MOPAN
2017-18 ASSESSMENTS

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)

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MOPAN
Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network

For any questions or comments, please contact:
The MOPAN Secretariat
secretariat@mopanonline.org
www.mopanonline.org

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Preface

ABOUT MOPAN

The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) comprises 18 countries[1] that share a common interest in assessing the effectiveness of the major multilateral organisations they fund. These include United Nations agencies, international financial institutions and global funds. The Network generates, collects, analyses and presents relevant and credible information on their organisational and development effectiveness. This knowledge base is intended to contribute to organisational learning within and among the organisations, their direct clients and partners, and other stakeholders. Network members use the reports for their own accountability needs and as a source of input for strategic decision-making.

MOPAN 3.0, first applied in 2015-16, is the latest operational and methodological iteration of how the Network assesses organisations. It builds on the former version, the *Common Approach*, which the Network implemented from 2009 through 2014.

In 2017-18, MOPAN assessed 14 organisations, including the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The other 13 are:
- Asian Development Bank (ADB)
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
- Global Environment Facility (GEF)
- Global Partnership for Education (GPE)
- International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
- International Organization for Migration (IOM)
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- World Food Programme (WFP)
- World Health Organization (WHO).

Operating principles
MOPAN generates assessments that are credible, fair and accurate. Credibility is ensured through an impartial, systematic and rigorous approach. MOPAN seeks an appropriate balance between coverage and depth of information from a variety of sources and through multiple streams of evidence. The Network gives priority to quality of information over quantity and uses structured tools for enquiry and analysis. An audit trail of findings ensures transparency. MOPAN applies efficient measures of assessment practice through building layers of data, with a view to limiting the burden on organisations assessed. A focus on organisational learning aims to ensure utility of the findings by multiple stakeholders.

Objectives of the MOPAN methodology
MOPAN seeks to provide a diagnostic assessment, or snapshot, of an organisation. It tells the story of an organisation's current performance. MOPAN is guided by framing questions which serve to understand the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of multilateral organisations, while also garnering a sense of the sustainability of their results. The empirical design of MOPAN is based on a theory of change.

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1. Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. MOPAN also has two observers, New Zealand and the United Arab Emirates.

The methodology's key elements include a set of five performance areas against which the assessment takes place. The first four cover strategic, operational, relationship and performance management. The fifth area englobes the organisation's contribution to development, humanitarian and normative results. These areas are captured in the MOPAN indicator framework against which performance is measured using three evidence streams – a document review, surveys, and interviews and consultations – brought together in a combined approach.

A MOPAN assessment is not an external audit of an organisation, nor is it an institutional evaluation. MOPAN does not comprehensively assess all operations or all processes of an organisation, nor can it provide a definitive picture of all the organisation's achievements and performance during the time period of the assessment. Neither does MOPAN offer comprehensive documentation or analysis of ongoing organisational reform processes.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
AAS	Assurance and Advisory Services Division
ACIO	Advisory Committee on Internal Oversight
AdCom	Advisory Commission
AOP	Annual Operational Plans
CBOs	Community-based organisations
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CG	Commissioner-General
CMM	Common Monitoring Matrix
DIOS	Department of Internal Oversight Services
EiE	Education in Emergencies
WHO/EMRO	World Health Organisation Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean
EPER	Staff performance Management System
ERCD	Department of External Relations and Communications
FPPO	Field Planning and Programming Office
GA	General Assembly
GBSV	Gender-based Sexual Violence
GBV	Gender-based violence
GEEW	Gender equality and empowerment of women
GES	Gender Equality Strategy
GFO	Gaza Field Office
GMS	Gender Mainstreaming Strategy
GSC	General Staff Circular
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human resources
HRCRT	Human Rights, Conflict Resolution and Tolerance
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICIP	Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme
IHRS	International human rights system
IIA	Institute of Internal Audit
INEE	Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies
ISA	International Standards of Auditing
JFO	Jordan Field Office
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
KPI	Key performance indicator
LFO	Lebanon Field Office
LSCE	Life skills and citizenship education
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MI	Micro-indicator
MO	Multilateral organisation
MOPAN	Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRM	Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism
MTS	Medium Term Strategy
NCD	Non-communicable diseases
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
OIC	Office of Internal Control
OSO	Operations Support Officer
PA	Palestinian Authority
PHC	Primary Health Care
PRB	Project Review Board
PSO	Programme Support Office
QCPR	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review
QMR	Quarterly Management Reviews
RBM	Results-based management
RMS	Results management system
RSS	Relief and social services
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SEA	Sexual exploitation and abuse
SEAH	Sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment
SH	Sexual harassment
SOP	Standard operating procedure
SRM	Security and Risk Management
SSNP	Social Safety Net Programme
SWM	Solid Waste Management
TF	Taskforce
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNBOA	United Nations Board of Auditors
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UN-SWAP	United Nations System-wide Action Plan
USD	United States dollar
WBFO	West Bank Field Office
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Executive summary

In 2017-18, MOPAN, the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network, assessed the performance of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The assessment looks at UNRWA's organisational effectiveness (strategic, operational, relationship and performance management aspects) and the results it has achieved against its objectives. This is the second MOPAN assessment of UNRWA; the first was conducted in 2011.

CONTEXT

UNRWA was established in 1949 as a temporary agency. It is mandated to provide protection and assistance through the delivery of relief, human development and protection services to Palestine refugees registered with the Agency and to other persons eligible to receive UNRWA services, including persons displaced by the 1967 hostilities, in its five fields of operations (the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank including East Jerusalem). UNRWA is greatly affected by its operating context, primarily the absence of political solution regarding a Palestinian state, but also in recent years the Gaza blockade and the Syrian civil war. This has been coupled with increasing programme costs, increased refugee needs and protection concerns. The unimpeded operation and provision of services by UNRWA is recognised by many as playing an important role in the stability of the region.

UNRWA is primarily funded from voluntary contributions. While UNRWA's current Medium Term Strategy (MTS) 2016-2021, endorsed by donors and host governments, is well-articulated and consciously aspirational, the financial backing and predictability of funds to deliver on its objectives has not been forthcoming from donors. The perennial budget shortfall crisis of the Agency was exacerbated in January 2018 by the withdrawal of USD 300 million in planned funding from the US Government, increasing the organisation's deficit significantly. UNRWA responded to this particular budget crisis by intensifying its fundraising efforts, extensive internal cost saving and austerity measures. Progress achieved on these fronts allowed operations to be largely maintained, although not without detriment to some services. The austerity measures have had a number of effects on UNRWA's work including increases in class sizes, reductions in some services and in maintenance, redundancies and hiring freezes.

The Agency's funding outlook remains deeply challenging, given its current financial deficit, increasing demand for its services and the cumulative impact of emergencies and protracted humanitarian crises.

KEY FINDINGS

Overall, UNRWA in 2018 is an organisation that is competent, resilient and resolute. The organisation is achieving humanitarian and development results in a challenging and resource-constrained environment in ways that reflect a well-managed organisation. By and large, its organisational performance remains on a positive trajectory.

The agency has robust organisational reform and improvement processes. With iterative learning and adaptation, this has resulted in more effective programmatic approaches, characterised by a high technical competence. This is particularly strong in education and health where the operating structure of UNRWA has encouraged and facilitated innovation within its fields of operation. Reform processes in other service areas such as relief and social services and camp services, though well sighted, have been more vulnerable to the funding crisis, and progress has been less developed over the assessment period.

Between MOPAN's previous assessment in 2011 and this assessment, UNRWA has preserved its strengths and made incremental progress on different aspects of strategic, operational, relationships and performance management. This is in the face of persistent and volatile operational and contextual challenges which include the pervasive funding crisis. This limits the space for UNRWA's management team to invest in and pursue the deepening of a coherent approach across the Agency behind the MTS strategic outcomes; the path through which the Agency can deliver added value, in terms of improvements to the lives of refugees and to sustainable development in the region.

The assessment identifies in 2018 four major **strengths** of UNRWA:

1. **UNRWA is highly knowledgeable about its mandate and context given its long-standing engagement in the region and the strength of its workforce.** The vast majority of its staff are highly committed Palestinian refugees and form part of the refugee communities that UNRWA serves. This comparative advantage of UNRWA is recognised by both the organisation and its partners and is well developed within UNRWA's strategy and reflected in its supporting documentation spanning issues of conflict, political economy, gender and vulnerability.

2. **UNRWA has a well-considered and robust results-based monitoring system.** Though relatively new, the system rests on strong foundations and generates large amounts of data. This has informed planning and decision-making at different levels within the organisation and has generated clear data on expenditure by field of operation and programme. Results-based management, including evaluative thinking, is a live practice within service areas, at regular intervals at different levels of the organisation.

3. **UNRWA's education and health programmes have high technical capacity as well as a proven capability to operate efficiently.** Ongoing funding constraints have been signified by increased cost-saving and austerity measures. Even so, UNRWA's core programmes have maintained high quality service delivery, whilst taking steps to strengthen inclusive aspects of programming. This is reflected by a well-managed and mature reform process corresponding to the needs and context of each service area, and it has significantly improved delivery.

4. **UNRWA continues to balance a cautious and rigorous approach to risk management with an increasingly strategic approach to how and with whom it engages.** The Agency has consistently applied strong internal measures for managing the organisation's budget, responding effectively to volatile funding conditions. It is actively pursuing good tactical use of project-related funding within programming and is taking an increasingly strategic approach to engagement with a range of actors and partners, focused on leveraging the Agency's resources and comparative advantage.

The assessment also finds in 2018 four major **areas for improvement**:

1. **UNRWA would benefit from addressing the lack of strategic evaluations.** There is a very limited amount of independent evaluations to demonstrate and guide progress towards the Agency's strategic objectives and contributions to the learning path of wider humanitarian and development goals in the region. Strengthened evidence on the relevance, effectiveness, impact and efficiency of UNRWA's programmatic work and overall approach can nurture strategic thinking by the Agency and inform its donors and host governments on how to best deal with the complex challenges lying ahead.

2. **UNRWA could work towards improving its approach to cross-cutting issues.** UNRWA requires coherent and consistent structures across the organisation to further strengthen its gender architecture and to prevent gender from being 'projectised' or siloed within one programme area. The organisation also requires an explicit policy and/or strategy regarding its approach to addressing environmental sustainability and climate change. There is limited evidence that a commitment to environmental sustainability informs interventions at the programmatic level.

3. **UNRWA could become more strategic in how it manages its workforce.** The agency could benefit from a strategic human resources strategy that not only remains considerate of the uncertainties and increasing security risks faced by staff, but also is more forward-looking as to the need to reconfigure staff resources and the changing skills mix which will enable UNRWA to best navigate the uncertain path to deliver on its mandate.

4. **UNRWA's delivery of a protection agenda could be further advanced.** As the Agency considers the best methods to embed a protection agenda, it faces a deteriorating situation in many of its field offices in which the agenda to date has been largely projectised. The Agency should consider the ways (including practical reporting) that suit an environment of very limited programme budget allocation for staffing and resources to further protection.

METHODS OF ANALYSIS

The assessment of performance covers the UNRWA's headquarters and regional and country field presence. It addresses organisational systems, practices and behaviours, as well as results achieved during the period May 2017 to mid-2018. It relies on three lines of evidence: a review of 150 documents, interviews with 89 staff members at headquarters and field offices, and an online survey among partners in all field areas.

The MOPAN 3.0 methodology entails a framework of 12 key performance indicators and associated micro-indicators. It comprises standards that characterise an effective multilateral organisation. MOPAN conducted the assessment with support from IOD PARC, a consulting company located in the United Kingdom that specialises in results-based performance assessment in international development. Denmark and Switzerland acted as the institutional lead countries, representing MOPAN members in this assessment process.

UNRWA PERFORMANCE RATING SUMMARY (2017-18)

Organisational Performance

Strategic management
- 1.1 Long-term vision
- 1.2 Organisational architecture
- 1.3 Support normative frameworks
- 1.4 Financial frameworks
- 1. Organisational architecture and financial framework
- 2.1a Gender
- 2.1b Environment
- 2.1c Good governance
- 2.1d Human rights
- 2. Cross-cutting issues

Operational management
- 3.1 Resources aligned to function
- 3.2 Resource mobilisation
- 3.3 Decentralised decision making
- 3.4 Performance-based human resources
- 3. Operating model and resources support, relevance and agility
- 4.1 Decision making
- 4.2 Disbursement
- 4.3 Results-based budgeting
- 4.4 International audit standards
- 4.5 Control mechanisms
- 4.6 Anti-fraud procedures
- 4. Cost and value consciousness, financial transparency

Relationship management
- 5.1 Alignment
- 5.2 Context analysis
- 5.3 Capacity analysis
- 5.4 Risk management
- 5.5 Cross cutting
- 5.6 Sustainability
- 5.7 Implementation speed
- 5. Operational planning and intervention design support, relevance and agility
- 6.1 Agility
- 6.2 Comparative advantage
- 6.3 Use country systems
- 6.4 Synergies
- 6.5 Partner co-ordination
- 6.6 Information sharing
- 6.7 Accountability to beneficiaries
- 6.8 Joint assessments
- 6.9 Knowledge
- 6. Works in coherent partnerships

Performance management
- 7.1 RBM applied
- 7.2 RBM in strategies
- 7.3 Evidence-based targets
- 7.4 Effective monitoring systems
- 7.5 Performance data applied
- 7. Strong and transparent results focus, explicity geared to function
- 8.1 Evaluation function
- 8.2 Evaluation coverage
- 8.3 Evaluation quality
- 8.4 Evidence-based design
- 8.5 Poor performance tracked
- 8.6 Follow-up systems
- 8.7 Uptake of lessons
- 8. Evidence-based planning and programming applied

Results

- 9.1 Results attained
- 9.2 Benefit target groups
- 9.3 Impact
- 9.4 Gender
- 9.5 Environment
- 9.6 Governance
- 9.7 Human rights
- 9. Achievement of results
- 10.1 Target groups
- 10.2 National objectives
- 10.3 Coherence
- 10. Relevance to partners
- 11.1 Cost efficiency
- 11.2 Timeliness
- 11. Efficient delivery
- 12.1 Sustainable benefits
- 12.2 Sustainable capacity
- 12.3 Enabling environment
- 12. Sustainability

Key

- **Highly satisfactory (3.01-4)**
- **Satisfactory (2.01-3)**
- **Unsatisfactory (1.01-2)**
- **Highly unsatisfactory (0-1)**

Micro-indicator
- 1.1
- 1.2
- 1.3
- 1.4
- 1.5
- 1.6
- 1.7

Key Performance Indicator
- 1

1. INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

This report has three chapters and three annexes. Chapter 1 introduces the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the MOPAN 3.0 assessment process. Chapter 2 presents the main findings of the assessment in relation to each performance area. Chapter 3 provides the conclusions of the assessment. Annex 1 summarises the evidence gathered against each indicator with the detailed scores. Annex 2 lists the documents used for the analysis. Finally, Annex 3 provides an overview of the results of MOPAN's partner survey.

1.2. UNRWA AT A GLANCE

Mission and mandate: UNRWA was established by United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees. Although created as a temporary agency, UNRWA has been operational for 68 years and the UN General Assembly has repeatedly renewed UNRWA's mandate (on three-year terms), most recently extending its mandate until 30 June 2020.

UNRWA is mandated to provide protection and assistance through the delivery of relief, human development and protection services to Palestine refugees registered with the Agency and to other persons eligible to receive UNRWA services, including persons displaced by the 1967 hostilities, in its five fields of operations (the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank including East Jerusalem). UNRWA is unique among UN agencies in that it delivers the vast majority of its services directly to refugees.

The UN General Assembly has expressed "special commendation to the Agency for the essential role that it has played for almost seven decades since its establishment in providing vital services for the well-being, human development and protection of the Palestine refugees and the amelioration of their plight and for the stability of the region, and affirms the necessity for continuing the work of the Agency and its unimpeded operation and provision of services, pending the just resolution of the question of the Palestine refugees".[2]

Governance: The UNRWA Commissioner-General has an externally focused role and is supported by the Deputy Commissioner-General, an internally focused role. The current Commissioner-General has served since March 2014. The Advisory Commission (AdCom), created in 1949, is tasked with advising and assisting the Commissioner-General in carrying out the Agency's mandate. UNRWA does not have an executive board. The AdCom is currently comprised of 28 Members, including donor and host government representatives, and 3 Observers and meets twice a year to discuss issues of importance to UNRWA. Members and Observers meet more frequently through the Sub-Committee of the Advisory Commission, whose role includes assisting the AdCom in providing guidance and advice to the Commissioner-General. The AdCom is supported by the Advisory Commission Secretariat, which is responsible for maintaining an effective relationship between the Advisory Commission and the Agency.

Organisational structure: UNRWA is one of the largest UN agencies, with more than 28 000 staff. The majority of its staff are Palestine refugees; the Agency also has 158 international staff positions funded from assessed contributions and an additional, small number of international staff funded under emergency appeals and projects or provided as complementary personnel. The staff work across the Agency's five fields of operations. UNRWA headquarters are located in Amman, Gaza and East Jerusalem; representative offices are located in New York; Washington, DC; and Brussels, with a liaison office in Cairo.

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2. UN General Assembly Resolution A/73/94, adopted 7 December 7, 2018. See https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/A-RES-73-94.pdf..

Strategy and services: UNRWA's Medium Term Strategy (MTS) 2016-21 delineates its strategic vision and the objectives for its programmes and operations for this period. The MTS sets out five strategic outcomes towards which UNRWA is working:

- Strategic outcome 1: Refugees' rights under international law are protected and promoted.
- Strategic outcome 2: Refugees' health is protected, and the disease burden is reduced.
- Strategic outcome 3: School-aged children complete quality, equitable and inclusive basic education.
- Strategic outcome 4: Refugee capabilities are strengthened for increased livelihood opportunities.
- Strategic outcome 5: Refugees are able to meet their basic human needs of food, shelter and environmental health.

UNRWA provides assistance and protection to a population of some 5.5 million registered Palestine refugees to help them achieve their full human development potential. The Agency's services encompass education, health care, relief and social services, camp infrastructure and improvement, protection, and microfinance as well as emergency assistance in times of crisis. UNRWA is committed to ensuring that the means made available to it are used in the most effective and efficient way possible. To this end, the MTS contains specific management and operational effectiveness commitments.

Finances: UNRWA is primarily funded from voluntary contributions. The UNRWA programme budget expenses for the 2017 fiscal year were USD 774.77 million. Budget allocations are guided by the strategic objectives and priorities outlined in the MTS, with roughly half of this budget going to education. In response to emergency situations in the region, notably in the occupied Palestinian territory and in Syria, UNRWA has launched emergency appeals to cover assistance costs that are not covered by the programme budget.

In recent years, UNRWA has suffered repeated shortfalls in its budgets. For example, UNRWA began 2018 with an overall budget shortfall of USD 146 million and, in January 2018, lost an additional USD 300 million in planned funding from the United States government, increasing the deficit significantly. Through a two-pronged approach of concerted fundraising efforts and internal cost saving measures, the Agency was able to overcome the funding shortfall and keep services operational throughout the year. However, the Agency's funding outlook is deeply challenging, given its current financial deficit, increased demand for its services, and the impact of emergencies and protracted humanitarian crises.

Organisational change initiatives: UNRWA has instituted organisational changes to further improve its effectiveness in protecting and assisting Palestine refugees. These changes are anchored in the organisational development process which began in 2007 and are managed in the difficult context of fluctuating resources. The Agency's comprehensive reform programme accompanied by the development and roll-out of the MTS 2016-21 includes initiatives to strengthen management capacities. UNRWA also has instituted measures to support decentralised decision-making and to take account of differentiated needs while also seeking to retain flexibility going forward. The Agency further has introduced a number of policies and systems to align its budget to intended results.

UNRWA has also undertaken major reform or improvement initiatives for each of its programme areas (education, health, relief and social services, and camp infrastructure and improvement) and microfinance to strengthen quality and delivery efficiency. In education and health, these reform efforts, distinct in their approach, have matured. Reforms to relief and social services (RSS) and to camp infrastructure and improvement are ongoing, although the severity of UNRWA's recent financial constraints has stalled progress on the more recent, mapped-out reforms.

Box 1: Preventing sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment[3]

UNRWA is responsible for protecting and promoting the rights of Palestine refugees. UNRWA is a key provider of basic services to more than 5.5 million Palestine refugees registered with the Agency across its fields of operations and is currently educating more than half a million children each day, providing over 8.5 million medical consultations each year and delivering life-saving humanitarian aid to almost 1.5 million persons with urgent needs. As a key provider of public services, UNRWA's capacity to help Palestine refugees achieve their full potential in human development depends on, among other things, the ability of its staff to uphold and promote the highest standards of ethical and professional conduct. The standards of conduct applicable to UNRWA personnel are grounded in the United Nations Charter, which provides that staff shall display the highest standards of integrity, and rooted in universal values of humanity and human rights including the fundamental principle of non-discrimination.

UNRWA Rules and Regulations prohibit staff from engaging in sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (SEA) of beneficiaries and sexual harassment (SH) in the workplace (collectively "sexual misconduct").

All UNRWA personnel have the obligation to eliminate SEA.[4] Moreover, all UNRWA personnel have a duty to report suspected misconduct, including concerns or suspicions that a beneficiary is experiencing or has experienced SEA by a fellow worker, as soon as possible after becoming aware of such suspected behaviour.[5] The UNRWA staff handbook on ethics and the standards of conduct applicable to UNRWA personnel[6] also outline the obligations of staff to safeguard against SEA and sexual harassment and the Agency's standards on SEA for its staff. UNRWA has an accompanying SEA Complaints Referral Form; incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse of beneficiaries can be reported to designated ethics focal points and gender-based violence (GBV) focal points across the Agency and to Field Directors, the Director of the Department of Internal Oversight Services (DIOS) and the Director of Human Resources.

The Agency participates in the UN working group on SEA, the UN Chief Executives Board Task Force on Sexual Harassment, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Accountability to Affected Populations, and the Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

In February 2018, the Commissioner-General took the initiative to establish an UNRWA task force on SEA and SH (the UNRWA Task Force) to find innovative ways to ensure the Agency not only meets UN Secretary-General and Chief Executives Board initiatives, standards and reporting requirements, but also goes beyond these and tailors UN-wide efforts to prevent SEA and SH to UNRWA's context and beneficiary community.

UNRWA's commitment to safeguarding the rights of refugees, as articulated in the Agency's Medium Term Strategy 2016-21, includes a commitment to focusing on the needs of the most vulnerable refugees and a responsibility to safeguard and advance Palestine refugee rights. UNRWA's Protection Policy (2012) sets out its commitment to protection. This policy includes the UNRWA protection framework and delineates the roles and responsibilities for protection within the Agency, with protection understood to be "what the Agency does to safeguard and advance the rights of Palestine refugees".

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3. The 2017-18 MOPAN assessment does not cover the organisation's performance with regard to preventing sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment (SEAH). This topic may become an area of assessment in future cycles. In the meantime, the assessment team simply collected key facts related to safeguarding against SEAH as self-reported by the organisation but did not verify the actual implementation of the instruments outlined by UNRWA.

4. General Staff Circular No. 5/2007, "Allegations and complaints procedure and protection against retaliation for reporting misconduct and cooperating with audits or investigations", and General Staff Circular No. 7/2010, "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Complaints Procedure", paragraph 4(e).

5. General Staff Circular No. 7/2010.

6. "Serving Ethically" handbook on ethics and the standards of conduct applicable to UNRWA personnel.

Since 2009, UNRWA has implemented a multi-sectoral programme to address GBV and has established referral systems to identify and refer GBV survivors to access a range of services. In 2015, UNRWA started the Building Safety programme supported by the United States Government that works to strengthen UNRWA's organisational capacity to respond, mitigate and prevent GBV in emergencies.

UNRWA's internal guidance, the Tool for Incorporating Minimum Standards on Protection into UNRWA Programming and Service Delivery, sets out standards that constitute an essential part of UNRWA protection mainstreaming. These standards include the requirement that UNRWA programmes deliver services in a manner that ensures the safety and dignity of beneficiaries and staff, and that UNRWA ensure its actions do not cause unintended harm or result in reduced protection of beneficiaries, communities or staff. At the field level, regular analysis of the degree of alignment with UNRWA protection standards is a key indicator for monitoring progress on protection mainstreaming.

UNRWA's Child Protection Policy (2016) outlines the Agency's intent and commitment to protect Palestine refugee children and provides a coherent approach to the diverse child protection activities being undertaken by programme departments and field offices.

UNRWA is addressing SEA in its programmes. For example, it is addressing SEA in education by deepening protection from violence and sexual harassment and exploitation of boys and girls through capacity building of teachers and other education staff, and improving and systematising the child protection referral system. The Agency has also worked to embed GBV response in its programmes through the Building Safety project aimed at increasing staff ability to respond to GBV and by raising awareness and changing staff perceptions of the acceptability of GBV. However, the Agency acknowledges that resistance to addressing GBV (including SEA) continues to be one of the main challenges in developing UNRWA's response to GBV and that changing attitudes of staff towards GBV is a long-term process.

1.3. THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Assessment framework

This MOPAN 3.0 assessment covers the initial period of the UNRWA Medium Term Strategy 2016 -21. In line with guidelines set out in the MOPAN 3.0 Methodology, which can be found on MOPAN's website, it addresses organisational systems, practices and behaviours, as well as results achieved. The assessment focuses on five performance areas. The first four relate to organisational effectiveness, and each has two key performance indicators (KPIs). The fifth performance area (results), relating to development and humanitarian effectiveness, consists of four KPIs.

The MOPAN 3.0 indicator framework was developed by MOPAN's Technical Working Group, and draws on international standards and reference points, as described in Annex C of the Methodology Manual.

Box 2: Performance areas and key performance indicators

Aspect	Performance area	Key performance indicator (KPI)
Organisational effectiveness	Strategic management	**KPI 1**: The organisational architecture and the financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results
		KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels
	Operational management	**KPI 3**:The operating model and human and financial resources support relevance and agility
		KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency and accountability
	Relationship management	**KPI 5**: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility within partnerships
		KPI 6: Partnership working is coherent and directed at leveraging and/or ensuring relevance and the catalytic use of resources
	Performance management	**KPI 7**: The focus on results is strong, transparent and explicitly geared towards function
		KPI 8: The organisation applies evidence-based planning and programming
Development effectiveness	Results	**KPI 9**: Development and humanitarian objectives are achieved, and results contribute to normative and cross-cutting goals
		KPI 10: Interventions are relevant to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate
		KPI 11: Results are delivered efficiently
		KPI 12: Results are sustainable

Applying the MOPAN methodology to UNRWA

The assessment of performance covers UNRWA's work at headquarters and in each of its five fields of operations. The MOPAN 3.0 methodology was applied with some adjustments to reflect the realities of UNRWA's mandate and operating systems. First, visits were made to four of the five UNRWA field offices to enhance the assessment team's understanding of the Agency's complex mandate and operations; remote contacts were employed to cover the fifth field of operations, Syria. In the case of other multilateral organisations, MOPAN assessment teams gathered data primarily at the organisation's headquarters.

Second, in conjunction with UNRWA, the assessment team judged several micro-indicators (MIs) and MI elements to be "non-applicable", as listed below. These decisions were based on the fact that UNRWA has a distinctive, temporary mandate and, in particular, that it has primary responsibility for the welfare and interests of Palestine refugees over a geographical area spanning numerous national jurisdictions. UNRWA operates in this context in a way that is considerate of the host authorities, but it has no mandate to engage with these authorities as a traditional development partner with the attendant focus on strengthening country systems.

The non-applicable MIs are the following:

- **MI 2.1c:** Good governance[7]
- **MI 5.1:** Interventions aligned with national/regional priorities and intended national/regional results
- **MI 5.3:** Capacity analysis [of national partner] informing intervention design and implementation, and strategies to address any weakness found are employed
- **MI 5.6:** Intervention designs that include detailed and realistic measures to ensure sustainability (as defined in Key Performance Indicator [KPI] 12)
- **MI 6.3:** Clear adherence to the commitment in the Busan Partnership for effective development co-operation on use of country systems
- **MI 6.8:** Participation with national and other partners in mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments
- **MI 9.3:** Interventions assessed as having contributed to significant changes in national development policies and programmes (policy and capacity impacts) or needed system reforms
- **MI 9.6:** Interventions assessed as helping to improve good governance
- **MI 10.2:** Interventions assessed as having helped to contribute to the realisation of national development goals and objectives
- **MI 12.1:** Benefits assessed as continuing or likely to continue after project or programme completion or effective measures that exist to link the humanitarian relief operations to recovery, resilience and eventually to longer-term development results
- **MI 12.2:** Interventions assessed as having built sufficient institutional and/or community capacity for sustainability or have been absorbed by government
- **MI 12.3:** Interventions assessed as having strengthened the enabling environment for development.

Moreover, the MOPAN assessment also applied specific interpretations of the terms "partner" and "intervention" in rating performance: "partner" is confined to implementing partners within UNRWA service areas and not to a broader appreciation of the institutions of a country, and "intervention" relates to the programme areas through which UNRWA delivers its services.

Some of the MIs noted above (5.1, 12.1, 12.2 and 12.3) are of interest or have partial applicability to UNRWA because of the nature of the Agency. In such cases, no assessment of performance is made. However, the assessment team discusses the indicators as they pertain to UNRWA where it considered that this information would add to the broader interpretation of UNRWA's performance in the context of the development landscape within which the Agency must operate.

Lines of evidence

The MOPAN assessment of UNRWA was undertaken between May 2017 and July 2018. It covers UNRWA's headquarters operations and the operations at the field office level. As part of the methodology, it relies on the following lines of evidence:

- **Document review:** The team collected and reviewed 150 documents, although more than this were screened for inclusion. Documents included public source documents such as reports, operational guidelines, independent reviews and evaluations and internal documents such as minutes of management meetings, planning and reporting templates for staff. Results documentation included nine independent evaluations – although these were primarily institutional evaluations rather than those focused on development results – and management reporting from 2016-18.

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7. In considering whether structures and mechanisms are in place and applied within an organisation to support the implementation of global frameworks of cross-cutting issues, MOPAN defines the cross-cutting area of "good governance" as "peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development that reduce inequality, provide justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels". UNRWA's mandate and strategy are considered as not directly sighted to this, and therefore this MI is considered non-applicable for purposes of assessing the organisational performance of UNRWA.

- **Online survey:** The survey was conducted among partners in the five field areas (the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank including East Jerusalem) and yielded 42 responses. The survey was designed to gather both perception data and an understanding of practice from a diverse set of well-informed partners of UNRWA (see Annex 3).

- **Interviews and consultations:** The team conducted interviews and consultations with 89 staff members in May 2018, at UNRWA headquarters in Amman, East Jerusalem and Gaza and at field office headquarters in Amman, Beirut, Gaza and East Jerusalem. Supplementary calls were made to the field office in Damascus.

An information call to discuss key findings was held with the Institutional Lead representatives from Denmark and Switzerland during the final stages of drafting.

Limitations

UNRWA has a clear and very challenging mandate; strategic and operational management takes place in a resource-constrained and politically charged context. To assess and interpret the *performance* of the Agency through the MOPAN lens of organisational and development effectiveness, it is necessary to appreciate over which factors UNRWA management has full, partial or no control and to nuance management principles such as prioritisation, efficiency, etc.

This MOPAN assessment was conducted during a challenging period for UNRWA. Significant resource constraints have compelled the Agency to adjust priorities, put some intended organisational actions on hold and put off planned activities. As part of the assessment, interviews were conducted with staff in headquarters and all five field offices (remotely, in Syria) to gain an appreciation of the diverse conditions across which UNRWA works and as determined by the refugee population it serves. MOPAN reviewed a range of additional documents, although there was limited examination of field-level documentation.

The formal evaluation evidence available to assess UNRWA's performance in terms of results (KPIs 9-12) was limited in both scope and quality. Independent evaluations of individual projects and thematic areas were considered, but there were no programmatic-level evaluations to draw from. The assessment drew heavily on management results reports (including detailed annual reviews of results) provided by the Agency and on internally-generated results data, held within UNRWA's comprehensive results based monitoring system. No independent evaluations were available from the assessment period of UNRWA's strategic plan or organisational architecture, the progress of its reforms, or its normative role to provide a wider view of the effectiveness, efficiency or sustainability of UNRWA's results.

Both quantitative and qualitative information from the partner survey was analysed and used where this expanded, supported or substantively challenged other evidence sources. Qualitative comments from the partner survey, while informative, were predictably quite individualistic and not amenable to broader extrapolation.

Despite these limitations, application of the MOPAN framework to the body of available evidence allowed for a robust assessment. Visits to the field offices provided a depth and richness to the evidence that have informed the analysis and highlighted UNRWA's adaptive way of working across diverse operating conditions and contexts. In the interests of brevity, the assessment of performance (including Annex 1) takes a macro perspective on the organisation.

2. DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF UNRWA PERFORMANCE

Chapter 2. Detailed assessment of UNRWA performance

The performance is assessed on four dimensions of organisational effectiveness – strategic, operational, relationship and performance management – and on the results achieved by the organisation. These findings are constructed against the organisation's own strategic plan and performance indicators.

In this way, organisational effectiveness relates to a blended assessment of intent, effort and response. Organisational intent is expressed through commitments, strategies, policies and plans. The organisational effort is that which the organisation puts behind a particular agenda for performance and improvement including guidance issued. The organisational response is its reaction to the effects of this effort in relation to changing organisational direction, practice and behaviour.

Organisational effectiveness is juxtaposed alongside development effectiveness. The latter refers to the extent to which the organisation is making a difference in ways that reflect its strategic objectives and mandate.

2.1. ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

PERFORMANCE AREA: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
Clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has a clear and very challenging mandate in a politically charged context. Conferred by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, this mandate recognises and endorses the organisation's role in providing for the well-being, human development and protection of Palestine refugees including in respect of their rights under international law. The strain on its strategic management continues to intensify, with UNRWA having now experienced several consecutive years of uncertainty as to whether there are sufficient resources to get through the calendar year. The funding crisis in early 2018 was considered an existential crisis, leading to a number of immediate consequences including increases in class sizes and adjustments to emergency activities. Thanks to a strong sense of mission and strong leadership – externally and internally – and a mature, robust and resilient organisational architecture, the impact of this has been minimised, and UNRWA has thus far been able to provide relief and largely deliver on its mandate.

The Medium Term Strategy (MTS) 2016-21 reflects a progressive and well-articulated strategic vision and set of targeted results and aims to integrate the humanitarian and rights-based core of UNRWA's work into a multi-faceted development orientation. The financial underpinning to realise these objectives has not been forthcoming. UNRWA

thus remains highly vulnerable, in the immediate future and over the longer term, to the changing demographics and (increasingly) protracted humanitarian crisis affecting the refugee population it is mandated to serve. Available resources are not commensurate with designated need. In the face of this adverse reality, UNRWA has consolidated its financial and staff resources around maintaining and continually working to improve the integrity of delivery within its core programmes. The austerity measures have not been without consequence though, with increases in class sizes, reductions in some services and in maintenance and employment freezes. Cross-cutting themes of gender, protection (including disability) and human rights remain visible within and important to UNRWA's programmes and operations. Dedicated policy statements in the MTS and in specific documentation support these cross-cutting areas, but limited core resources are available to address them.

KPI 1: The organisational architecture and the financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results.

This KPI focuses on the extent to which UNRWA has articulated a coherent and strategic vision of how and for what purpose it has organised its human activity and capital assets to deliver both long- and short-term results.

The current Medium Term Strategy articulates UNRWA's vision for achieving its mandate to contribute to the welfare and human development of Palestine refugees. The UN General Assembly established UNRWA as a temporary agency in 1949 and, since then, has continuously affirmed the necessity for the continuation of the organisation's work in providing services to Palestine refugees and supporting stability in the Middle East. UNRWA is both a humanitarian and development agency at the same time; using its comparative advantage to support the transition of Palestine refugees to sustained and lasting development solutions that are aligned to international normative instruments. The MTS 2016-21 reflects UNRWA's commitment to strengthening the humanitarian-development nexus while maintaining its core support for protecting the rights and meeting the basic needs of Palestine refugees.

While the current MTS sets out a coherent, well-articulated and consciously aspirational direction for UNRWA, financial backing of the international community to the level or manner required has not been forthcoming, despite the MTS being endorsed by both donors and hosts. UNRWA has been experiencing a sustained financial crisis in the last few years as well as increasing difficulty meeting projected, year-end cash shortfalls. This financial crisis has a political dimension. UNRWA has navigated this difficult situation through constant juggling of resources and careful cost control; while it is not in perfect shape, there is no obvious fat in its current configuration. This achievement is due to strong internal management (at all levels) that is adjusting the quality and quantity of outputs, as circumstances dictate, while not compromising on UNRWA's objective of maintaining an assured level of basic service delivery.

UNRWA's organisational architecture is consistent with its mandate and strategic plan. UNRWA has field offices in the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank and has headquarters offices and functions in Amman, Gaza and East Jerusalem. This structure is an organisational strength. It provides an effective balance (e.g. centralisation versus decentralisation) across five fields of operations between a headquarters structure straddling immediate and future-facing aspects of UNRWA and other dimensions of UNRWA's work.

UNRWA's reform has strengthened its management capacity in key areas. Since 2007, the organisation has undertaken and learned from robust organisational reform processes, as well as programmatic reform leading to more effective programmatic approaches to education and health services (characterised by high technical competence). Reform processes in other service areas such as relief and social services have been delayed and, as such, they appear to be more vulnerable to the acute funding crisis.

UNRWA's focus on the rights and welfare of Palestine refugees provides some clear points of alignment with wider normative frameworks. UNRWA's work is aligned to 10 of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Where it can (given its mandate), it operates in ways that are consistent with the Grand Bargain that emerged from the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and reports annually on this. UNRWA participates in UN accountability processes such as the UN System-wide Action Plan (UN-SWAP). In terms of humanitarian principles, UNRWA operates in full compliance with applicable international law and the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.

UNRWA has a single integrated budget framework comprising its programmes, projects and emergency appeals. An important use of projects is to provide the space for furthering quality and learning within UNRWA's core programmes. The Agency is increasingly mindful of the importance of ensuring that projects' success does not lead to unsustainable demands on the already-stretched programme budget.

There is limited scope within the current mandate and limited capacity for senior management to take the lead in developing alternative financial frameworks for UNRWA. While various initiatives are underway to diversify the Agency's funding base and enable it to access further flexible (and core) funding, a fundamental disconnect remains between the Agency's mandate (coupled with the associated calculation of basic needs) and its current financial framework.

KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels.

This KPI looks at the articulation and positioning within UNRWA's structures and mechanisms of the cross-cutting priorities to which the organisation is committed, in pursuit of its strategic objectives.

Cross-cutting themes of protection, gender, disability inclusion and human rights are specifically addressed by UNRWA. These cross-cutting areas are supported by dedicated policy statements in the MTS and other Agency documents. Each area is also integrated to some degree within UNRWA's results frameworks. There also is evidence of UNRWA staff capacity building in these areas and of accountability for the cross-cutting areas, internally and externally (e.g. UN-SWAP, international human rights mechanisms).

UNRWA is committed to the protection of human rights at the highest level. The Medium Term Strategy contains UNRWA's most recent policy statement of its commitment and approach to addressing human rights of Palestine refugees through all aspects of its work, highlighting rights as a strategic priority for the 2016-21 period. The MTS further recognises UNRWA as a duty bearer working to fulfil the human rights (including food, shelter, education and health) of its beneficiaries and takes note of the interlinkage of human rights and human development.

For UNRWA, human rights and its work on protection are intrinsically linked, yet addressing protection is a challenge for the Agency. The MTS defines protection as "what the Agency does to safeguard and advance the rights of Palestine refugees, including through the direct provision of services and other activities". UNRWA is tasked with the monitoring, reporting and advocacy of Palestine refugees' human rights at an international level to prevent violation of these rights and seek accountability and remedial measures for violations that occur. UNRWA is working to mainstream protection, institutionally and strategically, in a challenging environment. As the Agency wrestles with what protection means in real operational terms and for its organisational structure, it is facing a deteriorating protection situation in many of its field offices and has limited resources to address protection concerns. UNRWA has struggled to report on the protection indicators regarding individual protection cases currently in the MTS, and these have been removed from the results-based monitoring system, although they are still reported on separately in some cases.

To further its protection work, UNRWA established the headquarters Protection Division in 2016 along with dedicated protection teams across all its fields of operations. Within the context of a resource-constrained organisation, the development of these protection structures and the prioritisation of protection in the MTS constitute a significant achievement. This restructure was undertaken following the realisation that the organisation needed a more institutional and strategic approach to protection rather than keeping protection siloed within a particular programmatic area. In consequence, the Agency has put significant emphasis and efforts into mainstreaming protection across field offices. The Protection Framework outlines the roles and responsibilities of different UNRWA stakeholders in delivering on protection and human rights. This brings together key activities to promote protection of human rights, such as the Agency's long-standing engagement with the international human rights system (IHRS) under the Agency's framework for such engagement that is led by the Department of Legal Affairs in co-ordination with protection functions.

UNRWA has identified key protection standards to mainstream protection in the internal dimension of its protection work. These standards are to be used by senior staff, programme chiefs, programme protection focal points and others involved in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programme activities. Field offices undertake biennial protection audits that monitor the degree of alignment with Agency protection standards in all aspects of programming and make remedial recommendations as necessary. The training of staff on protection is an Agency priority; training has been delivered on case management, gender-based violence (GBV) and child protection. The concept of human rights is also embedded within UNRWA's programmes: UNRWA has a Human Rights, Conflict Resolution and Tolerance Policy, Strategy and Toolkit as part of its education programming.

Limited core resources from the programme budget have been allocated to the relatively recent Protection Division and associated structures across UNRWA field offices. At the field office level, many of the resources available for protection are from projects, including for the salaries of key institutional protection posts. The programme budget pays for only 2 protection positions (Chief of the Protection Division and Head of the Gender Section) out of the approximate 112 staff in the headquarters Protection Division and Protection Units/Operations Support Office (OSO) teams. The Protection Division also receives around USD 226 000 annually from the programme budget for staff and ongoing activities such as workshops, travel, etc. By contrast, the Protection Units/OSO teams in the field offices do not receive any of the Programme Budget. The work on protection of the Protection Units/OSO teams in the field offices has been funded by a key donor; that donor recently has withdrawn its funding to UNRWA including for both legal support to the protection function across the Agency and for engagement with the IHRS, which until 2018 was funded through the emergency appeals. At the time of the MOPAN assessment, it was unclear how this important function would be funded going forward.

UNRWA has an institutional commitment to gender as a cross-cutting area of its work and has a specific framework addressing gender that is aligned to international normative standards. While UNRWA's Medium Term Strategy does not have a standalone outcome on gender equality and the empowerment of women, gender considerations are to be included in the strategic objective concerning protection. The MTS results framework includes a limited number of indicators with a gender-specific focus, and data are disaggregated by gender for some indicators. The MTS draws upon previous UNRWA normative documentation relating to gender. These include the Agency's 2007 Gender Equality Policy, which commits the organisation to promoting gender equality and women's empowerment, and the previous 2008-15 Gender Mainstreaming Strategy. The design of the 2016-21 Gender Equality Strategy (GES) is underpinned by a theory of change that takes into account both organisational and programme changes needed to achieve more equitable and inclusive services for Palestine refugees. Implementation of the GES is reported on annually against action plans developed by field offices and cascaded to all departments. At the field level, gender and protection units ensure that gender and protection are adequately incorporated into new projects and funding proposals in their project review checklists.

A gender marker assessment to monitor resource allocation to gender found that 64.4% of UNRWA's programme budget contributes in a significant way to gender mainstreaming. This result is attributable mainly to the education programme, given the proportion of this programme that was scored as gender-sensitive. For example, for education, gender has been a key dimension in programmatic approaches, reflected explicitly in policies, strategies and programmes. Funding for gender mainstreaming activities is generated through allocations in existing programmes that address gender issues or through extra-budgetary resources raised for specific interventions and projects (e.g. the GBV referral system in UNRWA). However, the Agency does not allocate significant core funds to specific gender initiatives and gender mainstreaming efforts, and it funds only one specific gender staff member across the Agency.

There remains a lack of consistency in terms of where gender is situated within UNRWA. Structurally, gender sits within the Protection Division at the headquarters level, although this is not the case across all fields of operations. Locating gender within this division, combined with the GBV focus of the gender section's main project (Building Safety: Mainstreaming GBV Interventions into Emergency Preparedness, Prevention and Response), have given the protection aspects of gender a high profile within UNRWA. Outside of protection concerns, there is not necessarily a broader focus on gender, although the GBV training delivered under the Building Safety project includes broader gender equality concepts.

UNRWA is working to build staff capacity related to gender, and a priority of its Gender Equality Strategy is to strengthen the Agency's gender architecture. The structural pillar for gender mainstreaming in UNRWA continues to be the Gender Task Force, which comprises 70 gender focal points drawn from the various programmes and field offices. Gender focal points meet regularly at field and Agency levels to co-ordinate gender mainstreaming and build capacities. In its work on GBV, UNRWA's Gender Unit has sought to build the capacity of staff working on GBV prevention and response. This includes developing GBV roadmaps for all field offices that show GBV prevention work outcomes, outputs and activities based on a GBV prevention framework.

UNRWA's People Strategy commits the organisation to addressing human resources issues related to gender. The Agency supports a move towards gender parity in management and leadership positions and is working to ensure that gender and cultural sensitivity training is provided. Representation of women in senior management positions, particularly at the field and area office levels, is low. The Human Resources Department has developed a Gender Parity Action Plan based on the UN-SWAP. A commitment to gender equality and parity is included in the compacts signed by directors with the Commissioner-General. UNRWA has sought to incentivise staff commitment and contribution to gender mainstreaming by launching the Gender Champion Awards which recognise significant contributions by staff to the advancement of gender equality.

UNRWA participates in system-wide UN gender mainstreaming initiatives. In 2017, UNRWA[8] "met" or "exceeded" requirements for 80% of the performance indicators. Resource allocation was highlighted as an area requiring UNRWA's continued attention going forward. Overall, UNRWA's performance on gender mainstreaming is above that of other UN entities.

UNRWA does not have a dedicated policy on environmental sustainability and climate change. The MTS outlines a commitment to assist and co-ordinate with others that undertake work on climate change and its impact on refugee populations. UNRWA's 2016-21 strategy for infrastructure and camp improvement also sets out its intent to improve refugees' health and the natural environment by ensuring that Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme interventions are environmentally responsible. UNRWA has engaged in a number of green initiatives including the installation of solar photovoltaic systems in Gaza Strip camps. The recent Environmental Health Strategy

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8. UN WOMEN 2017, UNRWA UN-SWAP Report 2018

of the Lebanon Field Office (LFO) contextualises environmental sustainability and climate change in the context of UNRWA's work in terms of water access and management, sanitation, energy, air quality, and land use. This strategy further sets out action plans for UNRWA in these areas, although it is unclear to what extent the plans have so far been implemented.

UNRWA has created specific programming on disability inclusion and strengthened its organisational approach to this work. UNRWA has taken significant steps to support Palestine refugees with disabilities. These have included the roll-out of Disability Inclusion Guidelines for staff and partners to operationalise UNRWA's Disability Policy, which grew out of the work of a task force and aims to promote sharing of information and knowledge and strengthen specific disability initiatives. However, no core funds are allocated to the mainstreaming of disability. A non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff member seconded to UNRWA now provides support within the Agency to disability mainstreaming. UNRWA has an Inclusive Education Policy, Strategy and Teacher Toolkit and holds itself accountable for identifying and addressing the needs of children with disabilities.

PERFORMANCE AREA: OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Assets and capacities organised behind strategic direction and intended results, to ensure relevance, agility and accountability

UNRWA's biggest asset for delivering on its mandate and achieving strategic objectives is its workforce, which is comprised mostly of Palestine refugees and a small number of international staff. UNRWA has maintained a committed and able workforce while proactively managing relationships with staff associations and embedding neutrality practices. There remain recognised limitations in terms of the organisation's ability to change the staff mix in line with new requirements and/ or reconfigure roles within the existing complement of staff. Workarounds are used to give staff opportunities to develop within a relatively static structure.

UNRWA has a well-thought out, developed and increasingly diverse approach to resource mobilisation that is consistent with its core mandate, strategic priorities and the business model of an agency with a temporary mandate. Operationally, UNRWA currently is very dependent on voluntary contributions and has no capital reserves and a tightly controlled, yet growing, cost base. UNRWA has achieved significant savings through implementing austerity and efficiency measures to address this situation. UNRWA's decisions on resource allocation are clearly articulated, transparent and sensitive to the challenging financial reality of the Agency. Its organisational architecture facilitates decentralised decision-making, with the headquarters playing an overall guiding and enabling role and field offices helping to shape decisions and tailor operations to specific contexts.

The Agency has strong audit and investigation functions, an Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Policy, and a well-developed framework of roles and responsibilities for implementation. UNRWA reports fraud and corruption statistics annually and provides the certifications to the UN Board of Auditors in accordance with its reporting obligations.

- **Highly satisfactory (3.01-4)**
- **Satisfactory (2.01-3)**
- **Unsatisfactory (1.01-2)**
- **Highly unsatisfactory (0-1)**

UNRWA's whistle-blower protection policy is considered by the UN System's Joint Inspection Unit to be robust. Lack of staffing has hampered the internal oversight role of the Department of Internal Oversight Services, a role that is constrained by the limited internal demand for formal evaluations.

KPI 3: The operating model and human and financial resources support relevance and agility.

This KPI focuses on how key operational functions (e.g. human resources, resource generation and programming) are continuously geared to support strategic direction and deliver results.

Within its continuously changing political and operating context, UNRWA finds ways of aligning staffing and financial resources to key functions. UNRWA has undertaken or planned a number of internal structural changes at both field and headquarters levels with the aim of becoming a more future-facing organisation and better aligning staff to key functions. For example, as part of an internal, organisation-wide policy and strategy restructuring, UNRWA introduced structures designed to facilitate progress towards educational outcomes. This included putting in place a more efficient and effective staffing structure and norms and standards through its Class Formation Norms and Standards, which are used Agency-wide as part of the annual planning process. Another example is the reorganisation around the Family Health Team approach. In both education and health, the Agency has invested in strengthening staff capacity using cost-effective approaches. These changes are perceived to have had a positive effect on both learning outcomes and the efficiency of the system.

In the Gaza Strip, the restructuring of the Field Planning and Programming Office is designed to allow the Agency to dig deeper into the data it holds to inform programme planning, while also respecting data protection principles outlined in the Agency's draft Data Protection and Disclosure Policy, which is currently under finalisation. The aim is to bring in a stronger research element to inform UNRWA's decision-making and advocacy on specific issues and do so in sync with the organisation-wide appetite to be able (where appropriate) to bring a broader perspective.

To support service delivery, UNRWA has reformed its microfinance work financially and administratively. This distinct arrangement, which emerged from a consultative process, has been effective in allowing UNRWA to continue to provide access to credit and loans even in difficult political circumstances.

UNRWA's approach to protection from a structural and resource alignment perspective remains work in progress. Protection is a strategic objective of the MTS, cutting across all of UNRWA's work. It is recognised that Palestine refugees' protection needs are increasing. Just 5% of the costs needed for protection now come from the programme budget, which funds only the chief of the Protection Division and the head of the Gender Division; funding for the remainder of protection costs are sought from project funding. In 2016, UNRWA established the UNRWA Headquarters Protection Division and dedicated protection teams across all of the Agency's fields of operations to further its protection work.

Strengthening gender parity through more women in UNRWA's senior and leadership positions remains a priority. The Agency's Action Plan on Gender Parity is based on its Gender Equality Strategy for 2016-21. Although UNRWA has achieved an overall 51%/49% ratio of women to men among its total area and international staff, a considerably lower percentage of senior and leadership positions are held by women; in 2018, just 26% of senior area staff were female.

While conditions vary across the fields of operations, in general there is limited movement within UNRWA staffing structures and limited opportunity to introduce new skills and/or reconfigure staff among silos. Within these constraints, UNRWA uses task teams to facilitate cross working and as a way to recognise talented staff within the organisation. In this way, staff also get a chance to fully use their skills, given that staff in the Gaza Strip and other

fields of operations may be over-qualified for their positions. The limited opportunity for developing leadership skills within the field is a constraint.

UNRWA's decentralised structure, with two headquarters offices and five field offices, supports service delivery but with some tensions. UNRWA has instituted measures to support decentralised decision-making and to take account of differentiated needs while also seeking to retain flexibility going forward. Within the service areas (particularly education and health), the Amman headquarters staff play a well-developed role in shaping and supporting the delivery of a decentralised approach. This includes bringing Agency-wide standards to the field and a sense of shared ownership of the programmes among headquarters and the field. The decentralised approach allows and encourages innovation, which is UNRWA's natural instinct, within and beyond the fields of operations. There is clarity on delegated authority and a clear organisational intent to sustain it. Finding the right balance of headquarters and field authority under financial crisis conditions remains a source of tension. In general, the more mature the service area (e.g. education, health), the less tension is experienced.

UNRWA lives with perennial questions, from within and from outside the organisation, about whether and how effectively the Agency organises and delivers to reach the most vulnerable within its refugee population. It has proved challenging for UNRWA to target the most vulnerable, given the politically sensitive context of the host governments and the Agency's limited budget envelope. Effective targeting requires both the political operating space (in relation to the host government or authority) and the resources to set up and sustain systems. UNRWA has found it difficult to overcome resistance among beneficiaries and some staff who identify with the community.

UNRWA is working to professionalise its resource mobilisation in a challenging environment. Resource mobilisation is a top priority across the organisation including at the highest levels, where staff are pulling out all stops to address the funding crisis. Despite the success of resource mobilisation efforts, UNRWA is limited in what it can mobilise given its past underinvestment in communications and marketing and the competitive market conditions. Where UNRWA is able to mobilise funds, it often faces the dilemma of being required to "projectise" elements of the programme budget for specific initiatives. That said, resource mobilisation (e.g. emergency appeals and for the programme budget and externally funded projects) is managed in a way that generally maintains a programmatic orientation to UNRWA's work. However, chasing financial resources, particularly in the more accessible project form, and keeping tight control on costs cut into the time available for active programme management.

UNRWA's success in diversifying its funding base is improving. In 2017, 86.68% of the contributions to the programme budget came from traditional donors. UNRWA is in the process of exploring the development of a Trust Fund with the World Bank and an Islamic Endowment Fund, or *Waqf*, with the Islamic Development Bank, as alternative funding streams to provide the Agency with further and flexible funding. However, the evaluation of the Resource Mobilisation Strategy highlights UNRWA's overall challenge in mobilising resources and suggests that, even with the best strategy, the Agency will struggle to significantly and durably improve its mobilisation of much-needed resources.

UNRWA's staff performance management system is clearly set out but is not always implemented in practice. The system's three-point scale is not considered sufficiently nuanced. Strategic management of human resources is being faced with a difficult environment where laying off staff seems to easily heighten anxiety among staff. Increasing quality requirements at a time of constrained resources also create challenges to decentralised staff performance management and the needs of strategic HR management. Strategic HR management is also constrained by budget shortfalls, underfunding and unpredictability of funding month to month or year to year. The MTS 2016-21 outlines performance compacts between each director and the Commissioner-General that address the extent to which a director has taken necessary action recommended in audits, evaluations and inspections. These were introduced in 2016.

UNRWA has ongoing initiatives, supported by other UN partners, to support the safety and security of its staff. It has long been recognised that female UNRWA staff are confronted with specific safety and security risks during their work. To respond to this challenge, UNRWA embarked on a joint Training of Trainers with the UN Department of Safety and Security and the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) to explore specific security risks and needs of women. UNRWA also rolled out its own gender-sensitive training to train UNRWA (and partner) staff.

KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency and accountability.

This KPI examines how UNRWA uses its external and internal control mechanisms to meet the standards it sets on financial management and transparency.

UNRWA has been transparent in its needs-based approach to planning and budgeting amid rising refugee needs and operating costs and significant funding shortfalls. To be able to continue service delivery, UNRWA has instituted agency-wide austerity measures and fully utilises all available funding. For example, the Agency has clear costings for delivery of a quality education service, and thereby the areas where different investments in improvement initiatives can lead to marginal gains in quality. However, UNRWA currently lacks the financial resources to go further than this, as a very high proportion of resources is spent on staff salaries.

Projects are increasingly used in the service area as opportunities to develop new approaches, but in ways that are conscious of longer-term sustainability implications. However, not all projects are designed based on a cost-recovery model, which would contribute to sustainability. In education, projects are used to strengthen systems, sometimes through the piloting of new approaches. UNRWA, understandably given the context, is preoccupied with short-term funding priorities. Thus, much of its staff's time and attention are directed to resource management and mobilisation – potentially at the expense of their fully "doing the work".

UNRWA's ability to execute programming as planned is hampered by the unpredictability of revenue sources. The considerable variability of UNRWA's revenue in the current MTS period is having a significant impact. Although UNRWA maintains tight cash flow management and has clear data on expenditure by field of operations and by programme, the Agency has been required to continually adjust its spending according to the oscillation of funds available. Efficiencies in programming have been pursued and achieved, for example by moving from food distribution to cash transfers in some fields of operations and through the use of the information management of the e-education and e-health systems. However, these efficiencies have had some negative impacts on UNRWA services, such as increased class sizes, and there are some concerns over the wider effects, at household and societal level, of moving at this point in time from food distribution to cash transfers in certain field contexts.

UNRWA has data systems that support potential moves to results-based budgeting. UNRWA introduced and now runs an enterprise resource planning approach using SAP software. This provides good data on the costs of operations and on where cost savings have been achieved. However, this approach – as yet – does not separate out costs by output. In some areas of education and health, specific exercises have tracked cost data against outputs as a basis to compare the costs of delivering services internally versus using external service providers. In the Gaza Strip, the sustained practice of gathering and interpreting data now allows UNRWA to forecast with confidence the implication of a change in delivery standard that is driven by resource allocation in terms of effect on a progress indicator.

UNRWA has consistently met audit standards. UNRWA is audited by the UN Board of Auditors (UNBOA). Within UNRWA, the Department of Finance within the Executive Office has designated responsibility for addressing any gaps or weaknesses identified by external audits and for tracking, following up on and quality-checking the implementation

of UNBOA recommendations. The Department of Internal Oversight Services (DIOS) framework provides a basis for identifying areas that should be (internally) audited or/evaluated.

Internally, progress on provisions set out in the 2014 DIOS roadmap has been slow. Funding constraints have been a factor, and their full effects are yet to be fully realised. The mission of DIOS is to provide internal oversight services that add value to and support UNRWA in achieving its mission by strengthening accountability, transparency, integrity and learning within the Agency. DIOS fulfils its internal oversight role through independent and objective assurance (internal audit and inspection) and advisory services, evaluation, and investigation. Any issues affecting the ability of DIOS to operate independently are reported to the Advisory Committee on Internal Oversight and mentioned in the DIOS annual report submitted to the Advisory Commission. The Assurance and Advisory Services Division within DIOS carries out UNRWA's internal audits and monitors the implementation of audit recommendations. The DIOS annual work plan outlines planned audits and the rationale for selection.

UNRWA has a robust system of internal controls that are intended to safeguard assets, ensure adherence to regulations and rules including management policies and procedures, and prevent fraud. UNRWA has an up-to-date (2015) Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Policy and a well-developed framework of roles and responsibilities for implementation. The risk of fraud and corruption is managed as part of the Agency's enterprise risk management system. Managers are required to identify and assess the risks of fraud and corruption in their field or headquarters programmes, projects or support service areas. On an annual basis, findings from investigations are analysed to identify trends and areas where more resources should be devoted and to make recommendations to improve processes and practices.

Lack of staffing has hampered the role of internal oversight through DIOS. This is compounded by the limited internal demand for formal evaluations. UNRWA faces challenges in decentralised investigations, in particular in terms of ensuring investigations are handled consistently across the organisation and regarding the workload of the focal points assigned to each field of operations. Recruitment is underway for additional investigators to handle, among other cases, specialised sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment matters.

There are clear expectations and processes regarding staff reporting of incidents. UNRWA's Core Values and Standards of Conduct and its Handbook on Ethics outline organisational expectations around the reporting of incidents. Standard operating procedures were developed and implemented in 2017 for reporting on incidents with staff or assets. UNRWA annually prepares reports on cases of sexual exploitation and abuse, breach of neutrality, and fraud. The Agency has a whistle-blower protection policy. A review of whistle-blower policies and practices in UN organisations, conducted by the Joint Inspection Unit in 2018, found UNRWA to be one of only two agencies that met all the requirements for providing staff with comprehensive and independent channels for reporting misconduct and/or wrongdoing confidentially and anonymously, including to external entities, and that had specific provisions for reporting on the executive head and the head of the oversight office.

PERFORMANCE AREA: RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT
Engaging in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, to leverage effective solutions and to maximise results.

UNRWA has a necessarily broad interpretation, and very diverse set, of "partners". These range from UN agencies, donors, NGOs and host governments to implementing partners including camp and community-based organisations and representative bodies of the refugee population and staff. UNRWA's interventions also are varied and found at different operating levels, coalescing around particular service areas such as education, health, social and relief services, or camp improvement. The sectoral nature of this reflects UNRWA's mandate. The Agency's interventions also include advocacy for the protection of rights and other aspects that relate at a more strategic level to the interests of the Palestine refugees in the context of the international community's search for a long-term solution.

UNRWA's unique mandate and the fact that it is not a programme-based UN agency have shaped its approach to relationship management, which strongly emphasises self-reliance within the Agency and does not look to expose UNRWA to undue risks of service failure through dependency on partners. This stance is under increasing pressure as the need for and potential value of effective partnering grows. UNRWA brings to its work a very strong appreciation of context and an awareness of how its work connects with that of other actors such as governments of host countries and UN agencies. UNRWA's exchange of knowledge adds value in the host authority settings in which it works and contributes to wider regional discourse on shared challenges such as education in emergencies and protracted crises.

KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility within partnerships.

This KPI focuses on the scope and robustness of UNRWA's processes and practice to support timely, flexible and responsive planning and intervention design for partnerships.

UNRWA's operational planning and implementation have matured over time through field office strategic plans, annual work plans, director compacts and further digitalisation of its monitoring systems with an Agency-wide emphasis on strategic planning. For example, since 2009 education has moved from a disjointed Field Implementation Plan approach to coherence in planning and reporting. The Agency has robust mechanisms in place for risk management; risk assessments are undertaken as part of UNRWA's annual planning cycle; and risk management, mitigation and, where necessary, contingency planning inform operational plans.

UNRWA demonstrates the standpoint of a partner. UNRWA's remit in terms of aligning with national priorities and development results is to ensure that its planning and programming priorities for the Palestine refugees it serves align with the priorities of host authorities to best address the refugees' humanitarian and development needs. UNRWA works with a range of host governments and their ministries of education, health, social affairs and planning as well as with UN Country Teams. It aims to ensure, to the extent possible, complementarity between its services and those provided by the host authorities. While the nature of UNRWA's mandate means it is not expected to contribute

to or align to national development results, the Agency demonstrates strong alignment with the priorities of host authorities, particularly in terms of education and health.

The degree of alignment and collaboration with host governments varies across UNRWA field offices according to the context and the programmatic area of work. In terms of education programming, for example, UNRWA adheres to host country education curricula and texts and reviews these for adherence to UN neutrality and values; however, the Agency is not obliged to align to host country policies and procedures (e.g. teacher and student loads) and enriches its curriculum by including teaching on human rights. UNRWA Education has also worked to extend the host country curriculum through its emphasis on professional development of teachers and school principals towards student critical thinking and life skills. In the area of health, UNRWA's Jordan Field Office has strong collaboration with the Jordanian Ministry of Health, which provides UNRWA with vaccines and family planning; the ministry and UNRWA also share epidemiological surveillance. In the Lebanon Field Office, UNRWA vaccine campaigns are co-ordinated with national vaccine campaigns. In certain fields, UNRWA is part of national co-ordination mechanisms (e.g. the Palestinian Authority Education Sector Working Group). There are some areas of remaining tension between UNRWA and host authorities over allocation of responsibilities for populations; this is particularly the case with regard to solid waste management.

In practical terms, UNRWA works within the frame of the UN Country Teams, although not always as a full member. The degree of co-ordination and collaboration with other UN agencies and formal processes such as the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) varies in line with host authority expectations. In Lebanon and Syria, for example, UNRWA works as a member of the UN Country Team (UNCT) and the UNDAF, whereas in Jordan, UNRWA is part of several UN working groups and the UNCT but does not contribute to the UNDAF.

UNRWA demonstrates strong contextual analysis, including of relevant conditions and cross-cutting issues in the design of interventions across most service areas. UNRWA staff are well-versed on their operating contexts and on gender issues and conflict and fragility. But to date, there is limited focus on analysis of environmental sustainability and climate change in the design, implementation and reporting on interventions. The Agency has strived to develop what it calls a "protection reflex" at all levels, and clear efforts have been made through protection audits and other mechanisms to ensure that protection needs are analysed and protection principles incorporated in all stages of programme cycle management.

UNRWA has an emergency framework in place and an adaptive approach to support its work in emergency contexts. The aim of these measures is to ensure the process of registration of refugees and enable the Agency to act with urgency and to be accountable to the vulnerable population affected by the consequences of emergencies in the regions where it is present. UNRWA is able to adapt its programmes to need in such contexts: in Syria, for example, its health services have adapted to new types of morbidity such as war-related injuries (e.g. amputations, abdominal wounds).

UNRWA's work on education in emergencies is well regarded in the region and globally. This work reflects the Agency's capability to adapt programming in ways that ensure continuity of education provision at the same time it continues to move ahead with aspects of the Agency-wide education reform.

KPI 6: Partnership working is coherent and directed at leveraging and/or ensuring relevance and the catalytic use of resources.

This KPI looks at how UNRWA engages in partnerships to maximise the effect of its investment resources and its wider engagement.

UNRWA's direct service delivery, access, geographic coverage and staff on the ground are among the core competencies that it brings to its partnerships. Particularly with the current funding shortfall, UNRWA recognises

the interdependence of UNRWA, host governments, UN members, other UN agencies, the private sector and civil society in addressing the needs of Palestine refugees. While UNRWA is specifically and solely mandated to address the needs of Palestine refugees, the Agency maintains a corporate commitment to work in close co-ordination and partnership with other UN agencies. Its partnership strategy positions UNRWA to act on themes and in areas where it has a proven advantage over other service providers and where it can make the most impact with available resources. This strategy also sees partnerships as strategic engagements which enhance UNRWA's ability to deliver its mandate to Palestine refugees.

UNRWA's approach and rationale for partnerships are guided by analysis. UNRWA analyses partnerships in light of its recent budget shortfalls, increasingly scarce resources, ambitious development goals and its beneficiaries' increasing demand for UNRWA services. The Agency is careful to not be seen as passing its mandate on to other agencies – one of the challenges to its partnership working – and enters into partnerships if they are appropriate and contextually relevant to the different field office contexts.

UNRWA is able to engage effectively with host authorities on sensitive issues. For example, UNRWA addressed concerns over duplication of the cash transfer programme (e.g. so-called "double dipping") between the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA in the West Bank. In addition, UNRWA is careful not to seek the spotlight for its achievements in some areas out of respect for the situation in which it is operating.

UNRWA has mechanisms in place to allow for programmatic adjustments in changing conditions, as evidenced mainly in its emergency programming. However, few details are available about the extent to which these mechanisms enable the flexible use of programme funds or how institutional procedures permit changes to be made at different levels of the organisation. There is evidence that UNRWA has identified institutional bottlenecks in procedures.

Political sensitivities contribute to the relative lack of transparency of UNRWA's reporting. UNRWA has taken steps to increase the transparency of its reporting, particularly with donors, and to meet (in a proportionate way) specific reporting needs and interests. This has been facilitated by the work of the harmonised results working group composed of UNRWA and donors. There are some continued sensitivities of information sharing which are navigated by UNRWA.

Ensuring accountability to Palestine refugees and involving refugees in decisions that affect them are two tenets of UNRWA's strategy, although these are not always carried through to practice. UNRWA's Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) framework sets out formal and informal mechanisms, standards and practices at the field and programme levels to engage Palestine refugees throughout the programming cycle. However, the Agency does not have an agreed, overarching definition or policy on "participation"; instead, each programme has guidance on how to strengthen refugee participation. UNRWA is committed to monitoring accountability to affected populations, although the practice of refugee participation is not fully embedded in monitoring and evaluation of the Agency's programming.

UNRWA still could be more engaged in knowledge management and sharing of its expertise in working with refugees in the region. While UNRWA participates in global forums and interagency committees, lack of support from the international community and internal constraints (in terms of time, expertise and political will) may cause it to miss opportunities to share and exchange the expertise of its staff and the lessons gathered through its programmes. As protracted crises become more prevalent, UNRWA's mature approaches and the learning it has acquired from experience with crisis stand as increasingly important resources and added value for the wider discourse and changing practice on the humanitarian-development nexus.

UNRWA is a contributor to international processes. At the headquarters level, the Agency raises awareness of key alleged violations of international law relating to the rights of Palestine refugees and provides regular inputs on grave violations of child rights to the United Nations Security Council through the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism. For all field offices, UNRWA participates in relevant UN and national technical working groups and participates in some fields of operations through UN cluster mechanisms. Partnership structures and mechanisms are unique to each field office, given the different contexts in which the Agency works. Programmes also engage and share knowledge globally and regionally. The Education in Emergencies programme enhanced its global and regional profile, and elements have been adopted by other agencies, including the UN. UNRWA Education also contributed to global discourse on the SDGs, on specific programme areas such as human rights, teacher development, etc. Partnership structures are encouraged Agency-wide whenever possible. In education, such structures are encouraged with regard to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), UNICEF, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children and Right to Play, as they help to ensure coherent and relevant partnership impact and outcomes.

PERFORMANCE AREA: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

Systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results and to using performance information, including evaluation and lesson-learning.

UNRWA is strongly committed to results-based management, and there is a "results-orientated" culture at various levels of the organisation to enable evidence-based decision-making and accountability. Roles and responsibilities with regard to the results-based monitoring system are clear, and relevant focal points have been trained on its use. Compliance of reporting to the results-based monitoring system is monitored at a department level and reported on regularly. Results targets are developed collaboratively across the organisation and are evidence-based with clear internal logic and flow between inputs, outputs and outcomes. Results are reviewed regularly, and data are used to inform decision-making and planning within the service areas of education and health. The results-based monitoring system is relatively new and evolving;

it currently captures only programmatic results but will soon be integrated with the Agency's financial reporting systems. Reporting requirements have increased over time, although human resources are still inadequate to meet the demands of the system.

UNRWA's evaluation function is structurally independent and located within the Department of Internal Oversight Services. UNRWA has a medium-term evaluation plan which covers the same time period as the MTS and has developed an annual evaluation work plan. However, UNRWA's evaluation coverage through this formal structure has been affected by the organisation's current funding situation, which has resulted in a number of evaluations and a meta-synthesis of evaluation quality not being completed as planned. At the same time, there is evidence of strong evaluative thinking within the core programming areas of education and health. This is not expressed in the form of commissioned evaluations, but rather in programme teams' reflection sessions that are taking place – at different levels – to consider further improving service quality and where and how this can lead to stronger outcomes.

KPI 7: The focus on results is strong, transparent and explicitly geared towards function.

This KPI looks at how UNRWA transparently interprets and delivers an organisation wide focus on results.

UNRWA has a strong corporate commitment to results-based management. The Agency explicitly aligns its planning and reporting to ensure the commitments in the MTS are reflected in plans at all levels of the organisation. This alignment is driven by strong leadership for results-based management both at headquarters and at field office levels and that feeds into UNRWA programmes.

UNRWA's results framework takes the form of the Common Monitoring Matrix (CMM), which includes indicators at the outcome and output levels for strategic outcomes. The CMM, which also covers the activity level, is designed to support the measurement and management of results, with data collected and analysed on a quarterly basis at the field level and through formal Agency-wide results reviews. Results entered into the results-based monitoring system are also reviewed by programme departments through a systematic approach that is embedded within the system. Results targets in the CMM were developed at the beginning of the MTS 2016-21 for all indicators in collaboration with all fields of operations to ensure ownership and common understanding. These appear to be evidence-based and with a clear internal logic and flow between inputs, outputs and outcomes.

UNRWA's results-based management is evolving and maturing. The results-based monitoring system is currently used to report on the organisation's programmes and to capture management and effectiveness KPIs (rather than support functions which are reported through the management and operational effectiveness chapter of the MTS). The system will be integrated with the SAP, or REACH, system to facilitate a more complex processing of data and reporting; combine programmatic information with financial and HR aspects of projects and logical frameworks; and increase the reliability of data among UNRWA's different programmes and databases.

UNRWA has strengthened its thematic monitoring and data. UNRWA's systems for reporting on health data have been strengthened with the advent of e-health, which is enhancing the organisation's ability to report on its health indicators and is currently being tailored to ensure its alignment and relevance to local conditions. UNRWA also has a dedicated Education Management Information System, which captures information on individual children as they enter school and progress from one grade to the next. This system also links to other UNRWA data management systems.

UNRWA's monitoring system can be flexible in emergency settings. In such settings, UNRWA is able to adapt and use a "light" version of its results-based monitoring system whereby data are put into the system on a first-instance basis, are verified by the field office and then undergo a further quality check at headquarters before being entered permanently. This practice gives the Agency the opportunity to spot issues and respond at an early stage.

Significant efforts have been made to base UNRWA planning and programming on performance data, and accountability for the achievement of results is embedded at multiple levels of the organisation. UNRWA conducts annual and biannual Agency-wide reviews of expenditure and results using data from the results-based monitoring system. The Deputy Commissioner-General chairs the reviews, senior management participate, and each field of operations gets ten minutes to report on issues, what is and is not working and lessons to be shared across field offices. Quarterly reviews are held with field offices and headquarters on the implementation of priority activities, implementation of other initiatives in the fields' operational plans and achievement of programmatic results. The quarterly data submitted by field offices are verified in the field; data quality is further assured and verified by screening at headquarters for anomalies. Reviews and reporting of data are also undertaken at a programmatic level between departments and headquarters, with department chiefs accountable for programmatic results.

Annual reviews are used to follow progress, document issues, generate action points, and triangulate data with other sources to support decision-making and inform annual and periodic planning processes. Poorly performing or off-track indicators are monitored, with remedial plans made as necessary. The increased availability and use of data are perceived to have contributed to improvements in programming and to have enabled the identification of areas for cost savings. Data from these reviews are then aggregated to form the annual operational report and reports to donors. Survey responses indicated that, among some donors, there is a perceived duplication of UNRWA results targets, indicators and baselines that constrains the effectiveness of donors' communication with UNRWA on results and makes it difficult for some donors to establish predictable and confident tracking of UNRWA's progress.

UNRWA's corporate-level strategies are based on a sound results-based management focus and logic and guide programatic and thematic planning, monitoring, and reporting. At a programmatic level, UNRWA has specific log frames and, in some cases, theories of change for its interventions, although the inclusion of a theory of change is not mandatory. UNRWA's Gender Strategy, for example, is supported by a corresponding results framework that is aligned to the MTS and reported on annually. As a result of UNRWA's education reform, the education programme incorporates policies and strategies in a systemic approach that includes monitoring and reporting through multiple levels of universal education indicators within the CMM. This approach applies to each of the five field offices and field-specific baselines and targets.

A lack of capacity for monitoring all indicators limits the effectiveness of UNRWA's results-based management. Field offices consider many indicators burdensome to collect, given their available staff resources. The current MTS also doubled the number of indicators that field offices should report on, but no additional staff capacity for monitoring has been added. In addition, GBV, child protection, and gender and protection indicators for individual cases were removed recently from reporting requirements because some fields of operations were unable to collect reliable and accurate data on these. It also is not yet possible to use the results-based monitoring system to undertake results-based budgeting, which requires indicators and reliable data at activity, output and outcome levels. Some remaining technical glitches in the results-based monitoring system also constrain its full utility.

UNRWA faces broader contextual challenges around data collection. It can be challenging to gather reliable, timely data in contexts where UNRWA operates. The Syria crisis, for instance, rendered many UNRWA facilities inaccessible and displaced a large proportion of staff, severely impacting the field's capacity to access and collect data throughout the country; moreover, in this context, it is challenging for UNRWA to obtain government approval for any kind of data collection exercise.

KPI 8: The organisation applies evidence-based planning and programming.

This KPI focuses on the evaluation function, its positioning within UNRWA structures, attention to quality, and accountability and putting learning into practice.

Within the governance architecture of UNRWA, the evaluation function is structurally independent. The evaluation function is located within the Department of Internal Oversight Services (DIOS), which fulfils its internal oversight role through independent and objective assurance (internal audit and inspection), advisory services, evaluation, and investigation.

UNRWA's evaluation policy was developed following a United Nations Evaluation Group Peer Review in 2015 of the Agency's evaluation function. The UNRWA evaluation policy outlines the criteria for identifying what is to be evaluated; the processes for quality assurance, follow-up, dissemination and use of evaluations; and guidance on evaluation quality assurance. The policy also sets out DIOS's role in co-ordinating with fields of operations and

headquarters departments to produce evaluation plans as well as a medium-term plan aligned with the MTS that identifies evaluation work that needs to be undertaken. UNRWA's current medium-term evaluation plan (for centralised evaluations) is aligned with the MTS, and an annual work plan for evaluations is included as part of the DIOS annual plan.

Formal evaluation appears to be a significant casualty of the current funding crisis. The centralised evaluation plan, although prioritised, is not funded. Nor have a number of planned strategic evaluations for the 2015-18 period been undertaken due to funding constraints. An UNRWA organisational directive states the intention to ensure DIOS has the necessary budget and staffing resources to adequately maintain independence and objectivity. However, UNRWA's overall financial difficulties have directly affected the evaluation budget. Resources available for centralised evaluation are inadequate, amounting to just 0.1% of the UNRWA programme budget, compared to an average of 0.3% of the budgets of other UN agencies. In early 2018, 0% of the funding needed for the prioritised evaluations was available; in 2017, only 10% of the needed funding was available. The lack of available resources for evaluation limits the evaluation function's work and makes evaluation activities – on a piecemeal basis – largely dependent on donor funding.

Decentralised evaluations are being planned and undertaken by UNRWA at field level, although this activity is somewhat "projectised" rather than strategic. Budgets for evaluations are generally included at donor request in project budgets and/or agreements, rather than being built into the field office's overall strategy for learning and accountability. Field offices prepare evaluation plans that are shared with headquarters but, as is the case with centralised evaluations, a number of these do not go ahead due to scarcity of funds or the prioritisation of delivering services over evaluation. The programme budget allocates no funds for evaluation at field office level. This limits the independent selection of evaluation subjects and the extent to which a strategic approach to evaluation across the organisation can be applied.

UNRWA has quality assurance systems in place to monitor evaluation quality throughout the evaluation cycle. These systems indicate where quality assurance is necessary and describe roles and responsibilities at each stage of the cycle. At centralised and decentralised levels, the quality of evaluations is supported by DIOS oversight. However, no evidence is available as to whether the quality of evaluations has improved over time, as UNRWA has lacked the resources to undertake any meta-synthesis of evaluations to determine evaluation quality since the 2015 UN Evaluations Group Peer Review.

Despite the weaknesses noted in UNRWA's evaluation system and coverage, there is evidence that UNRWA programme and planning teams are thinking evaluatively, underpinned by the use of data from the results-based monitoring system. The Agency has practices that demonstrate strong information management, with reflection on lessons learned as part of the development of strategic and operational plans. Programme-wide, mid-year and annual results reviews take place, organised by strategic outcome, with all fields and departments present. Correctives measures are also identified in dialogue with communities and applied as necessary to programmes. All centralised and decentralised evaluation reports are required to be publicly available on UNRWA's website, although sharing of information between field offices is at times opportunistic and dependent on individuals, rather than systematic.

2.2. DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

PERFORMANCE AREA: RESULTS

Achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results in an efficient way.

UNRWA achieves humanitarian and development results. However, there is a limited body of independent evidence for assessing the performance of the Agency in terms of its results. The evaluations that are available speak to the high relevance of UNRWA's services under highly challenging operational and humanitarian conditions. Political turmoil, conflict, travel and trade restrictions, and resource constraints have significantly inhibited UNRWA's ability to deliver results or to meet planned delivery targets. The evaluations reflect variable integration of cross-cutting issues; while human rights and protection are mainstreamed in UNRWA's approach and its activities, gender and to a much lesser degree climate change are addressed less consistently. The lack of funds often compromises the efficiency and cost effectiveness of UNRWA's development effectiveness. Evaluations discuss the negative implications of funding uncertainty for cost-effective and efficient delivery of the Agency's services and programming.

- **Highly satisfactory (3.01-4)**
- **Satisfactory (2.01-3)**
- **Unsatisfactory (1.01-2)**
- **Highly unsatisfactory (0-1)**

In terms of management results data and analysis, UNRWA has a strong position, particularly in the core programme areas of education and health. These show some areas of strong achievement in terms of quality of service provision, progress towards the Agency's targeted learning and health outcomes, and results that compare well with other providers in the same operating environments. Moreover, much of this progress has been achieved in a deteriorating, or at best static, context.

Evaluations of projects often highlight both challenges and missed opportunities to sustain the benefits of the specific project intervention. Critically, they note that the lack of involvement of beneficiaries, the limitations of the host authority environment and funding shortfalls within UNRWA all reduce the chance that project benefits can be sustained across all fields of operations.

The longer-term sustainability of results within the programming areas framed by the strategic outcomes of the MTS 2016-21 is a concern for UNRWA, but its remit as a temporary agency does not include directly addressing this challenge. Continuity of results is also important, immediate and relevant to Palestine refugees; nevertheless, this question is outside the purview of UNRWA management and is therefore not covered by this MOPAN assessment.

KPI 9: Development and humanitarian objectives are achieved, and results contribute to normative and cross-cutting goals.

This KPI examines the nature and scale of the results UNRWA is achieving against the targets it sets and its expectations on making a difference.

UNRWA's reported management results show strong evidence of effective programming that is leading towards improving outcomes, particularly in education and health. Across the diverse conditions of its fields of operations, UNRWA is showing strong performance on education and health indicators that is aligned, respectively, with education learning outcomes and health outcomes. Progress on results includes in Syria, where adapted approaches have been used.

UNRWA's reported management results provide evidence of programming that helps to improve human rights. This evidence includes the Agency's effective engagement with the international human rights system to advance the protection and human rights of Palestine refugees and the Agency's record of raising concerns about alleged violations of international law, compliance and related international standards. It does this in writing and sometimes in in-person briefings with five relevant treaty bodies and through UN human rights special procedure processes.

Evaluations cite the important role UNRWA plays in supporting Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank including East Jerusalem, but these also note its mixed performance in delivering projects. Evaluations indicate that UNRWA has not achieved results in embedding cross-cutting areas. There have been major contributions to addressing gender issues, as documented in the UNRWA gender initiative, but significant barriers remain to effective mainstreaming of gender. Among these barriers are the cultural norms of staff who are predominantly refugees themselves, a lack of resources, the exacerbation of gender inequalities in conflict and the lack of a conducive enabling environment for gender equality.

KPI 10: Interventions are relevant to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate.

This KPI centres on the relevance of UNRWA's engagement given the needs and priorities of its partner countries and its results focus.

From a results perspective, UNRWA's engagement in the region is highly relevant. UNRWA delivers critical support to the refugee population that it directly services, to the host authorities and to the wider development processes of the region. The limited number of evaluations that provide a small window into UNRWA's work all attest to its high relevance.

UNRWA's progress towards its five strategic outcomes (MTS 2016-21) is key to the immediate and longer-term interests of the Palestine refugee population and to maintaining the fragile stability of the region. The set of services that UNRWA provides is tailored to meet distinct basic needs of the registered refugees. Service provision takes account of the specific conditions in each of the five field of operations, particularly the status of the Palestine refugee population in that jurisdiction, whether Palestine refugees have access to services provided by the host government/authority, and/or whether they have access to public facilities and opportunities. The dramatic increase in refugees in the region as a result of the Syrian crisis has placed a significant burden on Jordan and Lebanon. It also intensifies the well-being challenges facing Palestine refugees in these areas and diverting international political attention from the pursuit of a solution that will allow conclusion of UNRWA's mandate.

There is a limited body of independent evaluation evidence and evidence within UNRWA management results on which to judge the extent to which UNRWA is making a difference in the lives of beneficiaries. UNRWA's reporting does not routinely differentiate in the refugee population between the "abject poor" and the "absolute poor". Evaluations to date have tended to focus on the work processes rather than who benefitting. The selected (project-based) evaluations and management results note that performance towards poverty reduction is mixed.

KPI 11: Results are delivered efficiently.

This KPI looks at the extent to which UNRWA is meeting its own aims and standards on delivering results efficiently.

Within the context of UNRWA's funding shortfalls, cost effectiveness and efficiency are fundamental concerns for all of the Agency's projects. While no independent evidence is available regarding the cost effectiveness and efficiency of UNRWA's operations, project-based evaluations highlight the impact that insufficient funding has had, on occasion, on the timeliness of project delivery. Project-level evaluations also cite examples where funding uncertainty has led to inefficient project approaches and inefficient use of funds. However, the evidence does not offer the basis for an overall judgement of the efficiency of UNRWA's approach.

Management reporting provides project-based examples of efforts to increase efficiency and reduce costs. Examples of UNRWA's health programming initiatives include transitioning all health clinics to the e-Health (electronic medical records) system and the person-centred Family Health Teams, which have the benefit of longer but less frequent visits to primary doctors, limiting hospital visits to only the most vulnerable people and referring others to less-expensive care facilities. Education reform has increased efficiency and reduced costs very substantively through more rigorous management of the Class Formation process. UNRWA has also introduced cash-based programming to support efficiency gains and reduce operational costs associated with in-kind food distributions. However, the evaluation of UNRWA's transition to the e-card modality in Jordan, Lebanon and the West Bank found that, in reality, intended cost savings had not yet been delivered and that key data on management and overhead costs are unavailable.

KPI 12: Results are sustainable.

This KPI looks at the degree to which UNRWA successfully delivers results that are sustainable in the longer term.

While important dimensions of UNRWA's work are supportive of sustainable development, this KPI is not applicable for performance rating purposes because of the temporary nature of UNRWA's mandate. Nevertheless, UNRWA's work matters in terms of the 2030 Agenda as it deals with 10 of the 17 SDGs. UNRWA also is contributing to development in the region particularly through its work on the humanitarian-development nexus, which is one of the important pathways for stability. Directly through its core programmes of education and health and indirectly through linkages with host authorities, UNRWA is helping to build the human capital on which sustainable development depends.

3. OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF UNRWA

Chapter 3. Overall performance of UNRWA

The performance conclusions first consider four key attributes of an effective organisation: (1) whether it understands future needs and demands; (2) whether it is organised and makes use of its assets and comparative advantages; (3) whether it has mandate-oriented systems, planning and operations; and (4) whether it makes consistent developments according to its resource level and operational context. The journey of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) then is mapped against MOPAN's previous assessment of the organisation in 2011.

Lastly, the assessment report presents the key findings: the observed strengths and areas for improvement.

3.1. CURRENT STANDING AGAINST THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE ORGANISATION

Is UNRWA future facing?
UNRWA is greatly affected by its operating context: primarily the absence of political solution regarding a Palestinian state, the Gaza blockade and the Syrian civil war. At the same time, it is affected by the fluctuations and scarcity of its resource pool coupled with increasing costs, refugee needs and protection concerns. In this highly volatile and challenging operating context, UNRWA has demonstrated its ability to continue to deliver its core services in fulfilment of its temporary mandate.

UNRWA's Medium Term Strategy (MTS) 2016-21 and its strategic priorities – to provide protection, health, education, support to livelihoods and basic relief – reflect UNRWA's expertise and its key role as service provider and support to Palestine refugees throughout the Middle East. The MTS was developed on the basis of lessons learned and identified needs among Palestine refugees. The UN General Assembly recognises that these strategic priorities remain relevant so long as the Israel-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved, regional stability continues to be tenuous and Palestine refugees remain vulnerable.

The MTS sets out ambitious goals for the organisation and is consciously aspirational, given the nexus between humanitarian and development objectives implicit within the strategy and given UNRWA's resource context. Indeed, a number of the organisation's core functions are insufficiently funded and in particular protection, which is one of five strategic objectives in the MTS; the programme budget covers only 5% of its costs. This is of concern in light of the deterioration of protection standards across field offices and the use of primarily project funds, a precarious source, to support this core function.

Faced with a systemic funding crisis, a persistent budget deficit and no reserves, UNRWA has implemented an extensive array of efficiency and austerity measures. The organisation has also sought to diversify its resources by engaging with new donors, mobilising new types of funding and shifting the narrative about UNRWA. UNRWA recognises that it will continue to play a critical role for the foreseeable future and needs a focused and stable programme budget (through assessed or voluntary contributions from the international community).

Thanks to its long-standing engagement, its entrenched field presence, and its strong role in education, health and social services, UNRWA has a unique and comprehensive understanding of the context in which it is operating, whom it aims to serve and what is needed to accomplish its mission. The MTS reflects this: it is future-facing in terms of management working within the parameters of UNRWA's mandate; considers the needs of the organisation going forward to 2021; and highlights where investment is needed to achieve each strategic goal in terms of capacity strengthening, leveraging of partners, institutional reform, infrastructure development and, most significantly, resource requirements and mobilisation.

Recognising that its ability to meet these identified needs is contingent on available resources and resource mobilisation, UNRWA has put significant effort into diversifying and professionalising its resource mobilisation efforts. One example of the organisation's efforts to establish alternative funding mechanisms is the Dignity is Priceless global fundraising campaign (#DignityIsPriceless). In other examples, UNRWA is exploring the development of a Trust Fund with the World Bank and an Islamic Endowment Fund, or *Waqf*, with the Islamic Development Bank as alternative funding streams to provide the Agency with further and flexible funding. The organisation also has implemented a number of reforms, most notably in the fields of education and health but also in microfinance programming, to improve its efficiency and the quality of its service delivery. Further, UNRWA has implemented extensive efficiency, cost-saving and austerity measures. These have included management and organisational reforms such as centralisation of procurement, a review of administrative functions and co-location.

There are positive signs that these efforts are increasing the organisation's funding base while also respecting the parameters within which UNRWA management can work. Nevertheless, measured against the scale of UNRWA's funding challenges, these efforts, as yet, are not yielding adequate results. Additionally, there remain somewhat existential and ideological questions that are outside the scope of this organisational performance assessment; these regard the extent to which UNRWA, given its temporary and politicised mandate, can "future-proof" itself without more fundamental questions being considered and addressed through its governance structure and within the dynamic of the international political order.

Is UNRWA making best use of what it has?

UNRWA is specifically mandated to ensure that the humanitarian, human development and protection needs of Palestine refugees are met. The organisation is uniquely situated to deliver this support across diverse contexts, thanks to the scale and geographic coverage of its operations, its proximity to the communities it services and its extensive experience working with refugee communities. Both the organisation's staff and its partners clearly recognise these comparative advantages that are also well articulated in strategic documentation.

UNRWA's experienced workforce is its most important – and unique – asset. Most of its workforce of around 28 000 are Palestine refugees who are not only UNRWA staff but also its beneficiaries. This means that the Agency's work rests on a strong contextual underpinning and inherent understanding of the challenges experienced by Palestine refugees. This contextual understanding is demonstrated in much of UNRWA'S strategic documentation, spanning issues of conflict, political economy, gender and vulnerability. Another recognised great asset of UNRWA is the technical capacity of its staff, particularly as concerns its education programme where the Agency is able to share best practice and educational materials in the contexts in which it works.

UNRWA has put in place some measures to support its accountability to affected populations, although the practice of refugee participation in the programme management cycle is not fully embedded within UNRWA and feedback mechanisms are not systematically used across the Agency. The role of accountability to affected populations remains a significant and somewhat challenging issue for UNRWA, given that many of its staff are members of the communities they serve. There are protests from refugees and staff in response to the Agency's funding cutbacks and redundancies and over the risk of UNRWA shutting schools, and these require delicate and clear management from the Agency and appropriate support mechanisms.

UNRWA operates in a way that mirrors how a state actor operates; and it has extensive experience working in protracted crises and emergencies and in delivering development interventions. Reflecting these roles, the Agency has measures in place to ensure the registration process of refugees, to act with urgency and to be accountable to the vulnerable population affected by the consequences of emergencies in the regions where it is present. UNRWA has a robust emergency framework that outlines the operational structures, protocols and tools used in emergencies and that explains roles and responsibilities. The framework establishes structures, systems and procedures that are

to be put in place to enable an effective immediate response to emergencies. The Agency demonstrates an ability to respond effectively to changing funding conditions and has taken steps to review and reform the provision of assistance across all fields (e.g. transitioning from food cash across Jordon, Lebanon and the West Bank). However, while project planning includes risk mitigation measures, UNRWA's mechanisms are less well-developed for supporting adjustments at an Agency-wide scale to allow continuity and the evolution of specific programmes (e.g. education, health) in the face of different scenarios.

UNRWA works in partnership with a broad range of organisations that include UN agencies, donors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), host governments, implementing partners including camp and community-based organisations, and representative bodies of the refugee population and staff. The Agency's strategic framework for partnerships is clear about the comparative advantage that it brings to partnerships. The nature of partnerships varies across the organisation and its field offices, given the diverse contexts and programmatic areas in which UNRWA engages. UNRWA's current financial challenges compel it to think more innovatively about partnerships; to maximise opportunities to increase resource mobilisation through partnerships; and/or to find ways to strengthen outcomes through creative combinations of UNRWA staff resources, funding and partnering. Risks to the organisation in regard to service delivery remain high, at least in the short term, and will continue to require active management.

Is UNRWA a well-oiled machine?

With its organisational reforms which began in 2007, UNRWA has invested significantly and effectively in enhancing its leadership, management and operational capacity to deliver services to Palestine refugees. Key policies and systems have been introduced to its change agenda to clarify the line of sight between the organisation's budget and intended results. UNRWA's structure and approach support its ability to continue to operate across a diversity of contexts, each with its own political realities and sensitivities.

The process of change and improvement has been incremental. While aspects of UNRWA's operational effectiveness and efficiency have improved, gaps remain and new challenges are emerging that shrinking revenues and protracted conflict only exacerbate. A well-managed and mature reform process has significantly improved the delivery of education and health services, and these improvements are now well embedded. However, these programmes are largely not resilient to the strains of continuing uncertainties around funding and of an increasingly challenging operating context, given increasing class sizes, etc. In the areas of relief and social services and camp improvement/infrastructure, the direction of reform is set but the change process is nascent; both the gains achieved to date and the momentum of reform remain vulnerable. UNRWA has yet to establish the systems that would allow it to show, in a coherent way, that its services are bringing its beneficiaries durable relief and sustainable development gains. UNRWA is constrained in how it operates by the dual challenge of being "temporary" and at the same time necessary for the foreseeable future; this has implications for its funding model and its planning processes.

UNRWA has a strong corporate commitment to results-based management, and results data are reviewed and discussed regularly to inform decision-making and planning, at both headquarters and field office levels. While the Agency's results-based monitoring system is relatively new and evolving, it rests on strong foundations. The system currently captures programmatic results but soon will be integrated with REACH, UNRWA's enterprise resource planning system, and this will help to improve the preparation of financial statements and project accounting and to enhance the Agency's ability to undertake results-based budgeting. The results-based monitoring system generates a large volume of data. Although the data are used for decision-making, the system processes are onerous for the few staff who are responsible for its management. Key elements of UNRWA's work such as protection are not fully reported on in the results-based monitoring system; indicators for individual cases of gender-based violence, child protection, and gender and protection were removed recently from reporting requirements, as some fields of operations were unable to collect reliable and accurate data on these.

UNRWA's financial crisis has compelled the Agency to institute organisation-wide austerity measures, and a great deal of staff time and attention is being directed to resource management mobilisation, potentially at the expense of "doing" the work. UNRWA maintains tight financial management and it has clear data on expenditure by field of operations and by programme. The Agency has been able to continually adjust its spending based on funds available and to adjust programming as necessary, although decision-making has become more centralised at headquarters in this crisis. The work of the Department of Internal Oversight Services has been developed, but this has been incremental and insufficient due to funding constraints. UNRWA has a robust approach to risk management that considers relevant areas of risk to the organisation such as institutional (including reputational), programmatic, occupational and contextual (including political); UNRWA further reports risk against each of its strategic outcomes.

Although UNRWA's workforce is a key strength, there is a lack of systematic performance appraisal linked to staff promotion. Coupled with underlying resource insecurity risks, this can undermine productivity and motivation.

Is UNRWA making a difference?

There is a limited body of independent evidence against which to measure UNRWA's ability to deliver and demonstrate relevant and sustainable results in a cost-efficient way. UNRWA's results-based monitoring system is able to track its results to inform outcome-level reporting against strategic objectives. However, the Agency's evaluation function has been a casualty of the funding crisis, and it has not been able to undertake a number of intended strategic evaluations due to insufficient funds. Therefore, few opportunities have arisen to triangulate UNRWA's strategic reporting data, which indicate strong results in some programme areas (e.g. education, health), with independent and qualitative assessments. Beyond strategic evaluations, evaluations are built in as a deliverable in some UNRWA projects, a sign that evaluation to some extent is donor-driven rather than a strategic reflex of UNRWA management.

The limited number of evaluations available for review note the extent to which highly challenging operational and humanitarian conditions have increased the relevance of and need for UNRWA's services. Political turmoil, conflict, travel and trade restrictions, and resource constraints have significantly inhibited UNRWA's ability to deliver results or meet planned delivery targets.

Most evaluations note the impact of insufficient funds on their findings regarding the efficiency and cost effectiveness of UNRWA's development. Evaluations also note the negative implications of funding uncertainty for the Agency's cost-effective and efficient delivery of services and programming. Very few evaluations include any consideration of cost-benefit analysis or value for money, although many stakeholders perceive UNRWA, as a direct implementer with a predominantly national staff, as delivering significant achievements with the funding it receives.

Available evaluations, however, note variable integration of cross-cutting issues, with human rights and protection mainstreamed in UNRWA's approach and activities, while gender and (to a much lesser degree) climate change are addressed less consistently.

3.2. THE ORGANISATION'S PERFORMANCE JOURNEY

Comparison with previous assessments

MOPAN conducted its previous assessment of UNRWA in 2011. The assessment focused on UNRWA's organisational effectiveness and did not include an examination of its development results.

The previous assessment highlighted that UNRWA was underfunded. The Agency's funding situation deteriorated significantly between 2011 and 2018, to which UNRWA has responded with efforts to make the best use of available resources and to advance resource mobilisation.

The 2011 MOPAN assessment identified a number of strengths and areas for improvement (Box 3).

Box 3: Main strengths and areas for improvement from the MOPAN 2011 assessment

Strengths in 2011
● Strategic leadership for organisational renewal; embarked on an ambitious process of organisational development.
● Operational management that reflects adherence to humanitarian principles and efforts being made in linking aid management and performance, and various aspects of financial management.
● The capacity to manage relationships with a variety of actors and to adjust working procedures promptly to respond to changing circumstances and emergency situations.
● An increasing emphasis on evaluation, and the evaluation function has been made more independent.
● Considerable progress in becoming a more performance-oriented organisation; the MTS 2010-15 introduces key strategies to achieve the mandate enabled by corporate- and field-level results frameworks that incorporate thematic priorities.
● Reforms initiated, namely in results-based budgeting and human resources management, and designed to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its operations.

Areas for improvement in 2011
● The use of performance information in field-level programme planning and making adjustments as needs arise.
● The quality and coverage of evaluations and instituting a follow-up mechanism to ensure that evaluation recommendations are enacted.
● A policy position on results-based management and improved phrasing of results statements and selection of indicators.
● Mechanisms for delegated decision-making authority and responsibility to fields of operations.
● The implementation of existing policies that are supportive of moves towards more performance-oriented human resources management.
● Reporting performance through clear links between outputs and outcomes.
● The capturing and sharing of UNRWA's knowledge with a variety of stakeholders through improved evaluation, more tailored reporting to its different audiences and dissemination of lessons learned.
● Within the budgeting system, linking disbursements with reported results.

Between MOPAN's previous assessment in 2011 and this assessment, UNRWA undertook a number of significant reforms. UNRWA's mandate – to provide relief, human development and protection to Palestine refugees – remains vitally important. Progress has been made across all four of the performance areas, although the organisation still faces a number of operational and contextual challenges that are compounded by its ongoing and increasingly challenging financial situation. The 2011 MOPAN assessment was completed towards the beginning of the period of UNRWA's first Medium Term Strategy. It found that strategic management was one of UNRWA's strengths and that the Agency had made considerable progress in becoming a more performance-oriented organisation.

UNRWA continues on a positive trajectory of improving organisational performance, with an approach to strategic and performance management that is maturing. As the previous assessment highlighted, the Agency maintains

and collaborates with a diverse range of partners, and its partnership approaches are becoming more strategic and focused on leveraging UNRWA's resources and comparative advantage. UNRWA has strengthened its approach to mainstreaming relevant thematic issues and increased accountability across the organisation for reporting on gender and protection results.

Both MOPAN assessments of UNRWA note improvements in the organisation's evaluation function, although there are ongoing concerns about the quality and coverage of evaluations. Since the 2011 MOPAN assessment and following the 2015 UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) Peer Review, UNRWA has established an evaluation policy and evaluation quality standards. Nevertheless, the organisation's evaluation coverage is suboptimal, and no mechanisms are enforced systematically to measure improvements in evaluation quality.

Box 4 and Box 5 summarise the current assessment's findings on UNRWA's main strengths and areas for improvement in 2018. Overall, the assessment finds that UNRWA has improved performance in a number of areas and preserved the strengths that were highlighted in the 2011 assessment.

Box 4: Main strengths identified in the MOPAN 2017-18 assessment

Strengths in 2018
● A corporate strategy with a clearly articulated statement of UNRWA's unique and longstanding role in the Middle East, the comparative advantage it brings to this context and its alignment with relevant normative frameworks.
● A workforce that is uniquely integrated into the communities it serves: A very large proportion of the staff are themselves Palestine refugees, meaning they are committed to the communities they serve and have a deep understanding of the social and political context, sensitivities and needs of these communities.
● An embedded practice of results-based management that is strongest within core programme areas and enabled by a continual strengthening of strategy and performance management; regular review of and use of results reporting and data to inform planning and decision-making at different levels within the organisation.
● Strengthened and professionalised resource mobilisation efforts to attract new donors and efforts to establish new funding mechanisms to address the Agency's persistent and significant financial challenges.
● Strong and consistently applied internal measures for managing the organisation's budget and a rigorous approach to risk management.
● An increasingly strategic approach to engagement with a range of actors and partnership approaches, focused on leveraging the Agency's resources and comparative advantage.
● Strengthened delivery of protection programming and mainstreaming; well-positioned for integrating the approach to protection across UNRWA's programmes.
● Education and health programmes that demonstrate an innate and well-managed capacity to continue to improve on quality and achieve efficiency gains across a range of challenging conditions associated with protracted crises and in emergencies.
● Gender mainstreaming strengthened across the organisation with increased accountability for gender results and strengthened staff capacity to respond to gender-based violence.
● Effective, decentralised decision-making structure across its core programmes of health, education and to a lesser extent relief and social services; a clear headquarters/field role division; and collaboration on all aspects and shared ownership of programmes across headquarters and field offices.

Box 5: Areas for improvement identified in the MOPAN 2017-18 assessment

Areas for improvement in 2018
● Advance the delivery of a protection agenda, a core area of UNRWA's work, in ways (including practical reporting) that suit an environment of very limited programme budget allocation for staffing and resources and in which the protection agenda to date has been largely "projectised".
● Address the lack of strategic evaluations, which has resulted in limited independent evidence that the Agency can use to demonstrate the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of its interventions and overall approach in relation to the humanitarian-development nexus in protracted crises.
● Work towards greater consistency of the location of gender in the organisation with matching structures and further strengthen the gender architecture needed for delivery within a resource-constrained environment.
● Create an explicit policy and/or strategy regarding the Agency's approach to addressing environmental sustainability and climate change; there is limited evidence that analysis in these areas informs interventions at a programmatic level.
● Ensure a systematic application of the staff performance management and appraisal system; develop a strategic human resources strategy that remains considerate of the uncertainties and increasing security risks faced by staff, but also is more forward-looking on the need to reconfigure staff resources and the changing skills mix to enable UNRWA to best navigate the uncertain path to deliver on its mandate.
● In pursuing impact from the inter-dependent strategic outcomes of the MTS and building on the strategic approach on resource mobilisation, seek ways to take a more deliberate and visible stance to the blending of the strengths of UNRWA's staff capacity and organisational advocacy with the exploration of new horizons on partnering, including openness to new ways of working.
● Work within the limited space provided by current constraints of available resources and capacity to take results-based management to the next level; consolidate the emerging practices of data analysis and reflection at different management levels within core programme areas and build on these to examine and guide UNRWA's progress on more multi-faceted challenges such as poverty reduction and effective targeting of vulnerability. Through this, sharpen external communication on how effectively and efficiently the organisation is working against its own internal standards and in terms of the results it is and is not achieving.

UNRWA in 2018 is an organisation that is competent, resilient and resolute. Its way of working and the results it is achieving in a resource-constrained environment reflect a well-managed organisation that delivers. Overall, its organisational performance remains on a positive trajectory of improvement, and UNRWA is making progress in each of the performance areas of organisational effectiveness. However, the persistent funding crisis has had a significant impact on UNRWA's ability to invest in its services, development and systems beyond the "essentials" of delivering education, health, relief and social services, and camp services.

The funding crisis is pervasive and is consuming of staff time and efforts in financial management and necessary resource mobilisation. This constrains the ability of UNRWA management to capitalise on the strengths of the Agency, more actively engage with new challenges and start to explore where and how a more coherent approach across the Agency can deliver added value. The funding crisis also constrains the Agency's ability to meet the mandated humanitarian, human development and protection needs of Palestine refugees in ways that provide an effective platform for the international effort to segue openly to a sustainable development solution for the time when relief to Palestine refugees is no longer needed.

UNRWA provides a lifeline for extremely poor families and offers stability in an inherently unstable environment by keeping alive the hopes and possibilities of Palestine refugees. It does so by delivering, for example, a solid, basic education and by representing Palestine refugees within the UN and with UN member states. UNRWA's experiences, while drawn from a unique context, offer lessons for working in protracted crises that have wider relevance and value in the region and globally. Looking ahead, UNRWA whilst continuing to fulfil its mandate through the resilience of its systems, can be a stronger contributor – if it is enabled and equipped to do so – to the global discourse on strengthening the humanitarian-development nexus.

ANNEXES

Annex 1. Evidence table

Methodology for scoring and rating

The approach to scoring and rating under MOPAN 3.0 draws from the OECD *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide* (OECD/EU/JRC, 2008). Each of the MOPAN 3.0 key performance indicators (KPIs) contains a number of micro-indicators (MIs) which vary in number. The MIs, in turn, contain elements representing international best practice; their numbers also vary.

The approach is as follows:

a) Micro-indicator level

Scores ranging from 0 to 4 are assigned per **element**, according to the extent to which an organisation implements the element.

For **KPIs 1-8**, the following criteria frame the scores:

4 = Element is fully implemented/implemented in all cases
3 = Element is substantially implemented/implemented in the majority of cases
2 = Element is partially implemented/implemented in some cases
1 = Element is present, but not implemented/implemented in zero cases
0 = Element is not present

Taking the average of the constituent elements' scores, a rating is then calculated per MI. The rating scale applied is as follows:

3.01-4	**Highly satisfactory**
2.01-3	**Satisfactory**
1.01-2	**Unsatisfactory**
0.00-1	**Highly unsatisfactory**

The ratings scale for **KPIs 9-12** applies the same thresholds as for KPIs 1-8, for consistency, but pitches scores to the middle of the threshold value (to guard against skewing in favour of higher ratings).

3.01-4	**Highly satisfactory**
2.01-3	**Satisfactory**
1.01-2	**Unsatisfactory**
0.00-1	**Highly unsatisfactory**

A score of zero (0) for an element means the assessment team had expected to find evidence but did not find any. A score of zero counts towards the MI score.

A score of "N/E" means "no evidence" indicates that the assessment team could not find any evidence but was not confident of whether or not there was evidence to be found. The team assumes that "no evidence" does not necessarily equal a zero score. Elements rated N/E are excluded from any calculation of the average. A significant number of N/E scores in a report indicates an assessment limitation (see the Limitations section at the beginning of the report).

A note indicating "N/A" means that an element is considered to be "not applicable". This usually owes to the organisation's specific nature.

b) Aggregation to the KPI level

The same logic is pursued at aggregation to the KPI level to ensure a consistent approach. Taking the average of the constituent scores per MI, a rating is then calculated per KPI.

The calculation for KPIs is the same as for the MIs above, namely:

3.01-4	**Highly satisfactory**
2.01-3	**Satisfactory**
1.01-2	**Unsatisfactory**
0.00-1	**Highly unsatisfactory**

Key

Micro-indicator

Evidence confidence

Element 1
Element 2
Element 3
Element 4
Element 5
Element 6
Element 7

Highly satisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Highly unsatisfactory
No Evidence / Not assessed

High confidence
Medium confidence
Little to no confidence

Strategic management

KPI 1: Organisational and financial framework

1.1 Long-term vision
1.2 Organisational architecture
1.3 Support to normative frameworks
1.4 Financial frameworks

KPI 2: Structures for cross-cutting issues

2.1a Gender equality
2.1b Environment
2.1c Governance
2.1d Human rights

Operational management

KPI 3: Relevance and agility

3.1 Resources aligned to functions
3.2 Resource mobilisation
3.3 Decentralised decision-making
3.4 Performance-based HR

KPI 4: Cost effective and transparent systems

4.1 Decision-making
4.2 Disbursement
4.3 Results-based budgeting
4.4 International audit standards
4.5 Control mechanisms
4.6 Anti-fraud procedures

Relationship management

KPI 5: Relevance and agility in partnership

5.1 Alignment
5.2 Context analysis
5.3 Capacity analysis
5.4 Risk management
5.5 Design includes cross-cutting
5.6 Design includes sustainability
5.7 Implementation speed

KPI 6: Partnerships and resources

6.1 Agility
6.2 Comparative advantage
6.3 Country systems
6.4 Synergies
6.5 Partner coordination
6.6 Information sharing
6.7 Accountability
6.8 Joint assessments
6.9 Knowledge deployment

Performance management

KPI 7: Results focus

7.1 BRM applied
7.2 RBM in strategies
7.3 Evidence-based targets
7.4 Effective monitoring systems
7.5 Performance data applied

KPI 8: Evidence-based planning

8.1 Evaluation function
8.2 Evaluation coverage
8.3 Evaluation quality
8.4 Evidence-based design
8.5 Poor performance tracked
8.6 Follow-up systems
8.7 Uptake of lessons

Results

KPI 9: Achievement of results

9.1 Results deemed attained
9.2 Benefits for target groups
9.3 Policy/capacity impact
9.4 Gender equity results
9.5 Environment results
9.6 Governance results
9.7 Human rights results

KPI 10: Relevance to partners

10.1 Target groups
10.2 National objectives
10.3 Coherence

KPI 11: Results delivered efficiently

11.1 Cost efficiency
11.2 Timeliness

KPI 12: Sustainability of results

12.1 Sustainable benefits
12.2 Sustainable capacity
12.3 Enabling environment

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

Clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities

KPI 1: Organisational architecture and financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results	KPI score
Highly satisfactory	3.29

UNRWA's contemporary mandate to provide relief, human development and protection services to Palestine refugees is currently in place until June 2020. UNRWA's Medium Term Strategy 2016-21 (MTS) clearly articulates the organisation's medium-term vision; the current MTS is UNRWA's second and demonstrates a maturation of the organisation's strategic approach. The MTS includes a series of strategic outcomes, developed to reflect UNRWA's comparative advantage. The MTS is operationalised through Strategic Plans 2016-21 (SPs), as well as Annual Operation Plans for each of the fields it operates in. These are aligned with the strategic outcomes. The operating model supports the implementation of the plan and Annual Operation plans are reviewed regularly to ensure their ongoing relevance.

UNRWA's organisational architecture is congruent with its mandate and strategic plan and allows for cooperation across the organisation and with external partners. UNRWA has a largely decentralised operating model, though oversight from HQ has recently increased from a risk management perspective, largely in response to the agency's current funding crisis.

UNRWA's focus on the rights and welfare of Palestine refugees provides some clear points of alignment with wider normative frameworks. In terms of Humanitarian Principles, UNRWA operates in full compliance with applicable international law and to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. There is explicit reference within UNRWA's strategic plan (2016-21) to the SDGs and Agenda 2030 and the agency has mapped its contributions to the SDGs. UNRWA regularly reports also on the Grand Bargain and the UN-SWAP.

UNRWA has a single integrated budget framework; its Programme Budget - funded predominantly through voluntary, unearmarked, contributions from UN Member States and other donors, Project funds - resourced by 100 per cent voluntary earmarked contributions and the non-core sources of funding of Emergency Appeals, which raise earmarked and unearmarked funds in full through voluntary contributions. UNRWA is experiencing a protracted and severe financial crisis and has been operating without capital reserves since 2012. UNRWA has planned and implemented extensive measures in light of the crisis to prioritise the organisation's expenditure and its financial framework is examined and reviewed regularly by the organisation's governing body.

MI 1.1: Strategic plan and intended results based on a clear long-term vision and analysis of comparative advantage	Score
Overall MI Rating	Highly satisfactory
Overall MI score	3.75
Element 1: A publicly available Strategic Plan (or equivalent) contains a long-term vision	4
Element 2: The vision is based on a clear analysis and articulation of comparative advantage	4
Element 3: A strategic plan operationalizes the vision, including defining intended results	4
Element 4: The Strategic Plan is reviewed regularly to ensure continued relevance	3

MI 1.1 Analysis	Source document
UNRWA's mandate contemporary mandate is to provide relief, human development and protection services to Palestine refugees and persons displaced by the 1967 hostilities in its fields of operation. In the absence of a solution to the Palestine refugee problem, the General Assembly has repeatedly renewed UNRWA's mandate, most recently extending it until 30 June 2020. The current MTS is UNRWA's second and demonstrates a maturation of the organisation's strategic approach. The organisation's operational focus remains largely the same across strategic periods, but the MTS and its strategic priorities are 'negotiated' with host countries and donors to frame the content, and the accompanying results framework is the product of a negotiation with donors, where donors to some extent 'pick' results areas they wish the agency to focus on. UNRWA's MTS outlines an ambitious medium-term vision with a series of strategic outcomes based on UNRWA's comparative advantage: 1) Outcome 1: Rights under international law are protected and promoted; 2) Outcome 2: Health is protected, and disease burden is reduced; 3) Outcome 3: Children complete quality, equitable and inclusive basic education; 4) Outcome 4: Capabilities strengthened for increased livelihood opportunities; 5) Outcome 5: Basic human needs of nutrition, shelter and environmental health are met. UNRWA's comparative advantage is clearly recognised and relates to its ability to deliver emergency response and due to its size and infrastructure in the fields it operates in, as well as its technical expertise. The MTS is operationalised through Strategic Plans 2016-21 (SPs) and Annual Operation Plans for each of the fields it operates in which are aligned with the MTS strategic outcomes. These are monitored through an accompanying Common Monitoring Matrix (CMM). The SPs are deliberately separate from the organisation's strategy allowing for amendments in case the operating environment within one field of operations changes significantly. Whilst the MTS itself is not reviewed regularly, the SPs through which the MTS is operationalised is reviewed regularly and amended as necessary through agency-wide annual and half-yearly reviews on both expenditure and results.	1, 6, 7, 16, 24, 31, 36, 37, 41, 44, 43, 67
MI 1.1 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 1.2: Organisational architecture congruent with a clear long-term vision and associated operating model	Score
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.2**
Element 1: The organisational architecture is congruent with the strategic plan	3
Element 2: The operating model supports implementation of the strategic plan	3
Element 3: The operating model is reviewed regularly to ensure continued relevance	4
Element 4: The operating model allows for strong cooperation across the organisation and with other agencies	3
Element 5: The operating model clearly delineates responsibilities for results	3

MI 1.2 Analysis	Source document
UNRWA, as a UN agency offers services and assistance which are to some extent akin to public services provided by governments (health, education) and its architecture is congruent with its function, mandate and strategic plan. For example, in terms of governance, UNRWA's official governing body is the United Nations General Assembly and UNRWA is headed by the Commissioner-General who is supported by the Deputy Commissioner-General and by the Advisory Commission (AdCom). The AdCom is composed of 27 Members and 3 Observers (Palestine, the European Union, and the League of Arab States).	1, 8, 43, 31, 67
UNRWA's operating model reflects the geography and nature of the Palestine refugee population that it 'temporarily' serves and reflects the diversity of operating conditions across and within the different fields of operation. UNRWA's operating model is largely decentralised, although oversight from HQ has increased from a risk management perspective, largely in response to the agency's current funding crisis. Recent programmatic reforms have increased shared understanding across the organisation regarding what it is trying to achieve. Responsibilities for delivering results are clearly outlined in compacts between Directors and the Commissioner General. At an operational level, the MTS and SPs are implemented through annual operational plans that align with the UNRWA budget cycle. Emergency response plans are aligned to the Annual Operational Plans where necessary Annual operation plans and results are reviewed regularly at both a field and HQ level, with action points outlined regarding any necessary changes or areas of concern. There is evidence that the operating model is designed to allow for cooperation across the organisation and with external partners and for the organisation to be responsive to changes in context. According to the different contexts UNRWA works in, the agency has different relationships with the host government and engages as necessary with the wider UN architecture. For example, in Jordan, it works closely with government and other UN agencies but is not part of the UNDAFf. In Lebanon, it is part of the UNCT and the UNDAF but works less directly with the government given the arrangements around responsibility for Palestine refugees. UNRWA is actively working to transform a number of its existing partnerships into long-term strategic engagements to enhance the ability of the Agency to fulfil its mandate.	50, 58, 68, 73, 100, 109, 110, 111
MI 1.2 Evidence confidence	High confidence

MI 1.3: The strategic plan supports the implementation of wider normative frameworks and associated results, including Agenda 2030 and others where applicable (e.g. the quadrennial comprehensive policy review (QCPR), Grand Bargain, replenishment commitments, or other resource and results reviews)	Score
Overall MI rating	Satisfactory
Overall MI score	3
Element 1: The strategic plan is aligned to wider normative frameworks and associated results, including Agenda 2030, and others, such as the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable)	3
Element 2: The strategic plan includes clear results for normative frameworks, including Agenda 2030, and others, such as the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable)	3
Element 3: A system to track normative results is in place for Agenda 2030, and any other relevant frameworks, such as the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable)	3

Element 4: The organisation's accountability for achieving normative results, including those of Agenda 2030, and any other relevant frameworks, such as the SDGs and their targets and indicators, the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable), is clearly established	N/A
Element 5: Progress on implementation on an aggregated level is published at least annually	3
MI 1.3 Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA aligns its work with wider normative frameworks such as Agenda 2030 and has mapped the alignment between the SDGs and its MTS, with the MTS contributing to 10 of the 17 SDGs. UNRWA reports to both the UN-SWAP and the Grand Bargain on an annual basis. UNRWA's contribution to the SDGs is not aggregated in a specific report or reported on explicitly but can be seen in the agency annual results reporting.	1, 3, 7, 8, 47, 63, 69
In delivering on its mandate, UNRWA supports and exemplifies the framework of Humanitarian Principles and alignment with the international normative legal framework as it relates to humanitarian action and in particular the protection of human rights. UNRWA recently adopted a Neutrality Framework that not only builds on the existing regulatory framework pertaining to UNRWA's compliance with humanitarian principles, but also reflects existing practices and responds to recommendations issued by applicable United Nations Boards of Inquiry. Data on possible violations of international law, including human rights violations by duty bearers acting in UNRWA fields, is published on an annual basis and through protection publications as well as addressed in regular engagement with the IHRS. Core internal operating policies such as the Child Protection Framework and the Disability guidelines, drafted with reference to international conventions on the rights of children and persons with disabilities ensures internal programming aligns with international human rights standards. Element 4 is not applicable given UNRWA's mandate.	56, 58, 59, 75, 78, 91
MI 1.3 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 1.4: Financial Framework (e.g. division between core and non-core resources) supports mandate implementation	**Score**
Overall MI rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.2**
Element 1: Financial and budgetary planning ensures that all priority areas have adequate funding in the short term or are at least given clear priority in cases where funding is very limited	3
Element 2: A single integrated budgetary framework ensures transparency	3
Element 3: The financial framework is reviewed regularly by the governing bodies	4
Element 4: Funding windows or other incentives in place to encourage donors to provide more flexible/un-earmarked funding at global and country levels	3
Element 5: Policies/measures are in place to ensure that earmarked funds are targeted at priority areas	3

MI 1.4 Analysis	Source document
UNRWA has a single integrated budget framework, which is composed of its Programme, Projects, and Emergency Appeals. The Programme Budget is funded predominantly by voluntary unearmarked contributions from UN Member States and other donors. Project funds are resourced by 100 per cent voluntary earmarked contributions. The non-core sources of funding are Emergency Appeals, which raise all of their funds from voluntary contributions, both earmarked and unearmarked. UNRWA is experiencing a systemic and sustained financial crisis with increasing difficulties of filling increasing end-of-year cash shortfall projections. Given this funding crisis, the agency has clearly prioritised expenditure on the priority areas of health and education, although protection, is largely funded by projects rather than core funding. There is clear evidence that the Agency has planned and implemented measures to prioritise the organisation's expenditure and that its financial framework has been examined and reviewed regularly by the organisation's governing body. In light of the funding crisis, the agency has launched a large fundraising effort; its #DignityIsPriceless taskforce (TF) to raise USD 500 million to bridge serious funding gaps that the agency faces as a direct response to drastic funding cuts from a major donor and is in the process exploring the development of a Trust Fund with the World Bank, and an Islamic Endowment Fund (Waqf) with the Islamic Development Bank as alternative funding streams to provide the agency with further and flexible funding. The Waqf fund was first envisaged in a 2017 report by and announced at the OIC's 7th Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference in Istanbul in May 2018.	1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 10, 24, 31, 43, 44, 48, 55, 57, 60, 95, 118
MI 1.4 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms in place and applied to support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels	KPI score
Satisfactory	**2.39**

UNRWA specifically considers the cross-cutting themes of gender, protection (including disability), and human rights within its programmes and operations and these cross-cutting areas are supported by dedicated policy statements, whether within the MTS or in specific documentation. Each of these areas are integrated to some degree within UNRWA's results frameworks and there is evidence that capacity building of UNRWA staff in these areas has been undertaken and that there is accountability internally and externally for these cross-cutting areas, although limited programme resources available to support them.

Human rights are enshrined in the highest level of UNRWS's results framework in its goal statement and the MTS and Protection Strategy both incorporate objectives around human rights. For UNRWA, human rights and its work on protection are intrinsically linked. Protection, as defined in the MTS, is 'what the Agency does to safeguard and advance the rights of Palestine refugees, including through the direct provision of services and other activities.' UNRWA has very limited core resources from the programme budget allocated to protection. In 2016, UNRWA established the UNRWA Headquarters Protection Division as well as dedicated protection teams across all of the Agency's fields of operations to further its protection work. The agency has a dedicated Protection Strategy which outlines the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in UNRWA in terms of delivering on protection and human rights; This brings together key activities to promote protection of human rights such as the Agency's long-standing engagement with the international human rights system under the Agency's Framework for such engagement, led by the Department of Legal Affairs in co-ordination with protection functions.

UNRWA's Gender Equality Strategy (GES) 2016-21 covers the same time period as the MTS. The GES was rolled-out in 2017 with actions plans agreed to be all field offices and cascading presentation to all departments and field offices and is monitored annually. Strengthening UNRWA's gender architecture has been identified as a priority for the GES as structurally there is some inconsistency as to where gender 'sits' across the organisation and there are limited 'core' resources allocated to gender. UNRWA is engaged with at the UN system-wide gender mainstreaming accountability framework to strengthen its accountability in meeting GEEW results.

UNRWA does not have a policy statement with regards to environmental sustainability and climate change, although the MTS 2016-21 outlines an intention to assist and coordinate with others who undertake work on climate change and its impact on refugee populations.

MI 2.1a: Gender equality and the empowerment of women	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.17**
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on gender equality available and showing evidence of use	4
Element 2: Gender equality indicators and targets fully integrated into the organisation's strategic plan and corporate objectives	4
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect gender equality indicators and targets	3
Element 4: Gender screening checklists or similar tools used for all new Interventions	3
Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address gender issues	2
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on gender is underway or has been conducted	3
MI 2.1a Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA has a new Gender Equality Strategy (GES) 2016-21; covering the same time period as the MTS. The strategy draws upon previous UNRWA normative documentation relating to gender; the Agency's 2007 Gender Equality Policy, which commits the organisation to promote gender equality and women's empowerment, and the previous Gender Mainstreaming Strategy (GMS) 2008-15. UNRWA's MTS does not have a standalone outcome on gender equality and the empowerment of women (GEEW) but states that gender considerations are to be included in the Strategic Outcome concerning protection. The MTS results framework includes a limited number of indicators which have a gender-specific focus, as well as a number where data is disaggregated by gender as deemed relevant by UNRWA following a systematic review of all MTS indicators. The design of the new GES is underpinned by a theory of change which takes into account both organisational and programme changes needed to achieve more equitable and inclusive services for Palestine refugees. The GES is accompanied by a monitoring plan and implementation of the GES is reported on annually against action plans developed by Field Offices which are cascaded to all departments. At the field level several gender/protection units implement project review checklists or have project review boards to ensure that protection and gender are adequately incorporated into new projects and funding proposals and gender analysis guidance is available to support intervention design.	1, 3, 8, 10, 25, 35, 44, 47, 51, 50, 52, 74, 75, 76, 83, 114, 119

Strengthening UNRWA's gender architecture has been identified as a priority for the GES. Structurally, there is some inconsistency as to where gender 'sits' across the organisation. At a HQ level, gender sits within the Protection Division, although this structure has not yet been replicated across all fields and gender is found variously under protection, RSS and planning. The location of gender within the protection division and the focus of the gender section's main project 'Building Safety: Mainstreaming GBV Interventions into Emergency Preparedness, Prevention and Response" on GBV has meant that the protection aspects of gender are high profile within the organisation, but there is not necessarily a broader focus on gender outside of protection concerns, for example, gender mainstreaming. The key pillar to support gender mainstreaming across the organisation is UNRWA's Gender Task Forcewhich consists of seventy Gender Focal Points from the various programmes and field offices. Gender Focal Points meet regularly at field and Agency level to coordinate gender mainstreaming and build capacities. However, gender is an 'add-on' to existing staff responsibilities and as such, can be deprioritised in the face of scarce human and financial resources.

Within UNRWA's core budget, there are limited designated core funds from the Programme Budget allocated to gender. There is only one staff member (Head of Gender Section) funded by the Programme Budget across the whole of the organisation. Funding for gender mainstreaming activities is generated through the allocations in existing programmes which address gender issues, or through raising extra-budgetary resources for specific interventions (e.g. GBV referral system in UNRWA). However, a gender marker has been introduced for the Programme budget to monitor resource allocation and tracking of funds dedicated to gender, which reveals that 64.4 per cent of the budget is coded as contributing in significant way to gender mainstreaming. This is largely attributed to the education programme given the size of the programme that was scored as gender sensitive. In its work on GBV, UNRWA's Gender Unit has sought to build the capacity of staff working on GBV prevention and response, including the development of GBV road-maps for all field offices which details GBV prevention work outcomes, outputs and activities for all the Agency's field offices based on a GBV Prevention Framework.

The organisation is committed to addressing gender in terms of HR; UNRWA's People Strategy also commits the organisation to addressing human resources issues related to gender, in supporting a move towards gender parity in management and leadership positions and to ensuring gender and Cultural sensitivity training is provided. The HRD has developed a Gender Parity Action Plan based on the UN System-wide Strategy which has a baseline assessment of gender parity across the organisation and will be reviewed regularly. UNRWA has implemented measures for increased organisational accountability mechanisms for senior managers with respect to gender equality. All UNRWA directors have signed a compact with the UNRWA Commissioner-General which contains references to gender equality. UNRWA has sought to incentivize staff commitment and contribution to gender mainstreaming by launching the Gender Champion Awards which recognizes selected staff's significant contributions to the advancement of gender equality.

At a UN-wide level, UNRWA is engaged with the system-wide gender mainstreaming accountability framework (UN-SWAP) to strengthen its accountability in meeting GEEW results. Relative to the aggregate performance of Funds and Programmes entities, UNRWA's progress towards meeting UN-SWAP requirements was found to be below average in 2017. UNRWA was assessed as "meets" or "exceeds" requirements for 66 per cent of the performance indicators; whereas Funds and Programmes entities on average "meet" or "exceed" them for 73 per cent. Gender mainstreaming in evaluation, audit, resource tracking, resource allocation and gender architecture/parity are highlighted as areas requiring UNRWA focus going forward.

1, 3, 8, 10, 25, 35, 44, 47, 51, 50, 52, 74, 75, 76, 83, 114, 119

| MI 2.1a Evidence confidence | High confidence |

MI 2.1b: Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Highly unsatisfactory**
Overall MI score	**1**
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on environmental sustainability and climate change available and showing evidence of use	1
Element 2: Environmental sustainability/ climate change indicators and targets are fully integrated into the organisation's strategic plan and corporate objectives	0
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect environmental sustainability and climate change indicators and targets	2
Element 4: Environmental screening checklists/impact assessments used for all new Interventions	N/A
Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address environmental sustainability and climate change issues	1
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on environmental sustainability and climate change is underway or has taken place	1
MI 2.1b Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA has no explicit policy and/or strategy regarding its approach to addressing environmental sustainability and climate change, although there is a draft Environmental Management Policy dating from 2008.

The MTS 2016-21 outlines an intention to assist and coordinate with others who undertake work on climate change and its impact on refugee populations. The Corporate environmental management of UNRWA - Peer Review draft report outlines the limited human resources UNRWA currently has to address energy efficiency and provides suggestions in this regard.

UNRWA is committed in improving environmental conditions in camps and in this effort: (i) has adopted green technologies to improve environmental protection; (ii) has and continues to implement projects such as solar panels, photovoltaic cells, solar water heaters, greening etc. to improve environmental protection; (iii) has developed a Solid Waste Management (SWM) Framework and has developed SWM strategy for the Fields; (iv) has revised and issued Agency wide Technical Instruction addressing Environmental, Social, Health and Safety (ESHS) components in our construction works; (v) is seeking support in improving/developing monitoring tools and instructions to integrate ESHS in our works; and (vi) plans is to build capacity of UNRWA staff in this field. At a decentralised level, Lebanon Field Office has an Environmental Health Strategy for the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon. | 1, 4, 35, 72, 128, 129 |
| **MI 2.1b Evidence confidence** | **High confidence** |

MI 2.1c: Good governance	Score
Overall MI Rating	
Overall MI score	**N/A**
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on the principles of good governance and effective institutions available and showing evidence of use	N/A
Element 2: Indicators and targets related to the principles of good governance and effective institutions are integrated into the organisation's strategic plan and corporate objectives	N/A

Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect the principles of good governance and effective institutions	N/A
Element 4: New interventions are assessed for relevant governance/institutional effectiveness issues	N/A
Element 5: Human and financial resources are available to address the principles of good governance and issues related to effective institutions	N/A
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on the principles of good governance and effective institutions is underway or has taken place	N/A
MI 2.1c Analysis	**Source document**
Micro-indicator deemed not applicable for assessment purposes given UNRWA mandate	
MI 2.1c Evidence confidence	Choose an item.

MI 2.1d: Human Rights	**Score**
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3**
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on human rights issues available and showing evidence of use	4
Element 2: Human rights indicators and targets fully integrated into the organisation's strategic plan and corporate objectives	2
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect human rights indicators and targets	3
Element 4: Human rights screening checklists or similar tools used for all new interventions	N/A
Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address human rights issues	2
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on human rights is underway or has been conducted	4
MI 2.1d Analysis	**Source document**
For UNRWA, human rights and its work on protection are intrinsically linked. Protection, as defined in the MTS, is 'what the Agency does to safeguard and advance the rights of Palestine refugees, including through the direct provision of services and other activities. 'UNRWA promotes the protection of Palestine refugees, including the enjoyment of their human rights, through its work on reporting and advocacy, as well as delivering its associated programmatic results. Human rights are enshrined in the highest level of UNRWA's results framework in its goal statement and the MTS and Protection Strategy both incorporate objectives around human rights.

A key dimension of the Agency's international protection work seeks to advance respect for these rights by relevant State and other duty bearers. The Agency does this through private and public advocacy, including with the international systems dedicated to human rights. When the conduct of host authorities and other duty bearers raises serious human rights concerns, in addition to advocacy, the Agency's Framework for Effective engagement with the IHRS, looks to these mechanisms as a strategic avenue to promote the protection of human rights of Palestine refugees, including calling for accountability for violations of international law. The Agency has been able to maintain this engagement with 17 engagements in 2017 and 16 in 2018, despite financial constraints particularly in the West Bank. | 1, 2, 3, 22, 35, 40, 42, 44, 47, 81, 87, 134, 135, 136 |

UNRWA's MTS identifies strengthening monitoring, reporting and advocacy of the human rights of Palestine Refugees at an international level to prevent such violations from occurring and seek accountability and remedial measures for those that do occur. Addressing and mainstreaming protection is a challenge for UNRWA; it is an area of its work that is frequently politicised and the results its delivers are less tangible than that of its other areas of work in education, health and RSS. The agency is 'wrestling' with what protection means for UNRWA in real operational terms and in organisational structure requirements. At the same time, the agency is faced with a deteriorating protection situation in many of its field offices and limited resources to dress protection concerns. UNRWA has struggled to report on the protection indicators currently in the MTS, which are described as 'aspirational'.

UNRWA has limited programme budget resources allocated to protection. 5 per cent of the protection budget comes from the programme budget. Only two protection positions (Chief, Protection Division and Head of Gender Section) are paid for by the GA-assessed budget out of the approximate 112 staff in the HQ Protection Division and Protection Units/Operations Support Office (OSO) teams. The Protection Division also receives around $226,000 annually from the Programme Budget for staff and on-going activities (e.g. workshops, travel, etc.). By contrast, the Protection Units/OSO teams in the field offices do not receive any of the Programme Budget. At the field office level, resources available for Protection are from projects, including for the salaries of key institutional protection posts, which are therefore vulnerable in the face of funding cuts. A key donor has been providing funding for UNRWA's OSO which (amongst other roles) works to promote the rights of Palestine refugees and respond effectively to protection incidents and concerns; and to facilitate greater alignment of UNRWA programmes and service delivery with the Agency's common protection standards in a manner that promotes and respects the rights of beneficiaries. This key donor has recently withdrawn all funding to UNRWA and so it is unclear how much of the protection work will be financed going forward.

In 2016, UNRWA established the UNRWA Headquarters Protection Division as well as dedicated protection teams across all of the Agency's fields of operations to further its protection work. This restructure was undertaken in light of the 2014 Gaza conflict where it became clear the organisation needed a more institutional and strategic approach to protection rather than protection being siloed within a particular programmatic area. The agency has a dedicated Protection Strategy which outlines the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholder in UNRWA in terms of delivering on protection and human rights;

UNRWA has placed significant emphasis and efforts into the mainstreaming of protection across Field Offices. UNRWA has identified key protection standards to mainstream protection in the internal dimension of its protection work which are to be used by senior staff, programme chiefs, programme protection focal points and others involved in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programme activities. The agency completed a Protection baseline in 2016 to provide a reference point to measure progress towards the implementation of the MTS and the changing external operating environment in which the Agency operates. Field Offices undertake biennial protection audits which monitor the degree of alignment with Agency Protection Standards in all aspects of programming and makes remedial recommendations as necessary. Implementation of the recommendations generated through the Protection Audits is followed-up by protection working groups within each field office and monitored through an online tracking tool. The concept of protection and human rights is also embedded within UNRWA's programmes; UNRWA has a Human Rights, Conflict Resolution and Tolerance (HRCRT) Policy, Strategy and Toolkit as part of its education programming. For Education, protection is emphasised in all its work - i.e. the wellbeing and safety of its students. But it has also explicitly addressed the area, most specifically in its approach to the provision of education in emergencies - where safety and security is a key dimension, addressed in a number of very tangible ways. The training of staff on protection is an agency priority; training has been delivered on case-management, GBV, child protection.

1, 2, 3, 22, 35, 40, 42, 44, 47, 81, 87, 134, 135, 136

Training on human rights and protection has been delivered across the agency; for example, in 2017, 195 staff were trained on protection and 2016 staff received human rights, conflict resolution and tolerance (in relation to education) top up training. In 2018, 5,609 staff were trained on protection. There is limited evidence regarding the financial resources allocated to human rights.	1, 2, 3, 22, 35, 40, 42, 44, 47, 81, 87, 134, 135, 136
MI 2.1d Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Assets and capacities organised behind strategic direction and intended results, to ensure relevance agility and accountability

KPI 3: Operating model and human/financial resources support relevance and agility	KPI score
Highly satisfactory	**3.22**

UNRWA's biggest asset to deliver on its mandate and achieve strategic objectives is its workforce. The People Strategy 2016-21 is clear on the importance of both organisational culture and an empowered staff group at all levels in the organisation if the Agency is to maximise its impact. UNRWA is committed to ensuring that the capacities and capabilities of its staff are aligned with the Agency's mandate and has reviewed staffing requirements in each of its divisions and put forward an action plan to ensure that the staffing resources available are equal to the operational needs. Internal restructuring exercises having been completed (education, health), or are being planned/ being implemented (RSS) at HQ and field level with the clear intent of better aligning staff to key functions and to meet the needs of a more future facing UNRWA. UNRWA's approach to protection from a structural and resource alignment perspective remains work in progress as currently only 5 per cent of the costs needed for protection and 2 core staff (Chief of Protection Division and Head of Gender Section) are from the programme budget, and the rest from project funding. UNRWA is active in ensuring that the services it delivers are in sync with changing demands and the operating environment of the population group it serves through a strong commitment to continuous workforce planning and increasing professionalisation.

 UNRWA's Staff performance management system is clearly set out but mixed in its application. The three-point scale of the system is not considered sufficiently nuanced. Strategic HR management is constrained by an environment where there is heightened anxiety amongst staff regarding redundancies, recruitment freezes and concerns over job security. The challenges of staff security and safety are increasing, and although UNRWA demonstrates the ability to reconfigure its staffing structures and skills deployment to meet the needs of emergency situations, this flexibility may become harder to manage as emergency situations become more protracted. Strategic HR management is also constrained by budget short falls, underfunding and unpredictability of funding month to month or year to year.

Given UNRWA's current financial situation, resource mobilisation receives significant emphasis across the organisation and there is accountability for this at the highest levels with staff 'pulling out all stops' to address the funding crisis. UNRWA's lack of funding presents a strong threat to the Agency and professionalizing resource mobilisation is new territory for UNRWA. UNRWA has a well-reasoned, developed, and increasingly diverse approach to resource mobilisation, consistent with the Agency's core mandate and strategic priorities and a business model of an Agency with a temporary mandate. The agency is increasingly looking at new, sustainable funding models, engaging new donors and has implemented extensive efficiency measures. The RMS is reported against on a regular basis against detailed resource mobilisation targets.

UNRWA has clear delegation of authority between HQ and Field Offices with well laid out systems and processes – anchored in the MTS, Strategic Response Plans, AOPs and staff performance compacts - to support resource allocation and programming decisions at the field level. Field offices engage in planning and reporting processes regularly with HQ and targets are set collaboratively rather than imposed upon Field Offices. The extreme financial position in recent years has led to some centralised micro-management of expenditure and some understandable tension between HQ and the Field. Notwithstanding this, the core programmes are still driven by the needs of each field context and HQ provides the overall guidance and support – including a data informed challenge – to fields pursuing their own set of programmatic results.

MI 3.1: Organisational structures and staffing ensure that human and financial resources are continuously aligned and adjusted to key functions	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.33**
Element 1: Staffing is aligned with, or being reorganized to, requirements set out in the current Strategic Plan	3
Element 2: Resource allocations across functions are aligned to current organisational priorities and goals, as set out in the current Strategic Plan	3
Element 3: Internal restructuring exercises have a clear purpose and intent, aligned to the priorities of the current Strategic Plan	4
MI 3.1 Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA is committed to ensuring that the capacities and capabilities of UNRWA's staff are aligned with the Agency's mandate. In its planning at strategic and operational levels, UNRWA has reviewed staffing requirements in each of its divisions and put forward an action plan to ensure that the staffing resources available are equal to the operational needs. The MTS 2016-21 refers to how Annual Operational Plans will focus on the specific activities that will be undertaken in the course of the year to achieve targets at the output level of UNRWA's results chain and how these operational plans are aligned with a number of considerations including 'workforce and recruitment plans'. In the major areas of education and health service provision, UNRWA has ongoing reform efforts to meet evolving needs of the Palestine refugees and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of services. In education, the reform as focused on developing an organisation-wide strategic direction with the elaboration of a number of strategies and policies, as well as capacity strengthening of staff. These reforms have had a positive effect on both learning outcomes and the efficiency of the system. For health, reform has focused on the introduction of the Family Health Team model and an electronic medical record and appointment system named e-Health, which has simplified reporting and improved available data. The RSS reform is underway and will see reconfigurations of staff and new job descriptions, as well as the professionalisation of social work posts, to be more 'fit for purpose', as well as a move to cash assistance. In the face of the current financial crisis, UNRWA has sought to strengthen the Department of External Relations and Communications (ERCD) through the regularisation of contractual modalities for existing temporary contracts to reduce staff turnover, and thereby reducing churn. However, this has been hampered by further funding reductions. Despite these reforms in specific programmes, the current financial crisis (redundancies, recruitment freezes) has meant that in general there is limited movement within the UNRWA staffing structures and limited opportunity for introducing new skills and/ or reconfiguring between staff silos, as well as some posts remaining vacant and unfilled. The agency has an Action Plan on Gender Parity based on the Agency's Gender Equality Strategy for 2016-2021. Although the agency has achieved 51 per cent female and 49 per cent male employment among the total Area and International staff population, there remain considerably lower percentages of women in senior and leadership positions (in 2018, 26 per cent of Senior Area staff were female). Strengthening UNRWA's gender architecture has been identified as a priority for the GES. Improvements in female representation at most senior level improved in 2019. Female quotas have been set for the first time in the elections for Areas Staff Unions representatives.	1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 24, 25, 37, 38, 40, 50, 52, 57, 60, 61, 64, 65, 79, 84, 86, 114, 119, 146, 147, 149

Within the UNRWA Protection Policy (2012) the Agency commits to "seek and allocate appropriate human and financial resources to meet its commitment to protect Palestine refugees". However, UNRWA's approach to protection from a structural and resource alignment perspective remains work in progress as currently only 5 per cent of the costs needed for protection and 2 core staff (Chief of Protection Division and Head of Gender Section) are from the programme budget, and the rest from project funding. The remaining protection activities are currently project funded.	1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 24, 25, 37, 38, 40, 50, 52, 57, 60, 61, 64, 65, 79, 84, 86, 114, 119, 146, 147, 149
UNRWA has standard procedures for dealing with each phase of an Emergency (Preparedness, Response, and Recovery). The Agency works proactively to ensure sufficient prevention, mitigation and preparedness measures are in place so as to be well positioned in the event of a crisis. The Agency recognises that achieving these goals requires that the organisation's structure is adjusted to changing circumstances and that effects on staff, arising from such changes, are mitigated.	
MI 3.1 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 3.2: Resource mobilisation efforts consistent with the core mandate and strategic priorities	**Score**
Overall MI Rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.75**
Element 1: Resource mobilization strategy/case for support explicitly aligned to current strategic plan	4
Element 2: Resource mobilization strategy/case for support reflects recognition of need to diversify the funding base, particularly in relation to the private sector	4
Element 3: Resource mobilization strategy/case for support seeks multi-year funding within mandate and strategic priorities	3
Element 4: Resource mobilization strategy/case for support prioritises the raising of domestic resources from partner countries/institutions, aligned to goals and objectives of the Strategic Plan/ relevant country plan	N/A
Element 5: Resource mobilization strategy/case for support contains clear targets, monitoring and reporting mechanisms geared to the Strategic Plan or equivalent	4
MI 3.2 Analysis	**Source document**
Given UNRWA's current financial situation, resource mobilisation receives significant emphasis across the organisation and there is accountability for this at the highest levels with staff 'pulling out all stops' to address the funding crisis, and many senior staff spending up to 50 per cent of their time focused on resource mobilisation and resource management. There is widespread recognition within UNRWA and by donors of the destabilising effect, in an already unstable region, of potential or perceived threats to UNRWA's ability to deliver on mandate and as such messages around resource mobilisation are carefully communicated.	1, 2, 7, 10,12, 35, 42, 49, 57, 63, 64, 65, 66, 86, 97, 118
In response to the chronic funding crisis; UNRWA has significantly invested in resource mobilisation efforts, in resource management and in the consideration of alternative funding models for the agency going forward. UNRWA's Resource Mobilisation Strategy (RMS) 2016-18 is explicitly aligned to the timeframe of the MTS and designed to ensure that UNRWA has the necessary resources to deliver on its mandate and realise the MTS strategic outcomes across its five fields of operation; this in an operating context where many of the longer-term operations that UNRWA implements are funded from the UNRWA 'Programme Budget' which is funded by voluntary contributions. The RMS 2016-18 recognises how the extension of multi-year funding for UNRWA has the potential for numerous benefits that lead to not only a more efficient response, but also better outcomes for beneficiaries through:	

(i) lower operational costs, (ii) flexibility for early response, (iii) predictability of funding. By the end of quarter 2 in 2017, there were 13 active multi-year agreements for the Programme Budget in place.

The RMS is reported against on a regular basis against detailed resource mobilisation targets. The RMS has five challenging Agency wide goals to be monitored and reported on during the period 2016-18: The goals cover more effective and efficient resource mobilisation, strengthening of traditional donor partnerships, a stronger and more diversified donor base, an enabling environment from resource mobilisation, and resourcing of working capital and staff safety and security. Each goal has a set of indicators to track progress. The majority of the indicators have been taken from the previous RMS allowing the Agency to measure the success of the new RMS with continuity against the previous RMS.

Additionally, UNRWA has sought to diversify its resource mobilisation efforts, notably through the DignityIsPriceless campaign and is actively exploring partnerships with OIC, IDB and World Bank in the pursuit of alternative funding mechanisms. It has also depleted its contingency reserves and institutionalised austerity measures where possible. These measures, combined with programmatic reforms, have helped to reduce the growth in Agency costs from 6 per cent (average annual rate of growth in expenditure in the years preceding the current MTS) to 3.3 per cent.

UNRWA's success in diversifying its funding base has been mixed; by the end of of 2017, 86.68per cent of the contributions to the Programme budget were from traditional donors, whereas income from 'diversified sources' (regional partners, emerging donors, non-traditional donors and private partnerships) was below target for the majority of these donor groups; 8.87 per cent below the target of 24.8 per cent. UNRWA's financial challenges are further exacerbated by the recent announcement of the withdrawal of funding from UNRWA's most prominent traditional donor, amounting to some 30 per cent of the organisation's funding.

MI 3.2 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 3.3: Aid reallocation/programming decisions responsive to need can be made at a decentralised level	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3**
Element 1: An organisation-wide policy or guidelines exist which describe the delegation of decision-making authorities at different levels within the organisation	3
Element 2: *(If the first criterion is met)* The policy/guidelines or other documents provide evidence of a sufficient level of decision-making autonomy available at the country level (or other decentralized level as appropriate) regarding aid reallocation/programming	3
Element 3: Evaluations or other reports contain evidence that reallocation/programming decisions have been made to positive effect at country or other local level, as appropriate	3
Element 4: The organisation has made efforts to improve or sustain the delegation of decision-making on aid allocation/programming to the country or other relevant levels	3

The reference numbers "1, 2, 7, 10,12, 35, 42, 49, 57, 63, 64, 65, 66, 86, 97, 118" appear in the right column adjacent to the first section of body text.

MI 3.3 Analysis	Source document
UNRWA has clear roles and responsibilities between HQ and Field Offices in terms of decision-making. The Medium Term Strategy 2016-21 and its five Strategic Plans (one per field of operation) are complemented by a raft of internal strategies, policies and plans for different programmes and offices to ensure that all organisational units are operating in support of Agency objectives. There are clear Directorial compacts between the Commissioner General and all UNRWA department Directors outlining delegated authority and responsibility. This Compact stipulates; (b) the human and financial resources that will be made available to the Director, (e) the results expected of the Director. There is a clear recognition across the agency of the different contexts and enabling environments in which UNRWA works and the need to operate differently accordingly.	
Field offices engage in planning and reporting processes regularly with HQ and targets are set collaboratively rather than imposed upon Field Offices. Field Offices have autonomy around much decision-making although, in light of the recent financial crisis, there has been a retraction of delegated authority regarding organisational expenditure and increased oversight from HQ on cashflow and expenditure.	1,4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 25, 31, 35, 36,52, 57, 109, 110, 111, 134, 139, 141,149
The agency has invested in strengthening leadership across Field Offices with the Agency-wide 'Leadership Across Borders' staff development programme targeted at mid-career staff (Area Staff Grades 10 to 14). The programme includes the development of a style of leadership that supports the Agency's human development mandate; to enable participants to better understand how to strengthen and support an enabling environment; to provide participants with the skills needed to become more effective leaders of people; to provide guidance and tools to enable participants to manage their staff and related issues. This Agency-wide programme concluded in November 2017.	
There is currently limited evaluation evidence on UNRWA operations regarding how programming decisions are made. At a programme level, UNRWA reforms for education have supported the delegation of decision-making around implementation and M&E planning, with Field Education and Health departments responsible for the implementation and quality assurance of their School Health Programme. Protection audits, conducted by each field office, are to be followed-up within the context of the protection working groups within each field office and be monitored through an online tracking tool at HQ.	
MI 3.3 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 3.4: HR systems and policies performance based and geared to the achievement of results	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.8**
Element 1: A system is in place which requires the performance assessment of all staff, including senior staff	4
Element 2: There is evidence that the performance assessment system is systematically implemented by the organisation across all staff and to the required frequency	3
Element 3: The performance assessment system is clearly linked to organisational improvement, particularly the achievement of corporate objectives, and to demonstrate ability to work with other agencies	2
Element 4: The performance assessment of staff is applied in decision making relating to promotion, incentives, rewards, sanctions, etc.	2
Element 5: A clear process is in place to manage disagreement and complaints relating to staff performance assessments	3

MI 3.4 Analysis	Source document
UNRWA has an established Staff performance management system (EPER). The Performance Assessment System at UNRWA is governed by its respective policies and procedures, with the work plan defined for each staff member at the beginning of the year and the performance assessed every 4 months against the assigned objectives. Whilst the performance management system is in place, it was last reviewed over 5 years ago and there are question as to whether it is fit for purpose for the agency in its current reality as it is not possible to 'fail' with limited consequence for a negative assessment and improvement plans are not consistently developed when poor performance noted. Performance is assessed using a three-point scale, which is considered to be insufficiently nuanced. Prior to 2016, use of the performance assessment system was high but compliance dropped-off over time and is now being pushed more strongly by HR with a 78 per cent completion rate in 2017. There is a rebuttal mechanism in place through which a staff member who has been rated 'performance falls short of expectations' has the opportunity to seek a formal review of the rating. A Strategic Outcome of the MTS 2016-21 is that 'a strong culture of performance and accountability exists for UNRWA managers and staff'. In line with the MTS 2016-21, there is a performance compact between each Director and the CG. This was introduced in 2016 and includes the extent to which Directors have taken necessary action in relation to recommendations arising from audits, evaluations and inspections. There are 3 different levels of the EPER system; for levels 1-9, mid-management and senior management with objectives and accountability varied by level. UNRWA is committed (MTS 2016-21) to detailed workforce planning; with proactive forecasting of staffing and talent needs. The needs in terms of skills and experience vary by programme priority under the Medium Term Strategy and highlight that workforce needs analysis must be accompanied with managerial skills needs assessments. There is no evidence however of the extent to which such assessments are taking place and how this links with staff performance assessment. Strategic HR management is constrained by an environment in which it is very difficult to lay-off staff and at a time when (understandably) there is heightened anxiety amongst staff. The engagement of UNRWA's workforce and unions on issues related to staff relations and conditions of service has grown considerably in recent years, in the context of reform-driven changes in roles and responsibilities for many staff, and of new wage-related demands from public sector workers throughout the Middle East, which have been exacerbated by recruitment freezes, redundancies and heightened pressure upon staff given the resource constrained environment. For contractors, a new policy has been approved which requires that the performance of Individual Service Providers (i.e., Consultants/ Contractors) must be evaluated and recorded upon the completion of services. Final payment is only made when the evaluation has been completed and signed by the Contracting Manager, stating that the entire work has been satisfactorily completed.	1, 6, 8, 11, 24, 25, 37, 60, 64, 65, 80, 81
MI 3.4 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency/accountability	KPI score
Highly satisfactory	**3.11**

The 2016-17 Programme Budget aligns financial resources with strategic objectives - resource requirements are specified by objective and by category of expenditure with the strategic objectives of the MTS 2016-21. Financial expenditure and results are monitored on a quarterly and 6-monthly basis. The agency's current results-based monitoring system has not yet been integrated with the REACH system to enable full Results-based budgeting.

UNRWA faces a significant challenge in the unreliability and unpredictability of revenue sources available to the Agency to deliver its core mandate to Palestine refugees in its five fields of operation. Given the agency's current financial crisis, UNRWA undertakes detailed financial monitoring and reporting and is clear on the explanations for variances between planned expenditure and actual expenditure.

UNRWA has a clearly articulated and transparent basis for decision making on resource allocation, working within the challenging financial reality of the Agency. The allocation of funding across UNRWA's different programme areas is available in the Programme budget and the rationale for prioritising the programme areas of health and education is clearly understood across the organisation. At a programmes level, budgets are allocated in accordance with programme planning norms and service needs within the fields. Recognising that emergencies are an ongoing feature of its work, UNRWA takes measures to ensure that its emergency responses will not have recurring costs on its programme budget through its emergency appeals. Further, for emergency appeals, as part of annual planning UNRWA reviews allocations for each field office, based on an assessment of number of people in need, assistance provided per refugee and living conditions in each field. There is less clarity on the division and allocation of resources across Field Offices as a whole.

UNRWA's accounts are audited on an annual basis by the UNBOA and these audit reports are publicly available in line with international standards and contain a detailed record of Management response to earlier external audit recommendations. The agency has an Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Policy and a well-developed framework of roles and responsibilities for implementation. UNRWA reports annually on fraud and corruption statistics annually as part of the Agency's reporting obligations and certifications provided to the UN Board of Auditors. The agency has a whistle-blowers protection policy which is considered by the JIU to be robust.

UNRWA's Core Values and Standards of Conduct, and its Handbook on Ethics outline organisational expectations around the reporting of incidents and Standard Operating Procedures have been developed and implemented in 2017 for reporting on incidents with staff or assets.

MI 4.1: Transparent decision-making for resource allocation, consistent with strategic priorities	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.33**
Element 1: An explicit organisational statement or policy exists which clearly defines criteria for allocating resources to partners	2
Element 2: The criteria reflect targeting to the highest priority themes/countries/areas of intervention as set out in the current Strategic Plan	N/A
Element 3: The organisational policy or statement is regularly reviewed and updated	2
Element 4: The organisational statement or policy is publicly available	3

MI 4.1 Analysis	Source document
UNRWA has a clear statement which provides the basis from which all resourcing decisions follow – *'The Agency will seek and allocate appropriate human and financial resources to meet its commitment to protect Palestine refugees.'* The rationale of prioritising UNRWA funding to education and health is clearly understood across the organisation and the distribution of funding across programme areas is publicly available. UNRWA's programme budget is divided across the 5 Field Offices which each have projects, and emergency appeals. There do not appear to be explicit criteria regarding the allocation of funding to each Field Office and it is recognised that there are difficult questions around the allocation of resources across Field Offices .In Jordan, UNRWA is not able to be part of cross-agency emergency appeals or Jordan response plan, whereas in Lebanon it can. UNRWA's work includes ongoing and new emergencies. UNRWA takes measures to ensure that its emergency responses will not have recurring costs on its programme budget through its emergency appeals. The programme budgeting for 2016-17 included the working assumption that emergencies are expected to continue to characterise the operating context in three out of five UNRWA fields during the biennium. Given this assumption, the destructive impact of conflicts on livelihoods and the centrality of livelihoods in recovery efforts, UNRWA gave particular focus to promoting employment and income generating opportunities for refugees in conflict and post-conflict settings. Organisational Directive 21 (2017) outlines UNRWA's Annual Operational Planning Cycle. Each Field Office and Headquarters receives instruction from the Department of Planning regarding the development of annual operation plans. These are coordinated with the Department of Finance to ensure consistency with the Programme Budget. Financial expenditure is reviewed regularly with results throughout the year.	1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 11, 40, 42, 54, 55, 65
MI 4.1 Evidence confidence	High confidence

MI 4.2: Allocated resources disbursed as planned	Score
Overall MI Rating	Satisfactory
Overall MI score	3
Element 1: The institution sets clear targets for disbursement	N/A
Element 2: Financial information indicates that planned disbursements were met within institutionally agreed margins	N/A
Element 3 Clear explanations are available in relation to any variances	3
Element 4: Variances relate to external factors rather than internal procedural blockages	3

MI 4.2 Analysis	Source document
The major issue on budgeting and expenditure facing UNRWA is the persistent problems with the unreliability and unpredictability of revenue sources available to the Agency to deliver its core mandate to Palestine refugees in its five fields of operation. UNRWA undertakes detailed financial monitoring and reporting. This is consistent with an organisation that must practice very tight cash flow management. There is no evidence of institutionally agreed margins on disbursement rates or tracking against the same. There is some evidence of UNRWA being clear on the explanations for variances between planned expenditure and actual expenditure. For example, the Annual Operational Report for 2016 details how due to funding constraints; (i) the school feeding programme was not implemented, and complementary food assistance could not be provided for pregnant women and children under the age of 2, (ii) UNRWA was unable to implement the emergency cash assistance programme in Gaza. There is evidence of UNRWA making, conveying and holding to difficult choices relating to expenditure and the agency ensuring the implementation of cost reduction and control in its programme budget. Funding shortfalls are a major factor. The Programme Budget for 2016-17 referred to how '*At present, the SSNP remains severely underfunded and locked into a food distribution programme combined with ineffective amounts of cash distribution*'. The Budget document also refers to how progress in rehabilitating shelters and meeting annual targets [in Syria Field] has been challenging due to financial constraints, as the ICIP programme is driven by project funding, and the security situation in Syria, which precludes the rehabilitation of shelters in that field.	3,6,8, 10, 11,44
MI 4.2 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 4.3: Principles of results-based budgeting applied	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3**
Element 1: The most recent organisational budget clearly aligns financial resources with strategic objectives/intended results of the current Strategic Plan	3
Element 2: A budget document is available which provides clear costings for the achievement of each management result	3
Element 3: Systems are available and used to track costs from activity through to result (outcome)	3
Element 4: There is evidence of improved costing of management and development results in budget documents reviewed over time (evidence of building a better system)	3

MI 4.3 Analysis	Source document
The 2016-17 Programme Budget aligns financial resources with strategic objectives - resource requirements are specified by objective and by category of expenditure with the strategic objectives of the MTS 2016-21. These are presented at a high level (education etc.) in the Blue book and in more detail in UNRWA's budget documents thereby providing some basis for detailed costings for the achievement of each management result. UNRWA aims to reach higher cost effectiveness through results-based budgeting and human resources management and has invested in systems to support this; REACH in 2015 and the results-based monitoring system in 2017.	1, 2, 6, 8, 43, 44, 65

UNRWA's results-based monitoring system enables data collection and analysis against strategic outcomes set out in the MTS. The system also hosts monitoring structures for EAs, projects and other frameworks employed by the Agency, and where possible, establishes linkages between them. The agency's REACH system has allowed the agency to better forecast expenditure needs. However, the agency's current results-based monitoring system has not yet been integrated with the REACH system to enable full Results-based budgeting. Results-based budgeting is currently completed manually and at outcome, rather than output level. The impending integration of the REACH and results-based monitoring system will allow further granularity regarding results-based budgeting and a more efficient process. In 2013 UNRWA introduced the mid-year results review. This was designed to complement the established annual review process in order to align results-based management best practices by proactively reviewing organisational performance in key areas and linking results with utilised resources. These are completed every 6 months by each programme between HQ and across Field Offices, and relevant action points regarding implementation are noted and monitored.	1, 2, 6, 8, 43, 44, 65

MI 4.3 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 4.4: External audit or other external reviews certifies the meeting of international standards at all levels, including with respect to internal audit	**Score**
Overall MI Rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.67**
Element 1: External audit conducted which complies with international standards	4
Element 2: Most recent external audit confirms compliance with international standards across functions	4
Element 3: Management response is available to external audit	4
Element 4: Management response provides clear action plan for addressing any gaps or weaknesses identified by external audit	3
Element 5: Internal audit functions meet international standards, including for independence	4
Element 6: Internal audit reports are publicly available	3
MI 4.4 Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA's accounts are audited on an annual basis by the UNBOA and these audit reports are publicly available. These audits are completed in line with international standards and contain a detailed record of Management response to earlier external audit recommendations. Within UNRWA, there is designated responsibility for addressing any gaps or weaknesses identified by external audit (Department of Finance and the Executive Office).	1, 6, 21, 24, 36

UNRWA has a system of internal controls that are intended to safeguard assets, ensure adherence to regulations and rules, including management policies and procedures, and prevent fraud. The Assurance and Advisory Services Division (AAS) of DIOS carries out regular internal audits of UNRWA's programmes and functions (17 audits in 2017) and the rationale for the selection of audit subjects and the audit objective is detailed. DIOS prepares its work plan in line with the work done by other oversight bodies such as the United Nations Board of Auditors, the Joint Inspection Unit, the Office of Internal Oversight Services of the Secretariat of the United Nations, and work commissioned by donors. . Audits are conducted in accordance with DIOS standards which are designed to conform to the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. Assessment on conformity to IIA standards has not yet been conducted. Upon audit completion, the AAS team closely monitors the status of the implementation of the recommendations in accordance with internally established procedures for recommendation follow up. AAS is working to incrementally develop an enabling infrastructure that supports the AAS Division in providing assurance and advisory services that meets international internal auditing standards. Internal audit capacity is being built through increased staff training. Results of internal audits conducted during the year are summarized in the relevant DIOS annual reports which are shared with the donors at the AdCom as well as publicly available on the UNRWA website.	1, 6, 21, 24, 36

MI 4.4 Evidence confidence	High confidence

MI 4.5: Issues or concerns raised by internal control mechanisms (operational and financial risk management, internal audit, safeguards etc.) adequately addressed	Score
Overall MI Rating	Satisfactory
Overall MI score	3
Element 1: A clear policy or organisational statement exists on how any issues identified through internal control mechanisms will be addressed	4
Element 2: Management guidelines or rules provide clear guidance on the procedures for addressing any identified issues, including timelines	3
Element 3: Clear guidelines are available for staff on reporting any issues identified	3
Element 4: A tracking system is available which records responses and actions taken to address any identified issues	3
Element 5: Governing Body or management documents indicate that relevant procedures have been followed/action taken in response to identified issues, including recommendations from audits (internal and external)	3
Element 6: Timelines for taking action follow guidelines/ensure the addressing of the issue within twelve months following its reporting	2

MI 4.5 Analysis	Source document
In the MTS 2016-21 UNRWA commits to ensuring that accepted recommendations of audits, evaluations and inspections, as well as decisions relating to fraud, corruption and other financial irregularities, are promptly followed up and implemented. The Department of Internal Oversight Services remains responsible for tracking, following up and quality checking the implementation of recommendations from Internal Oversight. Follow-up mechanisms are in place to systematically track the implementation of recommendations. These mechanisms serve to monitor recommendation compliance, evaluate the timeliness of interventions, assess performance, and identify any gaps and challenges that affect progress.	1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 15, 17, 24, 29, 31, 43, 79, 80, 81, 134

 On an annual basis, findings from investigation are analysed to identify trends and areas where more resources should be devoted, as well as make recommendations to improve processes and practices. This analysis is presented in the DIOS annual report. In 2016, the Agency handled 317 allegations, and 299 in 2015. DIOS monitors the percentage of cases closed within 6 months, the cases open at the end of any given year, and the average number of days to complete each case for both DIOS led and decentralised cases as well as actions taken. UNRWA faces challenges with regards to decentralised investigations regarding ensuring consistency of how investigations are handled across the organisation and the workload of the focal points assigned to each field. DIOS acknowledges that risks still exist in the conduct of decentralised investigations by operational staff, both in terms of the technical skills of these investigators, and a lack of structural independence from Field Office Senior Management. Measures to mitigate this include in 2016 issuing the Investigation Policy as a technical instruction, describing the framework for all misconduct investigations in the Agency, including rights and obligations of staff, applicable to all investigations, whether initiated by a Field Office or by DIOS

UNRWA's Core Values and Standards of Conduct, and its Handbook on Ethics outline organisational expectations around the reporting of incidents and Standard Operating Procedures have been developed and implemented in 2017 for reporting on incidents with staff or assets. Regarding staff security, there are established reporting pathways for all identified threats to the safety and dignity of beneficiaries or staff. UNRWA Security Information Management System is the means by which reports on all safety and security-related incidents – at Camp and Area level - are captured and conveyed to local UNDSS (United Nations Department of Safety and Security) and to UNRWA Headquarters.

On an annual basis, UNRWA also prepares reports on cases of sexual exploitation and abuse, breach of neutrality, and fraud. In 2016, in the five cases where discipline was recommended and action taken against UNRWA staff, 4 involved allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. In 2 cases, the staff members were dismissed, in one case the Field Office decided not to take any action with respect to a substantiated allegation of sexual harassment and in the last case staff member accused of sexual harassment resigned from the Agency before his anticipated dismissal as a result of the DIOS investigation. UNRWA participates in UN-wide initiatives to improve investigations addressing sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment.

UNRWA is committed to developing and implementing internal oversight work plans that address enterprise risk and, therefore, further UNRWA's ability to achieve its strategic objectives. UNRWA monitors the implementation of projects, action taken to resolve issues that represent risks to successful project implementation and reporting to the Department of External Relations and Communications on issues that may require communication to concerned donors and host authorities.

UNRWA recently adopted a Neutrality Framework that not only builds on the existing regulatory framework pertaining to UNRWA's compliance with humanitarian principles, but also reflects existing practices and responds to recommendations issued by applicable United Nations Boards of Inquiry. The purpose of the Framework is to serve as a repository of existing standards, practices and procedures with regard to neutrality and to introduce new standards and procedures, where deemed necessary. UNRWA's Ethics office has developed a mandatory all-staff e-course on social media and neutrality, as well as a three-hour face-to-face training on social media for managers and supervisors.

UNRWA's implementation of recommendations made by the UNBOA in monitored and reported on in its audited financial statements.

1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 15, 17, 24, 29, 31, 43, 79, 80, 81, 134

| **MI 4.5 Evidence confidence** | **High confidence** |

MI 4.6: Policies and procedures effectively prevent, detect, investigate and sanction cases of fraud, corruption and other financial irregularities	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.67**
Element 1: A clear policy/guidelines on fraud, corruption and any other financial irregularities is available and made public	4
Element 2: The policy/guidelines clearly define the roles of management and staff in implementing/complying with the guidelines	4
Element 3: Staff training/awareness-raising has been conducted in relation to the policy/guidelines	3
Element 4: There is evidence of policy/guidelines implementation, e.g. through regular monitoring and reporting to the Governing Body	3
Element 5: There are channels/mechanisms in place for reporting suspicion of misuse of funds (e.g. anonymous reporting channels and "whistle-blower" protection policy)	4
Element 6: Annual reporting on cases of fraud, corruption and other irregularities, including actions taken, ensures that they are made public	4
MI 4.6 Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA has a clear unequivocal statement of a no tolerance approach to fraud, corruption and any other financial irregularities. The Agency is guided in this regard by its 2015 Anti-Fraud and Anti-corruption policy. This re-affirms the Agency's long-standing zero-tolerance for all forms of fraud and corruption. It outlines the responsibility of managers in identifying fraud and corruption risks in their areas of business and ensuring that all systems, procedures and internal controls are implemented and enforced, as well as the responsibilities of the Commissioner General, of DIOS, of the Advisory Commission on Internal Oversight and of individual staff.	
The policy states that all UNRWA staff are under an obligation to report information pointing to fraud or corruption involving UNRWA personnel, funds or assets. UNRWA's policy and procedures for reporting are set out in the policy and in General Staff Circular No. 05/2007 Allegations and Complaints Procedure and Protection against Retaliation for Reporting Misconduct and Cooperating with Audits and Investigations (GSC 05/2007) and General Staff Circular No. 08/2014 UNRWA Hotline - Reports of Misconduct (GSC 08/2014). All UNRWA Personnel are required to comply with the obligations placed upon their conduct by the UN Charter, the Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service and the UNRWA Regulatory Framework and to act at all times in accordance with the highest standards of fairness, integrity, transparency, ethical conduct and accountability.	1, 15, 24, 29, 79, 80, 81, 115, 150
The agency has a whistle-blowers protection policy. In a Review of Whistleblower Policies and Practices in UN Organisations conducted by the Joint Inspection Unit in 2018, UNRWA was one of only 2 agencies found to meet all the requirements for providing staff with comprehensive and independent channels for reporting misconduct/wrongdoing confidentially and anonymously, including to external entities, and with specific provisions for reporting on the executive head and the head of the oversight office.	
DIOS has undertaken the training of staff in Field Offices on general investigation methodology applicable for decentralised investigations, the Ethics office has (amongst others) delivered training to UNRWA staff on the Whistleblower Protection Policy, social media and SEA.	

UNRWA reports annually on fraud and corruption statistics annually as part of the Agency's reporting obligations and certifications provided to the UN Board of Auditors. An annual report summarizing the activities of DIOS (including details of the number of fraud and corruption allegations and investigations) is prepared and shared with the Agency's Advisory Commission and the ACIO. The Report of the Board of Auditors and its summary of cases of fraud and presumptive fraud is a public document, as is the DIOS annual report.	1, 15, 24, 29, 79, 80, 81, 115, 150
MI 4.6 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT

Engaging in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, to leverage effective solutions and to maximise results (in line with Busan Partnerships commitments

KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility (within partnerships)	KPI score
Satisfactory	**2.69**

UNRWA's remit in terms of aligning with national priorities and development results is to ensure that its planning and programming priorities for the Palestine refugees it serves align with the priorities of host authorities to best address the humanitarian and development needs of the Palestine refugees that UNRWA is mandated to serve. UNRWA works with a range of both host governments, including Ministries of Education, Health, Social Affairs and Planning) and with UN Country Teams to ensure, to the extent possible, complementarity between its services and those provided by the host authorities. Whilst the nature of UNRWA's mandate means it is not expected to contribute to or align to national development results, it demonstrates strong alignment with the priorities of host countries, particularly in terms of education and health.

The degree of UNRWA's coordination and collaboration with other UN agencies and formal processes (e.g. UNDAF) varies in line with host authority expectation; in Lebanon for example, UNRWA works a member of the UNCT, whereas in Jordan, UNRWA is part of a number of UN working groups but is not a member of the UNCT.

UNRWA demonstrates strong contextual analysis, including of relevant contextual and cross-cutting issues in the design of intervention across most service areas. UNRWA staff are well-sighted on the operating context, gender issues and conflict and fragility but to date there is limited focus on analysis regarding environmental sustainability and climate change in the design, implementation and reporting on interventions.

The organisation has robust mechanisms in place for risk management; risk assessments are undertaken as part of UNRWA's annual planning cycle and risk management and mitigation and where necessary, contingency planning, informs Operational Plans. Specific risk registers (e.g. for Emergency Appeal) are included as annexes to the Annual Operational reports. UNRWA's Assurance and Advisory Services Division in DIOS is tasked with assessing the effectiveness of UNRWA's risk management. There is no specific Risk Officer within the organisation; risk is addressed by both programme and corporate actors.

The agency has in place measures to support its work in emergency contexts with a recognition that there needs to be a similar approach to ensure the flexible and fast registration process of refugees in emergency contexts and to act with urgency and to be accountable to the vulnerable population affected by the consequences of emergencies in the regions where it has its presence. UNRWA's operational planning has matured over time, with Field Office Strategic Plans, Annual Workplans, Director Compacts and further digitalisation of its monitoring systems.

MI 5.1: Interventions aligned with national/regional priorities and intended national/regional results	Score
Overall MI Rating	
Overall MI score	**N/A**
Element 1: Reviewed country or regional strategies make reference to national/regional strategies or objectives	N/A
Element 2: Reviewed country strategies or regional strategies link the results statements to national or regional goals	N/A
Element 3: Structures and incentives in place for technical staff that allow investment of time and effort in alignment process	N/A
MI 5.1 Analysis	**Source document**
Micro-indicator deemed not applicable for rating purposes given UNRWA mandate however contextually relevant information. The Agency's mandate and remit in terms of aligning with national priorities and development results is to ensure that its planning / programming priorities for Palestine refugees it serves align with the planning / programming priorities of host nations to the extent of best serving the humanitarian and development needs of the Palestine refugees that UNRWA is mandated to serve. UNRWA being a UN agency, offers services and assistance that are to some extent akin to public services provided by governments and a set of unique responsibilities towards a specific population group. Whilst the nature of UNRWA's mandate means it is not expected to contribute to or align to national development results, it demonstrates strong alignment and the priorities of host countries, particularly in terms of education and health. The Agency works with key line Ministries (including Ministries of Education, Health, Social Affairs and Planning) and with UN Country Teams to ensure, to the extent possible, complementarity between its services and those provided by the host authorities. UNRWA has dialogue with the relevant governments in each of its field offices, but given the political context surrounding UNRWA's existence, this is at times challenging for the organisation to simultaneously fulfil its mandate whilst trying to align to requirements or 'wants' of host governments. Thematically, the Education Programme must adhere to host country curricula, it is not held to align with Host Country policies and procedures (which include teacher and student loads), which are UNRWA specific. Where the agency considers weaknesses in national curricula, it can enrich the education curricula (i.e. by including teaching on human rights. The Education Programme is aligned with the SDG4 objectives which are reflected in the National Plans of the Host Countries. For health, in the Jordan Field Office, UNRWA has strong collaboration with the Jordanian Ministry of Health, which provides UNRWA with vaccines and family planning and with which UNRWA shares epidemiological surveillance. In the Lebanon Field Office, UNRWA vaccine campaigns are coordinated with national vaccine campaigns. The degree of coordination and collaboration with other agencies also varies; in Lebanon for example, UNRWA works a member of the UNCT, whereas in Jordan, UNRWA is part of a number of UN working groups but not a member of the UNCT.	11, 37, 38, 88
MI 5.1 Evidence confidence	

MI 5.2: Contextual analysis (shared where possible) applied to shape the intervention designs and implementation	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.4**
Element 1: Intervention designs contain a clear statement that positions the intervention within the operating context	3
Element 2: Context statement has been developed jointly with partners	N/A
Element 3: Context analysis contains reference to gender issues, where relevant	2
Element 4: Context analysis contains reference to environmental sustainability and climate change issues, where relevant	1
Element 5: Context analysis contains reference to governance issues, including conflict and fragility, where relevant	4
Element 6: Evidence of reflection points with partner(s) that take note of any significant changes in context	2
MI 5.2 Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA undertakes regular contextual analysis to support the design of and inform the monitoring and reporting of its programmes. The fact that many of UNRWA's approximate 30,000 staff are Palestine refugees themselves ensures the agency's programmes are rooted in a strong understanding of the historical, political, cultural and social context within which UNRWA works. UNRWA staff are well-sighted on the operating context and conflict and fragility but there is limited focus on analysis regarding environmental sustainability and climate change in the design, implementation and reporting on interventions. At a programme level, for education MLA, Classroom Observation, and Perception Surveys are analysed in each Field context. Lessons learned are then considered in the preparation of the Field specific Education portions of the Annual Operational Plans (AOPs). Field Specific projects, such as the Education in Emergencies approach are developed reflecting such analysis. The agency has strived to develop a "protection reflex" at all levels of the Agency, and there have been clear efforts made through protection audits and other mechanisms to ensure that protection needs are analysed, and protection principles incorporated in all stages of programme cycle management. Gender analysis is undertaken and there is specific guidance for this but often focuses on numbers rather than analysis through a gender equality and women's empowerment lens. UNRWA does reflect on changes in context as part of dialogue with partners; although this appears to happen on a piecemeal basis rather than systematically with partners. Positive examples include planning and RSS co-leading strategic planning workshops for the Syria response whereby it invited UNHCR and the Syrian Centre for Policy Research to reflect on programme options and conflict sensitive approaches. The Agency also has a long-term, strategic relationship with UNHCR, which is the Agency responsible for the protection of Palestine refugees outside of UNRWA areas of operations.	6, 32, 36, 47, 56, 58, 143
MI 5.2 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 5.3: Capacity analysis informs intervention design and implementation, and strategies to address any weakness found are employed	Score
Overall MI Rating	
Overall MI score	**N/A**
Element 1: Intervention designs contain a clear statement of capacities of key national implementing partners	N/A
Element 2: Capacity analysis considers resources, strategy, culture, staff, systems and processes, structure and performance	N/A
Element 3: Capacity analysis statement has been developed jointly where feasible	N/A
Element 4: Capacity analysis statement includes clear strategies for addressing any weaknesses, with a view to sustainability	N/A
Element 5: Evidence of regular and resourced reflection points with partner(s) that take note of any significant changes in the wider institutional setting that affect capacity	N/A
MI 5.3 Analysis	**Source document**
Micro-indicator deemed not applicable for assessment purposes given UNRWA mandate	
MI 5.3 Evidence confidence	

MI 5.4: Detailed risk (strategic, political, reputational, operational) management strategies ensure the identification, mitigation, monitoring and reporting of risks	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.5**
Element 1: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for operational risk	3
Element 2: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for strategic risk	3
Element 3: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for political risk	4
Element 4: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for reputational risk	4
Element 5: Risks are routinely monitored and reflected upon by the partnership	N/A
Element 6: Risk mitigation actions taken by the partnership are documented and communicated	N/A
MI 5.4 Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA identifies four kinds of risk facing the agency: institutional (including reputational), programmatic, occupational and contextual (including political) and there is clarity on how each of these are managed and who is responsible.	
Risk assessments are undertaken as part of UNRWA's annual planning cycle and updated every quarter. Risk management and mitigation and where necessary, contingency planning informs Operational Plans but there are not specific mitigation strategies for operational risk. UNRWA's MTS has a matrix of risk associated with each of its strategic outcomes. Corporate documentation outlines how risks are reported on and relevant risks are also outlined in Field Office Strategic Plans. Financial risk has received a greater emphasis in the organisations planning and assessments recently in light of the organisation's funding constraints, with a high-level of scrutiny from HQ on Field Office expenditure and cash flow.	1, 8, 10, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 28, 31, 35, 36, 37, 52, 61, 142

Risk is examined in relation to specific areas of UNRWA's work which outlines risks and mitigation strategies; for example, UNRWA's Camp Security Approach and as part of the Gender Equality Strategy. Security risk management is of particular concern for the organisation; the 2017 Evaluation of the security risk management programme found that given UNRWA's decentralised nature, the operationalisation of safety and security differs across the field of operation and that safety and security was not fully mainstreamed in programming. A number of the evaluation's recommendations have been implemented since including a standard security risk management system is in place, and capacity gaps have been addressed through prioritized recruitment of FSOs. It remains a challenge for the organisation though; the end of 2017 26 UNRWA staff were missing, detained, kidnapped or presumed detained.	1, 8, 10, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 28, 31, 35, 36, 37, 52, 61, 142
UNRWA's Strategic Framework for Partnerships outlines that risk-assessment must be conducted if a formal agreement will be developed with a non-UN or non-State donors. UNRWA's Due Diligence policy provides the framework for a transparent process for screening potential partners to ensure that UNRWA only partners with entities that will not compromise UNRWA's reputation.	

MI 5.4 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 5.5: Intervention designs include the analysis of cross-cutting issues (as defined in KPI 2)	**Score**
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.2**
Element 1: Intervention design documentation includes the requirement to analyse cross-cutting issues	3
Element 2: Guidelines are available for staff on the implementation of the relevant guidelines	3
Element 3: Approval procedures require the assessment of the extent to which cross-cutting issues have been integrated in the design	N/E
Element 4: Intervention designs include the analysis of gender issues	2
Element 5: Intervention designs include the analysis of environmental sustainability and climate change issues	1
Element 6: Intervention designs include the analysis of good governance issues	N/A
Element 7: Plans for intervention monitoring and evaluation include attention to cross cutting issues	2
MI 5.5 Analysis	**Source document**
Cross-cutting, including contextual, gender and protection issues are required to be integrated into the activities of the Department for Risk and Security's activities and the Project Procedures Manual provides templates and checklists to ensure the integration of cross-cutting issues including gender, protection and other cross-cutting issues. There is no systematic analysis undertaken of climate change and environmental sustainability and this does not seem yet to be a key focus of the organisation. Project Review Committees also review projects for the integration of cross-cutting issues.	1, 3, 8, 18, 22, 31, 40, 104, 108
The MTS and other corporate strategic frameworks do include attention to cross-cutting issues, but the agency has struggled to report against its protection indicators, including on GBV, which are described as being 'aspirational'.	

In terms of protection, the Protection Strategy outlines that UNRWA will aim to develop a "protection reflex" at all levels of the Agency, so that protection needs are analysed, and protection principles incorporated in all stages of programme cycle management. Protection audits are undertaken regularly to ensure protection is addressed in all aspects of UNRWA's regular programme and project design, policies, protocols and procedures, as well as in staff training. The Tool for Incorporating Minimum Standards on Protection into UNRWA Programming and Service Delivery provides guidance to staff on implementing protection standards. Additionally, there is guidance provided for UNRWA staff to undertake a 'Do No Harm' assessment as part of programme design and that staff should reflect relevant issues through documentation of vulnerable groups' rights, needs and capacities; this includes reference to gender and SGBV issues. UNRWA has introduced protection checklists to incorporate protection within all project proposals. The standard project outline now includes such a checklist, which has to be completed before a project is internally approved. Gender analysis is undertaken and there is specific guidance for this but often focuses on numbers (access/participation) rather than analysis through a structural analysis of gender through a gender equality and women's empowerment lens.	1, 3, 8, 18, 22, 31, 40, 104, 108

MI 5.5 Evidence confidence	High confidence

MI 5.6: Intervention designs include detailed and realistic measures to ensure sustainability (as defined in KPI 12)	Score
Overall MI Rating	
Overall MI score	N/A
Element 1: Intervention designs include statement of critical aspects of sustainability, including; institutional framework, resources and human capacity, social behaviour, technical developments and trade, as appropriate	N/A
Element 2: Key elements of the enabling policy and legal environment that are required to sustain expected benefits from a successful intervention are defined in the design	N/A
Element 3: The critical assumptions that underpin sustainability form part of the approved monitoring and evaluation plan	N/A
Element 4: Where shifts in policy and legislation will be required these reform processes are addressed (within the intervention plan) directly and in a time sensitive manner	N/A
MI 5.6 Analysis	Source document
Micro-indicator deemed not applicable for assessment purposes given UNRWA mandate	
MI 5.6 Evidence confidence	

MI 5.7: Institutional procedures (including systems for engaging staff, procuring project inputs, disbursing payment, logistical arrangements etc.) positively support speed of implementation	Score
Overall MI Rating	Satisfactory
Overall MI score	2.67
Element 1: Internal standards are set to track the speed of implementation	3
Element 2: Organisation benchmarks (internally and externally) its performance on speed of implementation across different operating contexts	2

Element 3: Evidence that procedural delays have not hindered speed of implementation across interventions reviewed	N/E
Element 4: Evidence that any common institutional bottlenecks in speed of implementation identified and actions taken leading to an improvement	3

MI 5.7 Analysis	**Source document**
In emergency contexts, UNRWA has in place measures to ensure the flexible and fast registration process of refugees and to act with urgency and to be accountable to the vulnerable population affected by the consequences of emergencies in the regions where it has its presence. Its emergency framework outlines the operational structures, protocols and tools used in emergencies, and explains roles and responsibilities. Under its emergency appeals for the West Bank including East Jerusalem, Gaza strip and Syria, performance data is collected on a quarterly basis, providing the basis for action in the event of target underachievement; (ii) biannual results reviews where emergency appeal progress is reviewed between headquarters and field offices; (iii) quarterly reviews of progress against field office priorities; and (iv) risk registers that are updated on a regular basis (at least biannually). However, it is not clear how speed of implementation is tracked for its usual programme budget work. In terms of its health programme, UNRWA has worked to address common bottlenecks affecting programme speed and implementation; including the development of the e-Health system, which allow for instantaneous transmission of data between health centres, and through strengthening its procurement processes. UNRWA has moved from food to cash assistance in a number of its Field Offices but there is a recognition that such measures need to be applied in a contextually relevant manner. There is recognition that in Gaza for example; (i) it is perhaps unsuited to conditions which can easily fall back from a protracted crisis situation to a full blown 'emergency' situation (e.g. 2009, 2012, 2014), (ii) inflationary pressures in Gaza means that lack of control on food prices will lead to poor being even more exposed if using cash for food, (iii) limited food availability in Gaza and any delay with UNRWA leads to food prices rising, (iv) food distribution in its current form is an important employer. RSS in Gaza recognises that the universal trend is that cash gives 'more dignity' but believes that in the Gaza context that dignity will come by creating jobs (the broader RSS strategy).	16, 56

MI 5.7 Evidence confidence	**Medium confidence**

KPI 6: Works in coherent partnerships directed at leveraging and/or ensuring relevance and catalytic use of resources	**KPI score**
Satisfactory	**2.95**
UNRWA is clear about the comparative advantage it UNRWA brings to partners through its proximity, expertise, and clear mandate for Palestine refugees which lies in its trust among the community, level of access, extensive workforce, direct service provision, and geographical coverage. Although specifically and solely mandated to address the needs of the Palestine population, UNRWA maintains a corporate commitment to work in close coordination and partnership with other UN agencies. UNRWA's rationale for partnership working is highlighted in terms of its recent budget shortfalls, increasingly scarce resources, ambitious development goals, and increased demand amongst beneficiaries for UNRWA services. There are some challenges for the organisation with regards to partnership working; it is careful to not be seen to 'pass' its mandate on to other agencies and partnerships are entered into as appropriate and contextually relevant to the different Field Office contexts.	

UNRWA's participation in joint planning exercises with other UN agencies varies according to Field Office and context. In Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank, UNRWA takes part in the UNDAF. Similarly, in Syria, UNRWA's non-humanitarian activities (including those funded by the Programme Budget) are included in UNDAF Strategic Frameworks. In Jordan, UNRWA is not included in the UNCT and UNDAF but coordinates with other agencies through technical working groups and informal mechanisms.

UNRWA is accustomed to working in protracted conflicts where crisis management is a recurring need. With this, UNRWA has specific mechanisms in place to facilitate programme adjustment particularly in the face of emergencies. Its Emergency Management framework establishes structures, systems and procedures in place to enable an effective immediate response in the face of emergencies. The embedding of the results-based monitoring system has meant that the agency is increasingly able to forecast, and link expected results with expected resources, thus enabling it to be more agile when emergencies arise.

UNRWA's Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) framework sets out formal and informal mechanisms, standards and practices at the field and programme level to engage Palestine refugees throughout the programming cycle. The AAP framework focuses on information sharing, information gathering, consultation, participation of vulnerable groups, and complaints and feedback mechanisms to deliver on its commitments to Palestine Refugees. However, Protection Audits highlight that refugee participation can be further and that the practice of refugee participation during the programme management cycle is not thought to be fully embedded across UNRWA.

UNRWA is perceived as providing high-quality inputs to policy dialogue that affects the lives of Palestine refugees, although the agency does not have a formal knowledge management/normative function. UNRWA has historically had challenges in its internal knowledge management and identification and dissemination of lessons learned.

MI 6.1: Planning, programming and approval procedures enable agility in partnerships when conditions change	Score
Overall MI Rating	Satisfactory
Overall MI score	3
Element 1: Mechanisms in place to allow programmatic changes and adjustments when conditions change	3
Element 2: Mechanisms in place to allow the flexible use of programming funds as conditions change (budget revision or similar)	3
Element 3: Institutional procedures for revisions permit changes to be made at country/regional/HQ level within a limited timeframe (less than three months)	N/E
Element 4: Evidence that regular review points between partners support joint identification and interpretation of changes in conditions	N/A
Element 5: Evidence that any common institutional bottlenecks in procedures identified and action taken leading to an improvement	3
MI 6.1 Analysis	Source document
UNRWA is accustomed to working in protracted conflicts where crisis management is a recurring need. With this, UNRWA has specific mechanisms in place to facilitate programme adjustment particularly in the face of emergencies. Its Emergency Management framework establishes structures, systems and procedures in place to enable an effective immediate response in the face of emergencies. The embedding of the results-based monitoring system has meant that the Agency is increasingly able to forecast, and link expected results with expected resources, thus enabling it to be more agile when emergencies arise. It is not clear what mechanisms are in place to support programmatic changes and flexible use of funding in non-emergency contexts.	3, 16, 21, 30, 36, 37, 54

While UNRWA's systems to respond to emergencies are well developed, the specific institutional procedures in place to support programmatic changes are not fully integrated across UNRWA's operations. In practice, however, there are examples where the Agency has responded effectively to changing funding conditions and taken steps to review and reform the provision of assistance across all fields (e.g. transition from food to e-cards across Lebanon, Jordan and West Bank). There is evidence of UNRWA's recognition of the constraining and enabling factors supporting partnership working, including the need for partnerships to be based upon a medium to long-term vision, to be clearly tied to the Strategic Plan Results Framework, and for join planning and project development with partners. UNRWA has regular review processes in place to make changes as needed through biannual results reviews where programme budget progress is reviewed between headquarters and field offices, quarterly reviews of progress against Departmental priorities; and (iv) compact letters agreed between the Commissioner-General and all UNRWA Directors.	3, 16, 21, 30, 36, 37, 54

MI 6.1 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 6.2: Partnerships based on an explicit statement of comparative advantage e.g. technical knowledge, convening power/partnerships, policy dialogue/advocacy	**Score**
Overall MI Rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.33**
Element 1: Corporate documentation contains clear and explicit statement on the comparative advantage that the organisation is intending to bring to a given partnership	4
Element 2: Statement of comparative advantage is linked to clear evidence of organisational capacities and competencies as it relates to the partnership	3
Element 3: The organisation aligns its resources/competencies to its perceived comparative advantage	N/A
Element 4: Evidence that comparative advantage is deployed in partnerships to positive effect	3

MI 6.2 Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA is clear about the unique position, and comparative advantage that UNRWA brings to partners through its proximity, expertise, and clear mandate for Palestine refugees which lies in its trust among the community, level of access, extensive workforce, direct service provision, and geographical coverage. The Lebanon Field Office (LFO) also homes in on the comparative advantage that UNRWA brings to its partners in the 2018 Partnership and Inter-agency Coordination Strategy. UNRWA's rationale for partnership working is highlighted in terms of its recent budget shortfalls, increasingly scarce resources, ambitious development goals, and increased demand amongst beneficiaries for UNRWA services. There are some challenges for the organisation with regards to partnership working; it is careful to not be seen to 'pass' its mandate on to other agencies and partnerships are entered into as appropriate and contextually relevant to the different Field Office contexts.	1, 2, 3, 11, 14, 28, 30, 36, 37, 38, 43, 57

UNRWA has established strategic partnerships with other UN agencies (e.g. WHO for health, UNESCO for education) based on the consideration of how its (and others') comparative advantage can be deployed to positive effect, in terms of risk mitigation, cost saving, improving the quality of interventions (e.g. partnership with UNESCO in noted in terms of UNRWA's education reform). In some cases, UNRWA partners with sister UN agencies and serves as an implementing partner for them (e.g. delivering WFP food assistance in areas it cannot access). UNRWA also receives technical support from other agencies for example UNICEF in the form of seconded staff (e.g. child protection). Given the funding crisis, the Agency is increasingly focused on partnerships around resource mobilisation and fundraising. Areas of improvement noted in partnerships include the need for better internal and external communication and fostering funding partnerships.	1, 2, 3, 11, 14, 28, 30, 36, 37, 38, 43, 57
MI 6.2 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 6.3: Clear adherence to the commitment in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation on use of country systems	**Score**
Overall MI Rating	
Overall MI score	**N/A**
Element 1: Clear statement on set of expectations for how the organisation will seek to deliver on the Busan commitment/QCPR statement (as appropriate) on use of country systems within a given time period	N/A
Element 2: Internal processes (in collaboration with partners) to diagnose the condition of country systems	N/A
Element 3: Clear procedures for how organisation to respond to address (with partners) concerns identified in country systems	N/A
Element 4: Reasons for non-use of country systems clearly and transparently communicated	N/A
Element 5: Internal structures and incentives supportive of greater use of country systems	N/A
Element 6: Monitoring of the organisation trend on use of country systems and the associated scale of investments being made in strengthening country systems	N/A
MI 6.3 Analysis	**Source document**
Micro-indicator deemed not applicable for assessment purposes given UNRWA mandate	
MI 6.3 Evidence confidence	

MI 6.4: Strategies or designs identify synergies, to encourage leverage/catalytic use of resources and avoid fragmentation	**Score**
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3**
Element 1: Strategies or designs clearly recognise the importance of synergies and leverage	3
Element 2: Strategies or designs contain clear statements of how duplication/fragmentation will be avoided based on realistic assessment of comparative advantages	3
Element 3: Strategies or designs contain clear statement of where an intervention will add the most value to a wider change	N/E

Element 4: Strategies or designs contain a clear statement of how leverage will be ensured	N/E
Element 5: Strategies or designs contain a clear statement of how resources will be used catalytically to stimulate wider change	N/E
MI 6.4 Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA's Partnership Framework is clear about the importance of identifying synergies with potential partners and the importance of avoiding institutional fragmentation. With this in mind, the Strategy is clear that efforts to avoid duplication of efforts should be considered and each organisations' role should be articulated, for example, signing a Memorandum of Understanding with partners. For example, UNRWA has aimed at addressing duplication of cash transfer programmes between the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA in the West bank throughout 2017 and shares data with UNHCR regarding the registered number of refugees to avoid 'double dipping'. In LFO, UNRWA is partnering with WFP to deliver food assistance to 32, 500 Palestine refugees, where WFP contributes half the needed amount. In its MTS, UNRWA recognises the growing number of refugees living in poverty and the impact poverty has on the lives of Palestine refugees. As such, it is focusing its cash assistance on the abject poor (Strategic Outcome 5: Refugees Are Able to Meet Their Basic Human Needs of Food, Shelter and Environmental Health).	1, 8, 28, 36, 37, 41, 58,
MI 6.4 Evidence confidence	**Medium confidence**

MI 6.5: Key business practices (planning, design, implementation, monitoring and reporting) co-ordinated with other relevant partners (donors, UN agencies, etc.)	**Score**
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3**
Element 1: Evidence that the organisation has participated in joint planning exercises, such as the UNDAF	3
Element 2: Evidence that the organisation has aligned its programme activities with joint planning instruments, such as UNDAF	3
Element 3: Evidence that the organisation has participated in opportunities for joint programming where these exist	N/E
Element 4: Evidence that the organisation has participated in joint monitoring and reporting processes with key partners (donor, UN, etc.)	3
Element 5: Evidence of the identification of shared information gaps with partners and strategies developed to address these	N/E
Element 6: Evidence of participation in the joint planning, management and delivery of evaluation activities	N/E

MI 6.5 Analysis	Source document
Although specifically and solely mandated to address the needs of the Palestine population, UNRWA maintains a corporate commitment to work in close coordination and partnership with other UN agencies. UNRWA's participation in joint planning exercises with other UN agencies varies according to Field Office and context. In Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank, UNRWA takes part in the UNDAF. Similarly, in Syria, UNRWA's non-humanitarian activities (including those funded by the Programme Budget) are included in UNDAF Strategic Frameworks. In Jordan, UNRWA is not included in the UNCT and UNDAF but coordinates with other agencies through technical working groups and informal mechanisms.	
UNRWA has reviewed its monitoring and evaluation matrix with donors which has resulted in a number aligning UNRWA's reporting in line with this format. UNRWA has through its introduction of an Annual Operational Report (AOR) presented harmonised results reporting to donors with the collective aim of enhancing transparency and reducing transaction costs.	
Further examples of UNRWA's participation/coordination includes:	
• UNRWA provides national education statistics and health surveillance information (e.g. about outbreaks) to host governments.	
• UNRWA is a co-sponsor of the EiE IM Package / SDG4 technical workshop held to identify common indicators and data gaps for education in emergencies in the Arab Region. UNRWA participates in the NLG planning and reporting exercises with UNICEF.	1, 8, 10, 16, 24, 35, 47, 26, 37, 51, 54, 65
• UNRWA participates in national coordination mechanisms such as the PA Education Sector Working Group, chaired by UNESCO and presided by the MoEHE in Ramallah.	
• Participation in Annual appeal emergency appeal rounds; (i) OPT – west bank & Gaza, (ii) Syria, Lebanon. These appeals are part of Humanitarian Regional Plans (wider donor cooperation – inter-agency regional forums - in this space)	
• Over the years UNRWA has made a wider contribution to national systems in many areas of PHC provision; MHC (1960's), NCD (1992) and now mental health. National systems are learning from UNRWA – both in relation to the host authorities and more widely in the region. This learning is in relation to 'cost-effective PHC' … delivering quality service with minimal cost.	
• In Jordan now engaged in discussions on linking up eHealth with the 'Hakim' Jordan Government system	
• In West Bank the UNRWA MCH booklet has been accepted as a national MCH booklet	
• The Education Programme coordinates very closely with UNESCO and UNICEF within the Framework of the respective MOUs. Country level leveraging is illustrated in joint participation in coordination and hematic meetings, as well as through joint deliverables such as the Syria Self Learning Material developed by UNRWA with UNICEF support and used by UNICEF in the Whole of Syria Programme.	
• UNRWA takes part in various technical working groups across its Field Offices (gender, protection, education) and cluster mechanisms.	
MI 6.5 Evidence confidence	Medium confidence

MI 6.6: Key information (analysis, budgeting, management, results etc.) shared with strategic/ implementation partners on an ongoing basis	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3**
Element 1: Information on the organisation's website is easily accessible and current	2
Element 2: The organisation has signed up to the International Aid Transparency Initiative or reports through the OECD-DAC systems	4
Element 3: Accurate information is available on analysis, budgeting, management and is in line with IATI or OECD-DAC (CRS) guidelines	N/E
Element 4: Evidence that partner queries on analysis, budgeting, management and results are responded to in a timely fashion	3
Element 5: Evidence that information shared is accurate and of good quality	3
MI 6.6 Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA shares its main policy and strategy documents, its external audits, and its budgets on its website. The small number of evaluations that are available are published on the website. Documentation of UNRWA's projects is incomplete on UNRWA's website. UNRWA has not signed up to the International Aid Transparency Initiative. It provides information to the OECD-DAC system. UNRWA's information security activities have not been fully updated. This is partly due to an outdated information security policy, and the absence of an information security programme or assigned accountability for information security. UNRWA has taken measures to increase the transparency of its reporting, particularly with donors. UNRWA is taking steps to strengthen its information security policies. The draft policy is currently awaiting consideration/endorsement by the Agency's Executive Decision-Making Platform. UNRWA is also a member of the UN Privacy Principles Group, and the Agency's draft policy is based on common principles endorsed by the UN High Level Committee of Management in 2018.	2, 3,6, 10, 22, 30, 31, 61
MI 6.6 Evidence confidence	**Medium confidence**

MI 6.7: Clear standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiaries implemented	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.33**
Element 1: Explicit statement available on standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiary populations e.g. Accountability to Affected Populations	4
Element 2: Guidance for staff is available on the implementation of the procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	2
Element 3: Training has been conducted on the implementation of procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	0
Element 4: Programming tools explicitly contain the requirement to implement procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	3
Element 5: Approval mechanisms explicitly include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries will be addressed within the intervention	2

Element 6: Monitoring and evaluation procedures explicitly include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries have been addressed within the intervention	3

MI 6.7 Analysis	Source document
UNRWA's Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) framework sets out formal and informal mechanisms, standards and practices at the field and programme level to engage Palestine refugees throughout the programming cycle. The AAP framework focuses on information sharing, information gathering, consultation, participation of vulnerable groups, and complaints and feedback mechanisms to deliver on its commitments to Palestine Refugees. The statement is explicitly aligned to global standards, set by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, on accountability to affected populations. UNRWA deals with the unique scenario of having beneficiaries who are also staff. With this, UNRWA interfaces with area staff as a first port of call for decision making to determine how UNRWA's work will be carried out. Each of UNRWA's programmes has guidance on how to strengthen refugee participation. For example, Education has extensive guidance and practice on participation, the ICIP Camp improvement Manual has extensive guidance on how to ensure participation. However, Protection Audits highlight that refugee participation can be further strengthened and that, with the exception of Education and some specific projects, UNRWA does not adequately enable the participation of Palestine refugees in the whole programme cycle. The Terms of Reference of Project Review Committees do not include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries will be addressed within an individual intervention. UNRWA's corporate documents state that AAP is monitored through management compacts with senior staff; monitoring of and reporting against results, including in the Agency's Annual Operations Report; formal programme evaluations; and biennial protection audits in all fields. However, the practice of refugee participation during the programme management cycle is not thought to be fully embedded across UNRWA. There are examples of feedback mechanisms, such as the Perception survey undertaken by the Education division, but these are not systematically in place across the Agency. The 2016 UNRWA Protection Audit found that complaints and feedback mechanisms are not used or fit for purpose. For example, UNRWA installations have an anonymous complaints box, however, the boxes are often not used or not emptied out and recommendations not followed up and that Palestine refugees and UNRWA staff, even if aware of the existence of the boxes, are not always convinced of their effectiveness as a complaint mechanism.	1, 3, 5, 8, 31, 37, 40, 61, 109, 110, 111, 134

MI 6.7 Evidence confidence	High confidence

MI 6.8: Participation with national and other partners in mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments n/a	Score
Overall MI Rating	
Overall MI score	N/A
Element 1: Evidence of participation in joint performance reviews of interventions e.g. joint assessments	N/A
Element 2: Evidence of participation in multi-stakeholder dialogue around joint sectoral or normative commitments	N/A
Element 3: Evidence of engagement in the production of joint progress statements in the implementation of commitments e.g. joint assessment reports	N/A
Element 4: Documentation arising from mutual progress assessments contains clear statement of the organisation's contribution, agreed by all partners	N/A

Element 5: Surveys or other methods applied to assess partner perception of progress	N/A
MI 6.8 Analysis	**Source document**
MI 6.8 Evidence confidence	

MI 6.9: Deployment of knowledge base to support programming adjustments, policy dialogue and/or advocacy	**Score**
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3**
Element 1: Statement in corporate documentation explicitly recognises the organisation's role in knowledge production	N/A
Element 2: Evidence of knowledge products produced and utilised by partners to inform action	3
Element 3: Knowledge products generated and applied to inform advocacy at country, regional or global level	3
Element 4: Evidence that knowledge products generated are timely/perceived as timely by partners	3
Element 5: Evidence that knowledge products are perceived as high quality by partners	3
Element 6: Evidence that knowledge products are produced in a format that supports their utility to partners	N/E
MI 6.9 Analysis	**Source document**
Knowledge production is not formally part of UNRWA's mandate, and it is not a normative agency. UNRWA is perceived as providing high-quality inputs to policy dialogue that affects the lives of Palestine refugees. UNRWA, as part of its approach to protection, documents and raises awareness of key alleged violations of international law relating to the rights of Palestine refugees and provides regular inputs to the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on grave violations of child rights to the UN Security Council. UNRWA also produces a number of protection advocacy products including confidential IHRS submissions, and briefings to key donors and diplomatic community. The Education Programme regularly provides inputs to presentations on advocacy for Education and for education in Emergencies, for example presentations at the World Humanitarian Summit. UNRWA's Health Department is a Member of the UN Task force for NCD and mental health and participates regularly in global for a such as the WHO health assembly, and WHO/EMRO Regional committee to share research and lessons learned. Its microfinance programme also collaborated with the Syria Centre for Policy Research in the early stages of the conflict to produce quarterly socioeconomic reports on Syria in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which are regularly used for inter-agency planning and high-level advocacy. UNRWA's materials and work are referenced in the work of other agencies; for example, its materials are referenced by the International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) and in UNICEF's LSCE Framework. UNRWA has historically had challenges in its internal knowledge management and identification and dissemination of lessons learned.	11, 28, 32, 46, 60, 65
MI 6.9 Evidence confidence	**Medium confidence**

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

Systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results and the use of performance information, including evaluation and lesson-learning

KPI 7: Strong and transparent results focus, explicitly geared to function	KPI score
Highly satisfactory	**3.24**

UNRWA has a strong corporate commitment to results-based management and there is strong evidence of a 'results-orientated' culture at various levels of the organisation to ensure evidence-based decision-making and accountability. The results framework between the MTS and corporate strategies are well aligned and programmatic results are captured in the results-based monitoring system. There are clear roles and responsibilities with regards to the results-based monitoring system and relevant focal points have been trained on its use. Compliance of reporting to the RBM system is monitored by department and reported on regularly.

Results targets in the CMM were developed at the beginning of the 2016-2021 MTS for all indicators in collaboration with all Field offices to ensure ownership and common understanding. These appear evidence-based and there is a clear internal logic and flow between inputs, outputs and outcomes. Whilst exact resources allocated to the results-based monitoring system are not known, there are human resource gaps in terms of the agency's ability to monitor everything required by the results-based monitoring system.

Results achieved are reviewed through a 'reflective' with all Fields with respect to the set target and baseline and targets are adjusted with documented justification after discussion between Fields and HQ. Data quality is verified at field level and quality assured as part of regular results reporting processes. UNRWA uses its performance data to inform its planning and programming and there is strong accountability for the achievement of results at multiple levels of the organisation with regular reviews to document progress and action points.

MI 7.1: Leadership ensures application of an organisation-wide RBM approach	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3**
Element 1: Corporate commitment to a result culture is made clear in strategic planning documents	4
Element 2: Clear requirements/incentives in place for the use of an RBM approach in planning and programming	3
Element 3: Guidance for setting results targets and develop indicators is clear and accessible to all staff	3
Element 4: Tools and methods for measuring and managing results are available	3
Element 5: Adequate resources are allocated to the RBM system	2
Element 6: All relevant staff are trained in RBM approaches and methods	3

MI 7.1 Analysis	Source document
UNRWA has a strong corporate commitment to results-based management as outlined in the MTS and there is strong evidence of a 'results-orientated' culture at various levels of the organisation to ensure evidence-based decision-making and accountability. UNRWA's results-based monitoring system is designed to enable data collection and analysis against strategic outcomes set in the MTS. Directors in each of the Field Offices are responsible for the management of monitoring data. The current results-based monitoring system went live in 2017 and focal points from HQ and field offices were trained on the RBM system and relevant tools, but management do not appear to have been trained. Compliance of reporting to the results-based monitoring system is monitored by department and reported on regularly. There is clear methodological guidance available to staff to support the assessment of performance against targets.	1, 3, 4, 8, 11, 23, 31, 33, 36, 70, 73, 85, 100, 102, 105

Results targets in the CMM were developed at the beginning of the 2016-2021 MTS for all indicators in collaboration with all Field offices to ensure ownership and common understanding. These appear evidence-based and there is a clear internal logic and flow between inputs, outputs and outcomes. Whilst exact resources allocated to the results-based monitoring system are not known, there are human resource gaps in terms of the agency's ability to monitor everything required by the results-based monitoring system. There are many indicators which are perceived by field offices as burdensome to collect given available staff resources as the number of indicators for Field Offices to report on has doubled under the current MTS but there is no additional staff capacity for monitoring. The contexts in which UNRWA operates can also create a challenge in gathering reliable, timely data; the Syria crisis rendered many UNRWA facilities inaccessible and displaced a large proportion of staff, severely impacting on the Field's capacity to access and collect data throughout the country and it is challenging for UNRWA to get government approval for any kind of data collection exercise.

For protection, indicators for individual cases of GBV, child protection and gender were recently removed from reporting requirements as some fields were not able to collect reliable and accurate data on these. It is also not yet possible to use the system to undertake results-based budgeting and there are remain some technical glitches in the system which affect the systems' usability.

| | 1, 3, 4, 8, 11, 23, 31, 33, 36, 70, 73, 85, 100, 102, 105 |

MI 7.1 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 7.2: Corporate strategies, including country strategies, based on a sound RBM focus and logic	**Score**
Overall MI Rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.4**
Element 1: Organisation-wide plans and strategies include results frameworks	4
Element 2: Clear linkages exist between the different layers of the results framework, from project through to country and corporate level	4
Element 3: An annual report on performance is discussed with the governing bodies	4
Element 4: Corporate strategies are updated regularly	3
Element 5: The annual corporate reports show progress over time and notes areas of strong performance as well as deviations between planned and actual results	2
MI 7.2 Analysis	**Source document**

UNRWA's corporate-level strategies are based on a sound RBM focus and logic and guide field office and programmatic/thematic planning, reporting and results management approaches. UNRWA's MTS is supported by a 'Common monitoring matrix' (CMM) and corporate strategies are underpinned by results frameworks which are aligned in so far as possible to the MTS; for example, Field Office strategies, the Resource Mobilisation Strategy, the People Strategy and the GES are aligned to the same time period as the MTS, and outcomes in Field Office Strategic Plans are aligned to those in the MTS

UNRWA produces a series of six sets of annual reports each year which are presented to the appropriate level of governance. These include: (i) Annual report from the Commissioner-General to the UN General Assembly; (ii) A harmonized result report to donors; (iii) Project-specific progress and/or final reports to donors; (iv) Annual reports on initiatives/activities that are funded from multiple sources including, by way of example, reform projects and emergency appeals; (v) Reporting to refugees on an annual basis for the use of resources and the achievement (or not) of results; (vi) Annual report of the Department of Internal Oversight Services. Whilst corporate strategies are not necessarily updated once they have commenced, their implementation is supported by annual operation plans which are regularly reviewed and reported on.

| | 1, 3, 7, 8, 11, 12, 31, 36, 37, 40, 44, 59, 60, 69, 76, 79 , 86, 92, 109, 141, 142 |

A number of the reports are 'achievement-focused' and do not systematically reflect on progress achieved overtime in relation to intended targets. For example, the Annual Operational Report presents the baseline, the target and the actual results achieved for each year but does not show progress overtime. The Annual Health Reports report results achieved for that year, but do not present targets. Emergency Appeal reports present actual results and targets but not baseline results. Reports present to varying degrees analysis of the factors affecting results.	1, 3, 7, 8, 11, 12, 31, 36, 37, 40, 44, 59, 60, 69, 76, 79 , 86, 92, 109, 141, 142
Each of UNRWA's programmatic areas have specific logframes, and in some cases theories of change for UNRWA's interventions. UNRWA's Gender Strategy, for example, is supported by a corresponding results framework aligned to the MTS which is reported on annually. Subsequent to its education reform, UNRWA's Education Programme incorporates policies and strategies into a systemic approach which is monitored and reported on through multiple levels with universal education indicators within the CMM, applicable to each of the five Field Offices, as well as field-specific baselines and targets.	

MI 7.2 Evidence confidence	High confidence

MI 7.3: Results targets set based on a sound evidence base and logic	Score
Overall MI Rating	Satisfactory
Overall MI score	3
Element 1: Targets and indicators are adequate to capture causal pathways between interventions and the outcomes that contribute to higher order objectives	3
Element 2: Indicators are relevant to the expected result to enable measurement of the degree of goal achievement	2
Element 3: Development of baselines are mandatory for new interventions	3
Element 4: Results targets are regularly reviewed and adjusted when needed	4

MI 7.3 Analysis	Source document
There is evidence across the different programme areas (health, education) of a well-developed set of indicators supporting agency wide tracking to higher order goals. However, the MTS is not underpinned by an explicit theory of change and the extent to which the interlinkages between targets and indicators for UNRWA's individual strategic outcomes and the assumptions underpinning them are articulated is not consistent across and between all outcomes. Although output-level indicators are generally relevant, some of the indicators aligned to outcomes are more appropriate as output level indicators. . In the case specifically of protection, Field offices report challenges in reporting against these and the CMM has baselines and targets covering the percentage of UNRWA interventions on protection issues that prompt positive responses from authorities and the degree of alignment with UNRWA protection standards across all aspects of programming. This suggests that the targets and indicators within the CMM provide a basis for seeing how progress at different points/ work streams of the Agency contributes to a positive direction towards the higher order objectives of the Agency.	1, 11, 12, 28, 35, 47, 70, 73, 86
Baselines were established at the beginning of the 2016-2021 MTS for all CMM indicators (with the exception of new ones) in collaboration with all Fields to ensure ownership and common. Results achieved are reviewed with all Fields quarterly/six-monthly and annually with respect to performance against the set targets, and baseline and targets are adjusted with documented justification (e.g. Action plans) after discussion between Fields and HQ.	

MI 7.3 Evidence confidence	High confidence

MI 7.4: Monitoring systems generate high quality and useful performance data	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.14**
Element 1: The corporate monitoring system is adequately resourced	3
Element 2: Monitoring systems generate data at output and outcome level of the results chain	3
Element 3: Reporting structures are clear	3
Element 4: Reporting processes ensure timely data for key corporate reporting, and planning	3
Element 5: A system for ensuring data quality exists	4
Element 6: Data adequately captures key corporate results	3
Element 7: Adequate resources are allocated to the monitoring system	3
MI 7.4 Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA is strongly committed to generating high quality and useful performance data against the multi-tiered and broad set of results frameworks that are it monitor and reports against and has clear reporting structures to do this. There are some concerns regarding the 'fit for purpose' of monitoring given resource needs as the current system reports on double the number of indictors previously, but with no extra monitoring resources.. Compliance with reporting requirements is monitored across programmes, functions and field offices. There are some examples where there are duplications of effort and reporting structures could be clearer; staff in programme areas report being asked to send the same data sets to both their programme Chiefs at HQ, as well as to the Front Office (Planning) in each field. The results-based monitoring system is currently used to report on the organisation's programmes and to capture management and effectiveness KPIs (rather than support functions which are reported under the management and operational effectiveness chapter of the MTS) but will be integrated with the SAP (REACH) system to facilitate a more complex processing of reporting on corporate results, combining programmatic information with financial and HR aspects of projects and logical frameworks and increasing the reliability of data between UNRWA's different programmes and databases. Data quality is verified at field level and quality assured as part of regular results reporting processes (quarterly, six-monthly, annually) and produced on a timely basis. At a thematic level, UNRWA's systems for reporting on health data have been strengthened with the advent of e-Health, which in enhancing the organisation's ability to report on its health indicators and currently being tailored to ensure its alignment and relevance to local conditions. UNRWA also has a dedicated Education Management Information System, which captures information on individual children as they enter school and progress from one grade to the next and also links to other UNRWA data management systems. In emergency settings, UNRWA is able to adapt and use a 'light' version of its RBM system, whereby data is input to the system on a first instance basis, with the data then being verified by the Field Office and then going through a further quality check at HQ before being 'entered'. This practice allows to agency the opportunity to spot issues at an early stage and be responsive.	1, 3, 8, 11, 31, 33, 36, 37, 70, 73, 85, 100, 102, 105
MI 7.4 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 7.5: Performance data transparently applied in planning and decision-making	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.67**
Element 1: Planning documents are clearly based on performance data	4
Element 2: Proposed adjustments to interventions are clearly informed by performance data	3
Element 3: At corporate level, management regularly reviews corporate performance data and makes adjustments as appropriate	4
Element 4: Performance data support dialogue in partnerships at global, regional and country level	N/A

MI 7.5 Analysis	Source document
UNRWA uses its performance data to inform its planning and programming and there is strong accountability for the achievement of results at multiple levels of the organisation. Agency-wide reviews of expenditure and results are undertaken annually, and half-yearly agency-wide reviews using data from the results-based monitoring system, with each field given ten minutes to report on issues and what is/is not working and for lessons to be shared across Field Offices. In addition, quarterly reviews are held with Field Offices and HQ on the implementation of priority activities, implementation of other initiatives in the Fields operational plan and the achievement of programmatic results. Data submitted by Field Offices is verified in the field and further quality assured and verified by HQ who screen data for anomalies. Reviews and reporting of data are also undertaken at a programmatic level between departments and HQ, with Department Chiefs accountable for programmatic results achieved. These reporting processes inform the development of the following Operational Plans.

UNRWA uses these reviews to review progress and document action points. Data is analysed through a 'reflective' process, and data is triangulated with other sources to support decision making and inform annual and periodic planning processes. Poorly performing, or off-track indicators are monitored with remedial plans made as necessary. The increased availability and use of data is perceived to have contributed to both improvements in programming, as well as to have enabled the identification of areas of cost-saving.

At a field office level, some fields have Project Review Board (PRB) whose role it is to help ensure delivery of projects on time and on budget. These meet monthly by programme area. | 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 36, 37, 51, 66, 70, 73, 93, 99, 100, 102, 104, 108 |

MI 7.5 Evidence confidence	High confidence

KPI 8: Evidence-based planning and programming applied	KPI score
Satisfactory	**2.4**

UNRWA's evaluation function is located within the Department of Internal Oversight Services. DIOS fulfils its internal oversight role of UNRWA's work through independent and objective assurance (internal audit and inspection) and advisory services, evaluation and investigation and the DIOS Director reports to, and is directly accountable to, the Commissioner General. UNRWA's Evaluation Policy developed in 2016 affirms the independence of DIOS and the evaluation function; including unrestricted access to all functions, records, property, premises and personnel to enable DIOS to fulfil its responsibilities, and the necessary resources in terms of budget and staff in DIOS to adequately maintain its independence and objectivity. UNRWA's medium-term evaluation plan is included as an annex to the MTS and covers the same time period. These are set out according to the five-strategic objective, as well as a category for Management and operational effectiveness. The plan is not prioritised or funded and indicates that between 2015 and 2017 not all intended evaluations have been completed.

No meta-synthesis of evaluations has taken place since the UNEG Peer Review due to funding constraints; although this was one of the recommendations in the Peer Review.

DIOS uses a web-based tracking tool to follow up on the status of implementation of its recommendations under UNRWA's results-based monitoring system. The tool allows tracking of the implementation status of oversight recommendations from initiation to closure and includes the outline of the actions as well as the responsibility and timeline.

MI 8.1: A corporate independent evaluation function exists	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.43**
Element 1: The evaluation function is independent from other management functions such as planning and managing development assistance *(operational independence)*	4
Element 2: The Head of evaluation reports directly to the Governing Body of the organisation *(Structural independence)*	2
Element 3: The evaluation office has full discretion in deciding the evaluation programme	2
Element 4: A separate budget line (approved by the Governing Body) ensures *budgetary independence*	1
Element 5: The central evaluation programme is fully funded by core funds	1
Element 6: Evaluations are submitted directly for consideration at the appropriate level of decision-making pertaining to the subject of evaluation	4
Element 7: Evaluators are able to conduct their work throughout the evaluation without undue interference by those involved in implementing the unit of analysis being evaluated *(Behavioural independence)*	3
MI 8.1 Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA's corporate evaluation function is structurally independent as it is located within the Department of Internal Oversight Services (DIOS) which fulfils its internal oversight role of UNRWA's work through independent and objective assurance (internal audit and inspection) and advisory services, evaluation and investigation. The DIOS Director reports to, and is directly accountable to, the Commissioner General. The 2015 UNEG Peer Review of UNRWA's evaluation function found that whilst structural independence of the central evaluation function was satisfactory, the head of the evaluation division should be further enabled to engage in regular, direct dialogue with senior management, and donor representatives to ascertain their priorities and to update them on latest evaluation matters.

UNRWA's MTS includes a medium-term evaluation plan and DIOS co-ordinates with fields and headquarters departments to produce an annual plan to identify evaluation work that needs to be undertaken. The Evaluation Division in DIOS in theory has the lead in selecting intended evaluation subjects and in preparing the work plan, although the overall responsibility lies with the DIOS Director. However, due to funding constraints, not all intended corporate/central evaluations are carried out as planned and so this discretion in deciding the evaluation programme is not realised. The DIOS Annual workplan lists the intended evaluation activities (central and field) and details whether funding has been secured, whether an evaluation is prioritised and if an evaluation is not to take place, what alternative measures might be used to assess something (i.e. donor assessment, MOPAN, internal study). At a decentralised level, the selection of evaluations is ad hoc and to a large degree project and donor-driven (embedded in budgets at the outset of projects) which limits the independent selection of evaluation subjects. | 4, 21, 53, 61, 63, 66, 73 |

The organisational directive which guarantees the independence of DIOS and the Evaluation Division states that it ensures the necessary resources in terms of budget and staff in DIOS to adequately maintain its independence and objectivity and there is a separate budget line for the evaluation division as part of DIOS. However, core funds available for institutional and strategic evaluation are greatly restricted given UNRWA's current funding context, limiting the evaluation function's budgetary independence and making it largely dependent on donor funding. Funding for strategic/institutional evaluations remains a challenge with several evaluations in the medium-term plan in the MTS not having been completed as intended. There is currently one Evaluation staff member funded by the Programme Budget at a central level, and no programme budget funded evaluation staff at a field office level. The 2015 Review identified that behavioural independence and impartiality of evaluation staff and evaluators has been to a large extent upheld and that this is maintained using external consultants for agency-wide initiatives and a mixed team approach for sectoral initiatives.	4, 21, 53, 61, 63, 66, 73
MI 8.1 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 8.2: Consistent, independent evaluation of results (coverage)	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Unsatisfactory**
Overall MI score	**1.75**
Element 1: An evaluation policy describes the principles to ensure coverage, quality and use of findings, including in decentralised evaluations	2
Element 2: The policy/an evaluation manual guides the implementation of the different categories of evaluations, such as strategic, thematic, corporate level evaluations, as well as decentralized evaluations	1
Element 3: A prioritized and funded evaluation plan covering the organisation's planning and budgeting cycle is available	2
Element 4: The annual evaluation plan presents a systematic and periodic coverage of the organisation's Interventions, reflecting key priorities	2
Element 5: Evidence from sample countries demonstrate that the policy is being implemented	N/E
MI 8.2 Analysis	**Source document**
UNRWA has a recently developed evaluation policy (2016) which was developed following recommendations from the UNEG Peer Review of UNRWA's evaluation function in 2015. The policy outlines the criteria which are to be used to identify what needs to be evaluated and outlines that a Medium-term Evaluation Plan will be developed to align with the MTS and that Annual Evaluation plans will also be developed. The policy sets out how UNRWA will identify what needs to be evaluated but provides no specific guidance on the implementation of the different categories of evaluation. The policy also outlines processes for evaluation follow-up, communication and use and sets out intended processes for evaluation quality but does not articulate criteria for coverage. UNRWA's medium-term evaluation plan is included as an annex to the MTS and covers the same time period. These are set out according to the five-strategic objective, as well as a category for Management and operational effectiveness. The plan is not prioritised or funded and indicates that between 2015 and 2017, there were nine strategic evaluations planned; of these only three reports are available. UNRWA's inability to fulfil the intentions outlined in the evaluation plan is attributed to a deprioritisation of evaluation given the organisation's current financial constraints and systemic and periodic evaluation coverage of the organisation's interventions does not appear to be taking place.	1, 4, 21, 53

There is no separate Annual Evaluation plan but a list of centralised and decentralised evaluations to be undertaken each year is integrated into the DIOS Annual Workplan (the department the evaluation function sits in). DIOS has developed a framework to identify areas to be evaluated which takes into account the UNRWA context: budget size, complexity of the operational environment, closeness of the activity to the core of UNRWA mandate, maturity of the operation, monitoring results, and prior DIOS work with is included as an annex to the Oversight Plan; however, there is limited detail as to how the final selection of evaluations to be undertaken is identified from this framework and it is unclear, in the resource constrained environment, how decisions around prioritisation of evaluations are made in practice.

The centralised evaluations are listed in DIOS's Annual Table of Assignments; these are not prioritised although these is a budgeted number of work days assigned to each evaluation. The decentralised evaluations to be undertaken are listed but it is not clear where these are project funded and they are not prioritised.

1, 4, 21, 53

MI 8.2 Evidence confidence	High confidence

MI 8.3: Systems are applied to ensure the quality of evaluations	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Unsatisfactory**
Overall MI score	**1.6**
Element 1: Evaluations are based on design, planning and implementation processes that are inherently quality oriented	2
Element 2: Evaluations use appropriate methodologies for data-collection, analysis and interpretation	1
Element 3: Evaluation reports present in a complete and balanced way the evidence, findings, conclusions, and where relevant, recommendations	2
Element 4: The methodology presented incudes the methodological limitations and concerns	1
Element 5: A process exists to ensure the quality of all evaluations, including decentralized evaluations	2

MI 8.3 Analysis	Source document

The UNEG Peer Review of UNRWA's Evaluation Function in 2015 assessed whether UNRWA had a 'system in place to ensure the quality of evaluations in their design, methodology, conduct of evaluation and reporting'. This scored 2 (in development). The UNEG Peer Review undertook a quality assessment of a sample of fifteen UNRWA evaluation reports. In terms of design, the average score was 27 per cent (not adequate). The Peer Review score for evaluation design (which would encompass methodologies) was 'not adequate' (27 per cent). The Peer Review in its quality assessment rated evaluation limitations as 'not adequate' (36 per cent). No meta-synthesis of evaluations has taken place since the UNEG Peer Review due to funding constraints; although undertaking regular meta-synthesis was one of the recommendations in the Peer Review.

UNRWA has specific guidance on quality assurance in evaluation developed in 2016, which outline the full evaluation cycle and where quality assurance is necessary at each stage, as well as describing the roles and responsibilities for each of these stages. The document provides quality assurance templates against which evaluations can be assessed. The evaluation division in DIOS backstops decentralized evaluations aiming to insure both independence as well as quality. It is not possible to determine the extent to which these measures have resulted in improvements in evaluation quality.

34, 53

MI 8.3 Evidence confidence	High confidence

MI 8.4: Mandatory demonstration of the evidence base to design new interventions	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.67**
Element 1: A formal requirement exists to demonstrate how lessons from past interventions have been taken into account in the design of new interventions	2
Element 2: Clear feedback loops exist to feed lessons into new interventions design	3
Element 3: There is evidence that lessons from past interventions have informed new interventions	3
Element 4: Incentives exist to apply lessons learnt to new interventions	N/E
Element 5: The number/share of new operations designs that draw on lessons from evaluative approaches is made public	N/E
MI 8.4 Analysis	**Source document**
The UNRWA Evaluation Policy states that fields and headquarters' departments are required to take relevant evidence from evaluation into account when developing strategic response plans and annual work plans and that evaluation findings, recommendations, and lessons learned should be incorporated into decision-making processes in order to strengthen learning and accountability in the Agency with the aim of improving operations and results. There does not appear to be a specific mechanism through which this takes place, nonetheless, there appears to be a practice of 'informal' evaluation and reflection taking place across the organisation and this being used to inform decision-making. There is no evidence as to whether incentives exist to apply lessons learnt to new interventions or whether the number/share of new operations designs that draw on lessons from evaluative approaches is made public.	70, 73, 105, 108, 131, 137
MI 8.4 Evidence confidence	**Medium confidence**

MI 8.5: Poorly performing interventions proactively identified, tracked and addressed	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Highly satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**3.5**
Element 1: A system exists to identify poorly performing interventions	4
Element 2: Regular reporting tracks the status and evolution of poorly performing interventions	4
Element 3: A process for addressing the poor performance exists, with evidence of its use	3
Element 4: The process clearly delineates the responsibility to take action	3
MI 8.5 Analysis	**Source document**
At a decentralized level, UNRWA Field Offices track performance and identify poorly performing interventions through the quarterly RBM progress review. In the Jordan Field Office, for example, all departments are required to state planned actions to address areas identified as 'behind plan'. These areas are shared with HQ as part of the QMR and actions points of QMRs are prepared and circulated by PSO and reviewed in the next QMR. QMRs are aggregated across the field offices to produce the mid-year results reports, which features agency-wide action points, and which are also then tracked.	6, 20, 23, 70, 73, 105, 108, 131, 137
MI 8.5 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 8.6: Clear accountability system ensures responses and follow-up to and use of evaluation recommendations	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.6**
Element 1: Evaluation reports include a management response (or has one attached or associated with it)	2
Element 2: Management responses include an action plan and/or agreement clearly stating responsibilities and accountabilities	2
Element 3: A timeline for implementation of key recommendations is proposed	3
Element 4: A system exists to regularly track status of implementation	3
Element 5: An annual report on the status of use and implementation of evaluation recommendations is made public	3
MI 8.6 Analysis	**Source document**
Management response have been included in all strategic evaluations since 2016 but management responses do not always detail specific responsibilities and accountabilities for the implementation of recommendations and decentralised evaluations are not always accompanied by a management response DIOS uses a web-based tracking tool to follow up on the status of implementation of its strategic recommendations under UNRWA's results-based monitoring system. The tool allows tracking of the implementation status of oversight recommendations from initiation to closure and includes the outline of the actions as well as allocation of responsibility and timelines for implementation of recommendations. The DIOS annual report includes a summary of the recommendation status and highlights important developments in implementing recommendations and is shared with the ACIO and the Advisory Commission. Decentralised evaluations recommendations do not seem to be tracked and monitored in the same way.	21, 24, 53, 79, 132, 133
MI 8.6 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 8.7: Uptake of lessons learned and best practices from evaluations and other reports	Score
Overall MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
Overall MI score	**2.25**
Element 1: A complete and current repository of evaluations and their recommendations is available for use	2
Element 2: A mechanism for distilling and disseminating lessons learned internally exists	2
Element 3: A dissemination mechanism to partners, peers and other stakeholders is available and employed	2
Element 4: A system is available and used to track the uptake of lessons learned	N/E
Element 5: Evidence is available that lessons learned and good practices are being applied	3
Element 6: A corporate policy for Disclosure of information exists and is also applied to evaluations	N/E

MI 8.7 Analysis	Source document
The DIOS workplan states that evaluation reports are to be disseminated internally to all stakeholders; in the case of decentralised evaluations to all departments in headquarters and field offices that are concerned with the subject of the evaluation and for centralised evaluations that are concerned with strategic objectives of the MTS, these are to be circulated to all fields and departments in UNRWA. This, however, does not appear to be consistently applied in practice and there does not appear to be a mechanism or the dissemination of evaluation reports from HQ to fields or across fields.	
Externally, as of 2017, all strategic evaluation reports, and a number of decentralised ones, have been uploaded on the evaluation page of UNRWA's website. There is no evidence though as to how reports are actively shared with other stakeholders and partners.	24, 70, 79
The DIOS recommendation tracking system tracks the implementation of recommendations and is updated every six months, although this does not explicitly track lessons learned. The results of this are available in the Annual report of DIOS that is shared with the Advisory Commission, as well as the Agency Annual Results Review process and the Agency Operational Review.	
MI 8.7 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

RESULTS

Achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results in an efficient way

KPI 9: Achievement of development and humanitarian objectives and results e.g. at the institutional/corporate wide level, at the regional/corporate wide level and at the regional/country level, with results contributing to normative and cross-cutting goals	KPI score
Satisfactory	**2.1**

The sample reviewed for assessment of results comprises nine independent evaluations, and management reporting from 2016-2018**.** The reviewed evaluations are:

- Evaluation of the Office of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 2017

- Evaluation of the Resource Mobilization Strategy 2012-2015, 2015

- Evaluation of the e-Health Project, 2016

- Evaluation of UNRWA's Transition to the E-Card Modality in Jordan, Lebanon and west Bank Fields, 2018

- Evaluation of UNRWA 'Engaging Youth' Project in Syria, 2018

- Decentralized Evaluation of UNRWA Gender Initiative, 2017

- Final evaluation of project PQ12B21, Improvement of Living Conditions of Vulnerable Palestine refugees in Jerash Camp, 2017

- Evaluation of Replacing Rented Schools at Jabal Al Taj, 2018

- Evaluations of Security Risk Management Programme, 2017

Evaluations highlight the challenging humanitarian conditions affecting UNRWA's operations. Recurrent conflicts, political divisions, a growing refugee population in Syria, restrictions on movement of goods and people, and significant funding shortfalls have been some of many factors affecting UNRWA's achievement of humanitarian and development results across its areas of intervention. With this, evaluations refer both to the important role that UNRWA plays in supporting Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank and the Gaza but also the mixed performance in the delivery of its projects. UNRWA's results in cross-cutting areas are not well embedded. There have been significant gains in gender, as documented in the UNRWA Gender initiative, but there are still significant barriers to effective mainstreaming of gender. Climate change and environmental sustainability has not been a focus of UNRWA's work and there is a lack of knowledge or experience of implementing 'greening' programmes or green initiatives. Good governance, through supporting institutional strengthening has been achieved to varying degrees across UNRWA's initiatives.

MI 9.1: Interventions assessed as having achieved their stated development and/or humanitarian objectives and attain expected results	Score
MI Rating	**Satisfactory**
MI score	**2.5**
MI 9.1 Analysis	**Source document**

Evaluations provide evidence that UNRWA's interventions have promoted a decent standard of living for refugees and contributed to development objectives. However, the precarious operating environment has been a limiting factor across UNRWA's interventions. In addition to conflict, and political tensions, decreased funding has affected the provision of services and support to beneficiaries.

Five evaluations, and management reporting, provide evidence of the extent that interventions have achieved their stated development objectives. While there have been some achievements, the evaluations suggest less positive performance against this indicator, with some successes highlighted.

- Mixed performance is reported in four evaluations: The Evaluation of the Office of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East: Report of the Office of Internal Oversight states that that UNRWA has used its finite resources to help those in abject poverty, but its coverage has declined and its contributions to actual poverty reduction are uncertain. UNRWA delivered assistance to 39.9 per cent of abject poor refugees identified in 2015, 55.8 per cent fewer refugees than were receiving social safety net transfers as compared with 2012. Camp improvement plans were created to integrate planning of multiple interventions — e.g., shelter rehabilitation, urban design and provision of health and education service facilities but for the period 2010-15, only 8 out of 58 possible plans were initiated, developed and/or implemented. The design and intended roll-out of the goal of a decent standard was unsuccessful as although alignment in performance monitoring plans existed, the needed whole-agency, integrated approach to monitoring decent standard of living implementation did not occur. The Evaluation of the e-Health Project was mixed in its assessment. The evaluation found evidence that e-Health had contributed to the improvement of health centre performance, but this that it could have had much more impact had the UNRWA e-Health system been designed to exchange data with other systems from the beginning, host governments health data and statistics included, and that it was crucial for UNRWA e-Health to start exploring data exchange possibilities and also to take into account legal aspects of that data exchange. Both the Evaluation of the Improvement of Improvement of Living Conditions of Vulnerable Palestine refugees in Jerash Camp and the Evaluation of Replacing Rented Schools state that while the interventions had some successes, the project designs also had unintended negative consequences for vulnerable groups. | 9, 61, 63, 66, 77, 89, 133, 141, 142 |

- Positive performance is highlighted in the Evaluation of UNRWA's Engaging Youth Project found that the intervention achieved more than what was envisioned.

UNRWA's management reporting provides evidence of interventions achieving their objectives and attaining expected results. Achievements include provision of basic education, primary-health care, and social safety net assistance (including cash and food) large numbers of refugees. UNRWA also reached targets in providing livelihoods support and counselling to refugees.

| **MI 9.1 Evidence confidence** | **High confidence** |

MI 9.2: Interventions assessed as having realised the expected positive benefits for target group members	Score
MI Rating	Satisfactory
MI score	2.5
MI 9.2 Analysis	Source document

Four of the evaluations sampled articulate the extent that positive benefits for target group members have been achieved. However, these evaluations do not consistently present baselines or targets and so it is not possible to make an overall assessment of the extent to which expected positive benefits have been achieved for target groups. Nonetheless, the evaluations point to mixed levels of achievements undermined, in large part due to contextual challenges.

- Although the evaluations do not provide evidence of the overall benefits for target groups, programme successes for target group members are noted in three evaluations. The Evaluation of the E-Health Programme identifies positive benefits for target group members. The programme successfully expanded and improved "*non-communicable disease services with enhanced screening and patient control of Diabetes Mellitus over the duration of the programme.*" The Evaluation of the Transition to e-Cards finds that the programme contributes to food security and protection people from slipping further into poverty, also enhancing feelings of choice and dignity among target group members. Although the overall effectiveness of the programme is variable, the Evaluation of the Gender Initiative also points to positive benefits for the women involved in the programme in terms of enhanced self-confidence which was an aim of the project.

- The Evaluation of the Improvement of Living Conditions of Vulnerable Palestine Refugees in Jerash Camp finds that the interventions didn't realise the expected positive benefits for target group members. The project which was intended to improve shelters for the most vulnerable residence of "Gaza Camp" failed to provide support to the most vulnerable. This was due to flaws in the targeting criteria that was applied (and an imprecise definition of 'vulnerability') and failure to consider or meet beneficiary needs.

9, 66, 133, 77, 141

UNRWA's management results are mixed in terms of UNRWA's ability to meet the critical needs of Palestine refugees. While management reporting shows that UNRWA has achieved important gains for target group members, there are still high levels of unmet needs across target groups. Successes include improved training and livelihoods throughout the West Bank with a resulting growth in loan numbers and loan values. However, due to shortfalls, UNRWA was not able to meet food insecure families' emergency food needs or to fully deliver cash transfers for food to all eligible families.

Two evaluations (The Evaluation of the Office of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the Evaluation of the Transition to E-Cards) discuss mixed performance regarding how the interventions have helped vis-à-vis poverty reduction. Both evaluations suggest that although UNRWA provided assistance toward offsetting poverty among poor refugees through its programming, UNRWA's targeting criteria is somewhat opaque and it is difficult to ascertain to what extent UNRWA contributed to alleviating poverty across the identified poor groups. The Evaluation of the Office of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East finds that "*Targeting social safety net transfers did not always translate into lifting the identified population out of abject poverty*" and the Evaluation of the Transition to e-Cards raises questions about whether the targeting managed to reach those most in need.

| MI 9.2 Evidence confidence | Medium confidence |

MI 9.3: Interventions assessed as having contributed to significant changes in national development policies and programmes (policy and capacity impacts), or needed system reforms	Score
MI Rating	**N/A**
MI score	
MI 9.3 Analysis	**Source document**
Micro-Indicator deemed not applicable for assessment purposes given UNRWA mandate	
MI 9.3 Evidence confidence	

MI 9.4: Interventions assessed as having helped improve gender equality and the empowerment of women	Score
MI Rating	**Unsatisfactory**
MI score	**1.5**
MI 9.4 Analysis	**Source document**
Results for improving gender equality and the empowerment of women are assessed variably in five evaluation reports and discussed in depth in the Gender Initiative Evaluation. Overall, the evaluations signpost the challenging humanitarian and development context for women and girls in which UNRWA operates. With this, the performance of UNRWA interventions in improving gender equality and the empowerment of women, while having some successes, is mixed. Additionally, the information that is available about development results for women and girls is variable given that gender-disaggregated data is not consistently available. • The Gender Initiative Evaluation assessed one of the largest interventions focused on improving gender equality and the empowerment of women in the region. The evaluation found that overall, the initiative was "reasonably effective at an individual level and "somewhat" effective at the community level in increasing women's self-confidence, skills, awareness about their rights, mobility out of the domestic sphere and access to the labour market." Moreover, 96.6 percent of women reported having a positive change in at least one aspect after participating in the project. Furthermore, about half of the women reported positive changes for more than half of the investigated aspects. Less positive results are noted in three evaluations: • The Evaluation of the E-Health Programme notes that sex-disaggregated data was achieved by the health programme in 2013 but that as of yet, this is not consistent and is not well-analysed. It also found that the e-Health project does not well-reflect UNRWA's cross-cutting issues such as gender-based sexual violence (GBSV) which was felt to be a constraint by GFO and WBFO, where psychosocial and disability care are strongly developed. • The Evaluation of the Transition to E-Cards reports that survey data suggests that women lost decision-making power after the transition to e-Cards in some areas surveyed while men's decision making power increased. • Evaluation of Replacing Rented Schools at Jabal Al Taj found that the project had led to a steep increase in the enrolment of boys whereas girls' enrolment had declined. The project's design, which had a separate timetable for boys and girls in the same space, was found not to have accounted for contextual gender dynamics which meant that parents were not comfortable sending girls to a school where there was a cross-over with boys.	9, 61, 63, 66, 77, 89, 133, 141, 142

The DFID Annual review for 2015 UNRWA's management reporting identify positive results from UNRWA's work on addressing GBSV at output level. Specific achievements include: • *"Reaching 456 survivors of gender-based and domestic violence and abuse in the West Bank in 2016 and detecting 536 cases of neglect of elderly and families were detected through home visits.* • *Expanding the GBV referral system has continued to expand with continued trainings to frontline staff and CBOs have continued.* • *Providing counselling services to 2,539 GBV survivors detected, there were 3,061 services accessed."*	9, 61, 63, 66, 77, 89, 133, 141, 142
MI 9.4 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 9.5: Interventions assessed as having helped improve environmental sustainability/helped tackle the effects of climate change	**Score**
MI Rating	**Unsatisfactory**
MI score	**1.5**
MI 9.5 Analysis	**Source document**
There is very limited evidence available about the extent that UNRWA's interventions have helped to improve environmental sustainability and tackle the effects of climate change. One evaluation, the Evaluation of Replacing Rented Schools at Jabal Al Taj, 2018 finds that despite the initiative including a specific objective in developing green norms for UNRWA field offices, and the inclusion of green design specifications for the school, there is a lack of understanding at all levels in the organisation about 'green' initiatives. The project's aspirations, which included a number of energy efficiency measures, were weakened in the project's implementation. Overall, the project did not optimise the building's potential to become fully environmentally friendly and demonstrated the lack of knowledge of environmental sustainability across the organisation.	142
MI 9.5 Evidence confidence	**Little to no confidence**

MI 9.6: Interventions assessed as having helped improve good governance (as defined in 2.1.c)	**Score**
MI rating	
MI score	**N/A**
MI 9.6 Analysis	**Source document**
MI 9.6 Evidence confidence	

MI 9.7: Interventions assessed as having helped improve human rights	**Score**
MI rating	**Satisfactory**
MI score	**2.5**

MI 9.7 Analysis	Source document
UNRWA's effects on improving human rights through its interventions are not systematically considered in evaluations. Where discussed, human rights are framed in terms of UNRWA's attention to protection and disability considerations (e.g. differentiation of assistance for marginalized populations) finding mixed results in three evaluations. The Evaluation of the Gender Initiative assesses UNRWA's approach in balancing international human rights norms with the Islamic framework. • The Evaluation of the Gender Initiative finds that UNRWA's approach to human rights reports that the programme included information on women's rights both in the Human Rights / CEDAW framework and in the Islamic framework (including Sharia law). The approach was found to "strike the balance" between the UN commitment to Human Rights and the UN commitment to the respect of local values and cultures • Positive contributions to considering the specific rights of vulnerable groups are found in the Evaluation of the Transition to e-Cards where there had been some differentiation of assistance for marginalized populations and increase attention to protection and people with disabilities. • The Evaluation of UNRWA Engaging Youth Project and the Evaluation of Replacing Rented Schools at Jabal Al Taj find that the interventions are not sensitive to special needs requirements. UNRWA's management results report evidence of programming that helps to improve human rights. Examples of UNRWA's work to improve human rights include: • *"Effective engagement with the international human rights system (IHRS) to advance the protection of the human rights of Palestine refugees with 18 submissions and briefings to Special Rapporteurs and inputs to reports on international human rights instruments. UNRWA also provided information on Agency services contributing to the enjoyment of rights in relation to the initial State party reports of the State of Palestine".* • *Formal establishment of the UNRWA headquarters Protection Division in January 2016, coupled with the continued institution of dedicated protection teams in all Agency fields of operation and the development of a new gender equality strategy for 2016-21 and child protection framework, served as important milestones.* • *Raising concerns about alleged violations of international law and compliance both in writing and, on some occasions, in-person briefings with related international standards with five relevant treaty bodies and UN human rights special procedure processes to address the rights and protection needs of Palestine refugees. UNRWA had 17 such engagements in 2017 and 16 in 2018 and reported high take up of UNRWA-addressed issues by the relevant mechanisms. The sustained high level of engagement occurred, despite serious financial and other pressures on the Agency, as part of a well-established system created in 2011. UNRWA has a systemised approach to translating international human rights and other international legal standards and analysis of possible violations of international law affecting Palestine refugees into protection bilateral and public advocacy on key issues, identified collectively within the Agency as 'international protection' work.*	9, 61, 63, 66, 77, 89, 133, 141, 142
MI 9.7 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

KPI 10: Relevance of interventions to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and extent to which the organisation works towards results	KPI score
Satisfactory	**2.5**

MI 10.1 Interventions assessed as having responded to the needs/priorities of target groups	**Score**
MI rating	**Satisfactory**
MI score	**2.5**
MI 10.1 Analysis	**Source document**
Although the importance of UNRWA's interventions to the needs of target groups is underscored in evaluations. Evaluations reveal a mixed picture with respect to the extent that the interventions respond to the real needs and priorities of beneficiaries. Five evaluations provide evidence about the extent that interventions have responded to the needs and priorities of target groups, suggesting that project did not fully respond to immediate or medium-term needs of beneficiaries. The gaps in the relevance of UNRWA's interventions to the needs and priorities of Palestine Refugees are reported in Four evaluations: • Evaluation of the Office of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East found that UNRWA has work to do to fulfil the needs of the new generation of Palestine refugees, develop refugees' economically viable skills and improve their capacity-building. • The Evaluation of the E-Health System finds that, particularly in addressing gender issues where the systems could have better addressed the needs of female staff. • The Evaluation of UNRWA's Engaging Youth Project found that although the project responded to the training interests of the youth involved, the content of the training courses failed to align to the real needs of the market. The project which was intended to enhance youth employability did not respond to what the market needed for the future competitiveness of graduates. • The Evaluation of the Project for Improving Living Conditions of Vulnerable Palestine refugees in Jerash Camp found that the delivery of the project did not include or address the needs of the most vulnerable in the camps. The evaluation of the Gender Initiative finds that the interventions met the needs of women in some areas: • The initiative was found to respond to women's needs "*created and aggravated by the deteriorated socio-economic situation of the Gaza Strip*" but was less relevant in addressing women's needs in terms of increased access to GBV services and to the labour market.	9, 66, 89, 77, 141
MI 10.1 Evidence confidence	**Medium confidence**

MI 10.2: Interventions assessed as having helped contribute to the realisation of national development goals and objectives	**Score**
MI rating	**N/A**
MI score	**N/A**
MI 10.2 Analysis	**Source document**
Indicator deemed not applicable for assessment purposes given UNRWA mandate	
MI 10.2 Evidence confidence	

MI 10.3: Results assessed as having been delivered as part of a coherent response to an identified problem	Score
MI rating	Satisfactory
MI score	2.5
MI 10.3 Analysis	Source document

There is a lack of independent evaluation evidence as to the extent to which UNRWA's interventions are be fully built into a coherent, coordinated respond to the problems they aim to address. Four evaluations provide evidence of the coherence of UNRWA's response finding mixed results. For example: • The evaluation of UNRWA's Resource Mobilisation Strategy found it to be relevant to UNRWA and fully aligned with UNRWA's MTS 2010-15, as well as having been sufficiently flexible to allow adaptation to changing circumstances and priorities, although it identified that are further opportunities for private sector partnerships, engagement with non-traditional donors, and relationships with emerging markers to be developed. • The E-Health Evaluation found that the introduction of the electronic information system by the Health Department was relevant but was found to have lacked interaction and integration with the regions other electronic health systems and that there was little interaction between this system and other electronic systems in the agency. • The Evaluation of the Office of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East finds that has been some attempt to offer an agency-wide coherent response to providing a decent standard of living for Palestine refugees but this did not meet expectations due to the lack of a whole-agency, integrated approach to monitoring decent standard of living. • The E-Card Evaluation noted that UNRWA has low engagement with other cash actors and has few broader partnerships for learning and coordination (with the exception of the Lebanon Field Office which has a well-developed partnership strategy).	63, 66, 9, 133

MI 10.3 Evidence confidence	Medium confidence

KPI 11: Results delivered efficiently	KPI score
Satisfactory	2.5

Within the context of UNRWA's funding shortfalls, cost-effectiveness and efficiency are fundamental concerns for all of UNRWA's projects. Evaluations highlight the knock-on effect of lack of available funds on the timeliness of project delivery. Evaluations also bring out examples where funding uncertainty has led to inefficient project approaches and inefficient use of funds.

MI 11.1: Interventions assessed as resource/cost efficient	Score
MI rating	Satisfactory
MI score	2.5

MI 11.1 Analysis	Source document
Seven evaluation reports discuss challenges associated with resource and cost efficiency. • The Evaluation Report of the Office of the Internal Oversight discusses UNRWA's mixed success to increase cost-effectiveness in poverty reduction by a special hardship case model, where eligibility is based on refugee status, to the social safety net model, where eligibility is based on need, thus focusing on the most vulnerable. The resulting cost-efficiency of this reform has not yet been determined. The report also highlights mixed levels of efficiency in the UNRWA's health programming where UNRWA generally compared favourably with host authorities on health sector efficiency largely because UNRWA internalised costs rather than relying on contractors to provide services. Simultaneously though, UNRWA's inadequate budget led to stock shortages. • The Evaluation of the E-Health Project reports an extended development phase due to lack of available funds to test the system and subsequently higher than necessary costs. Also, the evaluation found that a lack of dedicated fulltime e-Health technical staff from the beginning created challenges to deliver in a timely manner and to produce clear costing. The evaluation found that the project had made insufficient use of basic management tools for system planning, which could affect forecasts for future system developments and jeopardise funding availability to keep the system in place and running. • High costs are highlighted in three evaluations: The Evaluation of the Transition to E-Cards indicates that the costs of the targeting process for UNRWA and recipients are high in relation to the value of the transfer received, but competent social workers provide more value through referrals and access to additional support. Overall changes in programme costs have resulted in a shifting of costs to recipients and other budget lines rather than efficiency gains. Missed opportunities to save costs prevented UNRWA from using such savings to mitigate cost fluctuations for recipients. The Evaluation of Improvement of Living Conditions of Vulnerable Palestine refugees in Jerash Camp found that contractor costs were more than 50 per cent above market rates. The evaluation concludes that elements of the project were cut to save money but there would have been budget available had it not been for excessive contractor costs, inadequate planning and documentation of the process. • The Gender Initiative Evaluation, while lacking conclusive cost-effectiveness data, suggests that some of the project elements (GBV component) might not be cost effective given that high-cost sessions have been conducted for women who may or may not be able to access the sessions suggesting that the programme's cost model its targeting have not been effective. • The Replacing Rented Schools at Jabal Al Taj Evaluation suggests that the project is expected to generate significant financial savings. It is reported in management results, that UNRWA has transitioned from the provision of in-kind food assistance to a cash-based transfer approach in Jordan, Lebanon and the West Bank and it is hoped that this this new distribution modality will reduce administrative and distribution costs associated with the delivery of in-kind assistance and provide recipients with greater freedom of choice and access to a wider range of healthy food options. However, an external evaluation notes concerns around inflation and price shocks which could affect the impact of this move and that the overall transfer costs per person have increased with the transition to cash.	9, 61, 63, 66, 77, 89, 133, 141, 142
MI 11.1 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

MI 11.2: Implementation and results assessed as having been achieved on time (given the context, in the case of humanitarian programming)	Score
MI rating	**Satisfactory**
MI score	**2.5**
MI 11.2 Analysis	Source document
Four evaluations discuss the timeliness of UNRWA's implementation and results. • Three evaluations (E-Health Evaluation, Evaluation of UNRWA Engaging Youth Project, and The Evaluation of Replacing Rented Schools at Jabal Al Taj) highlight delays in rollout due to a lack of available funds and delays as a result of operational challenges. • The Evaluation of the Transition to E-Cards, reports that the shift from food parcels to cash has introduced improvements in timeliness and easier access. Examples of delays affecting results were found in evaluation documentation that included delays in hiring new staff which were linked to the low achievements of the related target, delays in the implementation of a joint procurement-health programme initiative were reported to have led to stock out phase of some essential items and due to conflict (Syria and Gaza).	66, 142, 133, 89
MI 11.2 Evidence confidence	**High confidence**

KPI 12: Sustainability of results	KPI score

Given the temporary mandate of UNRWA and the nature and scale of its service work this KPI is judged to be Not Applicable' for a performance assessment of UNRWA.

Notwithstanding, some narrative (unscored) is provided here and in some of the MIs relating to limited and partial evaluation material.

There are a few evaluations at the project scale that consider sustainability in terms of the likelihood of project related outcomes sustaining beyond the funding lifespan. These raise issues in regard to: community and host country ownership, institutionalization of projects, and financial sustainability. These evaluations find missed opportunities to ensure sustainability of project initiatives through partnerships with other organisations (e.g. CBOs), and limited involvement of beneficiaries, and host countries' governments to sustain the benefits of the project. Funding shortfalls are also cited as a constraining factor for the sustainability of results.

MI 12.1: Benefits assessed as continuing or likely to continue after project or program completion or there are effective measures to link the humanitarian relief operations to recovery, resilience and, eventually, to longer-term developmental results	Score
MI rating	N/A
MI score	N/A
MI 12.1 Analysis	Source document
The limited scope of available evaluations suggest that UNRWA's programming is not generally set up to explicitly deliver medium-term or long-term results. This is consistent with its temporary mandate and its strategic outcomes (MTS 2016-21). That said, there are some examples of programming and specific project initiatives that supports access to other CBOs and to livelihoods training which may be designed to be more directly supportive of lasting results. Six evaluations provide evidence about the extent that UNRWA's projects' outcomes are likely to support longer-term results.	9, 61, 63, 66, 77, 89, 133, 141, 142

• Contribution to medium-term development results are noted in two evaluations with mixed results: the Evaluation the Engaging Youth Project in Syria and the Decentralized Evaluation of UNRWA Gender Initiative. In both of these evaluations, find that the projects have increased livelihoods opportunities and made investments in strengthening capacities. In the case of the Gender Initiative Evaluation, this translates to mobility, awareness of rights, business and job application skills, and self-confidence. Both evaluations note that there is a certain 'project-dependency' of some project participants. • Missed opportunities to sustain results are reported in three evaluations. The Evaluation of the Transition to E-Cards notes that UNRWA did not make the most of partnerships that could have supported embedding results. The Evaluation of the Improvement of Living Conditions of Vulnerable Palestine refugees in Jerash Camp notes that the project missed opportunities to support livelihoods of camp residents. The Rented Schools Evaluation finds that the project's sustainability may be limited due to the limited involvement of beneficiaries in the design and planning at the outset, leading to lack-of-ownership and buy-in from beneficiaries.	9, 61, 63, 66, 77, 89, 133, 141, 142
MI 12.1 Evidence confidence	

MI 12.2: Interventions assessed as having built sufficient institutional and/or community capacity for sustainability, or have been absorbed by government	**Score**
MI rating	**N/A**
MI score	**N/A**
MI 12.2 Analysis	**Source document**
Three evaluations assess the extent that UNRWA has built institutional or community capacity for sustainability finding mixed results. While the sample does not provide a large body of evidence about the extent that interventions have built institutional, community, or government capacity to support the sustainability of interventions, evaluations provide specific examples of UNRWA's capacity building at each of these levels: institutional, community, and host government absorption. • At the community level, the Rented Schools evaluation describes limited capacity-building of the community which is expected to constrain the sustainability of the project's outcomes. Specifically, the failure to consider the community's interests means that the enrolment rates of the school in question may not be sustained. • Referring to institutional capacity building, the Gender Initiative Evaluation identifies some successes in building organisational sustainability through the capacity building of CBOs provided by the Gender Initiative which has provided capacity building on gender and women's empowerment issues and organisational management and planning. • In terms of government uptake of programming, the Evaluation of the Transition to E-Cards suggests that the intervention has not been successful in building institutional capacity. The evaluation finds no evidence of host country willingness to discuss planning for greater integration or absorption of UNRWA's caseload due to political and financial factors.	133, 141, 142
MI 12.2 Evidence confidence	

MI 12.3: Interventions assessed as having strengthened the enabling environment for development	Score
MI Rating	**N/A**
MI score	**N/A**
MI 12.3 Analysis	**Source document**
Evaluations highlight key sustainability challenges facing the Agency. Particularly in light of the challenging environment for development. Three evaluations provide information about the effect of interventions on the enabling environment for development finding mixed results overall. • The Evaluation of the Office of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East identifies instances where sustainability goals were overtaken by the need for recurrent maintenance given the context of recurrent destruction. • The Evaluation of the Transition to E-Cards identifies missed opportunities to partner or learn with other humanitarian actors (who are also using cash), which would support the sustainability of interventions and support the enabling environment for development, particularly in attracting donors. • The Gender Initiative Evaluation suggests more positive results with a contribution to the enabling environment for development by supporting gender mainstreaming in CBOs.	9, 133, 141
MI 12.3 Evidence confidence	

Annex 2. List of documents

1. UNRWA (2016), *Medium-Term Strategy 2016-21*, The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
2. UNRWA (2016), *Resource Mobilization Strategy 2016*-18, The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
3. UNRWA (2017), *Annual Operational Report 2016*, The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
4. UNRWA (2016), *UNRWA Evaluation Policy*, The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
5. UNRWA (2017), *UNRWA Framework for Accountability to Affected Populations*, The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
6. UNRWA (2016), *Financial Report and Audited Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 December 2015,* General Assembly Official Records, Seventy-First Session, Supplement No. 5D.
7. United Nations General Assembly (2017), *Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East - Report of the Secretary-General*, UN General Assembly, Seventy-First Session, Agenda Item 49.
8. UNRWA (2015), *2016-17 Programme Budget*, The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
9. United Nations Economic and Social Council (2016), *Evaluation of the Office of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East: Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Service (E/AC.51/2017/3)*, Committee for Programme and Coordination, Fifty-Seventh Session.
10. European Commission (2016), *Commission Implementing Decision of 5.12.2016 on the second modification of Decision C (2016)1359 final on the Annual Action Programme 2016 part 1 in favour of Palestine to be financed from the general budget of the European Union*, European Commission.
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12. UNRWA (2016), *Microfinance Department Annual Report 2015*, The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
13. UNRWA (2015), *Microfinance Focus Note: UNRWA's Microfinance Portfolio*, The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
14. UNRWA (2015), *Reach Project: Operations Governance Manual*, The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
15. UNRWA (2012), *UNRWA Procurement Manual,* The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
16. UNRWA (2017), *UNRWA Emergency Management Framework,* The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
17. UNRWA (2017), *Security and Risk Management Framework of Accountability,* The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
18. UNRWA (2017), *Department of Security and Risk Management Strategy Paper,* The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
19. UNRWA (2017), *UNRWA Camp Security Approach: Risk Management of Front-Line Area Staff 2017-19,* The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
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# Annex 3. Results of Mopan's Partner Survey

Response profile

Number of survey responses: 42

**Number of survey responses by country:**

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
Staffing

UNRWA has sufficient staffing to deliver results

Number of respondents

- ■ MOPAN member donor government
- ■ Government
- ■ UN Agency/IFI
- ■ INGO or NGO
- ■ Academic/research/private sector
- ■ Other

UNRWA has sufficiently skilled and experienced staff

Number of respondents

- ■ MOPAN member donor government
- ■ Government
- ■ UN Agency/IFI
- ■ INGO or NGO
- ■ Academic/research/private sector
- ■ Other

UNRWA has sufficient continuity of staff to build relationships

Number of respondents

- ■ MOPAN member donor government
- ■ Government
- ■ UN Agency/IFI
- ■ INGO or NGO
- ■ Academic/research/private sector
- ■ Other

UNRWA staff can make critical strategic and programming decisions locally

Number of respondents

- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

Managing financial resources

UNRWA provides transparent criteria for financial resource allocation

Number of respondents

- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

UNRWA provides predictable financial allocations and disbursements

Number of respondents

- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

UNRWA financial cooperation is coherent/not fragmented

Number of respondents

- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

UNRWA has flexible resources

Number of respondents

- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

Interventions (programmes, projects, normative work)

UNRWA interventions are fit national programmes and results of partner countries

Number of respondents

- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

UNRWA interventions are tailored to the needs of the local context

Number of respondents

- ■ MOPAN member donor government
- ■ Government
- ■ UN Agency/IFI
- ■ INGO or NGO
- ■ Academic/research/private sector
- ■ Other

UNRWA interventions are based on a clear understanding of comparative advantage

Number of respondents

- ■ MOPAN member donor government
- ■ Government
- ■ UN Agency/IFI
- ■ INGO or NGO
- ■ Academic/research/private sector
- ■ Other

UNRWA can adapt or amend interventions to changes in context

Number of respondents

- ■ MOPAN member donor government
- ■ Government
- ■ UN Agency/IFI
- ■ INGO or NGO
- ■ Academic/research/private sector
- ■ Other

UNRWA interventions appropriately manage risk in a given context

Interventions (cross-cutting issues)

## Familiarity with the gender strategy of UNRWA

Interventions (cross-cutting issues, organisational performance)

### UNRWA promotes gender equality

Number of respondents

- ■ MOPAN member donor government
- ■ Government
- ■ UN Agency/IFI
- ■ INGO or NGO
- ■ Academic/research/private sector
- ■ Other

Managing relationships

UNRWA prioritises working in synergy/partnerships

Number of respondents

- ■ MOPAN member donor government
- ■ Government
- ■ UN Agency/IFI
- ■ INGO or NGO
- ■ Academic/research/private sector
- ■ Other

UNRWA shares key information with partners on an ongoing basis

Legend:
- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

UNRWA uses regular review points with partners to identify challenges

Legend:
- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

UNRWA organisational procedures are synergised with partners

Legend:
- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

UNRWA provides high quality inputs to country dialogue

Number of respondents

- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

UNRWA views are well respected in country policy dialogue

Number of respondents

- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

UNRWA organisational procedures do not cause delays for implementing partners

Number of respondents

- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

UNRWA knowledge products are useful for my work

Number of respondents

- ■ MOPAN member donor government
- ■ Government
- ■ UN Agency/IFI
- ■ INGO or NGO
- ■ Academic/research/private sector
- ■ Other

Performance management

UNRWA prioritises as results-based approach

Number of respondents

- ■ MOPAN member donor government
- ■ Government
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- ■ INGO or NGO
- ■ Academic/research/private sector
- ■ Other

UNRWA uses robust performance data when designing and implementing interventions

Number of respondents

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- ■ Government
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- ■ INGO or NGO
- ■ Academic/research/private sector
- ■ Other

Evidence base for planning and programming

UNRWA has a clear statement on which of its interventions must be evaluated

- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

Where required, UNRWA ensures that evaluations are carried out

- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
- UN Agency/IFI
- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

UNRWA intervention designs contain a statement of the evidence base

- MOPAN member donor government
- Government
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- INGO or NGO
- Academic/research/private sector
- Other

## UNRWA identifies under-performing interventions

UNRWA addresses any areas of intervention under-performance

UNRWA follows up evaluation recommendations systematically

UNRWA learns lessons from experience rather than repeating the same mistakes

Number of respondents

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- ■ Academic/research/private sector
- ■ Other

For any questions or comments, please contact:
The MOPAN Secretariat
secretariat@mopanonline.org
www.mopanonline.org