that the conflict is unmanageable, or may be inspired by third parties. An internal sense can emerge from three sources: a feeling that the conflict cannot be won, mounting political and economic costs, and negative forecast of aggravation in the future. Optimism refers to a feeling that it is possible to reach an agreement acceptable to both sides. A certain degree of optimism is needed to begin negotiations, but a higher level is essential to move negotiations into the next stages. Optimism can stem from a sense that the other side wants to end the conflict and a belief in finding a formula capable of bridging gaps and producing agreement. Optimism also depends on a commitment to peace of the other side. Figure 1 describes the variables and the connections among them leading to commence negotiations.
Pruitt (1997) explained that ripeness and readiness are related, and readiness is needed to explain more historical cases, generate more accurate research tools, and investigate other stages of negotiations, not only the initial phase. Both motivation and optimism are necessary but insufficient variables and must be present for any process leading to negotiations. Reaching an agreement requires readiness on both sides. If one side is not ready, moving the negotiation forward, let alone reaching an agreement, will not be possible (Pruitt 1997).
Pruitt (2005a, 2005b) acknowledged that readiness could be extended to the stages following the opening one, but the parties’ chance to reach an agreement is greater if their readiness persists and increases. At this point, he added a political component, central coalition theory (CCT), for analysis of stages 2 and 3. He constructed a political spectrum for each side stretching from hawks through moderates to doves (Pruitt 2007, 1532). All the political groups within each side occupy a relative place along this spectrum—and the larger the group, the stronger its influence. Hawks adopt tougher goals and are less open to concessions. They are often well organized and may even be well armed, and therefore appear more powerful than their numbers may suggest. Doves on either side share similar perspectives and may contact each other and even collaborate.
Participants in negotiations typically include moderates and doves on each side who may form a central coalition zone. Central coalitions vary in size from very broad, including doves, moderates, and most hawks, to very narrow, including only doves and some moderates (Pruitt 2007, 1533). If hawks on either side of the conflict are armed, the moderate central coalition on that given side would be broad, otherwise armed attacks and retaliations are likely to destroy the peace process (Pruitt 2007, 1534).
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of a broad versus narrow central coalition. The horizontal axis is the political spectrum, and the vertical axis is the level of readiness shown by members on the spectrum. The dotted horizontal line represents a threshold above which readiness is sufficient to produce conciliatory actions such as entering negotiation or making concessions. The groups above the threshold are considered members of the central coalition. A broad central coalition has a good chance of starting negotiation and producing agreement. A narrow central coalition may produce agreement, but it will not be binding on the rest of the groups and hence be less effective.
CCT does not assume that the disputants agree on all issues, only that they are willing to engage in a common task of seeking an agreement. If all the groups supported an agreement, it meant that the coalition persisted and got even stronger during the negotiation. If the groups failed to support an agreement, it meant that the extremists on both sides derailed the process. Pruitt argued that negotiators are successful when large enough coalitions on both sides support resolution, and they fail when the coalitions are too narrow.
Negotiation Theories: Explaining Failed Negotiations
Ripeness and readiness theorize that negotiations can begin only when certain necessary conditions are met. Both were based on careful analysis of successful negotiation processes. They assume that if actors enter negotiations, they probably wish to reach resolution and might be ready to make the concessions needed to produce an agreement (Held 1995; Clark 2001; Duffield 2001; Ikenberry 2001; Paris 2004; Richmond 2005). This assumption limits the explanatory power of ripeness and readiness. In several protracted conflicts, negotiations had begun several times, continued for decades, and still did not produce an agreement. Negotiation theories may ameliorate these theoretical gaps in CR theories.
The typical purpose of negotiation is to “explore options and, if possible, reach an agreement beneficial to all parties” (Glozman, Barak-Corren, and Yaniv 2014, 672). This axiom appeared in many definitions and studies of negotiations (Raiffa 1982; Lax and Sebenius 1986; Mnookin 1993; Susskind, McKearnan, and Thomas-Larmer 1999; Raiffa, Richardson, and Metcalfe 2002). Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991, xvii) defined negotiations as “back and forth communication designed to reach an agreement,” and Carnevale and Lawler (1986, 636) stated that “negotiation is a form of symbolic communication that involves two or more people attempting to reach an agreement on issues where there are perceived differences of interest.” Rubin and Brown (1975, 2) also defined negotiations as “the process by which two or more parties attempt to settle what each shall give and take.”
While most CR scholars have adopted this approach, several disagreed. Zartman (2000) noted, albeit only briefly, that sometimes negotiations do occur even in the absence of ripeness or with no intention of at least one side to reach an agreement. However, he considered these cases as “a tactical interlude, a breather for rest and rearmament, a sop to external pressure, without any intent of opening a sincere search for a joint outcome” (p. 227). It is difficult, Zartman admitted, to determine at the beginning whether parties are indeed sincere or deceptive. However, he did not theoretically conceptualize this tactical scenario nor incorporate it into his ripeness theory.
Richmond (2006) elaborated on this scenario and argued that disputants do not necessarily view a compromise solution as the optimal rational outcome. Parties may continue to negotiate due to resources or benefits the process may generate, even though they do not share the outcome the “international community” or a third party visualizes. In these cases, “the peace process can become a continuation of the conflict by other means” (p. 60). Furthermore, “the establishment of a peace process”—i.e., opening negotiations—“does not necessarily mean the end of violence, nor that disputants have fully accepted a mediated compromise around a negotiating table” (p. 61). Negotiations, therefore, could be seen as “a temporary pause in the war,” which “may provide time to rearm, alter the balance of power by building new alliances, and boost domestic as well as international support for the preparation for the use of force” (Aggestam 2012, 326). This approach also focuses on tactical short-term goals.
The scenario of parties engaged from the outset in negotiations for reasons other than agreement is different from CR processes envisaged by ripeness and readiness theories, and therefore warrants a detailed analysis. Negotiation experts from several disciplines coined terms and analyzed several non-agreement theories including “side effects,” “soft and hard avoidance bargaining,” “duplicitous negotiators,” “devious objectives,” “insincere bargaining,” “insincere negotiations,” and “false negotiation.” None of them has been systematically incorporated into CR theory.
Side Effects
Iklé (1964, 43–58) was probably the first scholar to discuss motivations other than reaching an agreement. In his classical treatise on international negotiations, he identified six tactical purposes and called them “side effects.” They include maintaining contact, either to provide a forum for exchanges on issues other than the central topics of the conflict or to provide a channel for emergency communications and crisis management. Second, assuaging an enemy to prevent him from an undesirable action. Third, gathering intelligence about an opponent, such as its long-term strategic goals, disagreements with allies, red lines, internal disagreements, and resources. Fourth, deceiving an enemy while preparing a military offensive. Fifth, conducting propaganda to publicize official views and policy goals, to enhance political standing by attending international conferences, or not to lose the goodwill of important groups domestically or internationally. Sixth, improving the bargaining position with third parties. Iklé explained that the initial adoption of these six side effects does not preclude negotiation toward agreements, as both could occur simultaneously.
Agreement Avoidance
Scholars developed theories and concepts in several social sciences to describe false intentions. Coming from labor studies, Wallihan (1998) distinguished between “soft and hard avoidance bargaining.” The soft “occurs when the negotiator's main objective is something other than agreement, but agreement is not ruled out absolutely” (p. 261). In talks with the United States in 1998, India promised to refrain from nuclear testing, but this was a smoke screen intended to buy time for completing the preparations for the testing. Hard avoidance bargaining is “the use of negotiation for the purpose of avoiding agreement” (Wallihan 1998, 257). This type “appears when a party prefers the status-quo or some other non-negotiation alternative to any possible gains from negotiation” (p. 259). The would-be avoider enters negotiation because of an external calculation. A prosecutor may think that a well-publicized jury trial will enhance his campaign for the mayor's office, and therefore heads off any request for a plea bargain (pp. 258–59). In contrast to side effects and soft avoidance bargaining, this behavior could explain the failure of CR processes. If a party is determined to avoid agreement, then no agreement will be reached, even unintentionally.
Emanating from business and management studies, Anand, Feldman, and Schweitzer (2009) used the term “duplicitous” or “instrumental negotiators” for parties who “use the negotiation process to achieve an outcome very different from reaching an agreement” (p. 2), for example, a technology company that enters merger or acquisition negotiations with a competitor only to obtain technological secrets. Coming from the field of mediation, Richmond (2006, 59) coined the term “devious objectives” to describe purposes such as winning legitimacy, recognition, and credibility, forming alliances, and saving time to regroup. He gave the example of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who exploited a peace process only to advance their national objectives rather than accepting compromises proposed by the United Nations (UN). Coming from management and economics, Kang et al. (2020) added the term “insincere negotiations” to describe “negotiations in which a negotiator has non-agreement goals” (p. 2), such as gathering information, stalling for time, blocking a competitor, or managing impressions.
Coming from decision-making and rationality studies, Glozman, Barak-Corren, and Yaniv (2014, 2) introduced the term “false negotiation” to define negotiation intended exclusively for tactical manipulation. A false negotiator would be a candidate for a job in two places, negotiating the terms of a position with one employer purely to improve the terms offered by the other employer. This concept, however, cannot explain negotiation breakdowns since it does not rule out the option of reaching an agreement unintentionally. The job seeker may receive and accept an outstanding offer from the second employer, whom he planned to use only to pressure the first. Theoretically, this unusual turn of events could happen in international negotiations only if one side accepts all or most of the demands of the other side. Coming from the field of mediation, Danneman and Beardsley (2020) introduced the term “insincere bargaining,” which means bargaining “in order to gain power and then return to conflict, with no intention of settling” (p. 190).
Table 1 classifies and summarizes the concepts developed in various disciplines to analyze negotiations for reasons other than reaching an agreement. They are organized by purpose and feasibility of reaching an agreement. The table suggests three categories: side effects, false negotiation, and hard avoidance bargaining. Soft avoidance bargaining, instrumental negotiations, devious objectives, and insincere negotiations are very similar and could come under the umbrella concept of side effects. Insincere bargaining is akin to the concept of false negotiation.
Concept . | Purpose . | Feasibility . | Similar concepts . |
---|---|---|---|
Side effects (Iklé 1964) | Reap benefits | Does not exclude reaching an agreement (possible) | 1. Soft avoidance bargaining (Wallihan 1998) |
2. Duplicitous/instrumental negotiator (Anand, Feldman, and Schweitzer 2009) | |||
3. Devious objectives (Richmond 2006) | |||
4. Insincere negotiation (Kang et al. 2020) | |||
Hard avoidance bargaining (Wallihan 1998) | Avoid agreement | Reaching an agreement impossible | – |
False negotiation (Glozman, Barak-Corren, and Yaniv 2014) | Reap benefits | Excludes reaching an agreement (possible unintentionally) | Insincere bargaining (Danneman and Beardsley 2020) |
Concept . | Purpose . | Feasibility . | Similar concepts . |
---|---|---|---|
Side effects (Iklé 1964) | Reap benefits | Does not exclude reaching an agreement (possible) | 1. Soft avoidance bargaining (Wallihan 1998) |
2. Duplicitous/instrumental negotiator (Anand, Feldman, and Schweitzer 2009) | |||
3. Devious objectives (Richmond 2006) | |||
4. Insincere negotiation (Kang et al. 2020) | |||
Hard avoidance bargaining (Wallihan 1998) | Avoid agreement | Reaching an agreement impossible | – |
False negotiation (Glozman, Barak-Corren, and Yaniv 2014) | Reap benefits | Excludes reaching an agreement (possible unintentionally) | Insincere bargaining (Danneman and Beardsley 2020) |
Concept . | Purpose . | Feasibility . | Similar concepts . |
---|---|---|---|
Side effects (Iklé 1964) | Reap benefits | Does not exclude reaching an agreement (possible) | 1. Soft avoidance bargaining (Wallihan 1998) |
2. Duplicitous/instrumental negotiator (Anand, Feldman, and Schweitzer 2009) | |||
3. Devious objectives (Richmond 2006) | |||
4. Insincere negotiation (Kang et al. 2020) | |||
Hard avoidance bargaining (Wallihan 1998) | Avoid agreement | Reaching an agreement impossible | – |
False negotiation (Glozman, Barak-Corren, and Yaniv 2014) | Reap benefits | Excludes reaching an agreement (possible unintentionally) | Insincere bargaining (Danneman and Beardsley 2020) |
Concept . | Purpose . | Feasibility . | Similar concepts . |
---|---|---|---|
Side effects (Iklé 1964) | Reap benefits | Does not exclude reaching an agreement (possible) | 1. Soft avoidance bargaining (Wallihan 1998) |
2. Duplicitous/instrumental negotiator (Anand, Feldman, and Schweitzer 2009) | |||
3. Devious objectives (Richmond 2006) | |||
4. Insincere negotiation (Kang et al. 2020) | |||
Hard avoidance bargaining (Wallihan 1998) | Avoid agreement | Reaching an agreement impossible | – |
False negotiation (Glozman, Barak-Corren, and Yaniv 2014) | Reap benefits | Excludes reaching an agreement (possible unintentionally) | Insincere bargaining (Danneman and Beardsley 2020) |
Implementation: Spoilers
The last stage in negotiations is implementation of agreements and it could be as complicated as the opening phase. Even when an agreement is achieved, there could be forces that seek to undermine or even prevent its implementation. Stedman (1997, 1999) coined the term “spoiler” to analyze impediments to implementation of peace agreements in civil wars in places such as Rwanda and Angola. Peace agreements reached to end these wars spawned powerful enemies who felt excluded from the negotiations and consequently threatened to prevent implementation. Stedman focused on these “enemies of peace,” whom he called spoilers. They were “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman 1997, 5).
Stedman (1999) distinguished between “enemies of peace” and parties “committed to peace” and asserted that “the most frequent threat to peace implementation is the presence of Spoilers who use stealth or violence to undermine peace” (p. 18). Spoilers “exist only when there is a peace process to undermine,” and only after the parties had committed themselves publicly to a pact or had signed a peace agreement (Stedman 1997, 7). Stedman developed a typology of spoilers to better understand who they are and how they operate. They differ by position (inside or outside of an agreement), number, type (limited, greedy, or total), and locus (leaders, followers, or both).
While originally developed to explain failures to implement agreements, CR scholars mentioned the concept in general or in relation to stages other than implementation. In one of his later attempts to predict successful CR processes, Zartman (2008) fleetingly referred to factors obstructing settlement: “parties, government or rebellion, that demand total power are most likely playing a spoiler role and are not open to compromise” (p. 240). In this case, as well, he did not develop the theoretical dimension of the concept and did not incorporate it into his ripeness theory.
Richmond (2006) observed that when devious objectives are present in negotiations, “it is quite possible that spoiling behavior will emerge” (p. 72), which he defined as “activities designed to undermine any existing negotiating process, and possibly to prevent any future accommodation by any party” (p. 59). Aggestam (2012) used the term spoilers to describe disputants’ behavior during negotiations, before reaching an agreement or implementing it. Golan and Sher (2019) applied the concept albeit in a loose fashion to Israeli–Palestinian negotiations after the signing of the initial Oslo Accords. Stedman's original conceptualization of spoilers has been limited to the implementation stage of agreements to end civil wars. It could be useful for research on the implementation stage of agreements to end conflicts. However, so far, all the applications of this theory to CR have been rudimentary, unsystematic, and often confusing.
Theoretical Lacuna
The main purpose of this article was to discover how CR and negotiation theories tackle protracted conflicts, which year after year continue round after round of negotiations but inevitably fail to reach agreements. The results show too many overlapping and sometimes confusing concepts, developed distinctly across various disciplines. Zartman's and Pruitt's pioneering theories of ripeness and readiness significantly contributed to the study of CR. They focused, however, mostly on the critical decision to open negotiations.
Ripeness for Zartman meant primarily a decision to “cross the Rubicon.” Parties decide to enter negotiations after undertaking a genuine evaluation of the conflict, leading them to replace their combative approach with negotiation and peacemaking. This process seemed especially relevant to parties who entered negotiations after decades of declaring and vowing never to recognize each other and never to negotiate, such as the actors in the Northern Ireland and the Palestinian–Israeli conflicts. Zartman did mention the possibility of parties entering negotiations despite the absence of ripeness and pointed to obstacles, which he called “false events.” However, he did not develop and integrate these scenarios into his theory. Pruitt drew his theory from what he perceived at the time (1990s) as successful CR processes: The Good Friday peace process in Northern Ireland and the Israeli–Palestinian Oslo Accords. While the Northern Ireland conflict did reach resolution, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict did not. In the latter case, readiness did not provide a convincing explanation for the failure.
Zartman and Pruitt created a paradigmatic format for CR research that viewed the first stage as a decisive one for a peace process. In many intractable conflicts, however, the crossing of the Rubicon did not lead to resolution. In historical perspective, a decision to enter negotiations seemed much less groundbreaking than ripeness and readiness anticipated. This reluctance to yield to the paradigmatic promise hidden in the process calls for further investigation. Critics of CR and negotiation theories have noticed this lack of attention to negotiations for purposes other than reaching agreements. Wallihan (1998) observed that “references in the negotiation literature to Avoidance Bargaining are typically brief, sometimes merely parenthetical” (pp. 258–66). He also argued, “Many discussions of Ripeness should address avoidance negotiation, at least as a related category and as a possible explanation of certain stalled negotiations.” Anand, Feldman, and Schweitzer (2009) noted that almost without exception existing research has assumed that negotiation takes place between parties who wish to and have interest in reaching an agreement (agreement-seeking environment). A significant lacuna emerges regarding cases where at least one of the parties or possibly both have the opposite motivation (non-agreement-seeking environment). Further study of this environment could potentially be promising for research of stalled negotiations.
Spoiler theory greatly contributed to the understanding of stalled and failed negotiations, but it “has been used by scholars in different ways,” and was “undoubtedly fuzzy” (Haklai 2014, 72). The theory “has been stretched beyond its original meaning and given rise to a number of ambiguities concerning its definition and empirical applicability,” up to a point where it risked “undermining the usefulness of the concept itself” (Nilsson and Kovacs 2011, 606). It also suffered from a few specific limitations. It was applied mostly to the ending of civil conflicts and wars, and much less so to international conflicts. It was well developed for research on the implementation stage but remained undeveloped for the earlier stages. The theory assumed that there was something to spoil, that at least at some stage—presumably, at the beginning—the decision to enter negotiations was genuine and contained at least some readiness to reach an agreed compromise. If spoilers failed to achieve their destructive goals, negotiations had at least a chance to succeed. This might not always be the case as sometimes at least one side is unwilling to reach agreement no matter what. Then, the question of why that party entered negotiation in the first place becomes even more acute.
This study revealed disciplinary gaps in research of intractable conflicts. The fact that these conflicts remained unresolved for a long period might indicate that earlier and existing understanding of the parties’ inner logic, interests, and behavior was lacking. In these cases, learning and applying lessons from successful cases seem incomplete. Furthermore, existing theories and concepts explain only certain stages and parts of negotiation processes, and currently, there is no theoretical framework that gives sufficient consideration to each of them. A more effective approach that combines theories from different disciplines could help close the gaps.
False Readiness
Given the limitations and deficiencies of existing CR and negotiation theories, this work adds a complementary theoretical layer to Pruitt's readiness theory. It uses the same variables but combines and integrates them with ideas from negotiation theory. The new layer, FR, is designed to facilitate research on protracted conflicts where the parties agree to open negotiations, conduct rounds for years and even decades, but fail to reach agreements. The assumption undergirding the new layer is that one or both sides adopt from the outset a long-term strategy of employing negotiations for long-term strategic interests other than peace. It is different from current negotiation theory concepts, which only describe tactical, short-term behavior. In FR cases, the opening stage conceals the true motivation of at least one side. FR might be able to explain certain failed negotiations, even if not all of them.
There are, or theoretically could be, conflicts where for ideological reasons at least one of the parties cannot accept the mere existence or identity of the other side. This party's ultimate goal is to annihilate the other side physically or ideologically. In this party's eyes, the conflict is not about gaining a piece of territory, independence, or economic benefits. It is about existence and national identity, and thus fundamentally irreconcilable. When a party in these types of conflict is unable to achieve its goal through hard power (force, sanctions, or siege), it decides to enter negotiations hoping and expecting to gain significant strategic advantages. These negotiations are not designed to reach an eventual peace or achieve short-term side effects. They seek to perpetuate the conflict from an improved strategic position. Such a change from hard power to negotiations could occur due to a major decline in the party's strategic position. This type of long-term strategic behavior lies at the core of FR.
FR integrates readiness from CR theory and expanded and revised concepts from negotiation theory. It supplements and extends readiness to some protracted conflicts and the entire sequence of negotiation processes. While readiness was developed to explain successful CR, FR was designed to explain stalled and failed processes. Readiness and FR are two sides of the same coin but indistinguishable at the beginning of the CR process. Following Pruitt's work, FR also includes two main variables, motivation and optimism, which in this case explain why and when a party might enter negotiation only to gain strategic advantages.
Motivation: In the FR scenario, the principal motivation is to gain a better strategic position for a more effective battle against the adversary. In the opening stage, it looks like readiness, but this is only a false impression. The FR actor views negotiation as another sophisticated phase in warfare, not as a step toward CR. A party may conclude that violence to overpower the enemy is less desirable or impossible, and a strategy of deception can yield better results. This main motivation does not preclude the existence of other motivations mentioned by Pruitt, such as pressure from third parties to pursue diplomacy. This can certainly occur simultaneously. However, unlike the equivalent factor in ripeness, there is no “crossing the Rubicon” effect in the decision to open negotiations. There is no sense of “it cannot go on like this anymore.” The actor does not undergo a transformational process culminating in a desire to end the conflict, and at no stage of the process exhibits a sincere attempt—even minimal—to resolve the conflict. On the contrary, the negotiation represents a calculated attempt to obtain significant strategic benefits, strictly in order to continue the battle.
In this scenario, the driving force is not a breakaway faction or a group that was excluded from negotiations, as the spoiler theory suggests. The party employing this strategy is a government or an organization professing moderation or pragmatism. Zartman noted that a decision to enter negotiations might be influenced by a sense of an impending catastrophe. Losing allies, especially a superpower or a regional power, or a dramatic re-alignment of forces, could also push an FR party toward negotiation.
Optimism: In FR, an actor believes in his ability to extract strategic gains through deceptive negotiations. These may include territorial gains if the dispute has geographical components, international legitimacy and recognition if the actor lacks them, and long-term financial support. All these gains might occur in any negotiations, but in FR, they are strategically sought for an eventual victory. One clear indication of FR is the refusal to make any significant compromises and systematic and constant rejection of peace proposals made by the other side or a mediator.
Figure 3 describes the FR theorizing of the decision to open negotiation in terms of Pruitt's readiness theory, with necessary adjustments (see figure 1). Like in readiness, the internal factor is the inability to win the conflict by force. The external factors include pressure from third parties to end the conflict by diplomacy and a sharp decline in the actor's strategic position. Both factors generate motivation to improve the strategic position without abandoning the final goal. Optimism in FR means an actor's conviction that gains can be made, and that the adversary and mediators would not detect the disputant's real intentions and goals.
The existence of aggressive parties not interested in ending a conflict is not theoretical. There are historical examples of states, political organizations, and movements, whose only vision of an end-of-conflict situation was the extinction of the other side's independent existence. Nazi Germany and the West German Red Army Faction (Baader–Meinhof Group) are remote examples. The twenty-first century saw terror organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, for whom no compromise with the West was possible. These actors were in many ways motivated by a Manichean worldview, which could not allow any option for accommodation with their adversaries. Scholars argued that Greek Cypriots acted in the same way, since they could not accept the fundamental refusal of Turkish Cypriots to be a minority under Greek rule (Richmond 1998). Others identified similar zero-sum characteristics in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict (Kelman 2001, 2007; Gelvin 2005; Bar-Tal and Salomon 2006). The Iranian regime's view of the United States and the West also resembled a zero-sum game, which impeded CR (Sebenius and Singh 2013).
FR is different from a lack of “zone of possible agreement (ZOPA).” This concept refers to a bargaining model in which “the buyer is willing to pay at least as much as the seller would accept as a minimum” (Ahlert and Strater 2016, 302; see also Raiffa 1982; Raiffa, Richardson, and Metcalfe 2002). In international negotiations, the absence of ZOPA means that the maximum concessions one side is prepared to make do not meet the minimum demands of the other side. The search for ZOPA can end either successfully or not, but FR is about ex ante not wanting to reach an agreement. Lack of ZOPA can be the result of a sincere attempt that failed, whereas FR actors reject any agreement and during negotiations often knowingly make demands that the other side cannot accept. FR describes the condition and behavior of a disputant, and therefore can apply to both civil wars and interstate conflicts. The relevant political actor is a government or an organization conducting negotiations (in intrastate conflicts). FR applies to all conflicts, whether or not they reach the threshold of war.
FR is not a tactical posture but part of the disputant's core identity. FR actors employ cost–benefit analysis in which ending a conflict might “cost” more than any other option. Genuine CR would be tantamount to betraying their identity. These actors cherish their ideology, ethos, and self-image, above any other value, including peace. Their self-perception as “warriors,” “saviors,” “liberators,” or “martyrs” carries far more weight than the physical damage that the conflict inflicts on them. CR puts their identity at stake and requires a radical change in identity. This is why the allies in the Second World War were prepared only to negotiate an end to Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Fascist Italy.
FR actors enter negotiations for several reasons. The first is akin to the “hurting stalemate” factor in the ripeness theory; the actor experiences a sharp deterioration in strategic position and has no other alternative to stop or slow it. Second, the FR actor seeks strategic assets such as territory, domestic support, international legitimacy, or economic aid. These assets may vary according to specific characteristics of protracted conflicts. Third, the FR actor could be hoping that the other side will cave in or that the negotiating process will take on a life of its own and lead to the ultimate desirable outcome. The Greek Cypriot behavior in the negotiations with Turkish Cypriots could serve as an example. The disputants’ positions were irreconcilable from the beginning (Richmond 1998; Schiff 2008). Turkish Cypriots demanded self-rule within a federation or a confederation, while Greek Cypriots viewed the entire island as Greek, and the Turkish population as a minority group.
Without ever intending to compromise, and without being “ready” for resolution, Greek Cypriots initially entered into negotiations due to the serious deterioration in their strategic position caused by the massive human and economic devastation of the Turkish occupation. Later, they were worried that the occupation would become permanent, and the negotiations were designed to convince adversaries and mediators that Greek Cypriots would not accept any division of the island into two states. They sought international diplomatic support for their position and could not afford to reject UN mediation efforts. They also wanted to join the European Union (EU), which initially had refused to admit a divided country into its ranks.
FR adds another theoretical layer and an alternative explanation of the forces inspiring parties to protracted conflicts to enter negotiations. It is about feigning a move toward resolution and even going so far as to sign interim agreements—which can yield certain benefits such as territory—without giving up on core positions. FR offers a different interpretation of interim agreements. Usually, these agreements have two purposes: providing disputants the time needed to adjust mentally and physically to the notion of peaceful coexistence with their former enemies and building trust and confidence toward final resolution by verifying adherence to commitments and obligations. For FR actors, however, interim agreements are used to gain strategic advantages and better prepare the ground for a future confrontation.
FR requires an element of diplomatic deception. If the actor's true belligerent goals would be known, the other actor would have no incentive to enter negotiations. If an FR actor were honest about its ultimate goal of continuing the conflict from a better strategic position, the other side would have no incentive to compromise. Therefore, FR actors conceal their true motivation, purport to be seeking resolution of the conflict, and act accordingly. Their goal is to create the false image of a sincere actor truly interested in agreement. They use a variety of deceptive moves including both statements of interest and commitment to peace, and actions such as meetings with representatives of the other side, participation in international peace conferences, and signing of interim agreements.
Negotiations of this type can continue as long as FR actors successfully maintain the false image of conciliatory force. The diplomatic deception can be aimed at the other side's leadership and public, mediators, and third parties, such as international and nongovernmental organizations. The behavior must be long term and strategic and cannot be temporary or sporadic, because otherwise it would be exposed. The disputants must also be optimistic about their ability to keep their pretention and deception hidden from all other actors; otherwise, their entire strategy would collapse. FR actor, if recognized and treated as such by third parties, might be forced to change direction. The opposite, of changing from real readiness to FR, is usually impossible, because FR is an identity issue.
FR raises a difficult challenge: how to distinguish between real and false negotiators. This is critically important, since any effort to conduct negotiation with at least one FR actor is futile. Recognizing false negotiators is difficult, since stalling for time, rejecting peace offers, and hard bargaining could be symptoms of both FR and genuine readiness. A genuine negotiator may employ these measures simply to get a better deal. At the opening stage, both FR and readiness actors behave in the same way, and it is almost impossible to distinguish between them. It is also difficult to recognize FR actor because the other side, eager to reach agreement, and third parties already heavily invested in mediation efforts, may lock themselves into rigid psychological frameworks, which blind them to the real motivation and behavior of the FR actor. Diplomatic deception is a long-term strategy and can be detected only in subsequent stages and after revealing stubborn consistency through years or decades. Symptoms of FR include systematic rejection of reasonable peace proposals, failing to offer counterproposals, using double-talk with domestic and foreign audiences, failing to prepare the public for concessions, and signing vague interim agreements.
Table 2 summarizes the various theories by phases. Ripeness, readiness, and side effects focus primarily on the first two phases: opening and advancing negotiations. False negotiation deals with two phases and spoilers focus exclusively on the implementation stage. FR deals with all the phases and provides a potential new way to investigate years of failures to resolve protracted conflicts. The combination of readiness and FR as suggested in this paper provides a more effective research platform to understand both success and failure in CR.
. | Phase . | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Theory . | Open negotiation . | Advance negotiation . | Agreement . | Implementation . |
Ripeness | MHS + WO | MEO | – | – |
Readiness | Motivation and optimism | Central coalition theory | – | – |
Side effects | Reap benefits | Reap more benefits | – | – |
False negotiation | Manipulation | Tactical deception | – | – |
Spoilers | – | – | – | Preventing implementation |
False readiness | Motivation and optimism | Strategic diplomatic deception | Interim agreements | False interim agreements |
. | Phase . | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Theory . | Open negotiation . | Advance negotiation . | Agreement . | Implementation . |
Ripeness | MHS + WO | MEO | – | – |
Readiness | Motivation and optimism | Central coalition theory | – | – |
Side effects | Reap benefits | Reap more benefits | – | – |
False negotiation | Manipulation | Tactical deception | – | – |
Spoilers | – | – | – | Preventing implementation |
False readiness | Motivation and optimism | Strategic diplomatic deception | Interim agreements | False interim agreements |
. | Phase . | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Theory . | Open negotiation . | Advance negotiation . | Agreement . | Implementation . |
Ripeness | MHS + WO | MEO | – | – |
Readiness | Motivation and optimism | Central coalition theory | – | – |
Side effects | Reap benefits | Reap more benefits | – | – |
False negotiation | Manipulation | Tactical deception | – | – |
Spoilers | – | – | – | Preventing implementation |
False readiness | Motivation and optimism | Strategic diplomatic deception | Interim agreements | False interim agreements |
. | Phase . | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Theory . | Open negotiation . | Advance negotiation . | Agreement . | Implementation . |
Ripeness | MHS + WO | MEO | – | – |
Readiness | Motivation and optimism | Central coalition theory | – | – |
Side effects | Reap benefits | Reap more benefits | – | – |
False negotiation | Manipulation | Tactical deception | – | – |
Spoilers | – | – | – | Preventing implementation |
False readiness | Motivation and optimism | Strategic diplomatic deception | Interim agreements | False interim agreements |
FR could produce alternative explanations for failures to resolve protracted conflicts. The Oslo peace process and the nuclear negotiations with Iran and North Korea may be cases suitable for analysis of FR actors. The Oslo process yielded a historic agreement between Israel and the PLO, and a few interim agreements, but so far failed to produce a final peace agreement. Ripeness and readiness theories viewed the Oslo 1993 initial mutual recognition agreement as an indication of the willingness of both sides to seek a mutually acceptable agreement based on the two-state solution. Scholars and practitioners, however, have challenged this assertion. A few blamed Israel for never truly accepting the idea of an independent Palestinian state, and for negotiating an interim agreement to prevent this outcome (Anziska 2018). Others blamed the Palestinians for never truly accepting the idea of an independent Jewish state, and for seeking an interim agreement only to continue the conflict from better self-ruled strategic positions in the West Bank and Gaza (Karsh 2003).
The nuclear negotiations with Iran and North Korea may represent a different version of FR. Scholars argued that during twenty-eight years of negotiations, North Korea had no intention to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure and weapons, and signed nuclear deals only to remove sanctions and preserve its nuclear capability (Klingner 2012). The architects of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) explained that it will be a step toward nuclear disarmament (Parsi 2017), but others claimed the opposite: Iran followed the North Korean example—agreed to negotiate and signed an interim deal only to remove sanctions and have a free hand to develop nuclear weapons after the deal expired (Rezaei 2017). It seems that both North Korea and Iran exhibited FR characteristics, as they both ostensibly negotiated disarmament but were seeking only to remove sanctions and be in a better strategic position to preserve their nuclear arsenals and ambitions. Systematic application of FR theory to these cases could determine whether the actors entered negotiations to resolve the conflict or to continue the conflict until achieving their strategic goals.
Conclusion
This study focused on theoretical approaches to resolution of protracted conflicts. It offered a critical survey and analysis of existing relevant theories in CR and negotiation. The CR theories of ripeness and readiness emerged from successful CR cases and focused mostly on the critical initial decision to replace confrontation with negotiation. They suggested conditions and variables both parties must meet to begin negotiations. The assumption was that “crossing the Rubicon” indicated genuine interest and commitment to peace, and if CR failed, it meant that the conflict was not “ripe” or “ready” for resolution. They did not sufficiently consider protracted conflicts where at least one side began negotiations without any intention of reaching a peace agreement.
Researchers of negotiation in various social science disciplines developed and applied theories and models, to cases where parties entered negotiation for reasons other than conflict resolution. However, there were too many disconnected terms and concepts describing similar phenomena and were therefore redundant. They dealt mostly with limited conflicts, tactical and short-term issues during one phase or another. This study suggested classifying them by purpose and feasibility and this process yielded three basic categories: side effects, hard avoidance bargaining, and false negotiation. The spoiler theory did explain CR failures, but it focused on the implementation stage and on attempts to prevent the execution of an agreement already achieved or in the process of being concluded in civil wars. This theory has not yet been sufficiently extended to the earlier negotiation stages.
The analysis of CR and negotiation theories revealed a lacuna in the approach to protracted conflicts, and this study proposed a possible remedy. Guided by Pruitt's work, the idea was to add a theoretical layer to existing theories, not to create an entirely new path. The solution was to add a component to readiness theory, which would be more suitable to investigate failures to resolve protracted conflicts. The process included three steps. The first was to modify and integrate the false negotiation theory with readiness. This step added the scenario of parties entering negotiation with no intention to reach agreement. These parties systematically deceive the other side by falsifying a desire for resolution and peace. Their real intention is to gain strategic assets in order to continue the conflict from a better position. The next step was to supplant Pruitt's variables of motivation and optimism with contents appropriate to the false CR strategy. The third step was to extend readiness to the last two negotiation stages by adding an alternative explanation of interim agreements.
The three steps led to the creation of the FR component. It extends and expands the original readiness theory, which now includes two versions: the original explores successful CR cases, motivated by a decision to seek resolution, while the new version explores failures to resolve protracted conflicts caused by a decision of at least one party to continue the conflict from a better strategic position. FR covers all the negotiation stages, explains failed negotiations from their beginning, provides an alternative explanation of the decision to open negotiations, and places interim agreements in a different negotiation sequence. If FR actors failed to achieve their strategic goals, they would most probably stop or suspend negotiations and return to violent or non-violent confrontations. This behavior may indicate whether a party was a genuine readiness actor or an FR actor in the first place.
This study suggests that there is more than one path to begin negotiations, and CR theories should address all types and cases of CR—both successful and unsuccessful. They should vigorously explore not only the starting phase but also subsequent critical stages. Ripeness and readiness have made significant theoretical contributions to research and practice in the field, but they have focused mainly on successful cases and the opening phases. They have not adequately addressed protracted conflicts that remain unresolved despite decades of negotiation rounds. They have acknowledged negotiations that may begin in the absence of ripeness or readiness but have not sufficiently developed these scenarios.
This study does not offer a completely new CR theory. It rather attempts to expand the elements in these theories that deal with motivation, phases of negotiation, and interim agreements. The FR component is designed to supplement ripeness and readiness, not to replace them. It should enable these pioneering theories to analyze protracted conflicts and negotiations to resolve them. Readiness and FR are indistinguishable in the opening phase, but it is important both theoretically and practically to identify false negotiations in the subsequent phases. When negotiations begin, FR disputants do not reveal their true intentions; on the contrary, they pretend to choose the readiness path. Failure of certain CR processes, which had started under the pretense of readiness, might in fact be the result of an FR scenario. The Palestinian–Israeli case might be a good example of such a circumstance. Ripeness and readiness viewed the Oslo peace process as a historical breakthrough destined to produce a peace agreement. It did not. FR could shed a different light on the disputants’ motivation, the opening phase, and the subsequent stages.
The investment in the study of FR could also be useful for CR practitioners because they must learn why resolution fails and how to convert unsuccessful approaches and techniques into successful ones. Moreover, great powers such as the United States and the EU, the UN, nongovernmental organizations, and even individuals have invested enormous efforts and huge resources in attempts to resolve protracted conflicts, frequently without much success. An FR scenario might require a different mediation approach that could save considerable diplomatic energy. Early identification of FR cases could help readiness actors and mediators to develop an effective strategy to promote genuine CR, and perhaps even modify the attitudes of FR actors. FR is not necessarily a constant deterministic position, and it might be open to changes. Further research of FR actors and scenarios could produce new fruitful CR and mediation strategies for protracted conflicts. Thus, understanding and coping with FR could increase the success rate of CR processes.
Pruitt explained that he created readiness to supplement ripeness with psychological concepts and analysis that could explain a greater range of historical cases, build more accurate research tools, and accumulate more knowledge about CR. The same justification applies to the creation of FR. The combination of readiness and FR could create a new research agenda and facilitate new research directions on the creation, evolution, and resolution of protracted conflicts. FR has implications for CR practices as well because at every phase or step of the negotiation process, negotiators and mediators must be confident that they are not dealing with FR actors. This study establishes the need for a new perspective on efforts to resolve protracted conflicts and suggests a tool to accomplish this task. The next step is to conduct intensive research with both readiness and FR into existing protracted conflicts, collect data and experiences, and possibly shed new light on the obstacles to resolve them.
Adi Schwartz is a PhD Presidential Candidate in the Department of Political Studies, and a Research Associate at the Center for International Communication, Bar-Ilan University. He received BA in history from Tel Aviv University and MA (with distinction) in political science and communication from Bar-Ilan University. He is co-author of The War of Return (St Martin's Press, 2020).
Eytan Gilboa (PhD Harvard) is a Professor of Political Science and International Communication and former Head of the School of Communication, Bar-Ilan University. His numerous publications include Simulation of Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Middle East (1980) and Media and Conflict (2002); articles published in the Journal of Peace Research, International Negotiation, Journal of Dispute Resolution, and Diplomacy and Statecraft; and contributions to Media and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Communication, and the Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy.
Notes
Author's note: An earlier and somewhat different version of this article was accepted for presentation at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, March 25–28, 2020, Honolulu, Hawaii.